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## THE TRANSITION OF POLITICAL CULTURE TO

## DEMOCRACY: SLOVENIAN CASE STUDY

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British historical experience:

"The aristocratic Whigs found it possible a coalition with non-conformist merchants and industrialists, to establish securely the principles of parliamentary supremacy and representation. The traditional aristocratic and monarchic forces assimilated enough of this civic culture to compete with the secularist tendencies for popular support and, indeed, to mitigate their rationalism and impart to them a love and respect for the sacredness of the nation and its ancient institutions.

What emerged was a third culture, neither traditional nor modern but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it. This was the civic culture. With this civic culture already consolidated, the working classes could enter into politics and, in a process of trial and error, find the language in which to couch their demands and the means to make them effective."

*Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture, 1963, pp. 7-8*

### **ABSTRACT:**

The results of all three dimensions of political culture (subjective, social and objective) show that social complexity, especially in the transitional period, is increasing rapidly. This contributes to the advancing increase of the instability of the political system and as such represents an objective obstacle for its consolidation and democratization. The specific role and the importance of subjective factors of political culture could increase only on the basis of consolidation of the political system. Consequently, only the efficient functioning of agents of political socialization could reduce the established increase of complexity of the social system to its reasonable control. This process could make way to different forms of modernization and rationalisation of society.

Only then, when the modern forms of social and political action prevail in social life, is it possible to expect the development of more rational ways of thinking and acting.

Only in this way can patterns of democratic, civic and participatory political culture be developed.

Increasing social and political changes, which are mostly initiated from »the top« can accelerate processes typical of the transitional period and at the same time consolidate and reduce the dispersed effects of influential objective factors of political culture. But on the other hand, they can contribute to the fact that the process of »democratic political socialization of citizens« is much slower than it could be, if the occurring changes were co-ordinated at lower levels of the social system.

In fact, a long-term foresight shows to us that the same process of changes can have also completely contradictory results, which can have an especially negative influence on the activity of subjective and social factors of political culture, especially on those which influence only implicitly form values and standards of political culture (for example: families, peer groups, kindergartens, mass media, schools, trade unions and enterprises).

**KEY WORDS:** transition to democracy, political culture, Slovenia, political socialization, political system, ideological political style, pragmatism political style, political parties, trade unions, political anthropology, case study

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## INTRODUCTION

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One may notice that today the researchers of democracy and political culture are concerned with the problem of how to establish and preserve the stability of the political system in the period of even more rapid changes emerging within the social system.

When the political system of the western parliamentary democracy was being established also in Slovenia (1985-1995), the questions related to the political socialization of citizens became set up in all its acuteness. There are appearing even more questions than answers to them exist. One could say, the political culture area remains in Slovenia continually as a non-examined research field, although the well known fact is that political culture variables are influencing the majority of the most important social and political decisions, accepted by different actors of civil and political life.

The following presentation endeavours to demonstrate an approximate but feasible way out of the central dilemma of social research, which had been formulated by Przeworski and Teune as follows:

“Since the number of the relevant determinants of any kind of social behavior is likely to exceed the number of accessible social systems, the objective of a theory free of all proper names will not be easily reached, and thus procedures must be formulated to maximize this objective.” (*Przeworski, Teune, 1970; 31*)

## **THE DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM**

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The pressure of objective historical events and changes, which are going on in Slovenia very rapidly, is condensing and concentrating the "rational core" of any kind of politics so much, that is very difficult to invent and to practice any self-determined political strategy and orientation. Furthermore - and what could be more important - this process of the fermentation in the social world, which is mainly limited to changes in the area of the political system, could in the longer run suspend the process of modernization and rationalization already started with long steps in the social system and in the society as such.

A somewhat longer quotation, formulated by Dirk Berg-Schlosser, will make clearer my attempt to explain the scientific goal and procedures which we used in this study:

"In any case, an historically-oriented comparative analysis at the macro-level of political culture analysis could be successful, when it involves 'big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons' research approach as well (Tilly, 1984). In order not to leave out a priori any potentially fruitful aspects, it seems imperative to begin any single case study in a configurative ("individualizing" in Tilly's terms) manner. Thus, even if the final explanation should be as parsimonious (hypothetical) as possible, the model to start from must be comprehensive and only in subsequent steps, as it has been attempted to demonstrate here, can the complexity of such kind of social studies be reduced to manageable levels. Such procedures may not lead to comprehensive single factor ('universalizing') explanations which are equally valid for all cases considered, but it may involve more complex multi-factor ('encompassing') ones and it at least leaves open the possibility of arriving at several distinct causal patterns or historical "paths" ('variation-finding'). Meaningful and sufficiently operationalized comparisons may not lead to a "royal way" in any sense, but they provide indispensable elements for any kind of empirically-based theory. (...) (Berg-Schlosser, *De Meur*, 1992)

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## **HYPOTHESIS**

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Shortly speaking, I am attempting to evaluate some of above mentioned dilemmas and procedures and use them to examine the validity of my general hypothesis. I would like to recall here the theory and the hypothesis of the cultural lag, introduced by William F. Ogburn (Ogburn, 1964, 1950). Ogburn asserted that, owing to the multiplicity of inventions, made possible by the accumulation of material culture, a social change has been occurring with great rapidity. In other words, the problem faced by modern man is one of adapting his way of thinking and behaving to the state of his technology and material culture. On this basis I would like to present two hypotheses regarding the Slovenian case.

The first one is like this: Because the historical experiences with the formation of our own political and social institutions are very small, libertarian traditions have not developed themselves as they have in other European countries. This "not self-confident" historical heritage of the Slovenian new state is a big objective burden for developing more rational forms of a political communication and modern features of political culture.

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The second hypothesis is: The main consequence of such a situation is a dominating ideological and not a pragmatismal political style performed in everyday political practice by political actors, where the last style could be more efficient in the period of transition of the political system to democracy and in the permanently changing society in general. (Diamond, 1994; 174)

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## **THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF OUR CASE STUDY**

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The following comparative European countries have been taken - on the geopolitical and the geographical size basis - to evaluate the results we have obtained for Slovenia (B) with others (**S** = Survivor Country<sup>1</sup>; **B** = Breakdown Country):

- 1 - Ireland (S)
- 2 - Belgium (S)
- 3 - Netherlands (S)
- 4 - Luxembourg (S)
- 5 - Switzerland (S)
- 6 - Denmark (S)

We are observing two categories of political culture in Slovenia: a) libertarian traditions (state-building traditions) and b) political culture characteristics.

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## **OPERATIONALIZATION OF CATEGORIES AND VARIABLES**

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All categories and variables used in my analysis were measured on ordinal scales. To approve or disapprove our general hypothesis and to provide some empirical evidence for our analysis, the following categories and variables of the political culture have been operationalized:

The variables of early-state-building or the variables of the libertarian tradition were designed on the category of social and historical circumstances on the basis of a selection of social and political indicators<sup>2</sup>, which are defined as follows:

### Variable 1 - Political Rights Index

The index is designed to measure only one aspect of freedom, namely political liberty, (see more in Appendix I., Coding schemes).

### Variable 2 - Civil Rights Index

Civil rights are those rights the individual has vis a vis the state. Particularly important are the freedom of the press and the other media and the independence of the judiciary, (see Appendix I.).

### Variable 3 - Political Discrimination: Percentage Discriminated against and Intensity of Discrimination

The indicators of discrimination measure the scope and intensity of political discrimination based upon ethnic, linguistic, religious, or regional identity. Members of the group or

groups are systematically restricted in their access to some political rights relative to other groups in their society. Intensity refers to the degree of discrimination, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 4 - Economic Discrimination: Percentage Discriminated against and Intensity of Discrimination

The indicators in this table measure the scope and intensity of economic discrimination based upon ethnic, linguistic, religious, or regional identity. Members of the group or groups are systematically restricted in their access to some economic values relative to other groups in their society. Intensity refers to the degree of discrimination, (see Appendix I. and Results).

Variable 5 - Potential Separatism: Percentage Involved and Intensity of Involvement

Intensity is coded on an ordinal scale of four categories that signify the political circumstances under which the separatist group came to be part of the state to which it now belongs. The underlying dimension is the *continuum of consensus to coercion*. The intensity of separatist sentiment is inferred to vary along this dimension, being more intense the greater is the coercion. However valid this assumption is, the coding categories provide information on the historical circumstances of contemporary separatism, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 6 - Voter Turnout as a Percentage of the Adult Population

Voter turnout measures the percentage of the population aged twenty years or older who voted in a national election for the national assembly. Turnout gives some indication of institutionalized mass participation in a political system. It can indicate, at least partially, the degree to which the electorate engages in active and formal political behavior. But it does not make sense to rely on voter turnout alone. The context is very important, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 7 - Party Fractionalization: Based upon Votes

Party fractionalization is based upon the distribution of votes in an election for the national legislature, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 8 - Party Fractionalization: Based upon Legislative Seats

Party fractionalization is based upon the distribution of legislative seats following an election for the national legislature, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 9 - Organized Labour as a Percentage of the Total Labour Force

These data refer to the percentage of the labour force that belongs to organized trade unions, (see Appendix I., and Results)\*.

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\*General Remark: The indexes reported above are concerned more with a specific set of rights traditionally defined as liberty. Categorizing Slovenia according to its level of freedom or oppression dates back at least to Aristotle. The coding schemes are presented in Appendix I., distinguishing between economic and political discrimination and between degrees or intensities of discrimination coded on ordinal scales.

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A set of dichotomous variables was designed on the category of political culture characteristics. The following variables have been dichotomized from the previous inspection of data using a pair comparison method:

- political participation (low/high)
- public guarantee of civil liberties including freedom of expression (no/yes)
- ethno-linguistic cleavages (no/yes)
- religious cleavages (no/yes)
- regional cleavages (no/yes)
- overarching structures (no/yes)
- democratic legitimacy (low/high)
- interest groups: unions (weak/strong)
- interest groups: employers (weak/strong)
- fragmentation of party system: Rae's  $F < 0.8$ (no/yes)
- percentage (of votes) of right and left antisystem parties: 15% (no/yes), and
- independence of judiciary (no/yes).

We have measured a "Boolean" distance as a measure of distance among countries, which measures the number of Boolean (i.e. dichotomized) variables in which two selected countries differ from each other, (see Results).

Altogether 12 variables for 4 countries were included in the research model, where "the most similar" and "the most different systems" have been classified across certain pairs. The effects of the world economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s, as the major stimulus for the eventual survival or breakdown of democratic regimes, have been taken as independent criteria variables.

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## **RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDY**

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The main purpose of my analysis is not to give definite answers to the questions I was setting up previously. Moreover I am trying to evaluate my hypothesis on the basis of some collected data about objective circumstances, which are influencing the norms, content and effects which have formed the political culture and democracy in Slovenia the most. At the same time, I am trying to examine the applicability and the explanatory power of the methods used in this paper.

Thus, the results obtained remain still relatively crude approximations. In spite of that we are providing some quantitative and qualitative data for further analyses, where more exact hypotheses and models could be evaluated.

As Arthur Stinchcombe put it:

"By the simple act of asserting that two instances are alike ... a class, a concept, is created, a generalization about it is offered, some evidence is brought forth, and we are embarked on a scientific enterprise." (1978;123)

## **LIBERTARIAN TRADITIONS**

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**a.** In the 70-s and 80-s Slovenia belonged to the group of those countries, which have had a very low political rights index, scoring on our scale from 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty). As a part of former Yugoslavia, the Slovenian political rights index had been scored with 6, which means, that a political system without elections ruled. When in 1990 the political system was changed, the political rights index increased in Slovenia rapidly, scored by 1 on our scale, which means that the majority of people in Slovenia had the right to participate in the elections. (TV +) \*\*

**b.** When we observed the data for the civil rights index, it could be noticed that the improvements were not so big. The situation has been changed on the scale from 6 to 4, which means that the Slovenian political system has broad areas of freedom, but broad areas of illegality as well. We could notice a better situation in Slovenia now than it was before in former Yugoslavia, where the rights of the state were thought to take priority over the civil rights. (TV -)

**c.** On the scale of a political discrimination it could be noticed that the intensity of discrimination in former Yugoslavia was not so big and that the intensity, scored with 1, does not increase in the new-formed Slovenian state, which means that only some political elite positions and some participatory activities (party membership, voting) are not accessible for minority groups, (TV 0).

**d.** The scale of economic discrimination indicates an increasing curve of the intensity of discrimination scored with 2, which means that the highest and some medium economic-value positions and many specific classes of economic activity depend on the economic power of minority groups (social and political elite's). The process of privatization, which started in 1993, will additionally bring new impulses, which will rapidly increase the intensity of the economic discrimination. The redistribution of the economic power is the main process, which will most probably influence the changes in political culture the most, (TV +).

**e.** The indicator of the potential separatism shows a quite different and opposite situation, because Slovenia definitely separated from the Yugoslav Federal State in 1991. While before 1991 Slovenia was scored with 1, as a region (republic), which had been incorporated into the Yugoslav State by its own request or by mutual agreement, its status had been changed basically after 1991. Since then it exists as an independent, sovereign state, scored with 2 on our scale, established by international agreement and by fiat (caused with civil war!) of a former colonial or a governing power, (TV +).

**f.** Voter turnout as a measure of the mass political participation shows that the situation has not changed greatly, while the valid percentages of the population aged eighteen years or older, who voted in national elections for the national assembly, are almost the same (in former Yugoslavia app. 85% on average; In Slovenia 1992, 82%). We could treat this turnout as an active formal political behavior of voters, who took their rights very seriously. The result for the participation in the Plebiscite for an independent state in 1990 with 86 % additionally proving this assertion, (TV 0).

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\*\* Signs TV +,-,0 means TV = transition variables, which have positive, negative or neutral influence regarding on the rate of change of the political culture and democratic changes in general.

**g.** Party fractionalization (Fv-coefficient) based upon Votes shows that the likelihood that two randomly selected voters will belong to different parties is about 40%. This is a relatively low percent, which indicates that the Slovenian "electorate" has not changed very much and that it is still being homogeneous, where the so called (Easton, 1965) "diffuse support" in the political system has not yet influenced the results of the election, (see Table 1. below).

**h.** Party fractionalization (Fs-coefficient) based upon Legislative Seats (N=90) shows that the likelihood that two randomly selected members of the national assembly (parliament) will belong to different parties is about 82%. This is a relatively high percent, which indicates that the effect of the "diffuse support" having an influence on decisions accepted by parliament and on the features of democratic political culture is here more likely. But, there still exists the problem of the effectiveness of parliament at the same time. (see Table 2 below)

**i.** The percentage of organized labour shows that the situation has been considerably changed. Former socialist trade unions were only transmitted organisations of the communist party policy and a transmitter of the idea of proletarian dictatorship, invented by Lenin. Slovenian trade unions (ZSSS- Free Unions and KNSS - Confederation of the Independent Unions) have lost, with approximately 40% of organized workers, a lot of their former social force and they must at the same time reorganize themselves due to their changed role

**Table 1:** Party fractionalization by votes (coefficient  $f=F$ ); Comparative data,  
Source: According to World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1983)

RANK	COUNTRY	Fv
1	FRANCE	0.840
3	SWITZERLAND	0.643
6	BELGIUM	0.797
13	NETHERLANDS	0.749
20	DENMARK	0.714
28	IRELAND	0.643
-	LUXEMBOURG	MISSING
46	JAMAICA	0.489
47	PHILIPPINES	0.488
48	BANGLADESH	0.474
49	GAMBIA	0.462
50	SINGAPORE	0.457
51	SLOVENIA	0.408
52	GUINEA BISAO	0.360
53	MEXICO	0.348
73	FORMER YU	0.000

**Table 2.** Party fractionalization by seats  
coefficient F, Comparative data,

Source: According to World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1983

RANK	COUNTRY	Fs
3	BAHRAIN	1.000
7	SLOVENIA	0.829
8	DENMARK	0.818
9	SWITZERLAND	0.806
11	LUXEMBOURG	0.766
15	BELGIUM	0.740
17	NETHERLANDS	0.735
36	IRELAND	0.584
67	JAMAICA	0.345
71	MEXICO	0.302
72	GAMBIA	0.301
78	PHILIPPINES	0.146
80	BANGLADESH	0.046
101	GUINEA BISAO	0.000
101	FORMER YU	0.000

**Table 3:** Organized labour

Percentage of the labour force that belongs to organized trade unions - Comparative data;  
Source: According to World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1983

RANK	COUNTRY	% Percent
1	GUINEA	100
8	DENMARK	65
14	SLOVENIA	approx. 60
14	BRAZIL	50
14	FIJI	50
14	MAURITANIA	50
16	BELGIUM	48
19	LUXEMBOURG	45
26	IRELAND	36
32	NETHERLANDS	33
52	SWITZERLAND	20

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in the new-formed political system. From the historical point of view, there does exist - for the first time in the Slovenian history - the opportunity to establish independent workers organizations inside their own sovereign state. (see Table 3 above)

From the above presented analysis we would like to reveal the following important findings:

**1.** The selected TV = “transition variables” of the libertarian tradition in Slovenia have a diverse and complex influence - positive and negative - on the main social and political processes going on as the transition from a traditional (totalitarian) to a democratic political culture. The index of political rights, the scale of economic discrimination, the potential separatism rate and the party fractionalization based upon seats have, in general, a positive influence (+) on the already achieved degree of freedom, meanwhile the political freedom rate and voter turnout portions have a neutral effect (0); and the civil rights index, the percentage of organized labour and the party fractionalization by votes have a prevalent negative (-) effect on the process of democratization carried out in Slovenia since 1990.

**2.** *Intermediate structures* in the political system (i.e. institutions of the aggregation and articulation of interests), especially representatives of dominant economic interests (workers and employers) and a non-formed “electoral body”, which does not have enough experience in political activities and competitions, are those important structural characteristics which are most holding back the velocity of transition in more free forms of the social and political life.

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## **POLITICAL STYLE (BOOLEAN PAIR-COMPARISON METHOD)**

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Some similar indicators, which could be found in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators are operationalized using the Boolean pair-comparison method already described. We can see from data presented in Table 4. that the main features of political culture characteristics can be described by using the dichotomous categories. In Slovenia there exists a low political participation rate (measured by party members in percentages), a medium public guarantee of civil liberties, absence of any ethno-linguistic cleavages, absence of religious cleavages, presence of regional cleavages, existence of overarching commitments and structures - mainly among the political elite, the low rate of democratic legitimacy, the weak influence of trade unions, the weak influence of employers, a divergent fragmentation of the party system, the presence of antisystem parties (app. 15%) and presence of the independent judiciary.

From the data presented in Table 4. it can be seen that the biggest discrepancies and dissimilarities among selected countries were emerging in (3) three variables: in the legitimacy of democracy, in the social force of trade unions (workers) and in the social force of employers (capitalists and ownership class).

Slovenia differs from all the other compared countries in seven (7) political culture characteristics, when we take all countries together. When we take pair-comparisons, then Slovenia differs in five (5) variables as default. Variables, which could be treated as ‘*differencia specifica*’ for Slovenia are:

- low political participation rate
- absence of ethno-linguistic cleavages

**Table 4:** Boolean pair-comparison (Comparative data); Adapted from: Berg-Schlösser, De Meur, 1991

	Variables	Country			
		SLO (B)	B (S)	IR (S)	NL (S)
		Slovenia	Belgium	Ireland	Netherlands
		I	II	III	IV
1	political participation	0	0	0	1
2	civil liberties	1	1	1	1
3	ethno-linguistic cleavages	0	1	1	0
4	religions cleavages	0	0	1	0
5	regional cleavages	1	1	1	1
6	overarching structures	1	1	1	1
7	democratic legitimacy	0	1	1	1
8	interest groups: trade unions	0	1	1	1
9	interest groups: employers/ownership class	0	1	1	1
10	fragmentation of party system - Rae's F < 0.8	0	0	0	0
11	percentage of votes (R/L): < 15%	1	0	1	0
12	independence of judiciary	1	1	1	1
	Dissimilarities: sum	7	5	5	5
			I NE II	I NE III	I NE IV

**NE** - not equal; code **1** - yes, strong, high; code **0** - no, weak, low

- absence of religious cleavages
- presence of regional cleavages
- low democratic legitimacy rate
- weak social force of trade unions
- weak social force of employers
- high rate of extreme political options.

When we try to explain these findings in the above described theoretical and methodological framework, it is significant to say that Slovenia, - as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918) during World War I., and later, as a part of the Yugoslav Kingdom (1918-1941) -, could be classified in the group of those countries, which do not belong to the SURVIVORS, where a democratic regime survived after the big world economic crisis, beginning in the year 1929. Thus, as a BREAKDOWN country, which is burdened with a non-democratic political past, Slovenia in the first place needs the energy to build democratic institutions of state. It is necessary at the same time to develop its social system at the level of other similar European states for it, to be possible to establish the necessary conditions for transition to the group of SURVIVORS, which have already

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established their own experience of how to preserve and develop democratic forms of social and political life.

In our analysis we have discovered, among the other important influencing factors - which are *not supporting* the great need and, we can say, a historical effort for transition among SURVIVOR countries - several predictor variables, from which could be derived three of the most important for the state of democracy in Slovenia. Namely, Slovenia differs from others the most when we observe its current position from the historical point of view - prospectively and retrospectively - in an antagonistic relationship between work and capital, where efficient instruments of conflict management have not developed yet and, on the other hand, in the very low legitimacy of democratic political institutions (e.g. the legitimacy of parliament, government and judiciary), which is additionally pressed down by the politically inexperienced and not very active electorate.

So, the successful transition in, let's say, "postsocialist" or "postcommunist" forms of democracy depends, first of all, on the efficiency and conceptual solutions by building a new political system - by dividing political power into executive, legislative and juridical - and this transition will be successful only then, when the interests of capital and work will lose their predominantly antagonistic character, where an efficient strategy of market economy will be elaborated in the national economic system framework.

The importance of the process of the privatization of property from the former "socialist property", which had been started in October 1993, is for that reason very big and crucial, and it is at the same time evident from this perspective that there are political culture variables depending more on external than on internal factors - this time again on the successfulness of the reform of the economic system in Slovenia.

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## CONCLUSION

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**1.** Increasing social and political changes, which are mainly performed "from above", could accelerate the process of transition and could consolidate and reduce the effects of objective factors at the same time. But, they would, on the other hand, contribute, to making the process of "democratic political socialization of citizens" much slower as well.

The same process of changes could, in a longer period of time, have very negative effects on the activity of subjective and social agents of political socialization, especially on those which have only implicit influence on the formation of the norms of political culture (i.e. families, peer groups, Kindergartens, mass media, schools, trade unions and enterprises).

**2.** As we know from previous researches in Slovenia, the traditional patterns of political behaviour prevailed. The prolongation of such a traditional way of social and political acting and communicating influenced the way of decision making and will most probably determine the set of the important political decisions at the national level for a longer period of time.

Our analysis shows that some characteristics of the libertarian tradition have been changed: especially in the areas of deconcentration of political power, pluralization of political ideas and movements, formation of the multiparty political system, extension of the political freedom, and similar.

**3.** Consequently it is more an objective than a subjective and socially conditioned intensity and frequency of change that is the main reason for and the generator of all kinds of social and political "blockades", which are not contributing to develop rational ways and modern styles of thinking and acting.

Some qualitative influencing factors have been revealed in this regard, which represent the greatest obstacles for the development of political culture in a more complementary type of social and political relationships. This kind of the most important qualitative influencing factors includes: the low degree of public guarantees of civil rights, the high degree of a multiparty system fractionalization connected with an inexperienced electoral body, the low percentage of organized labour, the competitive and violent pattern of the conflict resolution, the low political participation rate, the presence of regional cleavages, the low democratic legitimacy rate, the non-articulate interests of the work and the capital segments of the national economy, and the relatively high rate of the extreme political options.

### **Ideological political style**

**4.** The main consequence proceeding from the above described situation, where political and cultural activities are even more dependent on the increasing role of "objective historical changes", is the prevalent ideological political style of political actors, who are more occupied with big historical themes and political cleavages proceeding from the past, than with the practical problems of everyday life and the question of survival.

Some political parties, mostly with more nationalistic orientations, are almost obsessed with the questions, of how to define the essential tasks - *summum bonum* - of the whole nation and in its name.

The pragmatism political style<sup>3</sup> is, on the contrary, what Slovenia needs in the period of transition, which could proceed only from the already achieved organization of the social and political life. In the periods of social and economic crises, transitions and more chaotic general historical circumstances, the pragmatism political style, based on more progressive, non-radical and co-operative social and political philosophies, could be more efficient and productive in solving social and political problems, the complexity of which increases from day to day. Many recent treatments of the transition and consolidation processes have recognized (with varying degrees of explicitness) the importance for democracy of developing this moderate, accommodating style of political behavior.

**5.** However, the ideological political style remains dominant, because the following influencing factors of political culture still remain as the most important in Slovenia:

- the influence of "overarching" structure is still very strong (especially the power of the bureaucratic and political elites and their value orientations)
- the legitimacy of democratic institutions remains very low
- the aggregation and articulation of different interests group positions (work : capital) are not very clear, rather they are antagonistic
- the competitive and violent pattern of the conflict resolution remains dominant
- the most important political decisions are mainly accepted in very tiny circles, where the decision-making from above prevailed
- the questions of the role of the military and problems of national defence are becoming even more important.

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## **DISCUSSION**

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I. Very generally speaking, some results of our empirical analysis on the category of libertarian tradition still indicate a very low capability of all social actors to undertake subjective action in the period of transition to democracy. Rustow's <sup>4</sup> essay on democratic transitions has been particularly influential in directing attention to the elite variable, and to political, structural, and conjuncture factors shaping elite choices, interactions, and ultimately shifts in values. In Rustow's model democracy begins to emerge when a relatively small circle of the elite decides, either in stages over time or in a historical period of fundamental changes, "to accept the existence of diversity in unity" and to wage their conflicts peacefully through democratic rules and procedures.

II. The political culture characteristics of the Slovenian society have been developed more under the complete or limited dependency conditions (e.g. from Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Croats and Serbs...), than they have been developed by an independent political activity and with their own political institutions. The main consequence of such a dependent development is the general developmental lag.

For that reason we are still facing the problem, of how to reduce the increasing complexity of the "social world" to a level that will make it possible to establish more complementary social relationships and to delimit competencies between the political state and the civil society. At the same time, the question is opened about the possibility of any self-determination, of any possibility for seeking the personal and social identity of individuals and groups, for it then to be possible to establish a democratic political system with our own forces. Here we are opening the questions about a possible social and personal emancipation of individuals and social groups in general.

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In our opinion, further investigations of Slovenian political culture must be first of all designed more exactly, in order to ascertain the validity of more empirically based hypotheses, which will proceed from the following questions: Which of the subjective and social agents of political socialization are determined the most by the influencing factors which we have discussed here? Which of the subjective, social and explicit political agencies of political socialization are increasing their influence on the formation of Slovenian political culture to that level where they are contributing to the origin and emergence of the modern and democratic political culture?

## **NOTES**

¶ The classification on SURVIVOR and BREAKDOWN countries, which we used in our analysis, has been made on the basis of historical evidence. We took as an independent and criterion variable the effects of the world economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s as the major stimulus for the eventual survival or breakdown of democratic regimes. (See more precisely in: Gisele De Meur, Dirk Berg-Schlosser: *Comparing Political Systems - An Operationalized Approach*, 1992 and in: Linz J. and Stephan A., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Baltimore, 1978)

**2** The political and civil rights indexes reported in this section are documented in Appendix I. See more in: World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Volume 1: Cross-National Attributes and Rates of Change, Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, Third Edition, 1983

**3** Pragmatism - one of the qualities de Tocqueville first identified as a distinctive property of American democracy - facilitates bargaining and compromise by rendering goals negotiable and opinions and beliefs open to engagement and new formation. Such intellectual openness promotes tolerance by accepting "the idea that no one has a monopoly on absolute truth and that there can be no single, correct answer to public policy issues." Thus, pragmatism restrains the role of ideology in politics, and hence the danger of conflict polarization. Moreover, because the goals and beliefs of the pragmatist are implicit and so adaptable to circumstances, they are less likely to be totally abandoned under challenge or stress.

Because pragmatism generates flexible goals, it is consistent with a commitment to democratic procedural norms, which takes precedence over substantive policy objectives. This overriding commitment to democratic proceduralism is a critical political cultural condition for democracy. (Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Larry Diamond et. al., Lynne Rienner, London, 1994, 11)

**4** See more in : Dankwart A. Rustow, Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics 2, (April 1970): 357. For a similar, more recent treatment, see Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America." in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) especially pp. 165-172

## **POVZETEK:**

*Rezultati opazovanja vseh treh razsežnosti politične kulture kažejo, da v Sloveniji skokovito narašča družbena kompleksnost, posebno še v prehodnem obdobju, kar prispeva k nadaljnemu naraščanju nestabilnosti političnega sistema. Takšna nestabilnost predstavlja objektivno oviro za njegovo konsolidacijo in demokratizacijo, saj bi le na osnovi konsolidacije političnega sistema lahko narasla tudi specifična vloga in pomen subjektivnih dejavnikov politične kulture. Iz tega izhaja, da bi samo učinkovito delovanje agentov politične socializacije lahko reduciralo ugotovljeno naraščanje kompleksnosti socialnega sistema do mere njegove obvladljivosti. S tem bi se odprla pot različnim vrstam modernizacije in racionalizacije družbe v celoti.*

*Samo tedaj, ko bodo v družbenem življenju zavladae moderne oblike družbenega in političnega delovanja, je možno pričakovati razvoj bolj racionalnih načinov mišljenja in delovanja in le na ta način se lahko razvijejo vzorci demokratične, državljske in participativne politične kulture.*

*Naraščajoče družbene in politične spremembe, ki so pretežno vzpodbujene "od zgoraj", sicer lahko pospešijo procese značilne za prehodno obdobje in obenem tudi konsolidirajo in reducirajo razpršene učinke vplivnih objektivnih dejavnikov politične kulture. Vendar pa, po drugi strani, prispevajo tudi k temu, da bo proces "demokratične politične socializacije državljanov" veliko počasnejši, kakor bi bil, če bi spremembe nastajale in se koordinirale tudi na nižjih ravneh socialnega sistema.*

*Izkazalo se je torej, da ima lahko, dolgoročno gledano, isti proces sprememb tudi povsem nasprotujoče učinke, ki se še posebej negativno odražajo na dejavnost subjektivnih in socialnih agentov politične kulture, posebno še na delovanje tistih, ki le implicitno vplivajo na oblikovanje vrednot in norm politične kulture (npr. družin, skupin vrstnikov, otroških vrtcev, množičnih medijev, šol, sindikatov in podjetij).*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** prehod v demokracijo, politična kultura, Slovenija, politična socializacija, ideološki politični stil, pragmatični politični stil, politične stranke, sindikati, politična antropologija, študija primera

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## **Appendix I. Coding schemes: Social and Political Indicators**

### **V 1 - Political Rights Index**

Political rights involve the right to play a part in determining who will govern one's country and what the laws will be. Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 (highest degree of liberty) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty), as follows:

1. Political systems in which the great majority of persons or families has both the right and the opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Political parties may be freely formed for the purpose of making the right to compete for public office fairly general.

2. Political systems with an open process, which does not always work well, however, due to extreme poverty, a feudal social structure, violence, or other limitations on potential participants or results. As is the case with countries coded 1, a leader or party can be voted out of office.
3. Political systems in which people may elect their leaders or representatives, but in which coups d'état, large-scale interference with election results, and often nondemocratic procedures occur.
4. Political systems in which full democratic elections are blocked constitutionally or have little significance in determining power distributions.
5. Political systems in which elections are either closely controlled or limited, or in which the results have little significance.
6. Political systems without elections or with elections involving only a single list of candidates in which voting is largely a matter of demonstrating support for the system. Nevertheless, there is some distribution of political power.
7. Political systems that are tyrannies without legitimacy either in tradition or in international relations doctrine.

#### V 2 - Civil Rights Index

Remark: Notably with regard to the political rights index, the normative concern behind this index is the balancing of the political rights of majorities against the civil liberties of minorities.

Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 (greatest civil liberty) to 7 (least civil liberty), as follows:

1. Political systems in which the rule of law is unshaken. Freedom of expression is both possible and evident in a variety of news media.
2. Political systems that aspire to the above level of civil rights but are unable to achieve it because of violence, ignorance, or unavailability of the media, or because they have restrictive laws that seem to be greater than are needed for maintaining order.
3. Political systems that have the trappings of civil liberty and whose governments may be successfully opposed in the courts, although they may be threatened or have unresolvable political deadlocks and may have to rely often upon martial law, jailing for sedition, and suppression of publications.
4. Political systems in which there are broad areas of freedom but also broad areas of illegality. States recently emerging from a revolutionary situation or in transition from traditional society may easily fall into this category.
5. Political systems in which civil rights are often denied but in which there is no doctrine on which the denial is based. The media are often weak, controlled by the government, and censored.
6. Political systems in which no civil rights are thought to take priority over the rights of the state, although criticism is allowed to be stated in limited ways.
7. Political systems of which the outside world never hears criticism, except when it is condemned by the state. Citizens have no rights in relation to the state.

#### V 3 - Political Discrimination: Percentage Discriminated against and Intensity of Discrimination

An ordinal scale of four categories is used to measure the extent to which the discriminated group is disadvantaged. These categories are as follows:

1. Some significant political elite positions or some participatory activities (party membership, voting) are closed to the group.
2. Most or all political elite positions or most participatory activities or some of both are closed to the group.
3. Most or all political elite positions and some participatory activities are closed to the group.
4. Most or all political elite positions and most or all participatory activities are closed to the group.

Remark: The status of small groups cannot be assessed as consistently as large ones for lack of sufficiently detailed information. Therefore the series do not include data for groups that fall below a population threshold of 2 percent. They are coded only when they form a part of a larger aggregation that is known to be subject to discrimination.

#### V 4 - Economic Discrimination: Percentage Discriminated against and Intensity of Discrimination

An ordinal scale of four categories is used to measure the extent to which the discriminated group is disadvantaged. These categories are as follows:

1. Most higher economic-value positions or some specific classes of economic activity are closed to the group.
2. Most higher and some medium economic-value positions or many specific classes of economic activity are closed to the group.
3. Most higher and most medium economic-value positions are closed to the group.
4. Almost all higher and medium and even some lower economic-value positions are closed to the group.

#### V 5 - Potential Separatism: Percentage Involved and Intensity of Involvement

These categories are as follows:

1. The separatist region or group was incorporated by its own request or by mutual agreement.
2. The separatist region or group was designated a part of the country by international agreement or by fiat of a former colonial or governing power, unless circumstances in numbers 3 or 4 below also hold.
3. The separatist region or group was forcibly incorporated into the state prior to the twentieth century or was forcibly conquered by a colonial power prior to the twentieth century.
4. The separatist region or group was forcibly incorporated into the state during the twentieth century or was forcibly reincorporated in the twentieth century after a period of autonomy due to rebellion or other circumstances.

Remark: Potentially separatist groups can be identified with some confidence because the political incorporation and transfer of most peoples and territories is a matter of clear historical record.

#### V 6 - Voter Turnout as a Percentage of Adult Population

In some systems, people may go to the polls and yet be deeply cynical about the electoral process; in others they may be required to vote; in others they may be rewarded with bribes. These contextual variables must be taken into account in interpreting our results (see Results in 5.1.. For this reason, these results, more so than for any other series, should

not be used unthinkingly in statistical analyses assuming linear relationships. It is rather a table for perusal.

**V 7 - Party Fractionalization: Based upon Votes**

Fractionalization is calculated by the following formula:

$$F = 1 - \text{Sum} \left( \frac{n_i}{N} \right) \times \left( \frac{n_i - 1}{N - 1} \right)$$

where  $n_i$  equals the total number of votes received by the  $i$ th party and  $N$  equals the total number of votes cast.

Fractionalization indicates the likelihood that two randomly selected voters will belong to different parties. Data on which the index is based refer to elections to the lower (or only) house of the national legislature. Votes are assumed to be divided into mutually exclusive categories attached to distinct political parties.

**V 8 - Party Fractionalization: Based upon Legislative Seats**

Fractionalization is calculated by the same formula as for V 7:

$$F = 1 - \text{Sum} \left( \frac{n_i}{N} \right) \times \left( \frac{n_i - 1}{N - 1} \right)$$

where  $n_i$  equals the total number of seats received by the  $i$ th party and  $N$  equals the total number of seats in the legislature.

Fractionalization indicates the likelihood that two randomly selected members will belong to different parties. Data on which the index is based refer to seats obtained in the lower (or only) house of the national legislature. Appointed members are excluded from the calculations. Seats are assumed to be divided into mutually exclusive categories attached to distinct political parties.

Official data for calculation are taken from: *Volitve in politika po Slovensko, FDV, 1993*

**V 9 - Organized Labour as a Percentage of the Total Labour Force**

The labour force consists of both employed and unemployed persons who are employers, persons working on their own account, salaried employees, wage earners, unpaid family workers, and members of producers' co-operatives.