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

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FEAR, SHAME AND THE POWER OF THE GAZE IN AMBONWARI, PAPUA NEW GUINEA

BORUT TELBAN
Institute for Anthropological and Spatial Studies
Scientific Research Centre of the Slovene Academy of Sciences and Arts
Borut.Telban@zrc-sazu.si

ABSTRACT

The following article is about fear, shame and seeing and about the relation between them among Karawari speaking Ambonwari, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. When discussing the topic of fear in Papua New Guinea one cannot avoid confronting the notion of the, paranoid ethos' of Melanesian societies as proposed by Schwartz (1973). I discuss this at the beginning and show how both anxiety and fear are counteracted by what I have called 'care'. I present fear and anxiety as two separate concepts and I discuss their internalisation. After explaining Karawari terminology, I focus on Ambonwari notions concerning their fear of strangers, animals, and storms. The main body of the paper examines Ambonwari responses to the gaze of others. By recognizing how relationships between people and stability of the whole village can be constructed, modified and even controlled by fear, shame and pride (all of them consequences of a powerful gaze) Ambonwari men manipulate the visibility of behaviour (male defecation, for example) and things (carved spirits, for example) which are closely related to the undesired effects of the three emotional states mentioned above. In this way fear of being seen becomes important for social control and greatly influences people's shared reality and conduct. Moreover, manipulation of visibility is of a vital importance for a re-production of their cosmology. In such a way Ambonwari protect their village from inside and outside and try to preserve the unity of their cosmos or, in other words, cosmological oneness. By preserving closed bodies Ambonwari men safeguard their closed macrocosm. As cultural and social changes are taking place one wanders how are they going to deal with cosmological issues?

Key words: fear, anxiety, shame, emotions, seeing, the power of the gaze, cosmology, Papua New Guinea.

> The greatest restrainer of the anti-social tendencies of men is fear, not of the law, but of the opinion of their fellows (Huxley 1894:24)

> ... if the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the world as the object which sees what I see, then my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of *being seen* by the Other... It is shame or pride which reveals to me the Other's look and myself at the end of that look. It is the shame or pride which makes me *live*, not *know* the situation of being looked at (Sartre 1956:344, 350).

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In 1986-87, when I was in the upper Yuat River in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, people often expressed their fear of 'eye sorcery', that is, fear of being looked at by a sorcerer while he is whispering a destructive spell. Though I was mainly interested in ethnomedical beliefs and practices (Telban 1988), I was unable to penetrate deeper into the meanings of the evil look. On another field trip between 1990 and 1992, I lived for 18 months in Ambonwari village, in the East Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. Over the following years I revisited the area and conducted additional 5 months fieldwork in 1997, 2001, and 2005.[1] With 422 people in 1992, 552 in 1997, 570 in 2001, and 624 in 2005 Ambonwari has always been the largest Karawari-speaking village and the second largest (after neighbouring Imanmeri) in the Amboin Subdistrict.[2] The community is divided into twelve totemic clans and thirty-five patrilineal lineages. The kinship system of Ambonwari is a variety of the Omaha system and postmarital residence is patri-virilocal. Their cosmology is based on their myths of origin, which structure their social organization, propose desirable marriages, and define descent (see Telban 1998a). In many ways they resemble other Sepik communities such as, for example, the Iatmul (Bateson 1958). During my stay in the village I was able to participate in many practices and observe and discuss different aspects of their lives (see Telban 1993, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, Roscoe and Telban 2004). Though Ambonwari people are not familiar with 'eye sorcery', it became obvious how important 'looking' and 'seeing' are in their everyday relationships. Their saying *arim sambis ngandikim, kwandikas ngandikim* (skin has eyes, has ears) specifically emphasizes the two main aspects of their lives: ability to see (and be seen) and ability to hear (and be heard). This article will address only the former aspect.

[1] As Ambonwari village was my second fieldwork area in New Guinea, I was upon arrival already thoroughly familiar with general aspects of life in Papua New Guinea and fluent in Tok Pisin. I am grateful to Professor William Foley (who worked in neighbouring Yimas) for his advice prior my departure to the field and subsequent discussions about the area. I thank The Australian National University for its Research Scholarship, Tuition Fee Scholarship and other funding during my Ph.D. course and for enabling me to come back to ANU as Visiting Fellow in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2005. I also thank Scientific Research Centre of the Slovene Academy of Sciences and Arts, which generously provided financial support for my returns. Most of all, of course, I thank my Ambonwari friends who always take care of me and tolerate my inquiries and continuous questioning.
I thank Chris Ballard, Don Gardner, Rozanna Lilley, Jadran Mimica, and Michael Young, all of whom have been generous with their time in offering insightful comments. I am also grateful to Marcus Banks, Bob Barnes, Simon Harrison and Howard Morphy whose remarks I found most helpful while revising this article that was in its original form much longer. Parts of it were presented at the First European Colloquium on Pacific Studies in December 1992 in Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, in Sociology of Culture seminars. The paper was written for and presented at the University of Oxford, in a departmental seminar series during the 1993 Hilary Term on "Fear and the Control of Emotion".
Throughout the text I use the phoneme /#/ which is heard as /a/ in 'about' or as the vowel in 'sir'.

[2] There are 16 villages in Amboin Subdistrict (under Angoram District Office): Kansimei, Imanmeri, Ambonwari, Konmei, Manjamai, Kaiwaria, Kunggriambun, Meikerobi, Kundiman-1, Kundiman-2, Yimas-1, Yimas-2, Wambrimas, Yamandim, Awim, and Imboin. Karawari speaking Masandanai belong to another Subdistrict.

PARANOIA, ANXIETY AND FEAR: A COMMENT ON SCHWARTZ

In war or when state repression encompasses society as a whole (as in Stalinist Russia or the military dictatorships of Latin America), power is based on what Taussig (1992:21) has called "paranoia as social practice" (e.g. Bettelheim 1988, Taussig 1986). Extreme situations in a particular historical context such as, for example, epidemics or 'first contacts' between different cultures, may also result in a paranoid response on the part of a group or a whole society. On the other hand, fear as traumatic experience has been discussed by several authors in societies where 'fright illness' is recognized. Good and Good (1984) discuss fright as a cause of distress in Iran, while Rubel (1964:278) argues that the condition of *susto* (illness caused by fear) in traditional Latin-American culture "appears to communicate an individual's inability to fulfil adequately the expectations of the society in which he has been socialized." Rubel in Latin-America, Kleinman (1980:196) in Taiwan, and Frankel (1985, 1986:136-40) in Papua New Guinea all discuss illnesses caused by fright (mostly in children) of which people say that the spirit has fled the body.

In an article discussing cargo cults, Schwartz (1973) argued – in the manner of Ruth Benedict and her *Patterns of Culture* – that a paranoid ethos permeates Melanesian cultures. He even suggested that such an ethos "may have been prevalent throughout the cultural evolutionary stratum of primitive societies" and concluded that "generalized institutionalised paranoia is an effect of the interaction of normal human cognitive and affective processes under certain cultural implementations and social states" (Schwartz 1973:154-5). He attributed this paranoid ethos to the uncertainty of life, high mortality rates and short life spans, too many births and relatively few surviving children, uncertainty of the yield of productive activities, the extreme atomism of social and political life, the constancy of war and raiding, the uncertainty of all alliances and of village and clan cohesion (p. 155-6). According to Schwartz (p.163-4) this paranoia may be detected in the structure of trust and distrust, in the suspicion of the presence of spies, in accusations directed at wives for stealing husbands' belongings or substances for the purpose of performing sorcery, in shame, avoidance and joking relationships, the avoidance of certain names, and so on. He sums up:

> The paranoid ethos is not confined to relations with the supernatural but is manifest supra-institutionally throughout the social, political, and economic life of Melanesian peoples. The individual is attuned to it in the socialization process and has absorbed it as an ideology, directly and indirectly, by the time he reaches adulthood (1973:166).

Though scholars who worked in Melanesia never took up Schwartz's argument we can nevertheless ask, what is the basis for such a conclusion? The ethnographer's own ethos and ideology serve as the source for his or her judgement, and everything that deviates from this ethos and ideology (or everything he thinks deviates from it) is determined by this schism between two ethoses and two ideologies.[3] On the other hand the ethnopsychological concept does not recognize the ethos that underlies it.

Levy, who was familiar with Schwartz's paper when it was in preparation, tried to, but could not, find similar paranoid traits among Tahitians. Levy (1973:499) asks himself: "Why do fragments of suspicion and blame not develop into a 'paranoid ethos' in Piri and Roto?" Is this absence of paranoia attributable to the lack of traditional enemies? Or perhaps to the rarity of contacts with others? Levy concludes: "At any rate, paranoid projection is restrained to dreams, to bits of supernatural, and to momentary behaviors. It is not much used in the ordinary coping of daily life" (Levy 1973:500).

It is possible that 'paranoia' was only a response to culture contact resulting in cargo-cults as an indigenous form of interpretation. If paranoia in Melanesia was pervading society it would surely be seen in those situations where fear and fright are the prevailing emotions. For example, Ambonwari people regard the state of shame as very important and value it; shame may be said to form an ethos of shame. Fright, on the other hand, is an acute response and is considered neither a state nor something of importance in the everyday life of adults. Lewis (1977:116) convincingly argued that even the fear of sorcery, so often mentioned in Papua New Guinean ethnographies, was not something that oppressed the Gnau in their ordinary life; it surfaced only occasionally and for short periods. At the same time, large powerful villages, as Ambonwari consider their own village to be, experience less fear of their neighbours than do smaller villages. Looking at Ambonwari myths, legends and long folk songs, it can be seen that it is care between people and familiarity with their environment, which represent the most important sentiments and values. Care not only counters resentment (Telban 1993) but reduces the anxiety of being in an unfamiliar world and the fear of being alone. Anxiety comes from the inside, while resentment comes from the outside. The existential anxiety of an individual and the envy and resentment of others are nullified by care, sharing and generosity.

Lewis (1977) showed how, during one exceptional and brief period, fear of *minmin* sorcery throughout the West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea caused acute public anxiety. He compared locally familiar *sangguma* sorcery with non-familiar *minmin* sorcery. Concerning the characteristics of fear, Lewis noted that people showed a general level of awareness about *sangguma* but not persistent anxiety. In the case of *minmin*, however, wariness "was quite different, with a high level of fear for a few weeks... and many signs of anxiety" (Lewis 1977:123).

[3] Gregory Bateson (1958:32-3, 118) promoted the concepts of *ethos* and *eidos*. In my view and following Ambonwari vernacular the expression of standardised affective aspects of the individuals (*ethos*), or what I prefer to call social sentiment, cannot be separated from understanding. Thus there is no pure ethos. What might be called 'ethos' is always contaminated by ideology and the distinction between them is inevitably blurred in, as Ambonwari say, one and the same Heart.
What I mean by ideologies are 'social concepts and styles of thought'. Or to put it differently, a person "thinks *in* the idea rather than the idea being *in* his thought" (Sartre 1968:136). On the other hand, social sentiment (together with understanding) has its varieties such as public sentiment, family sentiment, historical sentiment, club sentiment, class, age or gender sentiment, and so on. Lefebvre, in his method for integrating sociology and history, characterized human groups as having 'horizontal' (between groups at the same moment) and 'vertical (historical) complexity' (cited in Sartre 1968:51 f.n., 69, 75). These two dimensions may well be applied to human sentiments and human understanding.

Anxiety, also called anguish and dread, has been widely discussed from different viewpoints. Mandler offers the following overview:

> Briefly, the following shared characteristics of contemporary theories of anxiety can be noted. First, an archetypical event or class of events exists that evokes anxiety primitively, innately, or congenitally. For Freud, this original inciter is overstimulation; for Mowrer, it is pain; for Miller, the 'innate fear reaction'; for Rank, the birth trauma; for Selye, stress; for existentialists, the very fact of being human and alive. The second commonality in theories about anxiety is the postulation that, somehow, the response to the archetypical event is transferred to previously innocuous events – events either in the external environment or in the action of the organism (1975:230).

I do not intend to enter this debate about anxiety as a learned experience opposed to a naturally-occurring initial state of organisms. But I do want to follow a distinction between fear and anxiety. Fear, as Kierkegaard (1980 [1844]) defines it, involves a specific object that is feared, while anxiety, being independent, is "a necessary attribute of all choice and possibility" (Mandler 1975:227). Borrowing from Kierkegaard's *Concept of anxiety (dread)*, Heidegger also contrasts fear with anxiety. Fear, for Heidegger, is "a mood in which one is afraid, an intentional directedness toward something fearsome" (Dreyfus 1991:176). On the other hand, anxiety is a disclosure of the world as world, wherein one feels unsettled, that is not-being-at-home (Heidegger 1962:233).

Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's concepts may be applied to Ambonwari distinctions between fear and anxiety. Ambonwari people perceive the world with Heart (Telban 1993, see also 1998:56-65). While the physiological heart is called *sisining* (a seed), *wambung* (Heart) is a mindful and affective 'insideness' located in the upper abdomen.[4] In Karawari language *wam-* is a verb stem meaning 'to go inside'. It is this insideness I refer to as Heart, and not to a romanticized category of sentimentality or emotions. Heart represents understanding, desires and social sentiments, all of them very important for the personal identity of an individual. 'Having Heart' (lit. 'being with Heart') means that a person is socially attuned. Heart is a seat of knowing, remembering and feeling.[5]

By having Heart a person is also in a state of 'existential' anxiety and care. Ambonwari experience the 'feeling of Heart' as 'worry' and place great importance on the public sentiment of 'caring for'. This state is always latent and is not directed towards something or somebody. Thus 'to have Heart', which is a synonym for anxiety and care, represents individuality; it represents an individual person who is 'alone' in the world, even in the world that one is familiar with. I argue that because of the recognition of this individual state, Ambonwari use the same term for the most important social sentiment

[4] What I call Heart in Ambonwari, Harrison (1990, 1993) calls Understanding in Avatip (see discussion in Telban 1998a). While mine, I think, is a more literal translation of the term *wambung*, Harrison's translation of the term *mawul* emphasizes rationality, skills and knowledge, though the "emphatic disposition toward others" (1990:353) is an additional aspect of *mawul*.

and ideology of 'caring for'. Thus *ama wambung ama sikan* (I feel Heart) means both 'I am anxious' ('I worry') and 'I care (for somebody or something)'. Through socialisation a child 'transforms' this anxiety into the social concept of the reciprocity of 'caring about'. In both cases a child can say *ama wambung ama sikan* (I feel Heart), but in the first case the notion has individual and egotistic meanings while in the second it carries social and moral connotations. For this reason people in Ambonwari say that a small child does not have Heart, referring to its social and moral aspects (see Telban 1997a).

If Schwartz had used the term 'ethos of anxiety' instead of 'paranoid ethos', he would have avoided the psychopathological implications of the terms he used and would have come closer to the concept of anxiety as discussed by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Such a concept could represent a Melanesian ethos and an ethos of many other societies. This anxiety expressed and counteracted through care has reached the dimensions of a social sentiment; however, this is quite different from the notion of paranoia. Schwartz also disregarded the concept of 'caring for' as representing the most important social sentiment and ideology. If he had not, he could not then have argued that "in such a society, existence is at least uncomfortable, possibly highly stressful, and undoubtedly anxious" (Schwartz 1973:167). I would suggest, rather, that because 'caring about' has its own features and consequences in Melanesian societies, anxiety and fear of 'not being cared for' also have their own. Also, the intensity of emotional expressions and the values which are attributed to particular emotions (thereby enhancing or suppressing them) differ from culture to culture. When society places such importance (in the sense of social sentiment and ideology) on 'caring for each other', and where individuals react resentfully if they are not 'cared about', fear represents an acute response to events and beings which are frightening. Public concern, excitement, despair, distress, worry, care and suchlike should not be considered a consequence of a paranoid ethos. Rather, they derive from

[5] It is often said, from an ethnopsychological point of view, that there is a gap between emotion and thought in the post-industrial societies of the West on the one hand, and those of the pre-industrial societies and the East on the other. In the latter, thought and emotion are not sharply distinctive; they shape each other through their interconnection. The notion of 'feeling-mind', Wikan (1989:294) says of Bali, has a social source and significance. In contemporary Japan *hara* (stomach, abdomen) represents a combination of the heart and the brain in the Western sense. Furthermore, it is the point of connection between thought and emotion or between intellect and affect (Ohnuki-Tierney 1984:58-9). Lutz (1988:4) treats emotion as "an ideological practice rather than as a thing to be discovered or an essence to be distilled", while Michele Rosaldo (1984:143) and Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) talk about "embodied thoughts" and "mindful body". In Ambonwari, thinking is related to speech, while *wambung* (Heart), or "human embodied psyche" (Mimica 1991:36), relates understanding, affectivity, perception and imagination. This brings us closer to Sartre's view of consciousness and emotions when he argued that emotion is a certain way of apprehending the world (1948:52); it is a transformation of the world (p.58), a phenomenon of belief (p.75). For Sartre emotion is "a mode of existence of consciousness, one of the ways in which it *understands* (in the Heideggerian sense of 'Verstehen') its 'being-in-the-world'" (1948:91). In short, Sartre maintained that emotions are conscious acts, as well as structures of consciousness, and that they are "purposive and 'meaningful' ways of 'constituting' our world for which we must accept responsibility" (Solomon 1981:212, 213).

culturally specific maybe even hypersensitive (for some) relationships between people who live together in an intimate environment. In such a society 'caring for one another' and 'being with each other' are things that are emphasized in creating and maintaining amicable relations among people. Resentment and fear are the consequences of particular events and relationships of everyday life and they are counteracted by care. Let me now look at those situations in the daily life of Ambonwari people where the experience of fear is most likely and most expected.

EXPRESSIONS AND OBJECTS OF FEAR

Emotions in Ambonwari correspond to the Latin meaning of *e - movere,* and are thus movements of Heart. Ambonwari use several expressions meaning 'to be afraid'. The most usual is *wambung amanan inga minggaykan* (lit. my Heart has run away from me). People never say that their spirit has run away, but when they are afraid (for example when walking through the bush where spirits live or when in a cemetery) they say that their Heart has run away. Ambonwari do not perceive the verb 'to run away' too literally, but do intend to mean 'to be afraid'. Thus if someone asks you to go and steal something, and you are afraid of doing it, you may simply say *ama ama minggaykan* (I am afraid), or *wambung amanana ama ama minggaykan* (inside my Heart I am afraid).

A shock, a sudden fear (which in Tok Pisin is expressed as *tingting bilong mi i sot olgeta*, literally, my mind is short altogether) is expressed in two different ways. A momentary fear such as when a canoe suddenly rocks and threatens to capsize, and you experience a kind of 'dumpling in the throat', may be expressed by *wambung amanan inga wapaypiar* (my Heart came up). The same expression is used when one is trembling with cold after having spent a long time in the water. A sudden panic, when one sees a snake near one's leg or, for instance, when a parent learns that his or her child (who does not know how to swim yet) has just fallen into a creek, is expressed by *wambung amanan inga arakuriar* (my Heart has jumped; I am terrified).

Fear is the only emotion that is verbally expressed in relation to both the Heart and the skin. When expressed in relation to the skin this brings fear closer to shame and to 'being seen' either by someone dangerous or in a situation where you did not want to be seen. Thus an ordinary fear may be expressed by *arim amanam pinga minggaykan* (my skin has run away; I am afraid). In the case of serious fright or terror (when one meets a bush spirit for example) Ambonwari use the same expression as when sick with malaria or when feeling cold after being drenched by rain: *arim amanam pinga sindimbran* (my skin is shivering). A similar state may be expressed as *arim amanam saki wapaykim pinga sikan* (I feel like a male bush spirit has come on my skin). This last expression is used also for the feeling one experiences after being caught stealing or copulating with a married person. Both spirits and people can simply look at you and you will experience such a feeling.

For surprise, such as when you receive an unexpected present, when someone startles you with his sudden appearance from behind a tree, or when someone brings an enormous pig from a hunting party, Ambonwari use the same expression *sambis min kamapyan* (he/she opens [my] eyes, i.e. he/she surprises me).

Robarchek (1979) argued that fear of strangers, animals, storms and spirits was so powerful and persistent amongst the Semai Senoi of West Malaysia, that it constituted an ethos of fearfulness. This ethos was characterized by the overall lack of other emotions. He found that "dangers of all sorts are ubiquitous in the Semai world" and that "virtually everything in their culturally constituted environment is viewed as actually or potentially threatening" (1979:556).

Many similar entities and events are also feared by Ambonwari people but fear is not something that dictates their lives. A hunter is not particularly concerned about bush spirits or human enemies or about being bitten by a snake or a wild pig.[6] People experience acute fear only in situations when something utterly unfamiliar happens and when they face perceived danger. Even in the past, during times of fighting with their neighbours, people say fear was acute. When someone was killed, people were cautious and anxious about going around the bush, fishing, gathering, or hunting. They feared revenge. But once the dispute was settled life returned to normal.

Children learn early in their lives the dangers of their environment. Their parents may use fear as a vehicle to quieten their children: when they ask for food when there is none; when they ask to be carried on their parents' shoulders but are expected to walk; when they run around, excited and, screaming, a parent may say: "The snake will bite you now" or "the strangers are coming" (usually *kambo*, a mountain man, which refers mostly to the neighbouring Imanmeri), or "an old man is coming" (his skin is wrinkled and 'ugly' and he 'can eat children'), or "rascals", "police", "a white man", "a motor canoe". A parent needs only repeat *saki, saki* (a male bush spirit) to get a child's attention. The child will look fearfully around for a threatening entity and will seek the parent's, usually mother's protection. Scaring a child to discipline it, then comforting it a few moments later is a kind of everyday game in which a child learns who cares about him or her. Showing fear is a positive value, accepted and expected, and points toward his or her longing for the company of others (for example when a mother together with all her children goes to the pit latrine at night). The strategy of using fear and nurture (care) in Ambonwari was in the past practiced also during initiation in a men's house where there were always those who were 'angry' with a boy for not understanding or for not behaving properly and who threatened him; and there were always those who protected him. "The perception of others as both nurturing and dangerous" as one of the most fundamental contrasts among the Ifaluk of Micronesia (Lutz 1988:188) is evident also in Ambonwari.

Children are not afraid of 'dangerous creatures' because they had a bad experience in the past but because they are 'not at home' with them. They hear stories about

[6] Small-eyed snake (*Micropechis ikaheka*), known as *langg#n wang* among Ambonwari, killed Daniel's and Rosa's son Luk in May 2004 while he was working on his new garden. He has just married and left her new wife pregnant. Two other young people died in that same year after being bitten by *imbo*, a death adder (*Acanthopsis sp.*). When I showed my Ambonwari friends the photographs of these snakes they got really excited saying that they are truly afraid of them. Daily practices, however, are performed without much thinking about snakes, while parents do call their children back when they run into the areas with a serious possibility of snakes being present.

them in which these beings are either very powerful or evil. However, a short time after being scared children see that there is no real threat, forget their fear and continue to run through the bush without thinking of poisonous snakes, strangers, or spirits. But as Poole (1985:207) noted, any unusual sound or movement, a change in the density of forest, a change in light, even an unusual smell, can surprise a child who may then feel scared and panic. "Such fear is not predicated on past experience and memory of some specific misfortune that is again recognized by environmental cues of some kind, but rather on a lack of familiarity and experience with some entity nearby" (Poole 1985:207). This does not mean that such a fear does not relate to the past. It does. By this I mean that it evolves exactly because there is no past. There is no past familiarity, no recognition. As Bowlby said, what is feared includes "not only the presence, actual or imminent, of certain sorts of situation but absence, actual or imminent, of certain other sorts of situation" (cited in Mandler 1975:239). To be left alone (to be confronted with the absence of their mother and other familiar faces) is very threatening to small children.

During the first 18 months that I stayed in Ambonwari there were only three violent storms which reminded me of those I have experienced in the European Alps: heavy rain, with lightning and thunder striking almost simultaneously, and the feeling of electricity saturating the air. In the following paragraph I will describe a storm which occurred on Sunday, 21st April 1991.

It was late afternoon. I was waiting in the house of an old woman to give some medicine to her daughter. Suddenly it started raining, more and more heavily. The woman gave me a flower sheath of palm to cover myself while I ran to the men's house of the Wallaby clan. Not long ago they had beaten a slit-drum to call a meeting in the men's house to discuss work. The storm was becoming more severe and it was obvious that it was coming closer. We were all scared. Eight or nine adult men were in the men's house, and some walked around repeating: "I am afraid, I am afraid." Lightening and thunder at one stage literally exploded around us; it seemed that fire might burn the village. From every house people called out asking if everything was all right. Everyone in the men's house was worried about his family. They cried out: "*Yakayay, yakayay* (alas!)!" Jacob threw aromatic bark into the fire. Francis took it out, wet it and waved it, spreading smoke at the front of the men's house. Men asked each other: "Why this storm now? Who has done something wrong?" Jacob said that someone had killed a crocodile (a spirit) and that bush spirits and spirits of the creeks were angry. He then rejected this explanation, as there was no wind. Soon news reached us that four young unmarried men had cut a tree for a house post at Angur, the place of the spirits where cutting of trees is forbidden. Thus the bush spirit Angurmari was angry. People were angry with the boys in turn: "Now see what you did. You did not want to think about it. You thought that because Job's father is a 'magic man' the spirits will not do anything." When the storm was over everyone returned to their houses. No one was hurt; lightning had struck just one coconut palm. The next day, the boys took the house post which they had brought to the village back to the place where they had cut it.

During the storm, people in their houses talked aloud, and called to each other from house to house: "Are you sleeping? Do not sleep!" They put pig or cassowary

bones on their beds above the fire or in it. People burned aromatic bark, a turtle shell, fish bones, or an old basket which they had thrown out of the house so that smoke flowed around. They lit kerosene lamps. In all these ways (talking aloud, burning bones or bark, turning on lights) people showed the spirits (so that they could hear, smell, and see) that these were their houses and that they were innocent. People say that lightning can mistake a house for a tree (where lightning usually strikes).

In a majority of the situations mentioned above, fear is anticipated as a 'normal' reaction to those entities and circumstances which are considered fearful. But there is another aspect of fear, one related to and revealed through the meaning of 'look' in human relationships.[7] This aspect can be manipulated in order to obtain or maintain social con-

[7] In my presentation of Ambonwari I am concerned with the so-called 'look in its social function' and mainly with its negative aspects for the person who is being looked at (being seen). This kind of look was also Sartre's (1956) concern in one of the most original and penetrating inquiries into what it means 'to be seen'. Foucault too discussed the role of vision and the power of the gaze in his works *The Birth of the Clinic* and *Discipline and Punish*. For a discussion of Foucault's views see Jay (1986).
The possibility of being seen obviously means that other people and other entities which can see really exist, that they are not just things, and that you are in some sort of relationship with them. It also means that while being seen doing something, you are being judged by those who are looking. Not only are you not alone but you may even become someone else's 'possession'. Before the appearance of the other's look, you were in control of things around you and of yourself. But the moment someone looks at you, you become 'a thing' under the control of the other's look. You become aware of yourself as the other sees you. To be seen, then, means that you have entered into a relationship with someone. In his essays on sexuality, Freud (1986:300) argues that seeing is "an activity that is ultimately derived from touching". If this is so, to be looked at instantiates a very close relationship; it means you are 'touched' by the other. A difficulty arises when the situation is such that you do not want this relationship. You are ensnared by the other's look, and 'at the mercy of' his or her own recognition, understanding, and interpretation. While seeing denotes a state, as Wittgenstein says, "to interpret is to think" (1991:212); people see something as they interpret it (Wittgenstein 1991:193). To put it differently, perception leads to evaluation and evaluation leads to perception (Heider 1958:31). As a person may, in the act of seeing, form false evaluations, being looked at can involve a person's being misinterpreted. The interpretation is influenced by understanding, by sentiments and feelings, by imagination, by familiarity, past relationships, and the influences of others. You feel at pains to influence this kind of relationship. You are seen as the other wants to see you. It is not surprising that in Miyanmin mythology 'looking at someone' is structurally equivalent to rape (Gardner, personal communication). In his biography of Jean Genet, Sartre constructs Genet's life around an event in his youth when he was caught stealing:
"Pinned by a look, a butterfly fixed to a cork, he is naked, everyone can see him and spit on him. The gaze of the adults is a *constituent power* which has transformed him into a *constituted nature*" (1963:49).
And again:
"Sexually, Genet is first of all a raped child. The first rape was the gaze of the other, who took him by surprise, penetrated him, transformed him forever into an object ... Undressed by the eyes of decent folk as women are by those of males, he carries his fault as they do their breasts and behind ... Having been caught stealing *from behind*, his back opens when he steals; it is with his back that he awaits human gazes and catastrophe" (1963:79-80; cited in Jay 1986:193-4).
The look of the other possesses you and holds you, he or she can do with you whatever he or she wants to do, even 'giving you' to others. This is revealed to you through the experiences of fear, pride, or shame. One should keep in mind that there are many other kinds of looks than those which appropriate, judge and possess, such as casual, friendly, meaningful looks, etc.

trol. Being well aware of the power of the gaze and of the shame, fear or pride experienced at the receiving end of a gaze, Ambonwari men manipulate the visibility of those situations and things which they find either shameful, fearsome or proud in order to maintain control over them and, in their opinion, to preserve and protect the stability of the village and the unity of their cosmos or cosmological oneness (see Telban 1998: 226-228). Thus, in many cases, men become the only audience on behalf of the whole society.

After discussing the relations between 'seeing' and fear, pride and shame I turn to two associated contexts which are representative only for men: the denial of defecation and the seclusion of those carvings which represent a certain category of powerful spirits.

THE SOCIAL MEANING OF SEEING

In the Society Islands, Levy (1973:267, 328 f.n.) says, "the word for 'knowledge' or 'understanding' is *'ite*, which is also the word for 'to see'... 'To be seen' also means 'to be known about'". Rubinstein reports similar concepts on the island of Malo in Vanuatu. While understanding comes from 'feel' and 'hear', knowing comes from visual examination by the eye. Marilyn Strathern writes that "validation of what people say must come through reference to the person who 'saw' it" (1988:108-9). In Goodenough Island the *kaiwabu* or ceremonial chief of the feast represents a figure who does not eat, drink, speak, laugh, move, defecate or urinate; he only gazes fixedly at the crowd (Young 1971:249; 1977:86). His overseeing gaze, 'all-seeing' power, to use Bentham's and Foucault's term (1980:152), is the symbolic and mythological representation of the magical act of seeing, of the all-seeing and powerful sun (Young 1983:267). Papuan languages of the Engan family and languages in the area of the Southern Highlands Province use evidentials to declare that something was seen by their eyes (Foley 1986:165). By means of these elements belonging to the category of the "outer operator morphemes" (Foley 1986:165) speakers tell about the truthfulness of an event, or whether it was only hearsay.

In Ambonwari 'seeing' represents the proof that something really happened or exists. In short, seeing is believing. Several Ambonwari men, when talking about selling rubber and the large amount of money they were supposed to receive, said that once they saw the money with their own eyes (and they pointed towards them) they would also believe it. The verb *sanggwa-* (to see) is related to the interrogative *sanggwana* (where). One could say that seeing is always spatial; and what is spatial can also be seen. Living through the spaces of their ancestors Ambonwari continually re-confirm their cosmo-topography and myths and stories associated with particular places. So the landscape is more than just a surrounding physical environment. It is their mirror, a mirror of Ambonwari cosmology (Telban n.d.2).

There is no doubt that seeing means recognizing the 'truth'. To give authenticity to his tale, for example, a storyteller uses all kinds of bodily signs, movements and sounds in a theatrical performance (including the use of objects which represent those in the story) to make his story not only be heard but also be seen. Bodily (physical) articulation of what is said might until recently also be seen during discussions in the men's house, even more so when rituals were performed. When people argue and scream at each other a man (never a woman) walks sideways, emulating the steps of an archer during battle, and

performs acts which represent the release of arrows from a bow string (see also Lewis 1990:255 and Tuzin 1976:158). Thus, the angry man 'shoots' the words at his opponent. A traditional healer in Ambonwari, as elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, extracts bones, thorns, teeth, stones and other objects from the body of the sick person so that the attack or punishment by spirits or sorcerers may also be actively visualized (see Telban 1997a).

To see a wrongdoer means to have evidence against him or her; the wrong is witnessed. The possibility of being seen is thus responsible for fear which arises when someone intends to do something considered socially wrong. As in Tahiti:

> Poria constantly refers to the danger of disapproved behavior being seen and thus becoming known to others in the community. He sees this danger as not just a possibility, but as highly probable. He expects to be visible. He controls himself out of anxiety that he may be seen and that there will then be trouble. The trouble includes violence, physical punishment, and, as one element among several, being shamed. He asserts that only the threat of being seen controls him and that otherwise he would act on his impulses if they became strong enough to move him (Levy 1973:330).

In everyday life, when you are counting tins of fish in your home and you suddenly hear a noise outside you experience the fear of being seen. If those outside saw you they might ask you to give them some tins and you would have to give them because of your fear of their resentment. Because of this fear most objects in individual houses are hidden so that they do not catch the eye of others. Once items are hidden you no longer feel fear as you know that they cannot be seen.

If the other is a stranger, an unidentified entity (a ghost, a bush spirit), or if you are conscious of a situation as being potentially dangerous, you can experience the real or imagined look of the other as fear. In the past, when fighting between villages was still common, people painted their bodies with a black substance (clay or charcoal). This had two effects. First, by 'protecting' their skin men influenced how their enemies were going to see them; second, they were not recognizable as persons. In this way the warriors protected themselves: the others could not see them plainly and, not being recognized, they did not experience shame under the eyes of someone they knew. The painted persons could not be 'touched' or, more precisely, they could be 'touched' only in the way that they desired – as horrifying and dangerous warriors or as spirits. A similar process occurs with body decoration during dancing. You dictate how you are seen: beautiful, representing the ancestor. You invite others to look at you in this state, to perceive an appearance that you have chosen. Here the fear of being seen is transformed into the pride of being seen.

Individual pride, excitement and happiness that do not include fellow kinsmen are not valued in Ambonwari except when people decide to carry someone on their shoulders (literally and metaphorically) as in the important *kurang* ceremony. This is equivalent to Iatmul's *naven*, as described by Bateson (1958). *Kurang* takes place after a socially recognized accomplishment by an individual, such as killing one's first wild pig, building one's first house, making one's first large canoe, returning from a long trip or completing

schooling. On such occasions individuals are carried aloft on men's shoulders, such that they are so exposed to the looks of others that they are overpowered by embarrassment. Houseman and Severi (1998) recently re-examined the whole ceremony and emphasized that *naven* means "to go on display".

There is an exception and circumstance in Ambonwari where pride is permissible. Young unmarried women walking through the village, aware that they are being looked at by people, push their breasts forward, walk straight, and flaunt pride to reduce their shyness and embarrassment. Such girls act as though they are arrogant and confident, but this is only a camouflage of their actual state. As people observe them and comment on their nubility, people recognize the 'hard times' in store for them and are not harsh with them. Nonetheless, boys and young unmarried men tease them for being proud and call such a girl *kumbungmay* ('show off' girl). While the masculine form of *kumbungmay, kumbungg#na karar* is rarely used, people can say for those men who are proud of something *m#n pan maun m#n awsasa kamaykan* (he put himself very high and he finds himself there) or *sanggwarar, karis#na krasan m#n susukuraykan* (look at him, he walks around as if he was the only one who has put meat on his sago pudding). This expression is also used by girls when they meet young men who are overexcited and happy to see them.

The third, and socially most recognized state induced by the other's look is shame. To generalize, Melanesians experience shame in situations such as not having enough food to offer or display to visitors, unwittingly displaying genitals or being seen while bathing, being in a foreign place under the gaze of strangers, being seen during sexual intercourse, being caught stealing and so on. As such shame is an "instrument of social control" (Epstein 1984:3).[8] If people are seen when doing something thought improper, like stealing or copulating with a married person, those who witnessed the wrongdoing will tell others and it soon becomes public knowledge. The wrongdoers will then feel ashamed and will seek solitude. Being seen in such situations is followed by the reappearance before the court, before the collective eyes of a knowing community. This is even more shameful. This is when the fear of being looked at becomes extremely powerful and the shame itself hard to bear. Shame is one of the main regulators of relationships between people; its potential increases in frequency as one moves from relationships between intimates of a household, through those between classificatory kin, to the outside world where intimate relationships do not exist. In embarrassment before others' eyes people may hold each other's hands, look down or away, stick close to one another, and in extreme cases stand paralysed. I remember my surprise when my Ambonwari friends and I were unloading our canoe in Angoram, that our young men were so mortified (because many people were watching us) that they were immobilized and unable to help. However, Ambonwari do not remember anyone committing suicide from shame though they may because of a shameful situation temporally leave the village and live in a bush camp for many months (but see Chowning 1989:22 and Valentine 1963:451 for the Lakalai of New Britain).

[8] Shame in Papua New Guinea has been discussed by many authors: e.g. Chowning 1989, Epstein 1984, Fajans 1983, Hogbin 1947, Schieffelin 1983, A.Strathern 1977, Todd 1936, Valentine 1963 and Young 1971.

Sartre (1956:301-3) pointed out that though shame is an intimate relation of myself to myself, it "is not originally a phenomenon of reflection... it is in its primary structure shame *before somebody*... Shame is by nature *recognition*. I recognize that I *am* as the Other sees me... Thus shame is shame *of oneself before the Other*" (italics in original). "Pure shame is not a feeling of being this and that guilty object but in general of being *an* object; that is, of *recognizing myself* in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am for the Other" (Sartre 1956:384). While fear may be experienced both in Heart and on the skin, for Ambonwari shame is a state which is acknowledged only by the skin. So the most common saying *miringgi ama sikan* (I feel shame) actually means *arim miringgi pinga sikan* (I feel shame on my skin, shame comes up on my skin). Yet for Ambonwari shame is a moral quality. It is one of the major states consequent upon the relationship between people. 'I am a shy/bashful man/woman' (I am a person of shame) is a common, if not the most usual self-description of an Ambonwari person (see Telban 2002). Obviously it is a virtue which stands in opposition to arrogance, pride, and showing off. Ambonwari people feel ashamed to expose their bodies in public if they are seen naked while washing, for example (there are separate places for men and women to wash). But men (or women) do wash together (though rarely unclothed), a man can urinate from a canoe in front of his family, and couples do tolerate the risk being caught while having sexual intercourse in the house. It is not my intention here to examine every aspect of shame but more to think through the relationship between fear, shame and looking, as exemplified in the situation of male defecation.

FEAR OF BEING SEEN DEFECATING

Ambonwari talk about defecation only when animals and children are involved. When they still practiced initiation the first secret revealed to a newly initiated boy was that from that moment on he would have to defecate in the bush at the back of the men's houses. There he would not be seen by women and children. Though they abandoned initiation and became since 1995 quite compulsive about Catholic Charismatic Movement (Telban n.d.1) their toilet practices did not change. Because of their special *mindirpinang*, 'defecating place', where women and children never venture, men do not fear being seen defecating while they are in the village. But whenever they visit their bush camps an anxiety, contributed to by the possibility of being seen and thus being ashamed, coincides with every act of defecation. The actual fear occurs only when they hear or glimpse an unidentified person moving through the forest during their act of defecation. Before initiation boys accompanied their siblings or their mothers to the pit latrine. After initiation they could not use a pit latrine anymore. They would also be told that they could not talk about these things, and could not emit flatulence when women and children were present. Old men would say to the novice: "Women do not know if we defecate or not. They actually think that men do not defecate." Of course it would be absurd to believe that women do not really know about this matter. Over years of marriage both partners learn each other's habits and many couples even talk about them when alone. But women never reveal that they know, nor do they talk about this matter in public.

Anal shame is typical of men in many, not only Melanesian, societies. Ann Chowning discussed the topic among the Lakalai referring to it as 'the male anal complex' (1989:17). While traditional attitudes of young Lakalai have changed in recent years, they well remember that in the past if a woman had known anything about men's anal functions or talked about them, mèn would have experienced extreme shame. Reo Fortune (1963[1932]:246) mentions an event in Dobu when he stumbled on his intimate neighbour in the act of re-covering himself with his pubic leaf. Though he was already covered when Fortune saw him, he was completely enraged and did not talk to Fortune for the rest of that day. During their stay among the Mundugumor, neither Mead nor Fortune noticed anything unusual about attitudes concerning defecation, and they labelled it 'pretty casual' (McDowell 1991:129). But McDowell's informants stressed that men were not allowed to tell women about their defecation. One man was killed for revealing the secret and informants even remembered names of women who had been killed for such an infraction (McDowell 1991:129).

In Ambonwari village male defecation is still one of the principal secrets. Men never tell anyone when they go to the toilet. They simply walk away from the group with whom they were sitting. No one ever asks where someone is going. If asked on the village path (where the question is a kind of greeting) the answer will reveal only a direction up (river), *pambin*, or down (river), *masir*. If a man has bowel problems he will try to find his privacy in the bush, a 'wind house' or a man's house (before the end of 2003). If he is too sick his mother will take care of him if he is young, or his wife if he is already an old man. But to mention defecation by men in a public place or to see a man going to a pit latrine (which Ambonwari men in the past never used) would bring shame to the whole village. Even worse, men believe that it could bring sickness and destroy the village. How? Men said that in case that they visited pit latrines women's and children's faeces would press down their own. Being their extension, an extension of their bodies, anything done to their excrements is done to their bodies. They would not only feel tired and heavy but such a practice would then press down the whole village and bad things could happen. Another secret, known only to a few men, is a story about a group of people who were the last to join Ambonwari village.

Only a few generations ago there were two villages at the place called Arkwas, up the Konmei creek, east from Ambonwari village. These people, who are today in Ambonwari grouped under the same man's house as two totemic groups spoke a different language and lived in permanent settlements in an area around Wakriyamarimbuk mountain which is still considered to be their land. At that time they were struck by sickness and death and the few that survived were brought to Ambonwari. What is interesting for my purpose here is their explanation of why so many people died.

After the deaths of many of his children, a man called Ambiamari was convinced that someone in the village had performed sorcery to kill his family. In his anger he sought revenge and decided to destroy everyone at Arkwas. He got a wild taro leaf, put it in the middle of the village and defecated on it. Everyone's eyes went down, people were ashamed. Some women whispered: "Ah, this is what all big men hide from us. And we thought that they did not do this thing." But Ambiamari was not satisfied. He went into the men's house

and brought out secret bamboo flutes and some other carved and secret objects. They were seen by women and children. From that day on, informants say, the population in Arkwas rapidly declined. Only five men and one woman were saved, and they were accepted in Ambonwari. They learned the Ambonwari language and forgot their own.

In this explanation the women seeing the men's faeces is equated with seeing secret flutes and objects from a men's house. Why is it so? Why do men pretend not to defecate and why is it such a curse if they are seen by women and children? To answer this psychoanalytically, for instance, I would need to discuss a number of complex issues dealt with by Abraham, Bettelheim and Freud. But there is no space here. Another reason could be attributed to the experience of shame which makes people act. If men were seen defecating their shame would impel them to leave the village. Experience of shame, however, is in my view not a satisfying explanation for this kind of behaviour. If we consider that every person, a man in this case, lives his life through his body that is both microcosmic and macrocosmic, we can approach the closure of his body from a cosmological perspective. To preserve the cosmological oneness, to keep their cosmos perpetuate, men have to take care of their bodies: what comes in and what comes out. Rituals and taboos help the men in their endeavour. Seeing the men in an act of defecation would also reveal their secret cosmological knowledge and that could result not only in them losing the authority but also in the possible destruction of the village. To better explain the concept of a closed body I present here a myth about the time when men began to defecate.

In the past all men ate and vomited their food. Because they did not have an anus they excreted through the mouth. Their bellies were strained and full of air, because there was no other place to relieve themselves except through the mouth. Once a male cassowary came along and asked a man: "You live so strange. I often looked at you people and I noticed that you don't defecate. You spray all the food through your mouth like flying foxes. I have never seen a human excrement. I know how to defecate. I will return in the morning and I will do something to you." The man agreed. In the morning the cassowary took a man into the men's house. He ordered the man to sit on the horizontal post in the middle of the men's house. The man sat on the post with his buttocks hanging down. The cassowary aimed with his beak in the centre of the buttocks and struck him. But his beak hit the bone. "I am sorry," said the cassowary, "I missed. You will have to lift your arse a bit." The cassowary moved back to take another run. And it struck again. This time he hit the centre of the man's buttocks and his faeces rushed out from the newly made hole, spraying the cassowary all over his body. The man was pleased and said: "I am very happy with the way you treated me, you showed me the good way. Now I feel excellent. In the past I ate through my mouth and I threw up again through my mouth. The skin of my belly was yellow and heavy. Now my skin is dark and light. The way you gave me is brilliant: eating through the mouth and defecating through the hole in my buttocks. Now I can sleep and I do not feel pain anymore." The man promised that in a couple of days he would cook some food and present it to the cassowary. A few days later, however, the man forgot his promise. The cassowary was disappointed as he had walked a long way to see the man. He resented the way he was treated and decided that from that moment on he would hide in the forest and would never again speak to humans.

It seems that this myth first of all justifies people's defecation. If they eat, they must also defecate. Otherwise they would be sick, feel heavy and would have to vomit all the time. It would have been perfect if their bodies had been closed and self-sufficient, but since they ate they already had one orifice, the mouth. So they had to have another hole from which to excrete. But this hole, according to the myth, did not come as something 'natural', together with their bodies, but had to be made through their relationships with their environment, the cassowary in this case. As in many other myths, people were able to talk to animals which behaved like humans. An Ambonwari man was a cassowary's friend and as it is often the case between friends, seeing him in trouble, the cassowary felt sorry for the man. He wanted to help him. He suggested making a hole through which he could get rid of excrement. At first he missed with his beak and that is why, Ambonwari explain, there is a little hollow in the bone in people's buttocks. In his second attempt, the cassowary aimed at the right spot and released man from permanent pain. A man began to defecate.

The human anal orifice is a product of a relationship between two friends, a man and a cassowary. The human anal orifice, however, is also the end of a relationship between two friends. A man promised to present the cassowary with a small feast, but he forgot his promise. By starting to defecate (and developing at the same time, of course, some sort of toilet habits) he started to forget about his friend. He did not care. He became selfish, stingy and greedy. The development of his anality is therefore equated with the development of greed. He wronged the cassowary who in his resentment even stopped speaking human language. In such a way, man also became deprived of all the knowledge which the cassowary had. He not only got rid of faeces but also of sure knowledge and of certain friendship. The way of the world changed. The man felt ashamed. His 'anal shame' was actually the shame of his greed. Such greed is not simply a greed for food or things but also voracity for knowledge, power, authority and domination over others. As Sartre said: "Thus to plug up a hole means originally to make a sacrifice of my body in order that the plenitude of being may exist" (1956:781). There can hardly be a better expression of what the denial of defecation in Ambonwari, in cosmological terms, is all about.

Significant social and cultural changes that have taken place over last 10 years, involvement of men and women in a Charismatic movement, abandonment of men's houses and exposure of their most secret objects will have severe consequences for their cosmology and the body of knowledge, and will in the future most probably influence also Ambonwari toilet practices. One can expect that pit latrines will soon be used by all villagers.

CONCLUSION

I began this essay by expressing concern with the notion that Melanesian societies like Ambonwari live according to a paranoid ethos. True, by having Heart ('insideness') a person is first of all in a state of 'existential' anxiety, but this is counterbalanced by a person's familiarity and knowledge of other people, places and habitual activities and by the most important social sentiment and ideology of 'caring'. In this way a person becomes socially attuned, though he or she will still experience anxiety when

confronted with unfamiliar people, places and situations. Fear, on the other hand, is experienced either as a movement of the Heart or on the skin; it is provoked by an encounter with something fearsome: strangers, spirits, animals, storms.

Ambonwari people are well aware of the power of the gaze, the significance of the look in its social function, the relationship between seeing and the experiences of fear, pride or shame. Men, being publicly and ritually more active, have developed their own secret domain, the stability of which enables them to gain mastery in relation to women as well as over their own existence. By managing the visibility of those situations, beings and things that evoke the unpleasant feelings of fear and shame, men gain control over society as a whole. Finding personal pride unacceptable they deliberately emphasize the social visibility of those whom they suspect of pride following a socially recognized achievement. Thus, during the *kurang* ceremony such individuals are carried on men's shoulders so that their pride is tempered by embarrassment. The overwhelming effect of shame allows it to be provoked as a form of punishment for wrongdoers when they are brought in front of the village court to be stared at by everyone. Anticipation of the gaze of others is a powerful sanction that induces, if not conformity, then a respect for village mores.

As shame is one of the most elaborated regulators of social relationships and as it is most powerfully experienced under the gaze of others, Ambonwari men need to restrict the possibility of their being seen in situations which they hold to be important and where shame would have devastating impact. The shame of being seen defecating by women, for example, represents the loss of something which, in their understanding, is necessary for the strength and stability of the whole community: the body of restricted male knowledge, in this case the acknowledgement that grown men do excrete. Moreover, by behaving as if their bodies were closed Ambonwari men try to preserve a closed macrocosm. While severe cultural and social changes are taking place in Ambonwari and surrounding villages one wanders how are they going to deal with traditional cosmological concerns? It seems that they will have to open to the outside world not only their macrocosm but their bodies as well.

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POVZETEK

Strah, sram in moč pogleda v Ambonwariju, Papua Nova Gvineja

Članek govori o strahu, sramu in gledanju ('biti na očeh') ter o odnosu med njimi med karawarijsko govorečimi Ambonwarijci iz province Vzhodni Sepik na Papui Novi Gvineji. Če hočemo govoriti o strahu na Papui Novi Gvineji ne moremo mimo soočenja s pojmom 'paranoidnega etosa' melanezijskih družb, ki ga je predlagal Schwartz (1973). O tem govori prvi del članka. Avtor poskuša pokazati kako sta tako tesnoba kot strah nevtralizirana z vedenjem, ki ga avtor imenuje 'skrb'. Tesnoba in strah sta predstavljena kot dva različna koncepta. Avtor predstavi njuno internalizacijo. Po razlagi karawarijske terminologije, se avtor osredotoči na primere in pojme, ki se nanašajo na strah pred tujci, živalmi in nevihtami. Glavni del članka analizira ambonwarijske odgovore na poglede drugih. Ko spoznavamo kako je odnos med ljudmi in stabilnostjo celotne vasi ustvarjen, modificiran ali pa celo kontroliran s pomočjo strahu, sramu in ponosa (vsak od njih je posledica silnega pogleda/bolščanja/zijanja), spoznamo, da Ambonwarijci manipulirajo vidnost obnašanja (na primer, moških straniščnih navad, to je, defekacije) in stvari (izrezljanih duhov), ki so tesno povezani z nezaželenimi učinki treh zgoraj omenjenih emocionalnih stanj. Na ta način postane strah pred 'biti viden' pomemben za družbeno kontrolo in močno vpliva na delovanje in vedenje ljudi v skupnosti. Še več, zaščita moških pred močjo pogleda pomeni zaščito njihove kozmologije tako od zunaj kot od znotraj. Z ohranitvijo zaprtih teles (z zanikanjem defekacije) ambonwarijski moški ohranjajo zaprt makrokozmos. V času resnih kulturnih in družbenih sprememb se človek vpraša, kaj bodo Ambonwarijci naredili glede tradicionalnih kozmoloških zadev? Zdi se, da bodo odprli zunanjemu svetu ne le njihov makrokozmos ampak tudi svoja telesa.

Ključne besede: strah, anksioznost, sram, čustva, gledanje, moč pogleda, kozmologija, Papua Nova Gvineja.

STRIKING FOR DEBT: POWER, FINANCE, AND GOVERNMENTALITY IN EGYPT

Julia Elyachar
New York University
julia.elyachar@nyu.edu

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the emergence of new forms of power at the turn of the millennium that were articulated via the medium of debt. It draws on ethnographic analysis of a sit-in at a bank carried out by members of an NGO in Cairo to gain access to loans originating with the World Bank. Fieldwork findings are interpreted with reference to historical debates about debt in the 18th century as both corrupting and liberating that are highly relevant to the rise of "empowerment debt" at the turn of the millennium.

Key words: Egypt, Middle East, political anthropology, economic anthropology, debt, markets.

Members of the NGO of Youth Graduates (*gamaiyet shabab el-kharagiyeen*) in Medinet el-Hirafiyeen in Northern Cairo saw one moment as key in the history of their organization (which consisted of recipients of "microloans" from the World Bank established Egyptian Social Fund for Development, or *sundu' al-ishtimaa'i*). That moment was a sit-in at the local branch of the Industrial Development Bank, a public sector bank, where the local Headquarters of the Social Fund was located. The sit-in had one aim: to force the bank to release funds that the NGO members saw as rightfully theirs. The President of the NGO at the time, Mamduh, was one of my informants. He recounted the story of the strike to me in the following way:

> We organized ourselves for the sit-in – made a group to take care of food, another for communications; etc. We were 24 people in the sit-in. We took part as individuals, not as representatives of the NGO, since the NGO could be closed down for taking such an action. The local state security official had already been called on the scene, and was seeing what was going on. A little confrontation happened between us, and to lots of the people involved this was a very big deal. They were worried and excited. We explained to state security that this was a strike, it wasn't against state institutions, nor against the President of the Republic. We told them that the law allowed us to hold our sit-in and that we would continue. We wanted to make contact with public opinion.

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This strike was not about working class demands for increased wages, working conditions, or workers' rights. Rather, the issue at stake was debt. More specifically, it was over the right to become indebted to international lending agencies and their local counterparts. The language and rhetorical style of the strike and labor militancy were mobilized by NGO members in the strike to demand the opportunity to get into debt. The greater object of the strike, if there was one, was not to increase the power of the working class, but rather to become "entrepreneurs" via debt relations.

The very notion that anyone would go on strike, and risk arrest, in order to go into debt, was surprising to me. Debt, in the Western tradition at least, is commonly associated with the loss of power. In early Greece, debt could lead to enslavement. One of the great radical slogans of 4th century Greece was thus the abolition of debt (Murray 1993, 189-190). Here, debt was a threat to the freedom of the citizen. The idea of debt being something to fight for goes against the grain of formative moments of modern economic institutions and the nation-state as well (more on this in a moment). In the Egyptian context, the notion of striking to become indebted to foreign lending institutions is equally counterintuitive. Egypt and the rest of the former Ottoman Empire experienced debt as a yoke through which foreigners exercised control over their land and its resources.[1] Debt as an instrument of oppression was a common trope in Egyptian nationalist discourse of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The term "strike" is strange here as well, as is the idea of a sit-in. For both are associated, in Egypt in particular, with working class demands for power in relation to capitalists or the state. Egyptian history is replete with accounts of strikes and sit-ins. Militancy such as that recounted in this story runs through a long and rich history of working class activity.[2] But here, instead, the strike is against international financial institutions and a bank – not the state or the owners of a factory.

How did a sit-in in Cairo come to be organized not in a factory, but rather in a bank, in the office of an agency charged with distributing loans that originated with the

[1] The Administration of the Public Debt was established on behalf of mainly western bondholders in the Ottoman Empire as a kind of state within the state in 1879, and was granted full property rights to the revenue from key commodities in the Empire, including the power to attempt to increase revenue flows. Egypt had been forced to accept a similar scheme in 1876. Given this history, debt has been an important political topic in Egypt with negative connotations since the 19th century. On the history of indebtedness in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, see, for a start, Blaisdell 1929; Shaw 1976; du Velay 1903; Landes 1958. Another important body of knowledge relevant to any anthropological discussion of debt is also that concerning gift exchange, in which the recipient of the gift is considered to be a debtor. For some recent contributions to relevance to issues I discuss in this paper, see Parry and Bloch 1989; Guyer 1995; Godelier 1999; Frow 1997; Munn 1986; Hann 1998b; Humphry and Hugh-Jones 1992. Empowerment debt, however, is rooted less in these two traditions than in the debates that I will discuss below.

[2] On this history of the working class in Egypt, see Lockman (1994). See also Lockman's critique of teleological discussions of "the working class" in Middle Eastern history, and of the "inevitable tension between our commitment to an antiessentialist epistemological stance and the deconstruction of stable categories and identities, on the one hand, and on the other, our commitment to retrieving, reconstructing, and making coherent the stories of actual working people and their struggles, fashioned into a narrative of working-class history." (Lockman 1994:xxviii).

World Bank, with the aim of funding youth to open up microenterprises, organize into NGOs, and sell their products to "the market"? How did debt become a locus of conflict and concern in narratives of power in contemporary Egypt? I will argue in this article that the phenomenon of striking for debt should not be viewed as the act of a bunch of confused young men from Egypt. This strike might involve quite some confusion, but that confusion, I will argue, lies more in the event itself, and in how we, the observers, should make sense of it, rather than in the character of the actors involved. Unimportant as this particular sit-in was— it led nowhere, resulted in no larger strikes, and was soon settled, it still can serve as a useful "diagnostic moment" (Moore 1987) in efforts to untangle new forms of power emergent in Egypt in the 1990s.

In what follows, I will look at that strike for debt in the context of new development practices and social technologies enacted in Egypt of the 1990s. I will characterize those practices by the rise of what I call "empowerment debt" at the turn of the millennium. I argue that empowerment debt is a useful way to think about the changing nature of power at the beginning of the 21st century. Those changes include shifts in the nature of the state as a "container of power" at the end of the 20th century, the rise of new forms of organizational power such as the NGO and the IO, and the growth of neoliberal notions of personal empowerment. I will suggest that tracing out the links among debt, power, and the state, can help us make sense of these transformations. I will further suggest that this link among debt, power, and the state is neither fortuitous nor accidental, and that there are, indeed, strong historical precedents for focusing on this link. To begin to untangle this ethnographic moment of striking for debt, and to develop my argument about emerging forms of power at the turn of the millennium, I thus turn first to debates about debt, power, commercial society, and the state in 18th century Europe. There, I will suggest, can be found important clues for how to think about the meaning of empowering via debt at the end of the 20th century.

DEBT, THE STATE, AND POLITICAL PERSONALITY

Debt — public debt – was central to the rise of the modern state in the 18th century. The new institution of public debt arose as a means of funding wars undertaken to defend and expand markets. In political thought of the time, trade in foreign markets was seen as the main source of wealth[3] and wars to consolidate that trade were central to the consolidation of the modern state. Public debt was also profoundly threatening to historically constructed notions of political personality and established social order. Debt was felt to be a threat to established ways of maintaining political order and, in turn, to the nation itself. Debates about the rise of public debt and the new class of speculators in public funds, or stock-jobbers, were the way in which capitalism "imparted its first shock and became involved in its first major controversy in the history of English-language political theory" (Pocock 1975, 460). This was all before, readers should keep in mind, there was such a thing as political economy, let alone economics.

[3] That is, as opposed to other theories in the history of economic thought that saw wealth as arising from land (physiocrats), gold (mercantilists), or industrial production (political economists).

These issues of debt, commercial society, and the rise of the state have been the subject of important analyses in the history of political thought by such scholars as Pocock, Hont, and Hirschman. But despite a growing interest in anthropology in finance and the state, few anthropologists have turned to those scholars for inspiration. Many, on the other hand, draw on the writings of Foucault (Ong 1999; Mitchell 2002, Ferguson and Gupta 2002). At least one important commentator on Foucault, in turn, has noted the deep affinities between the projects of Pocock and Foucault. In Gordon's view, both were concerned to understand the rise of "political individuality" (Gordon 1996, 257). That notion of political individuality arose in a context where anonymous mechanisms of credit and new forms of "imaginary property" were giving birth to "commercial society," before the "triumph of capitalism" (Hirschman 1977). These new forms of interaction, in turn, led to the development of "economic and intersubjective man" (Pocock 1975, 466).

These changes implied, according to Gordon, a "non-totalizable multiplicity" of interest in society and a "dialectic of spontaneous multiplicity." The period thus witnessed the rise of a "denser, fuller and more complex reality of the collective environment in which men as economic subjects of interest must be located, in order to govern them" (Gordon 1996, 257). The new realities engendered by the rise of public debt and commercial society, in other words, implied new forms of power as well. That power, in turn, seemed "incompatible with the unitary principle of totalization of wills assumed by doctrines of juridical sovereignty" (ibid.). In Gordon's reading of Foucault, these new realities were addressed in Adam Ferguson's reworking of the concept of civil society in the second half of the 18th century (Ferguson [1767] 1966), where the incompatibility between juridical sovereignty and the new forms of power was confronted (Gordon 1996, 257).

Perhaps, as Gordon suggests, those late 18th century writings on civil society resolved dilemmas engendered by the rise of commercial society and political individualism (ibid., 1996, 257). If so, then it is surely true that we can gain much insight into the transformations underway in our own era, when civil society has become the "ultimate magic bullet" of millennial capitalism, by reexamining those debates as, for example, have Comaroff and Comaroff (2000, 334). I would suggest, however, that anthropologists need to look a bit further back in the 18th century as well, to the onset of the controversies about debt and the rise of commercial society. It is possible to overestimate the importance of Ferguson's writings on civil society, due to their retrospective importance for the "civil society" movements of the 1980s in Eastern Europe, and the institutionalization of "civil society" as a political project at the turn of the millennium (Mastnak, forthcoming). But there is another, more important reason to look at what came before the 18th century discussions of civil society. At least as relevant for understanding the processes underway in our own times are the 18th century debates about debt, the state, and the rise of commercial society.

[4]The term "financial revolution" to describe this process was used by Dickson (1967) and Rubini (1970), as cited in Pocock (1975:425). In what follows, I draw on Pocock (1975, chapter 13 in particular), Pocock (1985, chapter 6 in particular), and Hont 1983; 1990; 1993. These issues are dealt with from a slightly different perspective in Hirschman (1977).

In this period of "Financial Revolution," a deep sense of unease pervaded about the role of debt and credit in a society undergoing rapid change, the direction of which was not yet clear.[4] Not only the National Debt was new. The Bank of England was a new creation as well. The creation of these institutions for the first time drew prosperity into close association with the political stability of a regime. It made possible the expansion of government activity and, most importantly, the conduct of war, in the period where England/Great Britain was emerging as a world power. A new form of property, "the material foundation of both personality and government" (Pocock 1985,112, cf. Hont 1990), had arisen. Unlike the landed property upon which earlier notions of civic virtue had been grounded, this property was (in a phrase that will not sound unfamiliar to readers today) "not merely mobile but imaginary" (Pocock 1985, 112).

Such a development was a "momentous intellectual event." There was a "sudden and traumatic discovery of capital in the form of government stock and a sudden and traumatic discovery of historical transformation as something brought about by the advent of public credit." (Pocock 1985, 108.) New figures entered into public debate and public consciousness. "The fundholder and the stockjobber, the bull and the bear, had come upon the stage; and the figure around which they were grouped, the concept which they introduced into the language of English politics, was not Trade but Credit" (Pocock 1975, 426). In the developing language of political economy, which was still largely discussed in terms of Aristotelian and civic humanist values (ibid., 460-61), finance and credit were seen as corrupting and destabilizing forces.[5] And yet, despite this destabilizing potential of credit and finance, public debt ensured the existence of the nation through its ability to conduct wars for commercial supremacy.

In the view of David Hume, however, public credit was not a boon but a threat to the very existence of the nation: "Either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation" (Hume [1777] 1985, 360-61). Hume's concerns about public debt lay in the "conjunction of commercial society and international power politics" (Hont 1993, 322), rather than in the rise of commercial society *per se*. But like many writers at the turn of the millennium, Hume was horrified by the speed with which financial markets operated. The speed with which ownership of stocks could fluctuate was a threat to social order: "The stocks can be transferred in an instant, and being in such a fluctuating state, will seldom be transmitted during three generations from father to son" (Hume 1985, 358; cf. Hont 1993, 340). "*Adieu*," Hume warned his readers, "to all ideas of nobility, gentry, and family" (ibid.). With the collapse of social ranks would come the collapse of the constitution as well: "The political stranglehold of the annuitant class over the Lords and Commons was an inevitable consequence of the debt" (Hont, op. cit.). The growing nexus of credit and the state was the subject of great concern. This nexus threatened traditional forms of social order. Soon enough, however, new modes of social stability were being conceived.

[5]For a discussion of the meaning of "corruption" in these debates, see Euben 1989, and the above citations from Pocock and Hont. It would be a worthwhile enterprise to compare these debates about "corruption" in the late 17th century with the current widespread debates about corruption of the state.

The century also saw attempts to turn the scourge of credit into a source of social stability. In the writings of Addison, for example, credit became "the cognition of social, moral and commercial reality," and an epistemology of the real. Everything was done "to eliminate the element of fantasy and fiction which had seemed so subversive of property and personality" (Pocock 1975, 456). This entailed a vigorous ideological effort to absorb the frightening image of the stockjobber into the merchant; and the rentier, who frightened social theorists, into the figure of the entrepreneur (ibid.) (This move is particularly resonant for the millennial moment that I will discuss below.) The broader dilemma involved the following problem: how to formulate a new basis for civic morality and political individuality in the context of commercial society? Given the dissolution of the stable property relations on which notions of political virtue and individuality had rested, what would be the basis of political individuality for economic man? According to Pocock, this involved privatizing the individual: "If indeed capitalist thought ended up privatizing the individual, this may have been because it was unable to find an appropriate way of presenting him as citizen" (ibid., 461). A new political subjectivity was one outcome of this new conjuncture of debt, war, and the state.

MILLENNIAL DEBTS

At the turn of the millennium, there was again great concern about debt and credit. The 1990s witnessed an extraordinary run-up of the stock market, the high-technology NASDAQ index in particular. The rise in the market was fueled by historically new levels of debt among the US middle classes, many of whom borrowed against their very homes to bet on a market that seemed to go only up. They were sustained in their hopes by theories about a "New Economy" in which the old rules of the game about business cycles had become obsolete.[6] Such theories collapsed by the close of the year 2000 with the burst of what now appeared as a "speculative bubble."[7]

Concerns about debt had been increasing since the 1970s. The rise of unregulated financial transfers outside the territory of the sovereign state in Euromarkets and

[6]For a good example of the high spirited endorsement of the New Economy, see Kelly (1998). Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, Alan Greenspan, accepted the notion of the "New Economy," as attested to by his policy regarding interest rates in the 1990s, and in speeches where he stated that new standards of profitability in the New Economy had rendered obsolete earlier notions of the business cycle. For a brief but excellent discussion of these issues, see Madrick 2001.

[7] Once again, the 18th century debates are of interest. On the "South Sea Bubble" and other speculative crises of the early 18th century, see Pocock (1985, 112,204).

[8]A good brief review of the issues surrounding the Latin American debt crisis and its aftermath, with many references for interested readers, can be found in Castells (1996:119-133). But my statements are largely based on my own experience as a Research Analyst at the New York Federal Reserve Bank between 1982-84. My responsibilities included analysis of the potential impact of Latin American debt crisis on the U.S. banking system, unregulated Euromarkets, and the impact of what was then called the "computerization of money" on the US banking system. Concern about those issues then was often *ad hoc*. As a recent college graduate whose politics had led to interest in debt and finance, I got to work on these issues merely by stating my strong interest in the topics to my superiors. No one else in my division, that was responsibility for researching issues of importance for US banking regulation, was working on those issues at the time.

offshore financial centers emerged as a topic of concern in US government circles by the 1980s. After US money center banks were flooded with cash from oil rents after 1973, those banks lent massive amounts to Latin American states in particular. Sovereign states, it was thought in models of "risk assessment" at the time, were risk free borrowers. That belief changed when Mexico threatened to default on its debt in 1982, and most of Latin America followed in turn.[8] Debt became further associated with crisis in the U.S. "savings and loan crisis" that followed soon after. It became clear that debt crises could originate at "home" as well. After the fall of communism in 1989, the global triumph of capitalism set into motion an associated series of debt crises in Russia and in Asia. The fears and unease of Enlightenment philosophers and early political economists, that debt could prove the death of the nation, and that public credit was a fickly female creature whose whims could not be predicted were, it would seem, well confirmed at the turn of the millennium.

The issue of debt soon became a galvanizing issue with broad appeal. The Jubilee 2000 Coalition built on previous efforts of NGOs and church groups to cancel the debts of the poorest heavily indebted countries. Thanks in part to the work of music superstars who made the cause their own, the issue of the crippling debts of poor countries was taken up by broad sectors of the population in Britain, the U.S., and around the world.[9] At the same time, an anti-globalization movement erupted into public view with demonstrations in Seattle and Washington, D.C. in 2000, and in Prague in 2001.[10] That movement focused attention on global financial institutions (GFIs) such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. The GFIs were targeted for forcing poor countries into debt while devastating their social and economic infrastructures. One organization launched an "IMF and World Bank Wanted for Fraud Campaign." The group condemned the Bank and IMF "for committing genocide and robbery" across Africa.[11] The organization "Drop the Debt" argued that the GFIs could well afford to cancel the debt of the poorest countries without threatening the financial well-being of their organizations.[12]

[9]On the Jubilee Coalition, see www.jubilee2000.uk.org. For a discussion of the issue of debt relief from the point of view of the World Bank, see World Bank 2001, pp. 200-204.

[10]While it is hard to generalize about an emergent and broad political movement like the anti-globalization movement, the issues of debt and finance are clearly unifying themes. Capitalism, in turn, is often linked with global finance capital.

[11]See the report from Bretton Woods Project, reporting on a protest outside the World Bank offices in London on 26 May 2001 to mark African Liberation Day, in which protesters carried placards proclaiming "Africa Needs Liberation Not Charity" and "the Debt is a Fraud," and describing the "IMF and World Bank Wanted for Fraud Campaign." Bretton Woods Update No23. Part 2, dated June 25, 2001.

[12]See "Reality check on debt," Bretton Woods Update No. 23, June 25, 2001. "A new report from Drop the Debt argues that the World Bank and IMF can afford to cancel in full the debts of the poorest countries without putting at risk their finances. A World Bank and IMF report released just prior to the Spring Meetings agrees that debt sustainability is not guaranteed by the HIPC initiative because export and growth projections are likely to be too optimistic and new borrowing, including to fight HIV/AIDS, is likely to push debt burdens up quickly. However, Bank President James Wolfensohn argued that giving more debt relief would take resources away from other equally needy countries." See also http://www.dropthedebt.org.

The Internet was key to this form of globalized movement against debt. A global portal site on international debt, "DebtChannel.org," was launched by OneWorld. Edited from Zambia, the site was a partnership of over 70 aid agencies, human rights and campaign groups worldwide. The site aimed to "help bring together global civil society to ensure that debt does not bring more human suffering and poverty," in the words of Joe Chilaizya, DebtChannel.org editor (Bretton Woods Update 3/3, 14 Dec 2000. See http://www.DebtChannel. Meanwhile, the Bretton Woods Project provided regular and sophisticated discussions online about debt and financial issues to a broad range of activists and NGOs across the range of the anti-globalization movement.[13] Debt and finance, long considered issues for specialists, became one of the key organizing issues of a global political movement. Once again, debt, credit, and finance capital were seen as a force of danger, this time not to the citizen or the nation, but to humanity as a whole.

At least until the NASDAQ bubble burst in 2001, it seemed to many that finance capital had acquired new mysterious powers. Commodity fetishism (Marx 1957) and the seeming ability of finance capital to shed money from its very pores without recourse to sweat or labor, seemed to have been realized (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000, 295). Finance had come unlinked from production, and capital had liberated itself from labor.[14] New communications technologies, the fall of political barriers with the end of communism, and financial deregulation gave finance capital mysterious powers to transcend the limitations of time and space. When the value of shares in a company like Cisco Systems when up over 300 percent in the course of one year, in turn, it really did seem that the old rules of the game simply did not apply.

Through the 1990s, metaphors of the stock market and the crap game were pervasive. Hopes — and fears — about debt, credit, and speculation shaped the concerns and lives of middle classes throughout the third world and, increasingly, in the United States as well. In the words of Fidel Castro, alchemy had finally been realized, and "paper has been turned into gold." This was now "casino capitalism."[15] Fears and hopes about the fickle powers of credit came to pervade popular discourse in a manner strikingly reminiscent of that analysed by Pocock and Hont.

In a mood of millennial hopes and massive disenchantment, middle classes around the world who had seen the promise of the market and democracy tried to find salvation in

[13] On the Bretton Woods Project, see the web site www.brettonwoodsproject.org.

[14] This issue, and the following debate in Comaroff and Comaroff, draws on extensive debates in the tradition of political economy that must be bracketed here. It is sufficient to note their statement that "in the upshot, production appears to have been superseded, as the *fons et origo* of wealth, by less tangible ways of generating value: by control over such things as the provision of services, the means of communication, and above all, the flow of finance capital. In short, by the market and by speculation" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 295).

[15] Comaroff and Comaroff 2000, 297. The Comaroffs here cite Fidel Castro, "Castro: World Has Become a Huge Casino," Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), 6 September 1998, 4; the article is a transcript of a speech given to the South African parliament. The phrase "casino capitalism" originates with John Maynard Keynes (I am indebted to Bill Maurer for pointing that out to me).

"get rich quick schemes." Given the scale of the rise of the NASDAQ at the core of establishment capitalism, it became hard to find the dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate forms of gaining wealth. Comaroff and Comaroff cited numerous schemes and frauds for riches in the United States, the pyramid schemes in Albania that led to the collapse of the government, and the growing importance of gambling for state finances. Other essays in that issue of *Public Culture* showed how the magical powers of finance and debt reshaped the imaginary in a decentered and deterritorialized third world (Coronil 2000; Morris 2000; Povinelli 2000). Millennial capitalism, the Comaroffs suggested, offered not only potential riches, but the promise of empowerment as well. That reference to empowerment is not developed in their essay, except in as much as they link disappointment of hopes for empowerment to the rise of "occult economies" around the world. In those occult economies, the search for empowerment went through methods that "transgress the conventional, the rational, the moral" and rather "multiply available techniques of producing value, fair or foul." (ibid.)

The idea that empowerment is central to neoliberal capitalism is brought out more forcefully in a volume edited by Barry, Osborne, and Rose, entitled *Foucault and Political Reason.* The notion of empowerment, as different authors in this volume point out, has its roots in the women's movement of the 1970s. Although it underwrites neo-liberal programs that "respond to the sufferer as if they were the author of their own misfortune," the notion of empowerment retains broad appeal across a broad spectrum of political opinion (Rose 1996, 59). In his analysis of advanced liberal democracies, for example, Nikolas Rose points to the "the proliferation of the new psychological techniques and languages of empowerment in relation to those subjects now coded as 'marginalized' or 'excluded'" (ibid.). Neo-liberalism, in other words, seems to be marked by new forms of power arrangements in which the self is a primary agent of the art of governing: the self is both subject and subjected.[16] Empowerment can be key to that double move.

In the neoliberal era, we then witness a "vast, newly articulated set of techniques and tactics that do this work of government," including "all of those tactics that seek to effect the empowerment, consultation, and participation of individuals and groups from the work of community development to the organization of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations or quangos. (Dean 1996, 223). Empowerment of communities and individuals, these authors suggest, are part of a new mode of governance, and relations of power, in which the individual polices him or herself rather than being the object of the direct exercise of power by the state. In a era of downsizing states, the exercise of power does not simply disappear, but is rather relocated in new spaces that valorize the individual and the community more than the state. But what does this have to do with debt and finance? How is empowerment married to debt?

[16]See, for example, Cruikshank's analysis of self-government and self-esteem, and how "poor single mothers on welfare who are enrolled in self-esteem programmes become subjects even as they are subjected to forms of power and government" (Cruikshank 1996:249).

DEBT AS EMPOWERMENT

Debt was first linked to empowerment among NGOs and "people's banks" around the Third World. The most famous case is the Grameen Bank of Bangledesh. In this new model of helping the poor help themselves, long-standing forms of self-help among the poor, as documented by anthropologists around the world, became a popular new model for development in a world where development itself had come increasingly into question.[17] Under the leadership of James Wolfensohn at the World Bank in the 1990s, this notion of microlending, as it came to be called, became a central tenant of the Bank's development programs. Soon, the Bank became the most powerful proponent of empowerment via debt. When debt became linked to empowerment at the World Bank an interesting situation emerged. At the same time that the indebtedness of poor countries was becoming a central issue of moral outrage and political concern, programs were emerging in which debt was discussed not as a problem, but as a solution. At the same moment that the World Bank became targeted as the agent of disempowerment around the world, the Bank was engaged in projects to empower—once again by relations of financial debt. Debt in this incarnation became not a means of oppression, but a means to empowerment. Reminiscent of contradictory views toward debt in the 18th century in a period of the rise of the modern state, debt in the era of globalization and changing (if not declining) sovereignty of the state, debt was viewed in a similarly contradictory way. Now, however, the state stood in a different position in this nexus.

Unlike the debt that was seen to enslave the poor countries of the world, this new form of debt was not proferred to states. Rather, it was offered to individuals, and to communities designated as "the poor." Credit was seen as liberatory when it bypassed the state (which was seen as a negative factor in neoliberal thought from the right and from the left) and went directly from financial institutions to NGOs as the direct representative of "the people" on the ground. Those NGOs, in turn, could directly link "the people" to the global market and to global civil society.[18] Like in the situations analyzed by Dean and Rose, the disenfranchised were reincarnated as the agents of their own empowerment. In this case, empowerment would come by incurring relations of debt to large IFOs like the World Bank via the intermediation of NGOs. One way of incurring those relations was through lending programs to the informal economy and microenterprises.

[17] I discuss this in more detail in Elyachar 2003.

[18] For two critiques of the notion of "global civil society" by anthropologist, see Elyachar (2001a) and Fisher (2001).

[19] This is well illustrated in training programs for microenterprise NGOs, three of which I took part in during my fieldwork. One is taught to view the family as a microenterprise and to view family decisions in terms of accounting problems. In turn, family problems can be discussed in a new language. See, for example, the following introduction to a textbook on accounting for NGOs: "Accounting is basically the 'language of business.' It is the language that businesspeople use to talk about the economic realities of their establishments. Like a language, it has rules and dialects. Also like a language, accounting uses its own vocabulary: money. To interpret its prose, one must understand its rules and the defintions of its major terms" (Bartel, McCord, and Bell 1994: 3).

In microenterprise lending programs like those I studied in Cairo, "clients" were taught to view their life choices as a series of financial decisions, and to utilize the language of accounting to track their family income. Money and accounting become a language through which families learned to speak about their lives.[19] As in other spheres of political and social life where state services are being transformed into a relationship mediated by money, transforming relations "into cash terms establishes new relations of power" (Rose 1996, 55). Speaking of life in terms of accounting, and budgets, "transforms the activity of the budget holder, increasing choices at the same time as regulating them and providing new ways of ensuring the responsibility and fidelity of agents who remain formally autonomous. Not merely in the setting of the budget, but in the very "budgetization" of the activity, the terms of calculation and decision are displaced and new diagrams of force and freedom are assembled" (ibid.).

To state the obvious, the forms of power and social interaction that empowerment debt rewrites in Cairo are quite different than those discussed by Rose regarding Britain or the United States. And yet, the overall project is the same; it is global in scope. In Cairo I was trained, by trainers who usually work in the United States and Latin America, to "see the family as a microenterprise" and to "learn to speak the language of money." In diverse contexts, vast political changes were being transposed into the language of economy and, in the process, tamed. (Whether such attempts will be successful is another question.) Young men who might have once gone on strike for political rights were going on strike to get into debt. In the 18th century, I have shown, the frightening image of the rentier in an emerging political order was transformed into the image of the entrepreneur. Here, the frightening image of downsized factory workers in the era of globalization, or the equally scary idea of unemployed youth turning to Islamic fundamentalism, was being transformed into an uplifting image of teeming masses of micro-entrepreneurs.[20]

Such use of the language of economy to discuss issues of structural power, we should remember, was pervasive at the turn of the millennium. Both within the academy, and in broader political discourses, the end of the 20th century witnessed a vast "imperialism of the economy." Ever increasing aspects of life that were once bound off under modernity from the logic of the market and the sphere of market relations, were being understood and controlled via the logic of the marketplace (Frow 1997). As such, while vast sectors of the world's population were being rendered redundant economically in a system now organized on a global scale by the logic of the market and capitalism, and thus had no "economic value," the very worth of human beings was increasingly being discussed in economic terms. If I am right, then issues of debt and finance clearly cannot be relegated to the sub-discipline of economic anthropology, but rather need to be considered at the center of the anthropology as a whole.

[20]This transformation reached its apogee in de Soto 2000.

BANKING ON MICROLOANS

Empowerment debt links together a broad range of organizations at different levels of what is usually thought of as a spatial hierarchy of the local, national, and global (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). In the case of microlending in Cairo, international lending organizations like the World Bank, some EU agencies, and Arab funders were prominent. USAID was active in giving out microloans through NGOs that it established. The Canadian agency CIDA, the Danish agency DANIDA, and the Dutch agency NOVIB were also donors, as were the Friederich Ebert Stiftung and the Ford Foundation. Funders transferred finance to Egypt through a variety of means. Since they were prevented by Egyptian law from directly funding local NGOs, they usually had to move through state or state-approved organizations. Money went from IOs, bilateral funders, or NGOs to banks (both public sector and private), the semi-independent Social Fund, or to state approved NGOs such as those established by AID.

Banking on microenterprise in Egypt was a profitable business. Playing the role of intermediary between donors and micro-borrowers was good business for Egyptian banks in both the public and private sectors.[21] Loans in hard currency on soft terms from at least some of the donor agencies became part of "bank capital," greatly improving the bank's capital base and balance sheets. Money was kept in dollar accounts and thus was available for trading on international markets. Meanwhile, internal bank loans made these sums available as well in local currency accounts, from which loans were given out at commercial bank rates or higher. The "spreads," or difference between the cost of funds and the interest they brought in, were excellent. Although these funds were technically loans, bankers I interviewed said that no arrangements had been made with the donors for repayment, and they were treated by the banks as part of bank capital to remain in perpetuity. On rare occasions, my informants said, the issue of repayment did come up, and the loans or grants to the banks were to be repaid only if the bank's microenterprise or informal economy lending programs were discontinued.

Microenterprise and informal economy lending, moreover, was a reliable business. "The poor" in Egypt as elsewhere were good borrowers: Ample research around the world had gone into proving this. And since those poor entrepreneurs paid market interest rates, lending to them was profitable as well. Charging high rates was not only good business, it was the right and respectful thing to do as well.[22]

There was less consensus on other aspects of the microenterprise project. To start with, bankers, NGO officials, consultants, and "youth entrepreneurs" all had different visions of whose money this was, and how it should be distributed. Funders of all kinds – IO, state, and NGO, wanted loans to be given out as fast as possible. One AID consultant put this perspective to me most clearly one day, in the middle of a training

[21] My account is based on interviews with officials of the Industrial Bank of Egypt, the National Bank of Egypt, AID, the World Bank, and independent consultants.

[22] As argued in one paper that summarizes this kind of research (Christen, Ryne, Vogel, et al. 1994).

session for NGO staff who provided loans to microenterprises: "This is empowerment money. We should be helping people get into debt." Debt, in the NGO micro-informal circles, had become highly fetishized. It had acquired the power to generate self-esteem, self-reliance, and liberation from the state. Bankers of the public sector banks took the opposite perspective from the NGOs: Money should not be lent out unless the lender could be fairly certain it would be returned.

Also at play in these arguments were the different legal mechanisms available to NGOs versus banks in the case of defaulted loans. The NGOs, in short, had access to more effective legal measures than the banks. Banks had to rely on civil courts in case of non-payment. And as one banker put it: "That's an endless road with lots of delays. Judicial procedures in Egypt are futile." Things were easier for the NGOs. The dominant model for microenterprise NGOs in Egypt made nonpayment fall under criminal rather than civil law.[23] Non-governmental organizations could draw on the state's repressive apparatus when they needed to collect back interest payments. They held, moreover, a kind of undated personal check from each borrower that could be deposited at any time. If funds were not there to back up the check, criminal legal procedures would be instituted. As one of the former bankers who had designed the system explained: "We put psychological pressure on our clients. We have the power of the police to scare them."

AID in Egypt, which established the best known microenterprise NGOs,[24] had a reputation for being "very formal"—turning to legal procedures right away. In other countries debt collection methods relied on the "informal sector." The vast possibilities for informal methods of debt collection were outlined in a microenterprise lending seminar that I attended in Cairo. "Culture" was the key to getting repaid:

> In every culture there is something that works, and the thing is to find out what that is. Is it the headman; the religious leader, community pressure, or the police? Find out what it is, and use it.

These different perspectives towards money and finance led to conflicts. As the biggest and most complex project, the Social Fund was the subject of many. A public sector banker, who had been responsible for managing the bank branch opened in el-Hirafiyeen, had been involved in many of them. From his point of view, the politicians who had established the Social Fund as a bank lending project had not wanted him to act like a banker. He complained that it was a "political project, 100%." Speaking of the former Governor of Cairo, who had presided over the building of el-Hirafiyeen and the establishment of the Social Fund, he had the following to say:

[23] What anthropologists might think of as "informal relationships" are integrated into the formal banking system in Egypt, in arrangements that then fall within the rubric of criminal law. If two individuals sign a note regarding a transaction, and affix to that note an official state stamp that anyone can purchase, then the note has the same legal status as an official bank check. The roots of this system lie first in Islamic law regarding transactions (Schacht 1964), and in Ottoman banking law.

[24] AID established NGOs for informal economy lending were called "foundations" since, I was told, the usual Arabic translation of NGOs had traditional overtones of charity.

> I had an argument with him. He said to me: you've taken money from the Social Fund for 20 million LE, and you haven't paid out from that more than one million LE. I told him: Where's the demand for loans, all those workshops are locked up! We're a government agency, it's our responsibility to be able to get our money back ... We have a loan from the Social Fund of 20 million. I lent out 970,000 LE from that and I won't loan out any more. We've already covered the real projects. The new ones, they're all locked up and closed down.

The "youth," for their part, were furious that "their" money was not reaching them. Some of them had "married on the loans": taken money to fund marriages long delayed by the lack of money necessary to establish a home and family. According to the consultant I quoted earlier, who was concerned about micro-enterprise as a path to self-esteem and political empowerment, non-production was a non-problem. But others saw things differently, and the image of the spoiled student marrying on the state's money became pervasive in local discussions of the neighborhood and the Social Fund.

The neighborhood where I carried out my fieldwork, Medinet el-Hirafiyeen, was host to a project of the Social Fund for Develoment, initiated by the World Bank, and hosted by the Egyptian State, for funding microenterprises among "youth graduates." The neighborhood had been originally been established by the Municipality of Cairo (which is a Ministry of the Government of Egypt) to house craftsmen evicted from neighborhoods in Northern Cairo deemed inappropriate for workshops. For reasons I discuss elsewhere, the evictions were only sporadically carried out. Many apartments and workshops in the neighborhood were still standing empty in 1991 and were allocated to new social group that had been established via priority statements of the World Bank. The Bank's mission was to create a new generation of " micro-entrepreneurs" who would not be dependent on the state for employment. In Egypt, the target groups for microloans to open up microenterprises were both "youth graduates" who were no longer guaranteed employment by the state, and "returnees from Iraq," who had been forced to leave Iraq when Egypt joined the U.S. led Desert Storm invasion in 1991. A state-owned bank, the Industrial Bank of Egypt, was chosen to be the intermediary between the Egyptian Social Fund for Development and the borrowers, who were themselves to be organized in an NGO. Other banks started lending to the youth as well.

Very quickly, a common complaint could be heard in the Egyptian media about the Social Fund project: the self-designated youth took the money of the loans, and "married on the loan." The complaint was that the "youth" used this sum of money for generational reproduction, not for production of commodities. In Egypt, having the money to purchase a lease or ownership rights in an apartment is a social prerequisite for getting married. In a situation of pervasive unemployment, the impediments to marriage and reproduction were vast. In a society that highly values marriage, children, and the family, a generation facing widespread unemployment was unable to get married and reproduce. A lump sum of money like that provided by the Social Fund program made it possible for some to make a down payment on an apartment. Some attributed the failure of the Social Fund project in el-Hirafiyeen to this tendency to "marry on the money."

Some of the youth had taken the loans and used the funds to get married. But many tried to play by the rules. They were highly motivated to become entrepreneurs, had started up their businesses, but then fallen on bad times when they confronted the realities of turning ideological debt into real commodities that would sell. They landed in an impossible situation with a triple blow. Their microenterprises were failing, the bank wouldn't release the second installment of their loans, and they were stuck with paying market-rate interest on the full value of their loans. Some of the Youth (who often were over 30) like the first President of the NGO I quoted at the beginning of this article, saw in this situation a great political battle. In keeping with the new flavor of politics in the NGO age, former party activists took on the battle to get their money from the bank.

CONTESTED DEBTS: THE SIT-IN AT THE BANK

One August day in 1993 in Cairo, members of the Youth Graduates' NGO (*gamai'at shabab al-kharigiyeen*) of el-Hirafiyeen occupied the offices of the local branch of the Industrial Development Bank.[25] The NGO had been formed to mediate the distribution of loans that originated with the Social Fund, and had as its aim the promotion of microenterprises and microentrepreneurs. They carried out their strike at "the bank" (as it was locally known) in el-Hirafiyeen. This branch of the Industrial Development Bank, was both the headquarters of the local Social Fund branch, and the fiduciary responsible for mediating between the Youth NGO borrowers on the one hand, and donor agencies on the other. The General in charge of the local Social Fund project had his office in the bank, and from there managed the program of lending to the Youth NGO. The Bank stood in the main square of the neighborhood, with other buildings that marked the official presence of the state: the official mosque and a telephone central (rarely open). A cloth banner hung next to the bank: "Program for the Development of Medinet el-Hirafiyeen, in Cooperation with the Social Fund and the Industrial Bank for Development."

The bank where this strike occurred, in other words, marked the presence of the state, the Social Fund, and its sponsoring agency, the World Bank. It was an institution that was global as much as it was local. The strike that went on there had as its object the new configuration of power that shaped this one neighborhood of Cairo. The strike occurred, in fact, soon after the Youth NGO had been established, to great fanfare, together with the establishment and expansion of the Egyptian Social Fund, itself established by the World Bank. The NGO had been established in order to mediate the flow of funds from the Social Fund. In these financial relations, "the state," the "international community," and the "NGO" were drawn together into a new configuration of power whose contours was not year clear.

The Graduates NGO provided a context for the meeting of diverse individuals and groups who crossed the boundaries of "civil society" and "the state." Since the NGO was established specifically as a conduit for the transmission of funds from the IO and bilateral donors for the purpose of establishing microenterprises in Egypt, many individu-

[25] This strike took place before I began my fieldwork. I did not witness any of these events myself.

als with ideas about how that money could be spent were attracted. Some were from the sphere of "civil society"—depending on how we define that term—and others were from "the state."

The mechanics of how to manage this form of debt relations via NGOs had not been set out in the original plans for the Social Fund or, for that matter, in broader thinking about how to strengthen civil society, and promote empowerment, via NGOs and debt. The problem of how to manage the funds, and who would be responsible for distributing them, was a continuous one in Egypt throughout the course of my research. The Youth, however, knew the answer from the start. They took seriously the idea that this was "their" money.

The Youth in the NGO were well aware of the amounts that were being sent to Egypt to support "Youth" and "microenterprise." In their view, the money was being sent for "the Youth," and for "NGOs"—not for the State. They were the Youth, theirs was an NGO. Ergo the money should be theirs to control. Any attempt by the state to intervene in the management of that money was, from their point of view, illegitimate. When officials attempted to impose funding criteria of their own, or bankers said they couldn't have the money right away, the Youth saw that as a form of stealing. They believed the rhetoric of the microenteprise and NGO movement: from the IO to the NGO to the entrepreneurs. To many bankers and politicians who handed them loans, on the other hand, the Youth were a bunch of spoiled kids at best and crooks at worst. In the words of one banker, the kids saw this money as their bequest (*tirka*) from the State. Like greedy children after the death of a parent, they fought to get the share they thought they deserved.

The problem of how to mediate the relations among the state, "civil society," and IO donors was not theoretical. Given the high priority accorded to civil society, NGOs, and microenterprise in the 1990s development agenda, the money began to flow before there was a clear structure to organize distribution. The Social Fund allocated 20 million LE (about $6 million) for projects in el-Hirafiyeen in the early 1990s. This money was in addition to the other banks and development funders who were already giving out loans in the neighborhood. It was decided that 4 million LE (about $1.2 million) of the 20 million LE would be allocated in the first round. Before a system of loan distribution was set into place, however, a period of flexibility and experimentation prevailed. The broad strokes of a program originating in IOs, to support civil society and microenterprise through NGO lending, had become a reality. In the process some interesting problems emerged.

What would be done with that large amount of money, and who had to power to decide? It was clear to many that el-Hirafiyeen could not "absorb" (*yistaw'ab*) the huge amounts of money that were being sent there. At the same time, it was not yet clear who would be the intermediary and guarantor of the funds being allocated to the Youth NGO from the Social Fund. Since these millions of dollars were allocated, in name at least, to the Youth, their NGO became the focal point for high level maneuvers for power and wealth. Many actors in "civil society" were eager to help. One of the first proposals to the Youth NGO, according to my informants, came from a prominent businessmen's association, that had originally been established with the help of USAID, and which functioned as a "civil society NGO" for the purposes of international donor agendas.

The president of this civil society NGO in the business sector told the leadership of the Youth NGO, they claimed, that of the 20 million LE (about 6 million US dollars at the time) being given them from the Social Fund, el-Harifiyeen couldn't absorb even the 4 million that would be dispersed at the first go. He suggested that they should "take 2-3 million, shut up and disappear." They'd have "nothing to say about the rest of the money, and in turn no one would ask them about what they did with the 2 million." The Youth began to sense just how powerful was their new status, and became a bit nervous that they would lose access to the money attached to the name of "the Youth." They were unhappy with this proposal, they said. Not due to moral outrage about corruption. The idea that they were being offered 3 million LE entranced some of them. The realized that the name of the Youth NGO, and their new social/political status, must be worth much more. Perhaps the businessmen were going to make business for themselves, rather than to help the Youth. These Youth attempted to keep hold of the power generated by the activation of the new status of Youth empowered by debt. These attempts, however, consistently failed.

The Youth were unable to control the power generated by the category of their NGO, and the streams of money that were intended for their hands. For example, early in 1993, they appointed X as an advisor to their NGO, to help in their dealings with officials. The Youth issued a letter stating the advisor's position and responsibilities. X circulated with that letter, and developed relationships with local government and high state officials, in accordance with his status as advisor to the high priority Social Fund Youth NGO. However, according to the Youth, X had his own agendas to pursue, and used their name and their letter to pursue his own projects. When the Youth decided that X was no longer acting in their interests, they wanted to end the agreement, but found that he had, through the name of the Youth NGO, already acquired new relationships and a reputation that they could not annul. In their name, others were making connections that they could neither control nor cancel. The currency of their name was circulating, and through this process of circulation, creating value in a sense closer to Simmel (1990) than to Marx. The piece of paper attached to the name of the NGO itself became imbued with power. As an icon of power, it circulated and accumulated power through the process of circulation (Tambiah 1984), regardless of the paper's technical attachment to its legal claimants. Names and papers attached to the category of the NGO circulated as items that could be translated into money, and into more power. All this was a surprise. Two years later, a kind of awe remained in the faces of those recounting the story.

In the meantime they, the Youth for whom the project supposedly existed, found themselves struggling to survive, and unable to access the money transferred to the bank in their name. Inside the bank, those funds were functioning as bank capital on the books of the national banking system, and could be lent out on international markets as finance capital. At the same time, while it was supposed to function as a starting sum of M to set into motion a traditional Marxian turnover cycle of capital M-C-M+, the so-called producers could not get access to the loans. The Youth were blocked from access to the money that was supposed to set their production process into motion.

Meanwhile, contracts were signed at the Social Fund for the allocation of the 20 million dollars for the Youth, and the Industrial Bank for Development became the custo-

dian and guarantor of those funds. Its local branch then became the "intermediary" with the Youth NGO. "The Bank" became, in addition to its function as a mediator of funds, a locus for overt political conflict that — on the surface of things at least -- pit "the state" against "the NGO." Frustration of the "youth" with the current situation — entranced with the glimmering sums of money that were entering the country in their name, and with the discourse of the international agencies picked up, in large part, by state agencies and press, about the importance of Youth Microenterprise, matched by their inability to get access to loans they had been promised to start up their enterprises, culminated in the sit-in at the bank

Control over the flow of money was not the only terrain of contestation. The control of information became another terrain for the contestation of power. Here, the issue was the following: on what basis would funding decisions be made? This issue of control, of who in practice would have this decision making power, had been a concern of the World Bank from the start of the project. In an early review of the Social Fund project for the World Bank, concern is expressed that the Social Fund "may be subjected to political pressures that could force subproject choices inconsistent with agreed selection criteria" (World Bank 1991, 42). That is, that patronage relations might become more important than the objectives that had been defined on paper by the Bank. But the forms of contestation over the direction of the funds was far more complex than such a dualistic conflict between the on-paper formal objectives of a project on the one hand, and the patronage relations of a certain branch of government on the other. Rather, there were diverse players who entered the field created by the new Social Fund monies.

Some of this played itself out regarding the "questionnaires." The Social Fund had distributed forms to the Youth to fill out about their projects. In the beginning, the NGO was supposed to decide which projects would get funding and which would not. As such they had distributed questionnaires about Youth projects, and promised answers about funding within 28 days. But as doubts began to rise about the wisdom of letting the Youth NGO make funding decisions, local officials of the Social Fund began an indirect process of subverting the leading role of the NGO. According to members of the NGO at the time, the crisis began when the Social Fund officials printed a new copy of the questionnaire, in which the body of the questionnaire was separated out from the NGO's comments and evaluation. In place of that page, a new one was added for technical and specialist evaluations of the project brought in by the Social Fund.

From the viewpoint of the Youth, they were being robbed of from their legitimate role. The Social Fund was starting to freeze them out from "their" money and "their" decision making process. The Youth also raised concerns that good project ideas were being appropriated by the Social Fund for their own purposes—a charge that I might have thought absurd if I had not seen ample evidence of such appropriations from a number quite different informants, including one in a private consulting firm. Furthermore, the Youth were then denied access to the questionnaires distributed by the Social Fund. All this led to a confrontation between the NGO and the Social Fund, in August of 1993, inside the offices of the local bank.

On that day, the NGO leadership marched into the office of the local Social Fund bank branch, and locked themselves into the managing offices. They demanded to see the

questionnaires, and a copy of the contract between the Social Fund and the Bank, and the numbers of how much money they were supposed to have received. They demanded to see a copy of the contract between the Social Fund and the Bank, and demanded copies of the questionnaires about potential Youth microenterprise projects. In the midst of this sit-in, the Youth later claimed, they found out that the 4 million LE that was supposed to have been allocated to them immediately, had, in their words, "disappeared." Here they had landed in the midst of the financial crisis of the Egyptian state and its banking sector.

The bank that had been appointed as the fiduciary for their loans was, in fact, in deep financial trouble. Many of the Egyptian banks were known to be in a deep state of financial crisis at the time, for reasons that are well reviewed in Mitchell (2002). In the internal accounting that goes on between Central Banks and individual banks in any country, this particular bank was in debt. So when the 4 million LE were deposited into the Bank account, the Central Bank allocated it to cover some of the red ink of the bank in question. The Central Bank, in short, blocked payment of the money. To the Youth, this meant that their money had been stolen. The NGO members organized themselves to hold in sit-in in the local offices of the Social Fund. I quote the words of one organizer of the sit-in at the opening of this paper. Starting as it did with great words of confrontation and calls for justice, the event came to a close without the conflict, and the publicity, that some had hoped for. The event marked the high point, and then the collapse, of the first NGO.

THE GENERATION OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

> When things settled down afterwards, we were surprised with a new composition of the Managing Committee for the Social Fund project. There were only two people from the NGO, two from the Bank, someone from the Social Fund, and General Salah. This Committee was now given the power to decide about funding projects. Now neither the NGO, nor the Bank that was responsible for the money, had the power to decide about the money. But in the new arrangement, the Bank could still block decisions made by the Committee through administrative measures. The Committee could approve something, even while knowing that the decision would be blocked by bank officials who would not authorize payment. Although the Bank was respresented on the Committee, as Executing Agent, it could stop a decision taken by its own officials.

After the sit-in, in the words of some of the NGO leadership, the Bank managed to "break up" the Youth and set them against each other. The officials convinced the Youth that the confrontational style of the old leadership had been a mistake, and that "with your rough style and rudeness, you'll never get a thing." To calm down the situation, 11 of 15 members of the Executive Board of the first NGO resigned, as they said, in "the public interest." At the same time, the Program Administration Committee of the local Social Fund administration in the Bank evicted the 2 members of the NGO from the Committee. In turn, applications for funding began to be approved. Other technical arrangements were made, such as an installment plan for disbursement of the loans. This, again,

made good administrative sense, according to the Youth, since there were so many concerns that Youth were simply taking the money and "getting married on the loan." However, this also gave the Bank and the other public officials more control over the disbursement of funds in ways that, in the view of the Youth, made it impossible for them to run their businesses. They had to pay interest on the entire sum of the loan, and yet only received the money in parts. There was great anger among many of the Youth, including those who had stayed far away from the confrontations initiated by the first NGO, that they had had to shut down their businesses because they didn't have their second installment, couldn't purchase materials to continue working, and yet had to pay interest to the bank on the entire value of their loan.

With the appointment of the new NGO board, however, the confrontational relation of the NGO to the state faded away. A new leadership was installed with closer links to the authorities. The new leading figure in the NGO, Mohammed, was an expert producer of official state discourses regarding Youth, NGOs, and Microenterprise. Cooperation with the authorities was far more productive of results. Most of the Youth became convinced that they had more to gain by cooperating with the authorities. A "struggle" had become a "conflict" in which the system was reproduced, not challenged at a systemic level (Gluckman 1967). The discourse of empowerment via debt prevailed, on the one hand. On the other hand, the money entering Egypt via internationally generated empowerment debt schema accelerated a process of accelerating fuzziness of the boundaries of the state. The state incorporated into itself a program that had begun as an antidote to the corrupt third world state by the promotion of informal economy and civil society (Elyachar 2002).

In the words of two of the organizers of the sit-in, this event had marked an important phase in the struggle for the rights of youth in Egypt. Mamduh translated all the problems with the banks into an issue of politics, of the social rights of the youth, and a great struggle for justice. Mohammed Ashraf, on the other hand, who had little interest in politics, analyzed the issues at hand in purely economic terms. When he spoke about the strike, his discursive referents were rather to the Asian Tigers, to the economic problems of Egypt, and those of small business around the Third World in the wake of GATT. From the point of view of the bankers who were in charge of the lending program, on the other hand, these were all spoiled children waiting for their take, a bunch of crooks who had no intention of paying back their money to the state. And to those who took over the NGO after the event, those who engineered the sit-in were of "a bad social class." Mohammed, the new President of the NGO mobilized a different language of politics — the politics of names and connections, of "who knows whom." His language was dotted with fictive and less fictive accounts of his meetings and contacts with state officials, from the level of the local government to the President of the Republic himself. His discourse was equally marked by the presence of phrases about micro-enterprise from the press. From his point of view, the leaders of the sit-in were trouble-makers, "from the worst social environments". They had a wrong attitude, making trouble with the officials, rather than working together with them.

The story of the sit-in remained one recounted only in local lore, among local contenders for power. It faded away, much as had the first NGO itself, with the new organization far more efficiently functioning on a dual level as a partner of state officials

responsible for overseeing the flow of funds from international agencies for "civil society" on the one hand, and as a representative on the media stage as proof of the existence of a vibrant civil sector, and the success of microenterprise lending as a strategy for the "generation of structural adjustment." That was the memorable phrase used by a leader of one of the Youth NGOs in a public speech he made in 1994, celebrating the establishment of the Social Fund project for Youth Microenterprise in Cairo in 1994:

We were the children of socialism. We were brought up to go to school and then wait for an appointment from the State. And then structural adjustment hit us. We didn't know what to do at first. We had to learn to depend on ourselves, that we couldn't sit and wait for the State to take care of us, that we had to do something. And that's what we've done. Now, we make things happen for ourselves, we don't wait for someone to come to us. Now, we are the generation of Structural Adjustment.

The strike, I have suggested, was a signifier for many, indicating new fault lines and new alliances. The way in which the strike evaporated was equally significant: the generation of structural adjustment, it seemed, had a different kind of power, and a different kind of subjectivity. Rather than demanding power, they would be empowered. Through a program for providing debt to wean youth from their addiction to the state, a new field of power was being created in which the state, IOs, and NGOs were woven together in complex ways.

Some of the participants in the strike over debt, and many of their funders, argued that taking on debt in order to open up microenterprises was a form of empowerment. When funders spoke about power in reference to microenterprise or civil society, the word power was always cushioned by a prefix and suffice that turned it into something else altogether – empowerment. Those carrying out the strike at the bank slipped, in the first place – leaving aside the question of whether or not they were crooks – because their referents were to power, to a context of struggles over power. Rather, it turned out, the issue at stake was to be empowerment, not power. And a particular form of empowerment – empowerment via debt.

EMPOWERMENT DEBT AND FIELDS OF POWER

Empowerment debt maps out fiscal pathways through the social field of those excluded from the statistics of national economies and GNP. That terrain is usually characterized by the term of "informal economy." As I have discussed elsewhere (Elyachar 2003), that informal economy became the object of interest to IOs and development funders in the 1980s as a potential safety net for those left out of the riches of globalization. In that informal economy, it seemed, economy was never economy alone. This phenomenon was nothing new to anthropologists. As opposed to the transactions and interactions of the modern West, it was long assumed, the "underdeveloped world" studied by anthropologists was characterized by interactions in which there was no simple relationship of ends and means. Interactions in the "underdeveloped world," it was said, were always about more than one thing. Not just an exchange of money for goods, for example. Interactions were complex and multifaceted. Anthropologists had been making the point in their theorizing about gift exchange ever since Mauss (Mauss 1967). It was likewise assumed that informal practices, in which networks and webs of multiplex relationships (Gluckman 1967)

dominated social and political organization, were characteristic of the kind of places that anthropologists usually studied: out there, in the field, away from the modern, among the underdeveloped and the indigenous.[26] The formal and the informal were not *coeval* (Fabian 1983).[27]

That assumption was later undermined. Anthropologists turned their gaze to the West in the anthropology of modernity opened up by Foucault (Rabinow 1989; Mitchell 1991; Rofel 1999), to the countries and cultures that long formed the assumed counterpart to their objects of study elsewhere, somewhere else, out in the field. And there they found, together with sociologists and political scientists adopting the ethnographic method, that the networks of "there" formed a key part of life "here" as well. Ethnographies of the state made this point forcefully. In some formulations, the state began to be discussed as "imagined" (Gupta 1995), in a fashion parallel to Benedict Anderson's formulation of the issue of the "nation" (Anderson 1983). Herzfeld argued that the state in the "west" was no more rational, and no less symbolic, than the state in societies usually studied by anthropologists (Herzfeld 1992). The point that the state was far less coherent than we might have thought was made in political science as well. In an influential article that sparked much debate, Mitchell argued that the state should be analyzed not as a structure but as a structural effect of dispersed disciplinary practices (Mitchell 1991b).

It is an interesting historical fact that the eye of anthropologists turned to the state just as state sovereignty was increasingly being challenged in the era of globalization. It is still hard to discern whether such informal structures became more visible because more people were looking for them, or whether something new was going on in the period characterized by declining sovereignty of the state and changing modes of power in the world. Is the perceived rise of networks and informal forms of organization a consequence of the dissolving of the sovereignty of the state? Does the rise of "network society" (Castells 1996) indicate that power has become unbound from the state? Or are networks just an intellectual fashion that will pass with the times? That is something that only time will tell. The answers need not be contradictory.

Some things are more certain. The kind of informal structures that had always the domain of anthropological interest "elsewhere," became more and more relevant around the world at the turn of the millennium. The concepts of informality and networks became central to the praxis of powerful IOs like the World Bank. The networks that stood revealed in the era of globalization may always have been there, "here," among "us," as well as out "there," among "them." Anthropologists have pointed out that informal structures of power underlay, and were the barnacles to, the overarching structure of the state (Wolf 1999; Verdery 1998; Scott 1998). The point was not that the state didn't matter, or that the state was imaginary. Rather, all formal structures work in part due to the informal processes that lie underneath. Ethnographic research as employed by anthropologists, in

[26] On the bipolar locations of "the field" and "home," see Gupta and Ferguson 1997.

[27] For a good summary of alternative formulations of this issue of the denial of *coevalness*, see Frow 1997, pp. 1-12.

turn, naturally emphasized the informal, the practice, the *parole*, rather than the formal logic of bureaucracy, or the *langue* that was the concern of the sociologists.

When power is unbound from the sovereign state, then those informal networks hidden behind that sovereign power stand more clearly revealed. When states become unravelled, then informal structures assume far more importance (Hibou 1999). Much of life can become wrapped up in mobilizing as many possible networks of relationships as possible in order to increase the possibilities of survival. The point has been made quite forcefully in the African context by Sara Berry (Berry 1995), and in the context of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by Caroline Humphrey and Katherine Verdery (Verdery 1998). Informal networks acquire increasing importance in a world where political order is in a state of flux. The growing importance of networks, as an object of analysis and as empirical reality, thus needs to be analyzed in the context of changes in the nature and location of power. The state is not disappearing, but power — tactical or structural — is clearly not bound today by any clear "container." (Giddens 1985; Walker 1993; Gupta 1999).

Gupta has drawn on Ruggie's concept of the "unbound territoriality" of the nation-state to describe the transformations of the state in the era of globalization (Gupta 19959). I suggest, in turn, that it is power rather than territoriality that is being set free from the bounds of the sovereign state. Unbounded power is, in part, being vested in a deterritorialized "people" on the one hand, and a global "market" on the other. In such a context, both tactical and structural power need to be approached as a nexus that crosses previously distinct levels of analysis — the state, the global, and the local.

Networks of community support have long existed among the disenfranchised of the world. Programs for informal economy and microenterprise grew out of research into those networks of survival, research that was sponsored, in large part, by IOs such as the World Bank and the ILO. Those survival networks, in turn, have gained increasing strategic importance in the context of globalization and the unbundling of the power of the nation-state. Flowing through those networks, and sometimes linking them up to other institutional forms of power such as IOs, can be traced the flow of debt and finance. As the sea of the state power recedes (whether in empirical terms, or thanks to the shifting conceptual gaze enabled by Foucault), those informal networks become more visible. What, in turn, is the relation of those informal networks to those networks that are being built up in an emerging global nexus of power?

Poor people, as the literature on informal economy and microenterprise movement has documented around the world, are good credit risks. At the same time, in the downsized state, policing and regulatory costs are reduced by banks' and IOs' adaptation of "community lending groups," noted in development studies of the third world informal economy for years: If one doesn't pay, the whole lending group can go to jail, or be sanctioned in other ways by the community.[28] No less than Clifford Geertz was perhaps

[28] Nor are such policies irrelevant to the US: conservative politician Jack Kemp was the first to pick up this trend in his proposal for empowerment zones in the ghetto. The Nation of Islam and then President Clinton adopted as their own the strategy of microenterprise loans as empowerment as well.

the first to make the point about the importance of such lending groups for development. In 1962, he expressed the view that such revolving credit associations were a "middle rung" in development (Geertz 1962). Such views were abandoned by Geertz, and few anthropologists after post-modernism would write about developing the "sub-altern" in such terms. But the insights of Geertz and other anthropologists[29] helped launch the new wave of development thinking, shaped around the notion of social capital, when his insight was picked up by James Coleman in his seminal article on social capital (Coleman 2000).

When links of mutual dependence expressed in local cultural forms are championed, however, the community does not extract all the "value" of these links. Rather, the value of social networks is transformed into an efficient revenue-gathering device to repay debts to the bank/NGO mediators of the finance flowing into the third world from IOs. This was best captured for me in one training program for NGOs lending to microenterprises and the informal economy. Participants were exhorted to discover the cultural methods particular to their own society for enforcing social discipline, and to consciously use such methods to enforce the collection of debt. We were encouraged to brainstorm about what those cultural traits might be. Program leaders and participants volunteered examples of such methods in Latin America, Africa, and their own societies in the Arab world. None of this is too different from the ways in which colonial structures of indirect rule mobilized local cultural practice, except that the sphere of intervention is finance, not political rule. While these issues are fundamentally political, the language and tools of revisionist neoclassical economics are often the vehicle through which these efforts were carried out—thus facilitating a depoliticizing effect (Ferguson 1990).

Does the rise of NGOs and "global civil society" constitute an new field of power? Can informal networks of the poor be transformed into NGOs, and consolidated into an alternative power force of "global civil society" that can counter the hegemonic project of globalization? Could such a "global civil society" itself gain hegemony? Would "grassroots globalization" (Appadurai 2000) be democratic? What happens to other forms of power that are not reconstituted as NGOs? Can the power generated in the social networks of the poor be tapped on and appropriated by those already empowered by globalization and neoliberalismi? Do informal networks within local communities represent a new emerging market, as sometimes seems to be the hope of investors? Does the "financialization of the globe," extending into the deepest recesses of the disenfranchised via microloans, represent a form of economic accumulation? What kind of power is entailed by empowering debt? The oddest incidents, like striking for debt at a bank, can at least help us to start thinking about the answer to that question.

Inchoate new forms of power were mediated by debt and finance at the turn of the 18th century. Those debates about debt, as it turns out, were linked to the rise of both the modern state and commercial society. I would like to suggest that debates about debt in our own times are also important signals about transformations in the nature of the state

[29] Coleman also drew on the analytic contributions of Max Gluckman to anthropology, about simplex and multiplex relations, to make his argument (Gluckman, 1967; cited in Coleman, 2000: 26).

and commercial society. In this period as well, new forms of debt have arisen and come to be viewed as something dangerous. In this period too, efforts have been also launched to absorb that which was frightening into something positive and uplifting. I suggest that these new forms of debt that I call empowerment debt are linked to the possible end of the sovereign state and a deep transformation in the nature of market society at the time of triumph of global capitalism. We, too, are witnessing efforts to transform dangerous debts into a source of moral virtue — of empowerment. At the turn of the millennium, at a moment when Hume's concerns about the death of the nation-state seemed to have come true, preoccupation with debt and credit — as a source of danger and as a source of virtue — was no less intense. Here, too, new forms of debt can be studied as an indicator of new forms of power and political subjectivities. At the turn of the millennium, I am suggesting, empowerment debt is at the center of a new locus of power and generative of new political subjectivities. It is important as part of a new field of power that cuts across the bounds of national, international, and local institutions.

While it is not yet clear how history will designate the era we are living through, as one of "neoliberalism," "globalization" or "millennial capitalism," it does seem clear that the transformations underway at the turn of the millennium mark a sea-change as great as the 18th century rise of political economy, public debt, and commercial society. As in the phase of upheaval in the 18th century I discussed above, debt and finance at the turn of the millennium mediated debate both about what was frightening, and about what was morally uplifting, in a time of great change. Debt not only appeared as a force destructive to humanity at the turn of the millennium. It also emerged as an instrument of empowerment and liberation.

In our own day as well, there are efforts to transform what is frightening in a new world order into more uplifting images. In the 18th century, Addison suppressed the image of the rentier and stressed the figure of the entrepreneur (see above). In our own day, it is rather the masses of structurally unemployed in the underbelly of globalization, who are being transformed into a vital image of budding entrepreneurs. That transformation is being effected via the liberating medium of debt and finance. The image of that entrepreneur may be absurd on some levels, but it is a powerful one at the same time: to become an entrepreneur was a subjectivity adopted by those who took out loans they could ill afford. The loans functioned as a way in which a new subjectivity was created on the one hand and, on the other, in which new relations of power were being forged. In those relations, the state was not in a direct relation to its citizens via fiscality. Rather, the youth graduate microenterpreneurs who carried out the sit-in at the bank were in a fiscal relation with IOs, and organized themselves into an NGO in order to access that debt. The state, in turn, inserted itself into this relation in order to gain access to rents this relationship allowed. The sit-in at the bank was not a strike against the state or a capitalist firm. It was a strike for incorporation, along with many others higher up on the financial feeding chain set into motion by the World Bank and others, into an emerging form of rule in which debt, NGOs, and fiscality are key.

How to think about that form of rule is a key question that many are struggling with today. Many think about these issues in terms of globalization. Others have been

turning to Foucault's notion of governmentality. Many have recently found his concept to be a useful way to discuss evolving forms of power that lie behind the boundaries of the state. The advantages of the concept of governmentality as a way to analyze this new situation are many. Those being empowered by debt are not of interest as "citizens of a sovereign state." Population — not citizenry — is the object of programs of intervention that were initiated by IOs to "alleviate poverty" or to help the poor help themselves. The object of these acts of governing is clearly not to increase the sovereignty of the state. (And without the state, it makes little sense to talk about citizenry.) But, as I have argued elsewhere, the use of Foucault's concept of governmentality to examine the complex relations of states, IOs, NGOs, and social movements is equally problematic (Elyachar 2002). As a concept, governmentality defines away the state as an object of analysis. This, despite the fact that Foucault was theorizing the nature of power within the territory of the state when he developed his concept. In the notion of governmentality, the move to transnationality — like the move to micro-power — is already subsumed into the theoretical perspective, rather than problematized as an issue for analysis. For once the object of disciplinary measures is a "population," rather than a citizenry, the move to a global scale is already implicit. Populations are universal; they refer not to political identity, rather to human identity as a category outside of political divisions (Malkki 1994; Mastnak 1996). If this is the case, then the adoption of the concept of "transnational governmentality," as has recently been proposed by Ferguson and Gupta, may not solve the dilemma (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Rather, I propose, we should look further into odd incidents like strikes for debt to see the ways in which debt, the state, and political subjectivities are woven together in an emerging nexus of power.

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POVZETEK

Stavkanje za dolg: moč, finance in prakse vladanja v Egiptu

Članek analizira pojav novih oblik moči na prelomu tisočletja, ki se izražajo skozi medij dolga. Jedro članka je etnografska analiza protestnega shoda v kairski banki, ki so ga organizirali člani tamkajšnjih nevladnih organizacij, da bi si pridobili dostop do posojil Svetovne Banke. Spoznanja s terenskega dela so interpretirana z navezavo na zgodovinske debate o dolgu v 18. stoletju, v katerih so gledali na dolg kot na silo, ki in korumpira in osvobaja. Ta zgodovinska razprava je nadvse relevantna za razumevanje vzpona »dolga, ki daje moč«, ki smo mu priče danes.

Ključne besede: Egipt, Srednji Vzhod, politična antropologija, ekonomska antropologija, dolg, trgovanje.

DOES THE NINE-YEAR PRIMARY SCHOOL FAVOUR LEARNING OVER TEACHING?

BOGOMIR NOVAK
Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana
Bogomir.Novak@pei.si

ABSTRACT

The main objective of this article is to find out to what extent the Slovene nine-year primary schools implemented new learning, thinking and teaching styles in an attempt to improve the quality of teaching. We have used the following research instruments: observations of classes of the three eight-year and three nine-year primary schools, questionnaires for the teachers and interviews conducted with the pupils, teachers and headmasters. The main hypothesis is that by using all four teaching styles (of a waiter, constructor, alpine guide, and gardener) teachers find it easier to consider the interests of pupils for learning and thinking than by using only the first style of a waiter.

The curricula of the nine-year primary school are more process- and goal-oriented than the curricula of the eight-year school, that are subject-oriented; teachers of the nine-year primary school have to perform new tasks and consult other colleagues at their own school and in other schools with regard to their experience in achieving new objectives. The burden on pupils is balanced in the last three years of primary school by teaching at three levels. Such teaching is flexible enough to allow pupils to move from one level group to another on the basis of their abilities demonstrated in a level group. At the highest level it is easiest for the teachers to teach transformationally and for the pupils to develop flexible thinking involving empirical, rational and intuitive thinking as well as experiential learning in transformational, auto-reflexive and creative terms. In general, nine-year primary schools do not yet favour learning over teaching with the exception of the most talented pupils - since the culture of learning has only now started to develop.

Key words: teaching styles, learning styles, thinking styles, eight-year primary school, nine-year primary school, pupil, transmissive school paradigm, transformational school paradigm.

[1] Like the Maribor study (Scmidt, 2002), this evaluation study was financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of Slovenia (2000 - 2002). Its final report can be obtained from the Institute of Education.

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1. Premise of the concepts, hypotheses, objectives and application of the research instruments

This article focuses on an interpretation of the results of the evaluation study *The importance of implementing new learning, thinking and teaching styles to ease the mind of pupils in the nine-year primary school*[1], on the results of Maribor evaluation study by Schmidt, M. (2002) *Reform in educational process: evalvation study, integrated report* and on the criticism of the current analyses of school reform.

The observations of evaluation study (Novak et al. 2002) were made in classes of social sciences (history or geography), science (mathematics or physics) and language (the Slovene or the English language) in the 6th and 7th grade of the three eight-year and in the 7th and 8th grade of the three nine-year primary schools. We also used questionnaires for the teachers and interviews conducted with the teachers and headmasters. The shift of school paradigm from the transmissive to a transformational, process-based concept of education is regarded by the critics of the recent curricular reform after 1999 (the result of which is the nine-year primary school) as a basic problem, whereas its founding fathers do not see it as a basic objective of school development. It is well known that a shift of school paradigm from transmissive to transformational is not possible if priority is not given to learning over teaching. Giving priority does not, however, mean replacing teaching by learning. It simply means organising teaching in such a way that pupils can use their own learning and thinking styles. This is an interaction of three educational processes.[2]

The sample used in the survey was small: we did not have a larger sample because of the lack of finances and staff and because eight-year primary schools were prevalent at the time the survey was conducted. In the school year 2000/01 there were approximately 30% of all primary schools nine-year schools, in 2002/03 approximately 50%. In the school year 2003/04 all primary schools have introduced the nine-year school system from the first class onwards.

This evaluation study looked into didactic improvements of the advanced primary-school classes. In planning the evaluation study on didactic improvements of the advanced classes in primary school, the following hypotheses were set:

- by using all four teaching styles (of a waiter, constructor, alpine guide, gardener), teachers find it easier to consider the interests of pupils for learning and thinking than by using only the first style;

- the more teachers think independently, critically and creatively in teaching their subject, the more they encourage pupils to do the same;

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[2] For the fundamental differences between the two models/paradigms, see the paper of Marentič Požarnik et al. (1998), and Novak (2000b) and Ivanuš Grmek M. (2001).

[3] Here I would like to pay tribute to an unknown reviewer for his/her comments on this paper. (S)he put forward that at least as far as learning and thinking go, this is not a novelty, at least in Western educational systems. Nevertheless, in Slovenia teachers are unaware what teaching styles they could use and how they would thus promote students' learning styles.
We have established that learning is a polysemic concept. Interestingly, the literature on education does not offer the distinction between regular and campaign learning even though it is a popular topic of discussion in schools.

- the more a teacher includes pupils in all class-work activities, the more they help pupils to develop their own learning and thinking styles.

These hypotheses were reached through analysis of the existent educational practise before the curricular reform (1996-1999); however, they are still valid. The educational pluralism has been tested by distribution of learning styles.[3] We differentiate between the experiential learning, i. e. in its narrow, empirical and non-reflected sense as well as in its broader, reflected, holistic, personally-significant and transformational sense (Jarvis 1998, 2001). Experiential learning can be defined according to the notions of the model of learning, whereby learning starts with an experience, and is followed by reflection, debate, analysis and evaluation of the experience. It is very uncommon to learn from an experience that has not been evaluated, assigned our own value in terms of our own objectives, ambitions and expectations. These processes bring about insights, discoveries, understanding and getting a whole picture out of individual parts. The experience is assigned a special value in relation to other experiences.[4] These inter-relations are then conceptualised, synthesised and integrated into an individual system of positions that a pupil takes on the world. Through that system a pupil observes, perceives, categorises, evaluates and gets to know the experiences.

Learning, thinking and teaching form one cluster. A difference between thinking and learning is an abstract one since we cannot differentiate between the two. The reason for that is that we think about the thing we are learning. In the same way, a teacher cannot teach what she/he has not learnt. Since every kind of learning is in a sense experiential learning (in terms of empirical or at least reflective experience), it is associated with our personality either superficially or more profoundly. Learning styles according to Entwistle (1988) are deep, surface and strategic styles. These styles are connected with holistic and serialist styles. Findings of research on the School for commissioned officers show us what kinds of styles students have. The results are compared with other research engaged in higher education. Even though classifications of learning, thinking and teaching may differ significantly, they essentially deal with the difference between what is partial and what is whole. Entwistle's classification is handy since it stresses the difference in motives for learning: pupils studying in order to get good marks do not study in depth, in a personally relevant manner and in the long run. An individual experience is for them like a tree; and they cannot see the forest for the trees. This kind of pupil is in the majority,

[4] Experiential learning has four distinct meanings:
- The first one involves learning from life and work experience; the experience provides a basis for creating new ways of learning in higher education, employment and professional organisations.
- The second one concentrates on experiential learning as a basis for introducing changes to the structures, purposes and curricula of higher and university education.
- The third one emphasises the raising of the collective consciousness, working in a community and its component in the process of social changes.
- The fourth one implies personal growth, self-awareness and collective efficiency. (Susan W. Weil and Ian McGill 1989: 3) Only the last meaning is in compliance with transformative learning.

[5] Note the distinction between various types of thinking (see Novak 2000a). Sternberg (1997), for example, distinguishes between monarchic, hierarchic, oligarchic and anarchic forms as well as legislative, executive and judicial functions of thinking styles.

regardless of the school type or level. This kind of pupil cannot think critically. If teachers do not encourage them to do so, they do not act in accordance with the objectives of the reform, i. e. qualitative knowledge and development of critical thinking.

Cognitive styles, that include thinking styles, are classified by Rancourt (Marentič Požarnik, 1995) as empirical, rational and noetic.[5] The first one is based on logical inference and argumentation, the second on observation and collection of information and the third on the subjective insights. Empirical thinking cannot be regarded as critical as it is not differentiated. Instead it involves, similarly to the basic learning, only memorising; it can become critical at the rational levels, i. e. differentiating and intuitive-associative or synthetic levels.

The following teaching styles can be differentiated:

1. teaching as a process of transmission (transfer) of knowledge in a form adapted to the pupil;
2. teaching as a process of shaping pupils' capabilities and skills;
3. teaching as a journey or guiding a pupil on the way to his/her goals: the teacher offers the pupil a possibility to be independent and helps him/her to stay on the track;
4. teaching as an encouragement of the pupil's development by giving the pupil various sources, experiences and incentives (Fox 1983, quoted in Marenti~ Po`arnik 2000: 256).

Metaphors serve as a mind jogger and the teacher's four teaching styles could therefore be described as: (1) a waiter or a delivery van (2) a constructor or a sculptor (3) an alpine guide and (4) a gardener. The teachers were not informed about these teaching styles, but the researcher can recognise them in several indirect ways:

- how frequently teachers use various didactic methods and forms,
- their orientation toward pupil or toward a subject,
- the other opposite characteristics of transmissive and transformational school models.

In various subjects in the nine-year primary school we observed that pupils look for information on their own in order to find answers to the questions posed or to solve problems. Teachers choose their teaching styles considering how quickly and in what way pupils can grasp the ideas. In addition, teachers help their pupils by repeating the rules, by drawing their attention to some methods of problem solving. Teachers can give difficult exercises to more advanced pupils who are at a higher level and who can solve the problems more quickly.

Because the first teaching style (waiter) prevails at a school, this indicates the transmissive school paradigm. The latter three styles i. e. sculptor, alpine guide and gardener – take into account the pupil's interests and indicate the transformational paradigm. It is clear that the last three styles are more difficult to put into practice in primary schools because some conditions have to be fulfilled – e. g. competent teachers who are not just experts but also educators, appropriate teaching material (more textbooks, workbooks, modern teaching technology), level teaching, adaptation to various learning, thinking and teaching styles, expectations of parents and of school management. The teacher usually favours only one style, which on its own does not represent a transformational paradigm.

With regard to the various teacher's roles, both teaching styles are cognitive: the transmissive style is cognitive because of the transfer of knowledge; the transformational styles are cognitive because of the host of other reasons (such as cooperation with the

Table 1: The relationships between transmissive and transformative learning

Inhibiting factors	Promoting factors
Teacher's one-way communication with pupils	Two-way interactive communication between the teacher and pupils
Pupils are only externally motivated for learning and they do not cooperate among themselves	Pupils have inner motivation for learning and they cooperate among themselves
Pupils' family background is not stimulating	Pupils' family background is stimulating
Teachers do not teach their pupils how to learn	Teachers do teach their pupils how to learn
Teacher mainly uses one didactic method and form of teaching	Teacher uses various didactic methods and forms of teaching
Teacher uses mainly first style (waiter) of teaching	Teacher uses all four teaching styles
Teacher has no knowledge of how to motivate pupils	Teacher uses various kinds of knowledge with a view to motivating pupils
Transmissive school model	Transformative school, teaching and learning

pupil, encouraging and guiding the pupil, research). The transmissive teaching style does not aim at developing critical thinking and quality learning (creative, quantum, interactive, transformational, personally important, holistic, reflexive, experiential and lifelong). Through transmissive non-reflective learning, primary schools maintain declarative, factual, repetition knowledge. Only through transformational learning, can constructive and procedural learning emerge, which is a way to strategic and conditional knowledge.[6]

Senge (2000) puts forward a transformational definition of learning as changing oneself and the environment. Only transformational learning is personally significant and experiential in the larger sense of meaning, therefore, pupils have to know what they are learning for. Teachers as reflective practitioners explore the learning and teaching possibilities with a view to discovering new methods in order to make learning individuals pursue changes on their own. This should be a tendency of all those involved in education.

2. Interdependence between teaching, learning and thinking

The transmissive model of mass school is gradually becoming obsolete as many styles of carrying out school tasks are gaining grounds. Nevertheless, today teachers in

[6] The more complex teachers's knowledge is, the more complex is the knowledge expected from their pupils. Teachers' professional knowledge can be of various types. These are: content, expert and subject knowledge, general educational knowledge (being familiar with theories, empirical findings, visions and standpoints on classwork, upbringing, school, evaluation from the point of education, didactics and other disciplines), psychological knowledge (being familiar with developmental particularities and differences between individuals and with the process of learning), knowledge in special didactics (i. e. content educational knowledge), curricular knowledge (being familiar with legislation, curricula, school system), practical (action, experience and situation) knowledge (know-how, being familiar with the scope of skills and capabilities) (Marentič-Požarnik 2000: 6-7).

classes of up to 20 pupils do not have the time nor perhaps the capacity to determine the abilities of individual pupils. All pupils have to do the same exercises at the same time. The transformation shift raises the question of how to turn learning into teaching or vice versa effectively and in a qualitative manner. The answer can be provided by putting into practice interactive communication between a teacher and pupils, especially when a teacher allows pupils to know more than (s)he does (Sotto 1994); although, teachers can rarely learn from pupils.

Pupils have to solve clearly defined problems by finding the missing datum on the basis of the given data and making use of the rules they have previously learnt. Such procedural thinking is in correlation with convergent learning, which leads to only one correct answer. Experiential learning makes sense when a teacher admits and positively assesses many correct answers. But this is rarely the case even in social sciences and languages.

The public compulsory primary school has not yet been sufficiently oriented toward developing the pupil's personality. Therefore, some teachers do not teach how to learn. As problem-solving was virtually unknown, memorising facts prevailed as a result of non-reflective learning. Thus a pupil does not know nor does he/she select the special learning strategies. On the other hand, the pluralistic teaching, learning and thinking styles[7] are only one of the conditions for the transformational school model and thus for a shift from the school with the objective being knowledge as a result of learning, to the school oriented to the process of learning and communication. The teacher's chosen purpose and the selected didactical means enable relations perceived in the actual process of teaching through the chosen communication strategy. If communication is interactive and dialogical, relations are formed at a high psychological level, otherwise they remain invisible and at a lower level. However, this relation is intrinsic to the very definition of learning: a process of mind which leads to changes at various levels, ranging from intra-personal (in terms of evaluation, norms, views), interpersonal (in terms of relation to others, e. g. co-operation) to a specific educational level of upbringing, knowledge and teaching as a way of getting used to learning.

By making use of different teaching styles, teachers try to approach pupils by being as open in their comprehension as possible so that they can take into account their different thinking and learning styles. The incompatibility in the styles of a teacher and a pupil decreases the possibility for their fruitful communication. It is impossible to find a correlation between every teaching and every learning style since styles are limited by divergent interests and capabilities of pupils and teachers. Pupils with lower results and less interest find the first teaching style better, while those with better results – possibly in a higher level group in the nine-year school – prefer the latter three. In a class where pupils are not differentiated into groups with lower/better results, a teacher can less

[7] The pluralism of educational interests can be understood as a way to holism. Pluralism is often understood just politically but it should be also understood as multicultural, religious, economic (the privatisation process in post-socialist countries) and educational pluralism. Pediček (1990) described education at several levels from the ontological, epistemological, psychological, pedagogical-didactical to the anthropological ones.

readily and only exceptionally decide to use the styles of an alpine guide or of a gardener and thus promote a creative, mainly noetic thinking. On the basis of the research methods used and described here, teaching styles and pupils' thinking and learning have been put into correlation. Therefore, they can now be classified in two groups:

1. The prevailing *ex-cathedra* teaching (a teacher as an authority), waiter teaching style oriented to the expert knowledge and use of lower psychological capabilities by overburdening pupils bring about pupils' convergent learning styles in empirical or rational thinking styles.

2. Teaching styles of sculptor, alpine guide and gardener with group and individual form of learning (which are directed to pupils' interests and use of pupils' higher psychological capabilities) lead to reflexive experiential learning and a flexible thinking style (including empirical rational and intuitive styles).

Pupils themselves with their flexible thinking and teachers with their creative teaching encourage the use of the latter three teaching styles. Therefore, if teachers are not only experts in their own subject matter but are also flexible and complex professionals[8], they can find or create opportunities to use transformational styles in pupils, teaching technology and school atmosphere.

2.1. What is it that enables and limits the implementation of new teaching, learning and thinking styles in schools?

Both the eight-year and the nine-year primary schools aspire to creativity. But something hinders this. It is well known that the external tranquillity for being internally excited is an essential precondition for pupils' creativity. When they are noisy (shouting one over another), they cannot focus on the learning content. Noise is inevitably noticeable, disturbing and a warning signal in the communication between teachers and pupils, especially when didactic innovations are being put into practice. No thinking style can fully be expressed if pupils are disturbing each other in using their own thinking style. Negative noise distracts pupils' attention from learning content and solving problems. According to Pšunder (2004) a teacher is able to discipline the class only if (s)he has

[8] In comparison between the eight- and nine-year primary school, I make use also of the findings of the project *Anthropological Research of Political Culture and School* (1997-1999), of which I was the principal researcher (member on the project was also J. Kolenc). See also Ivanuš Grmek (2000: 35).

[9] A reviewer of this paper wrote: a reader might get an impression what a noisy school you have in Slovenia. A very commonsensical remark »Noise distracts pupils' attention from learning content and solving problems« and previous sentences do not tell us anything about when, where, how this noise occurs. Moreover, I cannot see how these statements about noise can lead to conclusion that »the pupils' activities in primary school are in general not based on their reflexive experiential learning«. It is also not clear what (and how and why) can be expected at the highest level of the primary school (I suppose reflexive experiential learning).

My response would be the following. Of course it is not only the noise which has negative impact on learning in school since noise could be positive as well. The difficulty is that some teachers seem to be able to get at least some attention for their subject only through repressive methods, personal remarks and threats of giving low marks. This however cannot be concluded by simply observing the classes and analysing the questionnaires but only through interviews with teachers (admitting to it) and headmasters.

brought into line her/his own experience from childhood, patterns (s)he has learnt, experience of her/his colleagues, own current experience and the books on the topic. This is the most advanced level of her/his professionalism.[9] Therefore, it can be concluded that the pupils' activities in primary school are in general not based on their reflexive experiential learning. Nevertheless, that can be expected at the highest level of the primary school, i. e. in the third triad of the nine-year primary school.

Due to new and complex educational expectations, teachers often find themselves in a more stressful situation than they were used to and they complain of being under pressure. Therefore, it goes without saying that demands for innovation are put into practice differently with regard to the subject and school in question. Some schools place more emphasis on quality of education, others, i. e. mainly nine-year primary schools, on how to maintain the achieved level since this could drop with time – what is good today, will no longer be good tomorrow. The participants in education can help themselves by knowing the prevalent styles at the school, some key factors influencing the pupils' prevalent learning style at the school, i. e. curricula, textbooks, teaching technology, pluralism of teaching styles and implicit learning theories of teachers and pupils' parents.

Be it in social sciences, language or science subjects, pupils think critically and learn creatively when they look for the rules and definitions themselves, when they recognise general patterns in special cases either in a group or individually. In teaching with the waiter style, the correct thinking is prevalent whereby a question, usually asked by teacher, can have only one correct answer. This style does not develop variety of teaching and thinking styles and is present to a greater degree in eight-year primary schools.

Not long ago there was some criticism in Slovenia with regard to its school system remaining to be too selective which leads to the hectic competitiveness. The pupils have too much to learn, but they do not know how to do it efficiently. Therefore, they concentrate too much on memorising. As a result the pupils suffer from promotional neurosis too early and do not perform well in the functional literacy in comparison with other European countries. As a reason for the poorer performance, I have put forward the transmissive school model, which is too rigid (Novak 2000). But some reformed curricula in Slovene schools are still overtaxing, which has to reproductive knowledge, thinking and learning. Consequently, the achieved result is the same.

Pluralistic teaching, learning and thinking styles are a condition for the transformational school model and thus for a shift from the school oriented to acquiring knowledge as a result of learning to the school oriented to the process of learning and communication. If teacher-pupil communication is interactive and dialogical, relations are formed at a high psychological level, otherwise they remain at a lower level. The relation is intrinsic to the very definition of learning. As the process of mind leading to intra-personal (in terms of evaluation, norms, views), interpersonal (in terms of relation to others, e. g. Cupertino) and educational changes in knowledge, skills and values.

A new question is how pupils influence teachers' selection of teaching styles even though it is clear that teachers are under such influence (un)willingly. Some teachers find their incentive for transformational teaching styles in the pupils with better results - possibly in a higher level group in the nine year school. In a class where pupils are not

differentiated into groups by ability, a teacher can less readily and only exceptionally decide to use the styles of an alpine guide or of a gardener and thus promote a creative, mainly noetic thinking.

3. The characteristics of the Slovene primary school after curriculum reform

The curricular reform has brought about a goal-oriented curriculum, attempts to ease the load of learning contents and underlined the significance of developing independent and critical thinking of pupils. In 1999 the implementation of the nine-year school started with a view to easing the load of automatic learning and memorising facts. The expression »transformational model« has been put forward, in Slovenia, by some experts (Marentič Požarnik 1998, Bečaj 2001, Erčulj 2001 and Novak 2000b) as a criticism of the reform.

The curricular reform has not changed just the learning content but also the aims and methods. The styles of educational practice are differentiated. The most prominent has become teaching for the sake of creative learning with joy. The teacher is more and more a promoter of student's personal development by encouraging development of pupils' eagerness for knowledge and by helping them to choose learning and thinking styles adapted to their personal aptitudes.

Obviously the transmissive model is characterised by the class and bell system (bell marking the end of a class), hierarchy of relations prevailing over their democracy, indoctrination instead of the application of methods for the development of critical thinking, and pseudo-activity of pupils. These do not correspond to the current needs, nevertheless, they are still dominant.

Possibly, the Slovene primary school has programme characteristics (of various degrees) of the transformational school paradigm, such as: implementation of the integrated curriculum; application of interactive communication in concentric circles: pupils and their teacher, teachers among themselves, teachers and the head-teacher, teachers and parents, school and the environment; consistent development of biological, psychosocial and spiritual layers; inter-institutional school ties (local community, enterprises, health centres, other schools); modification of thinking, learning and teaching styles. In transformational school, teaching styles denote learning in the broadest sense. This means the use of such flexible styles of teaching, thinking and learning that entail many layers of existence and not just one, e. g. the rational or the empirical.

Accordingly, the image of good teachers changes, as teachers become multi-skilled professionals. They are both educated and educators (*homo educans and homo educator*) and must learn how to teach pupils. Besides knowledge about the subject they teach, they also need knowledge about learning and teaching. A good teacher[10] teaches the learners how to learn by organising the subject systematically and most effectively. Challenges are also in creating a positive self-image of students and teachers, in develop-

[10] A good teacher is not just the one who can distinguish well (e. g. between autocracy and autonomy, norms and consciousness, teaching oneself and others) but also the one who knows that he/she will be conquered in the battle of gaining new knowledge. As long as the teacher wants to maintain the role of a good teacher, he/she is going to be even more inquisitive than the pupils.

ing independent critical thinking, in increasing the number of roles and tasks of students and teachers, in integrative teaching of children with special educational needs and in quality of teaching.

The centralised school system, great expectations of school authorities and of pupils' parents regarding school, the need to preserve the positive self-image of the teachers, the conflicting interests of the participants in education as well as other characteristics of school were put, for the purposes of this paper, under elements of its lower transformationality – this limits the objectivity of our conclusions gained through analysis of data collected with empirical instruments.

In the interviews teachers of nine-year primary schools gave more answers suggesting the transformational school model than did teachers of eight-year primary schools. They aim to a greater extent at achieving learning objectives and not only at passing on learning contents, as they have the support of the school and colleagues. Therefore, they take into account more the interdisciplinary approach in teaching and assessing and discussions in classroom. All teachers have to consider the pupils' achievements in the subject-matter and in terms of development of their interests.[11] However, nine-year primary school teachers consider to a far greater extent the need of pupils to be familiar with the new learning methods. The interviews with pupils on the selected sample of primary schools indicate that the nine-year primary school pupils have more interest in the problem of teaching and learning than their peers from the eight-year schools; however only a minority of them is familiar with publications on the topic, with the types of learning, and has heard of the techniques and new evaluation of knowledge.[12]

Factors positively influencing teacher's education include flexible organisation of school work (in contrast with the rigid timetable system), help of colleagues, cooperation of a team of teachers teaching at the same level, understanding of the school management, possibility of extended periods of study leave, susceptibility to didactic alternatives and innovations. Nonetheless, self-motivation remains the most important factor. The transmissive model of a closed (i.e. inert) public school with familiar characteristics restrains education and learning to a large extent.

Teachers' further education is a great impetus for the quality of classes. Although the government maintains that teachers are well prepared to teach by the new programmes of the nine-year primary school, the practice shows that this kind of education is lacking. It is probable that the deficit in education of the teachers starting to teach in the first or the last three years of the nine-year primary school in 2003/2004 will become apparent later.

[11] By introducing a new culture of assessment and evaluation, the culture itself is subject to evaluation. The Educational board of the Republic of Slovenia has had a project 'New culture of evaluation and assessment', led by Z. Rutar Ilc since 1999. The project aims at primary and secondary schools. This issue is already well covered. As the basic reading on this topic, see Rutar Ilc, Z. (2000) Izhodišča nove kulture preverjanja znanja. In: *Vzgoja in izobraževanje* 31 (2-3): 78 - 81.

[12] For more of that see Novak, 2002.

Teachers in nine-year primary schools pursue the same form of graduate studies and hence they have the same sort of experience as their colleagues in the eight-year schools. However, they have more enthusiasm, work as a team and get incentives from the school management.

All teachers are included in the lifelong learning process for many reasons: increasing demands for their complex professionalism, the changing school paradigm, i.e. from transmissive to transformational, increasing needs for quality teaching, the changing programmes of teacher education and the fact that school is turning into an educational institution of central importance for information society. Teachers have to teach pupils and themselves how to learn.

Only one curricular reform cannot bring about a thorough transformation. However, Slovenia has not yet introduced a continuous school reform corresponding to the changes that are taking place thanks to the globalisation process.

4. Conclusion

Through I do not intend to go into details of evaluation studies (Gril 2003, Novak et al. 2002, Schmidt 2002), I would nevertheless put forward some of their relevant general conclusions:

- Implementation of a variety of teaching, learning and thinking styles in the Slovene schools leads to a greater activity of pupils and gives them a greater opportunity for experiential learning in a broader sense and leads to transition from the transmissive to the transformational school, greater activity of pupils.

- The transmissive teaching style of (1) a waiter is frequently used in the Slovene schools, unlike the styles of (2) a constructor (3) an alpine guide and (4) a gardener which are rarely used and appear together with the noetic thinking style and experiential learning in a broader sense.

- The educational process in which teachers play different roles (i.e. facilitators of pupils' personal development) by helping pupils to choose learning and thinking styles adapted to their personal aptitudes has already begun and it occurs more frequently at the lower level of primary school.

- Pupils can get information on learning in subjects, such as philosophy for children, ethics and society or in any other subject if their teacher wants his/her pupils to know how to learn to the best effect.

- The waiter style of teaching, empirical style of thinking and accommodative learning still prevail in the classes with pupils at lower levels or in mixed groups. In transformation school, teaching styles denote learning in the broadest sense. This means the use of such flexible styles of teaching, thinking and learning that entail many layers of existence and not just one, e. g. the rational or the empirical.

- Advanced pupils in classes at the highest level in the nine-year school co-operate more, associate the noetic and rational thinking styles as well as creative learning to a greater extent.

- Curricular reform with goal-oriented curriculum both accelerates and limits the development of pupils' independent, creative, critical and holistic thinking and experiential learning in a larger sense.

- Teachers who are still insufficiently educated or trained for optimal achievement of curricular reform objectives do not offer enough opportunity to pupils for problem solving and creative learning.

Our evaluation study has been made on a very small sample (including three eight-year and three nine-year schools); therefore its findings are valid only for the similar cases. Revisions of the curricula for primary schools have indeed given rise to implementation of various teaching, thinking and learning styles. Still, this is just the first stage of their implementation; therefore, the changes observed cannot be permanent. Managing (primary) schools for learning means managing them for critical thinking because learning is actually thinking with a view to acquiring new knowledge and transforming the old. Consequently our conclusion is that the mentioned hypotheses have been partially confirmed.

The results based on the teaching methods used show that in the nine-year schools, the focus has turned from teaching suited best to teachers and content-oriented curriculum to teaching tailored to pupils' interests, experiences and learning styles and based on the objectives of the subjects' curricula. Classes of the first grades of primary school are organised much more flexibly and holistically than at later stages. In the last three years of the primary school, the highest level of level teaching takes place.

The paper does not make comparisons only in the quality of teaching within one school but also between schools. Students in grammar schools have more motivation for learning than those in vocational training; similarly, students of the Faculty of arts are more motivated for learning than those of the Military Academy (Lavrič 2004).

To develop educational culture of learning, it is important to distinguish between learning in order to get a good mark and learning for life; between informal lifelong learning and formal learning which takes place in a school; between individual and social learning; learning as an intrinsically human function and learning as a cultivated function. These differences influence the selection of a strategy of efficient learning. The school reform has given the necessary impetus for a majority of pupils and students to make a shift from a quality lower level of learning to a quality demanding level. Teachers, though, do not have the necessary knowledge and skills to use alternative didactical methods in order to motivate students to organise their knowledge in a self-determined way and to select a strategy to self-regulate learning.

It is not possible to put in practice the transformational paradigm only within schools. The formal education is only one part of lifelong learning and informal education is the other one. The transformational model entails a process of learning and thinking with flexible styles. Educational anthropology defines a person as a being of learning and teaching in partial and holistic terms. Two types of persons can emerge. The first type is without any vision or mission, not personally engaged and having no intellectual stance, without any intention to change its environment and thus learn something. The second person has all these characteristics and is therefore flexible, cooperative, recognises his/her institution, knows how to think globally and act locally. Today's (primary) school focuses mainly on external assessment of knowledge and not on the new culture of assessment and evaluation. Thus it encourages development of the first type and not enough

of the second. Therefore, any knowledge acquired in this way is quickly fragmented and easy to forget. The same applies for the secondary school, since students there are more externally than internally motivated.

The share of ex cathedra teaching has dropped whereas the percentage of group learning is on the increase. The number of students learning on their own remained unchanged. Noticeably, the work is gradually becoming more individual and students get more actively involved in classes. Teachers see the importance of the nine-year primary schools in its didactic novelties.

Hopefully these conclusions answer at least partially the possible questions of a critical reader expecting more profound changes brought about by the nine-year primary school and a more detailed insight into these changes.

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POVZETEK

Ali je v devetletki učenje pomembnejše kot poučevanje?

Namen tega prispevka je ugotoviti, v koliki meri slovenska devetletka uvaja stile poučevanja, mišljenja in učenja z namenom izboljšati kvaliteto pouka. Uporabili smo naslednje raziskovalne metode: opazovanje pouka, ankete za učence in učitelje, intervjuje za učitelje in ravnatelje. Glavna hipoteza je, da učitelji z vsemi štirimi stili (natakar, oblikovalec, gorski vodnik, vrtnar) bolj spodbujajo interese učencev pri izbiri njim lastnih stilov učenja in mišljenja kot zgolj z uporabo prvega stila natakarja.

Kurikuli devetletke so bolj procesno in ciljno orientirani kot kurikuli osemletke, ki so učnovsebinsko orientirani. Učitelji devetletke morajo izvrševati nove naloge ter sodelovali med seboj zaradi pridobivanja novih izkušenj pri doseganju ciljev. Obremenitve učencev so v zadnji triadi uravnotežene, ker jih učitelji poučujejo na treh nivojih. Takšno poučevanje je fleksibilno, ker učenci lahko prehajajo iz enega nivoja na drugega glede na svoje sposobnosti. Na najvišjem nivoju je najlaže poučevati transformacijsko, tako da učenci lahko razvijajo različne stile učenja, zlasti izkustvenega v najširšem kreativnem pomenu in stile mišljenja. Na splošno lahko rečemo, da učenje v devetletki razen za najbolj nadarjene učence še ni pomembnejše kot poučevanje, ker se je kultura učenja šele začela razvijati.

Ključne besede: poučevalni stili, mišljenjski stili, osemletka, devetletka, učenci, transmisijska paradigma, transformacijska paradigma.

EKSTASE UND ZEIT: DIE DUPLIZITÄT DES DIONYSISCHEN UND APOLLINISCHEN ALS LEITBEGRIFFE

K.M. Woschitz
Institut für Religionswissenschaft
Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz

Das vorliegende Referat will das zum philosophisch-anthropologischen Begriff gewordene Begriffspaar „Apollinisch-Dionysisch" mit seinen vielfältigen Aspekten aus dem klassischen Humanismus entfalten. Einerseits handelt es sich um das Kulturgeistige, harmonisch Geordnete, bildhaft Gestaltete, weisheitsvoll Begrenzte der ethischen Maximen des Apollogottes von Delphi, ferner um den Menschen als „animal symbolicum" und eine kulturanthropologische Ausdruckskraft (Religion, Mythos, Kunst, Wissenschaft), andererseits um das Dionysische als das leidenschaftlich Bewegte, die Ekstase, um Schmerz und Schuld, Leidenschaft und Reinigung (Katharsis) sowie um die ekstatisch wirksamen Qualitäten (simultane Distanz und Nähe, tödliche Starrheit und suggestive Lebendigkeit) des frontalen Blicks der Maske des „Maskengottes" Dionysos. Die Maske ermöglicht „verwandelnde Vereinigung" und „vereinigende Verwandlung", ist Ausdruck der dionysischen Tragödie und in ihr Darstellung menschlicher Höhen und Tiefen sowie der tragischen Verknotung von Götterwille, Menschenwille und Schicksal.

Schlüssel Wörter: Dionysischen, Apollinischen, Ekstase, Zeit, Mensch.

1. EXPOSITION (EINE VORBEMERKUNG)

Das Thema führt uns zunächst in das mythenschaffende Hellas (mythotokos Hellas) und seine Geisteslandschaft, in welchem zentrale Ideen und Gedanken in der frühen Stunde unseres Abendlandes Gestalt angenommen haben und uns zu ihren willigen Gefangenen und intellektuellen Abenteurern machten.[1] Auf ihrer Ausfahrt auf das weite Meer der menschlichen Seele entdeckten die Griechen sich selbst, erfanden das Wort „Idee" und lockten uns auf ihren Weg der Erkenntnis, die gleichen Fragen zu stellen und im Nachklang ihrer Philosophie, Dichtung und Dramen ihre Bühne in der rosafingrigen Morgendämmerung der Kinderfragen zu betreten sowie ihnen auf den Marktplatz, die Agora der Freiheit unter der Herrschaft des Gesetzes zu folgen und dem menschlichen Leben Würde zu geben.[2] Mit

[1] Vgl. W. Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos. Die Selbstentfaltung des griechischen Denkens, Stuttgart 1975.
[2] Vgl. A. Szlezák, Platon lesen, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt 1997. E. Martens, Die Sache des Sokrates, Stuttgart 1992.

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der Wanderung und Invasion der griechischen Stämme in das Land, das Plato mit dem Gerippe eines dahinsiechenden Menschen vergleicht, dessen Fleisch weggebrannt ist, strömten auch ihre Götter aus allen Himmelsrichtungen ein, Zeus, der Vater aller Götter, Demeter, die Erdmutter, Athene, die Beschützerin der Städte, Aphrodite, Symbol unsterblicher Schönheit und Liebe, Dionysos, der Gott des Weines und der Tragödie, des Rausches und der Ekstase, und Apollo, Herr der Vernunft, des Geistes, sowie der Gott des glorifizierten Lichtes. Licht war das Mark des Lebens, sodass Homer in seiner Ilias den tragischen Helden Ajax darum beten lässt, in der Sonne zu sterben:

Mache den Himmel klar und gib, daß wir mit unseren Augen
sehen können.
Licht soll sein, auch wenn du mich töten mußt!

Bildlich gesprochen gab es nur einen Morgen in Griechenland, keinen Mittag, keinen Sonnenuntergang. Niemals verblasste das Licht am Himmel – und noch heute leben wir in dem langen Morgen der griechischen Welt. Mythen bildeten ihren erzählenden Hintergrund. Sie sind nicht Zeugnisse eines Ehemaligen, sondern des Immerwährenden, sodass Sallustios von den Attismysterien sagen kann: „Dies hat sich nie zugetragen, aber es ist immer". Zur Eigenart des mythischen Denkens und seinen auffälligsten Kennzeichen gehört – wie Claude Lévi-Strauss es in seiner strukturalen Anthropologie herausgestellt hat -, seine „doppelte, zugleich historische und ahistorische Struktur", ein prozessualer, unlösbarer Gegensatz. Der Mythos spiegelt und löst ein sprachliches Problem: die Differenz zwischen dem gesprochenen, verhallenden Wort und dem, was es bezeichnet, dem bleibenden Sinn. Er erzählt immer wieder neu, wie das Vergängliche und das Nichtvergänglich-Bleibende zugleich möglich sein können. Er ist eine Vorstellung hinter der Sprache, ist erzählte Geschichte. So spiegeln z.B. auch die dionysischen Mythen das ihnen innewohnende Polare von Leben und Tod, Fruchtbarkeit und Tragik, in summa die Wirkkraft dionysischen Wesens und seiner Epiphanie.

2. APOLLON - DIONYSOS[3]

Die beiden Göttergestalten von Hellas und des olympischen Himmels, Apollon und Dionysos, sind symbolische Ausdrücke für das innere und unbewusste Drama der menschlichen Seele, Projektionen und Allegorien subjektiver Erfahrungen, die Naturphänomene spiegeln und so dem menschlichen Bewusstsein fassbar werden. Ihr Mythos als eine erlebte und gelebte Wirklichkeit gewinnt in ihnen eine vitale Bedeutung einer zugleich innen und außen erlebten, ungeteilten Wirklichkeit, der mythischen Wirklichkeit und Weltwirklichkeit. Dieses Begriffspaar stellt zwei griechische Götter mit ihren jeweiligen Eigenschaften einander gegenüber und reflektiert darin zwei Aspekte menschlicher Selbstthematisierung. Im Prozess der „symbolischen Formung" repräsentieren sie – gemäß dem Schillerschen Wort über die griechischen Götter, in denen

[3] Vgl. M. Detienne, Dionysos. Göttliche Wildheit, Frankfurt 1992. Fr. Hamdorf (Hg.), Dionysos – Bacchus: Kult und Wandlungen des Weingottes, München 1986. K. Kerényi, Dionysos: Urbild des unzerstörbaren Lebens, Stuttgart 1994.

sich der Mensch selbst „malet", - zwei Grundaspekte unseres Menschseins: Apollon ist der Gott der siebensaitigen Leier, der Gott der Klarheit des Geistes, der Form, der Ordnung. Er steht für das rationale Prinzip der Welterkenntnis und der Kontrollierbarkeit der Welt durch rationales Bewusstsein. Dionysos ist der Gott des Weines, der Trunkenheit und Ekstase, des Enthusiasmus. Er steht für das sinnliche, irrationale und unmittelbare Erleben der Welt. Macht das Apollinische auf analytische Weise das Trennende bewusst, so sucht das Dionysische die Vereinheitlichung, das Zusammen. Es handelt sich letztlich um eine Theologie der göttlichen Wörter, d.h. um eine religiöse Ideenlehre, die die Grundzüge der Wirklichkeit und des Menschenwesens ins Licht heben: Zeus, Vater und König; Hera, das Mütterliche; Apollon, das Männlich-Geistige; Dionysos, das rauschhaft Ekstatische und die emotionale Bewegtheit; Athena, die Klugheit und Weisheit; Artemis, das Mädchenhafte; Aphrodite, das Ewigweibliche, u.a.m. Mit der Vermenschlichung der Götter aber beginnt auch die Ehrfurcht vor ihnen zu schwinden, besonders in der Zeit der Sophisten, so dass Platon, der Schüler des Sokrates, der Idee des höchsten Gutes huldigt und einen Gedankenbau aufrichtet, um das Normative im Ewigen und Transzendenten zu verwurzeln.

W. Schlegel nennt das Dionysische „göttliche Trunkenheit", das Apollinische „leise Besonnenheit".[4] Fr. Nietzsche sah in seinem Erstlingswerk „Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik" (1872) in der attischen Tragödie ein ebenso dionysisches als auch apollinisches Kunstwerk. Die beiden symbolischen Analoga, das Apollinische und das Dionysische sind für ihn die beiden Kunsttriebe, die sich in einem fortwährenden Widerstreit miteinander befinden und sich periodisch zu immer neuen Gestaltungen versöhnen. Apollo steht für den schönen Schein der Traumwelten, die bildnerischen Kräfte, die maßvolle Begrenzung, Vergeistigung und das principium individuationis, während Dionysos für die Analogie des Rausches und der Verzückung steht. In ihm versinnlicht sich das Ewig-Leidende und Widerspruchsvolle, das Leidenschaftliche samt der Erlösung vom „Ich" in der mystischen Einheitsempfindung. Der apollinischen Schönheitswelt aber liegt die schreckliche Weisheit des weisen Silen zugrunde, der ihr das „Wehe! Wehe!" zuruft: Der reiche König Midas habe, so erzählt der Mythos, lange in den Wäldern nach dem Silen gejagt, ohne ihn fangen zu können. Als er aber seiner habhaft wurde, stellte er ihm die Frage, was für den Menschen das Allerbeste sei. Der starr und unbeweglich im Schweigen verharrende Dämon wurde schließlich vom König hart bedrängt und gezwungen. Dann aber bricht er unter gellendem Lachen in die Worte aus:

> Elendes Eintagsgeschlecht, des Zufalls Kinder und der Mühsal,
> was zwingst du mich dir zu sagen, was nicht zu hören für dich das
> Ersprießlichste ist?
> Das Allerbeste ist für dich gänzlich unerreichbar:
> nicht geboren zu sein, nicht zu sein, nichts zu sein.
> Das Zweitbeste aber ist für dich – bald zu sterben.

[4] W. Schlegel, Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie, 1797.

Nicht die Philosophie, sondern die Tragödie der Griechen hat die ganze Paradoxie menschlicher Existenz aufgegriffen mit der Schuld-, der Schicksals- und der Leidensfrage. Die Tragödie ist ja die künstlerische Spiegelung der Zweideutigkeit menschlicher Existenz samt den Mischformen des Tragischen und Komischen, d.h. jener Ironie des Schicksals, wenn sich das Bedrohliche gerade durch das Bemühen des Fernhaltens einstellt. In der der Folge solcher Darstellung entwickelt Aristoteles in seiner Poetik, Kap. 13, die Lehre von dem Umschlag (metabolé) des Geschickes als Kern des tragischen Mythos, wonach der Sturz des Menschen, seine Höhe als Fallhöhe, di' hamartian erfolgte, d.h. durch Verfehlen im Sinne menschlicher Unzulänglichkeit und der Grenzen, das Richtige zu erkennen. Zum Tragischen gehört vor allem die Unausweichlichkeit eines unverschuldet erlittenen schweren Schicksalsschlages,[5] durch den das existentielle Gefühl der Trauer oder der Erfahrung des Leides geweckt wird. Die Tragödie ist die künstlerische Spiegelung der Zweideutigkeit menschlicher Existenz samt den Mischformen des Tragischen und Komischen, d.h. jener Ironie des Schicksals, wenn sich das Bedrohliche gerade durch das Bemühen des Fernhaltens einstellt. Apollon, die große Gottheit der homerischen Religion, ist die „heilige Geisteskraft" selbst gegenüber Dionysos, der Kraft der Entfesselung und der höchsten Daseinssteigerung. In der dionysischen Ekstase wird etwas vom Innersten nach außen gekehrt, – der Mensch tritt aus sich selbst hervor –, zugleich aber ist der Enthusiasmus (en-theos) die Aufnahme des Gottes im Menschen, seine Erweckung und seine sich manifestierende Gegenwart.

3. DIE IDEE DES MENSCHEN UND DIE DELPHISCHE THEOLOGIE

Apollon verkörpert in Delphi, seinem Heiligtum, die Humanität und Menschlichkeit des Menschen, die dem Menschen aus vier Kraftquellen zuströmt, menschenwürdig leben und handeln zu können: Es sind dies die Einsicht in den Wert der Dinge, der Hochsinn dessen, was über uns ist, mit dem Wissen um Maß und Schönheit, das dem sittlichen Charakter Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbescheidung auferlegt, sowie das freie Wohltun, das sich in der Gerechtigkeit ausdrückt. Dionysos aber ist als Gott der Wandlung und Verwandlung begriffen, der in das Innerste des menschlichen Herzens einzudringen vermag. Seine Wandlung ist Befreiung, Erlösung, Ekstasis, die aus den irdischen Begrenzungen in eine überzeitliche, überindividuelle Sphäre führt, die Sphäre der Mysterienkulte und des Religiösen. Die Ekstase, die er bewirkt, stellt sich dar als eine Entäußerung, als eine Selbstentfremdung des Ich in das Göttliche hinein, in das Geheimnis des Ur-Einen. Und Horaz fragt: quo me Bacche rapis tui plenum? (Carm. 3,25). Dionysos (Bacchus) bewirkt das ekstatische Heraustreten aus der alltäglichen Persönlichkeit und die Entrückung.

[5] Lit.: K. Jaspers; Über das Tragische, München 1954. W. Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, Princeton 1969. M. Scheler, Zum Phänomen des Tragischen (1915), in: Gesammelte Werke Bd. 3; Bern 1955. F. Schiller, Über die tragische Kunst (1792). S. Söring, Tragödie. Notwendigkeit und Zufall im Spannungsfeld tragischer Prozesse, Stuttgart 1983. K.P. Szondi, Versuch über das Tragische, Frankfurt/M. 1961.

In der Antike war die „Idee des Menschen" an die delphische Theologie der Menschlichkeit und des Gottes Apollon gebunden, der bei den Griechen neben seinem Vater Zeus die höchste Göttlichkeit des Göttlichen verkörperte, die Reinheit und die letzte Entschiedenheit des Geistes. Die „delphischen Sprüche" (delphika parangelmata) wiesen den Menschen zunächst in seine Sterblichkeit ein: gnothi seauton, thneton onta, erkenne dich, Mensch, als Sterblichen. Sophokles bezeugt diese Maxime delphischer Weisheit in dem „Bedenke das Sterbliche" (thneta phronein; Frg. 590) und sieht den Mensch in seinem „Sein zum Tode", d.i. einem Innesein, in welchem er sich in seinem Denken, Fühlen, Handeln im Horizont seiner sterblichen Begrenztheit verhalte, d.h. aber „menschlich" verhalte. Weitere Maximen sind:

Nicht zuviel (meden agan);
Blicke auf das Gegebene (kairon hora);
Das Maß ist das beste (metron ariston)
und das Bescheide dich (sophronei).

Ein Exemplum aus der griechischen Antike für diese delphische Humanität spiegelt z.B. die Antigone-Tragödie des Sophokles (497/6-406 n.Chr.).[6] Sie hat den Widerstreit und den Untergang zweier Menschen und ihrer kontrastierenden Prinzipien, der Ödipus-Tochter Antigone und ihres Onkels Kreon, des Herrschers von Theben, zum Thema. Antigone widersteht als einzige dem Tyrannen, der Unmenschliches zum Staatsgesetz erhebt: Antigones Bruder, Polyneikes, soll unbegraben bleiben, Vögeln und Hunden zum Fraß, weil er seine Heimatstadt Theben mit Waffengewalt zu erobern trachtete, dabei aber im Kampfe fiel. Antigone hingegen handelt dem Gebot Kreons zuwider, bestattet ihren toten Bruder und motiviert ihre Tat mit den ungeschriebenen Gesetzen der Liebe zu den Banden des Blutes und dem Gehorsam gegen die Götter („Nicht mitzuhassen, mitzulieben bin ich da", V. 523). Antigone, die Titelheldin, ist Inbild der unbedingten Hingabe an das göttliche Gebot und die mitmenschliche Pflicht und so die Urverkörperung der sophokleischen, ja der abendländischen Humanität. Die Tragödie „Antigone" ist ein Plädoyer für Menschentum gegen Menschensatzung.[7] Als Kreon sie zum Tod verurteilt, geht sie ungebeugt in den Tod. Der autokratische Kreon verkennt das Maß seines irdischen Amtes und muss daran zu Fall kommen. In hybrishafter Selbstüberhebung und eigensinniger Verblendung hatte Kreon seinen Willen mit dem Polisgesetz und dem Willen der Götter identifiziert und so gegen die göttliche Weltordnung gefrevelt. Im Verhalten Kreons dem warnenden Seher Teiresias gegenüber wird der Wesenskern und die egozentrische Gottlosigkeit des Königs offenbar: der grausige Fluch des Sehers ist der Höhepunkt eines Geschehens, das sich unerbittlich vollzieht. Sophokles bringt in der Haltung Kreons die sich unter dem Einfluss der Sophisten anbahnende politische Entwicklung zur Darstellung: die Loslösung des Staats von den religiösen Grundlagen mit dem Sophisma vom Menschen

[6] Vgl. R.F. Goheen, The Imagery of Sophocles' „Antigone", Princeton 1951. R. Verde, L' „Antigone" di Sofocle, Turin 1954.
[7] Vgl. A. Lesky, Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen, Göttingen 1964, 113-117 (mit Bibliographie).

als dem alleinigen Maßstab aller Dinge und des sittlichen Verhaltens. Der Chor der Alten spricht das Schlusswort: „Nie darf gegen Gottes Gebot man freveln."

Der Stoff findet eine Reihe moderner Umdichtungen, so z.B. durch Jean Anouilh (1942), der die tragische Fabel zum Gefäß des Nihilismus macht und Antigones Herzensgröße in Weltverzweiflung travestiert. Er zeigt, wie Menschlichkeit gegen Terror aufsteht und die Wahrheit auch im Untergehen siegt. Kreon, Sachwalter der Ordnung, muss das ihm Aufgetragene und Notwendige tun, auch wenn er sich damit ins Unrecht setzt und sein Gewissen opfert. Antigone aber verkörpert den Willen zum Absoluten, kompromisslos bis zur Selbstvernichtung.

Der Kultort Apollons, Delphi, wurde durch das Orakel zu einem moralischen Mittelpunkt, wo auf die in der Alternativform vorgelegten menschlichen Fragen ein göttliches Ja oder Nein kund wurde. In der ursprünglichen Frageform: „Ist es besser, so oder so zu tun?", forderte der Gott schon im Fragestellen die Klarheit ein. Delphi war der „Frageort" des Orakels der Pythia und Kulturort des Apollon schlechthin sowie der alle vier Jahre zu seinen Ehren gefeierten panhellenischen Wettspiele am Fuße des Parnassos. Apollon galt als der Bezwinger der Maßlosigkeit und Willkür. Er war der kultisch reinigende, kultivierende, erziehende, zivilisierende Gott, und Gott der Vergeistigung. Durch Pythia stellt er im delphischen Orakel seine sittlichen Forderungen, war Träger seelischer Reinheit und menschlicher Gerechtigkeit.

Und doch liegt auch in ihm das Moment einer ungeheuren Spannung Im Apollonhymnus heißt es von ihm:

Die Leier sei mir lieb und der gekrümmte
Bogen, und im Orakel künden will ich den Menschen
Den untrüglichen Ratschluß des Zeus (V. 131f).

Die Saiten der Kithara und die Sehne des Bogens – beide erklingen und erbeben bei ihrer Berührung -, aber zu gegensätzlicher Wirkung. Apollon bringt einerseits die Harmonie und er schafft andererseits den Tod. Diese coincidentia oppositorum, diesen Ineinsfall der Gegensätze, bringt der dunkle Heraklit mit den Worten zum Ausdruck: „Sie verstehen nicht, wie das Unstimmige mit sich übereinstimmt: widerstrebige Fügung, wie bei Bogen und Leier" (Frg. 51). D.h.: Das in sich Gegensätzliche ist Einheit oder Ganzheit, wie Leben und Tod, Tag und Nacht, der Weg hinauf und hinab. Das Eine schlägt in das Andere um – wie der ganze Fluss er selbst bleibt im zeitmäßig sich vollziehenden Wandel.

4. DIONYSOS

Der Dionysos-Mythos mit der Erzählung von den Leiden, dem Tod und Zum-Leben–Kommen des Göttlichen Kindes, hat seine Travestie in der orphischen Tradition gefunden. Das Dionysos-Kind wird von den von Hera, der eifersüchtigen Gattin des Zeus, angestifteten Titanen verschleppt, sucht diesen aber zu entkommen oder sie irrezuführen. Nacheinander verwandelt er sich in einen Ziegenbock, einen Löwen, eine Schlange, einen Tiger und einen Stier, in welch letzter Metamorphose sie ihn in Stücke reißen und sein rohes Fleisch verzehren.

Die Dionysos-Religion in ihrem Bezug zur Vegetation hat einen naturhaften Ansatz, ist quasi-sakramental und metaphysisch angelegt. Im vollkommsten Symbol der Natur,

dem Wein, wird die Klarheit menschlichen Selbstbewusstseins überwältigt und der Mensch über sich hinaus gerissen. In einer Rede auf Dionysos preist der Rhetor Aelius Aristides (2.Jh.n.Chr.) die lösende Macht des Dionysos Lysios und Lyaios:

> Nichts wird so fest gebunden sein, weder durch Krankheit, doch durch Zorn, noch durch irgendein Geschick, das zu lösen Dionysos nicht fähig wäre.

Der Dionysos-Mythos ist genetisch und kosmisch zugleich. Die Titanen als Verkörperung chthonischer Kräfte spiegeln im Mythos die dunkle Seite der menschlichen Doppelnatur, wie dies in sprichwörtlichen Wendungen „die Titanen sind in uns", oder „die Titanen sind die menschliche Natur", zum Ausdruck kommt. Die im Körper gefangene Seele aber ist die dionysische Substanz, die in der Asche der Titanen überdauerte. Die Zusammenfügung des zerrissenen Dionysos ist ein kosmischer Mythos der ewigen Wiederkehr und Erneuerung, ein Mythos von Tod und Wiedergeburt, Chaos und Kosmos. Der Mythos des Dionysos spiegelt so die alljährliche zyklische Erneuerung der Natur (Absterben, Neubeginn) und ist ferner Reflex des kosmologischen Musters der Ur-Ganzheit und ihrer Fragmentierung.

Am Ende seines Lebens hat Euripides (ca. 485/4-407/6) noch einmal aus den dionysischen Urquellen geschöpft, zugleich aber die Grenzen dessen berührt, was auf dem Rund der attischen Bühne an großer Tragik überhaupt sichtbar zu machen sei. Sein Drama der „Bakchen" ist die Dionysischste aller Tragödien. Es ist das Drama des Rausches und seines dunklen Gegenbildes, des Wahnsinns, des Seins und des Scheins aus deren gemeinsamer Wurzel. Dionysos lebt in dieser Tragödie sozusagen in zwei Personen. Er ist der Gott der Wandlung und Verwandlung, der aus der Ordnung der Polis und ihres Nomos herausführt in eine überindividuelle und überzeitliche Sphäre, um so aus der Geschichte zu befreien und zu erlösen.

In seinem Abschiedswerk, dem 408/7 v.Chr. in Makedonien entstandenen und 405 posthum an den Dionysien aufgeführten Werk, „Die Bakchen", geht es um das Thema des Einzugs des Dionysos, des asiatischen Gottes, in Hellas und die Abwehr sowie Verweigerung seines Kultes in seiner Geburtsstadt Theben. In den „Bakchen" will Pentheus, der König von Theben, den Kult des Dionysos in seiner Vaterstadt Theben verhindern, ob welcher Missachtung sich der Gott an ihm auf grausamste Weise rächen wird. Der König verkleidet sich als Frau und will – so zum Spottbild geworden – das Treiben der Frauen beobachten, läuft aber gerade so in die tödlichen Arme seiner Mutter. Er wird in die Beute verwandelt und seine eigene, wahnverwirrte Mutter wird ihren Sohn zerreißen wie ein wildes Tier und das Haupt auf der dionysischen Insignie pfählen, dem efeuumwundenen Thyrsosstab. Pentheus hat in den „Bakchen" des Euripides die Rolle des stellvertretenden „Sündenbocks" inne und wiederholt in seiner Opferung das Opfer des Gottes Dionysos. In dem Stück ist Dionysos zugleich Prophet seiner selbst. Im Prolog erzählt er einen Abschnitt seiner Herkunft. Er ist Kind des Zeus und der Semele, ein Name aus der phrygischen Sprache und bedeutet die „Unterweltliche", also ein Kind von Leben und Tod. Als solcher kehrt er in Begleitung von lydischen Bacchantinnen in seine Geburtsstadt Theben zurück, um überall seine Mysterien durch ekstatischen Tanz und durch geheime heilige Handlungen einzusetzen (Euripides, Bacch. 21f). Er ist der Gott des Saftes in den

Pflanzen und Bäumen, des Blutes in den Adern der Tiere und Menschen, der Gott der strömenden Lebenskraft.[8] Rausch und Begeisterung, aber auch sinnverstörte Raserei geht von ihm aus. Er ist der Gott, der durch Tanz, dem Gebet des Körpers, und durch Wein, in den Menschen einzieht. Der Wein als „mixed blessing" ist seine Erscheinungsform, eine willkommene, das Leben erträglich machende Ergänzung zur Gabe des Brotes durch Demeter (Euripides, Bacch. 274-283). Der König von Theben heißt Pentheus, sein Gegenspieler und Doppelgänger, die apollinische Verkörperung der Ordnung staatlicher Institutionen und der Gesetze. Der Name Pentheus bedeutet „Leidensmann" und hat den Gott selbst zum Paradigma, so dass Dionysos in diesem sacer ludus, diesem heiligen Spiel, seinem eigenen Leiden und darin der menschlichen Passion, den Schicksalsschlägen und seinem Sterben begegnet, seiner Zerreißung. Es stehen sich Mystizismus und praktische Vernunft entgegen. Der König will im Kithairongebirge das bacchantische Spiel des Dionysos belauschen. Von ihm wird gesagt: „Nun ist dein Geist von seiner Krankheit ganz erwacht!" (V. 947). Auf einem Baum versteckt wird er von den Frauen als Zuschauer entdeckt, gepackt und zum Opfer der Handlung, zum Opfertier, das zerrissen wird.

Zuerst begann als Priesterin die Mutter
Die Opferung und warf sich auf ihn (V.1114f),

schildert die Tragödie. Sie trennt den Kopf vom Rumpf und spießt ihn als Trophäe auf den Thyrsosstab in heiliger Trance, und in der Verblendung, einen Löwen erlegt zu haben. Sie will den Ritus des Verzehrens des rohen Fleisches vollziehen, die Omophagie.

O glücklicher Fang!
Nimm teil nun am Mahl! (V.1183f).

Darauf folgt die grausamste Erkenntnisszene des gesamten griechischen Dramas, die Erkenntnis als Befreiung aus dem Wahn, samt einer der ergreifendsten Klagen aus dem Mund einer Mutter. Die Zerreißung aber ist nur eine Wiederholung des ersten Opfers, in illo tempore.

Die einzige christliche Tragödie in griechischer Sprache, die aus dem Mittelalter auf uns gekommen ist, war der Christos paschon, „Der leidende Christus" eines byzantinischen Dichters, der von der Klage der Pentheusmutter Agaue ganze Verspartien entlehnt und sie der klagenden Gottesmutter in den Mund gibt, die alles Herzzerreißende überbieten, was je in griechischer Sprache überliefert ist.

5. DIONYSOS, DER GOTT DES „DRAUßEN" UND DES „DRINNEN"

Die griechische Antike kannte keine Trennung zwischen der religiösen Sphäre und der säkularen Lebenswelt der Menschen und ihren literarischen und kulturellen Schöpfungen. Religion manifestierte sich in den beiden zentralen Kategorien der griechischen Polis, dem Ritual und dem Mythos,[9] in welchem auch das griechische Drama

[8] Vgl. J. Bremmer, Greek maenadism reconsidered, in: ZPE 55 (1984) 267-286. Vgl. P.E. Arias, B.B. Shefton, M. Hirmer, A History of Greek Vase Painting, 1962, Taf. 218f. J. Boardman, Athenian Red Figure Vases. The Classical Period, 1989, 167ff.

seinen „Sitz im Leben" und seine institutionelle Verankerung hatte. Das Schema (pattern) bildete der Dionysoskult.

Die dionysischen Feste standen pragmatisch in Beziehung zu den Ausnahmeritualen und der sistierten Ordnung wie Wildheit, Tanz, tierisches Verhalten, Verwandlung und waren in ihrer Theatralität auf die drei religionswissenschaftlichen Paradigmen von Initiation, Beginn eines Neuen Jahres und die erhoffte Fruchtbarkeit hin offen. „In den Initiationsriten erneuert sich das Leben der Gemeinschaft, in den daraus erwachsenen Neujahrsriten erneuert sich die Ordnung der Natur und der Polis."[10] Die Aufführungen der Tragödien am Dionysosfest begannen mit dem Opfer des Bocks (tragos). Für Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) ist in seiner Schrift „Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik" (1872)[11] die attische Tragödie ein Produkt des Dionysischen und Apollinischen. Friedrich Nietzsche, der sich im Verhältnis zu seinen Zeitgenossen als „Unzeitgemäßer" versteht und sich für den „letzten Jünger des Dionysos" hielt, sagt von sich: „Sie reden alle von mir...aber niemand denkt an mich!....ihr Lärm um mich breitet einen Mantel über meine Gedanken." Für ihn ist der apollinische Trieb in dieser Welt im Menschen das „principium individuationis", das Streben, durch Maß und Begrenzung in Raum und Zeit bildhafte Gestalten zu schaffen (Malerei, Plastik, Epik) und zu verewigen; apollinisch ist also die Vision des harmonisch Geordneten (z.B. der Staat/Polis) und der weisheitsvollen Begrenzung (Ethik). Dionysos dagegen ist der andere Pol. Er gehört der Mysterienwelt zu und der gleichsam außerkanonischen Mania, der trunkenen Ekstase, der Welt des Rausches, des leidenschaftlich Bewegten, des Irrationalen, der Kraft aus der Tiefe und des Erdhaften des Lebens. Zeugend zerbricht er das Begrenzte und Gestaltete und führt es in den einigenden Weltgrund zurück. Der Vorstellungscharakter der Welt, der „Bann der Individuation" wird sistiert. „Wir sind wirklich in kurzen Augenblicken das Urwesen selbst und fühlen dessen unbändige Daseinsgier und Daseinslust; der Kampf, die Qual, die Vernichtung der Erscheinungen dünkt uns jetzt wie notwendig...; wir werden von dem wütenden Stachel dieser Qualen in demselben Augenblicke durchbohrt, wo wir gleichsam mit der unermeßlichen Urlust am Dasein eins geworden sind und wo wir die Unzerstörbarkeit und Ewigkeit dieser Lust in dionysischer Entzückung ahnen", schreibt Fr. Nietzsche. Wirkt das Apollinische im philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Diskurs fort, so fordert es als Gegenwirkung das Dionysische heraus, das sein Weiterleben in den Mysterien und der Religion hat.

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[9] Vgl. G. Nagy, Pindar's Homer, 1990, 30-33. Die Cambridge-Ritualists mit ihrer sog. „myth-and-ritual"-Schule setzen den Ursprung des Dramas im Ritual an. Vgl. H.S. Versnel, Inconsistencies in Greek and Roman Religion 2. Transition and Riversal in Myth and Ritual, 1993, 15-88. R. Friedrich, Drama und Ritual, in: J. Rednond (Hg.), Drama and Religion (Themes in Drama 5), 1983, 159-233. Forschungsgeschichtlich sind damit die Namen verbunden: J.E. Harrison (1850-1928), G. Murray (1866-1957) und F.M. Cornford (1874-1943).

[10] W. Burkert, Kekropidensage und Arrhephoria. Vom Initiationsritus zum Panathenäenfest, in: Hermes 94 (1966) 1-25.14.

[11] Vgl. K. Gründner (Hg.), Der Streit um Nietzsches „Geburt der Tragödie", 1968. H.J. Schmidt, Nietzsche und Sokrates, 1969. F. Decher, Nietzsches Metyphysik in der Geburt der Tragödie im Verhältnis zur Philosophie Schopenhauers, 1985.

Durch die Aufführung des kultischen Dramas aber wird auch die Zeit verändert. Sie wird zur Festzeit, zur alternativen Zeit, in der diese sich erneuert und mit ihr der Mensch, die Polisgesellschaft und die Natur. Die Handlung der griechischen Tragödie zu Ehren des Dionysos wurde durch den Chor begleitet und gedeutet. Der Rhythmus in der Musik und die (Tanz-)Bewegung wiederholten den Rhythmus der kosmischen Ordnung aber auch die antagonistischen Konfigurationen des Konfliktes der Menschen, der Gesellschaft, dann des Kosmos und der transzendenten Welt mit all den Göttern sowie dem über allem waltenden Schicksal. Am Zuschauer sollte sich – mit Worten der modernen Psychologie gesagt, eine „Übertragung" vollziehen, ein existentielles Berührtsein.

Das Drama selbst stellt in seinem Hauptteil die liminale Phase dar, den sog. Grenzübergang. Äußerlich wird dies durch die Maske, die Bemalungen sowie Verkleidungen der Schauspieler ausgedrückt, Requisiten, die der Verwandlung dienten und der Epiphanie des Gottes. Dionysos war ja der Maskengott schlechthin. Die Maske heißt griech. Prosopon: = „was man ansieht". Durch die Maske kann der Mensch aus sich heraustreten (Ekstase) und sich verwandeln, zur Sphäre des Göttlichen oder des Tierischen hin, um sich übernatürliche Kräfte anzueignen. Die Dionysosmaske war Symbol seiner Präsenz und konnte als Kultbild dienen, wie dies oft auf den sog. Lenäen-Vasen dargestellt wird, wo der Gott in Gestalt einer an einem Baum befestigten Maske von den Mänaden umtanzt und verehrt wird. Die Maske verändert den Träger. Dionysos mit seinem Epitheton „mainomenos" (Homer, Il VI, 132), der „rasende" Gott, überträgt dieses sein Spezifikum in der Weise der rituellen Raserei, des „göttlichen Wahnsinns" (theia mania) auf seine Verehrer, die im Enthusiasmus sich von ihm erfüllt wussten und in der Ekstase aus sich heraustreten und Grenzen überschreiten. Der Wein galt als seine Erscheinungsform und war metonymisch für ihn verwendbar (vgl. Euripides, Bacch. 284). Er galt als seine entscheidende und leidenmindernde Tat, um das Leben erträglich zu machen.

Die Maske als Erscheinungsform des Gottes selbst vermittelte gleichzeitig göttliche Präsenz, Gegenwart im Zeigen und gleichzeitig die Verhüllung, das Dahinter, den Entzug. In den schwarzfigurigen sog. Augen-Schalen-Vasen blickt uns die Maske ekstatisch wirksam in all ihrer Frontalität an. Sie schafft simultane Distanz und Nähe zugleich, tödliche Starrheit und suggestive Lebendigkeit. Sie weist auf die „verwandelnde Vereinigung" und „vereinigende Verwandlung" hin in das Mehr als Menschliche, in das Menschliche und Göttliche. In seiner Verbindung mit den Mysterien identifizierte Platon im Phaidros 265b 4 die den Dionysos charakterisierende „Mania", den „göttlichen Wahnsinn", als „zu den Einweihungen gehörig" (telestike). Dionysische Mysterien wollten die Hoffnung auf ein seliges Los im Jenseits auftun, auf Todesüberwindung und Wiedergeburt, ja auf die Gottwerdung.

Als Gott des „Draußen" und des „Drinnen" akzentuiert Dionysos alle Arten von Grenzüberschreitung. Er erscheint daher mythisch als „schrecklichster und mildester unter allen Göttern" (deinótatos, epiótatos: Euripides, Bacch, 861), ist Gott des überschäumenden Lebens, aber auch des Vergehens und des Todes, sodass Heraklit ihn mit dem Hades gleichsetzen konnte (fr. 15 D.-K.). Dionysos ist Repräsentant des ganz „Andern", des Dunklen und der todestrunkenen Qualitäten, aber auch Verkörperung der Unzerstörbarkeit des Lebens, Gott der Polyvalenzen und der Vermischung von Göttlichem und

Menschlichem, Leiden und Lust, Opferobjekt und Opfersubjekt, Metamorphose des Tierischen und Menschlichen, des Femininen und Maskulinen. Zusammenfassend kann man sagen: Apollo steht für Reflexion und Rationalität, Ruhe, Mäßigung, Besonnenheit, Beherrschung, Dionysos für Ekstase, Inbrunst, Unbesonnenheit, Übersteigung, Leidenschaft. Er reißt die Schleier vom Antlitz der Alltäglichkeit des Menschen und lässt auch in die Abgründe der zerstörerischen Gewalt blicken. Als Repräsentant des ganz „Anderen" aber verkörpert er durch seine todestrunkenen Qualitäten die Unzerstörbarkeit des Lebens.

6. DIONYSOS UND DAS LACHEN UND WEINEN ALS EKSTASE DES MENSCHEN

Dionysos, der Maskengott, hat mit dem Lachen und Weinen des Menschen zu tun. Lachen und Weinen sind zwei Erscheinungsweisen der Expressivität des Leibes. Der Mensch drückt sich darin als geistig-körperliches Wesen im Innen und Außen aus, wobei der Körper eine sinnvolle Antwort auf eine Situation übernimmt, die ansonsten kaum beantwortbar wäre.[12] Dem Menschen kann dabei die contenance über sich entgleiten, aber so, dass er sich nicht verliert. Er bringt sich im Lachen oder Weinen ganzheitlich zum Ausdruck. Der Körper reagiert durch automatische Reflexe auf „Situationen, denen gegenüber keine wie immer geartete sinnvolle Antwort durch Gebärde, Geste, Sprache und Handlung noch möglich ist"[13], schreibt H. Plessner. In Lachen und Weinen äußert sich der „Verlust der Beherrschung im Ganzen", eine „Desorganisation des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Menschen und seiner physischen Existenz"[14]. In seinem Sich-dem-Körper-Überlassen findet der Mensch für seine inneren Empfindungen einen sinnvollen Ausdruck für das Ganze seiner Situation. Eine andere menschliche Ausdrucksform ist das „Lächeln", das weder von einem inneren oder äußeren Anlass noch von einer Zweckmäßigkeit her eindeutig geprägt ist, sondern Ausdruck für eine exzentrische Distanz des Menschen von sich. Dabei wird im Ausdruck ein Abstand vom Ausdruck gewahrt. Das Lächeln ist vieldeutig. Es ist Ausdruck des homo abyssus, der bei all seinem Auf-Welt-Bezogenseins immer zugleich bei sich ist. Im Lächeln wird das Zusammenspiel von Körper und Geist deutlich; es kann sich unbewusst einstellen und vom Geist zum bewussten Ausdruck gebracht werden. Auch das Lachen ist ambivalent.[15] Es kann selbstironisch sein, verspottend oder innerlich befreiend, wo sich ein innerer Konflikt löst. Oft ist das Komische in Kunst und Leben das, was zum Lachen reizt, wobei unterschieden werden muss zwischen dem Witzigen als dem gewollt Komischen und dem Lächerlichen, als dem unfreiwillig Komischen.

[12] Vgl. H. Plessner, Lachen und Weinen, in: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. VII, Frankfurt 1982, 419-434.
[13] H. Plessner, Lachen und Weinen, a.a.O. 275.
[14] H. Plessner, a.a.O. 274.
[15] H. Bergson, Le rire. Essais sur la signification du comique, Paris 1900, (dt. Das Lachen, Zürich 1972). W. Hirsch, Das Wesen des Komischen, Amsterdam 1960. Th. Lipps, Komik und Humor, Hamburg 31922. G. Müller, Theorie des Komischen, Würzburg 1964. A. Stern, Philosophie des Lachens und Weinens, Wien/München 1980.

7. EKSTASE UND ZEIT

Apollon und Dionysos haben auch einen besonderen Bezug zur Zeit. Steht für den geordneten Ablauf der Zeit Apollo mit der siebensaitigen Leier, Deuter des Chronos, der Ablaufszeit in ihrer Erstreckung, so für die Erlebniszeit Dionysos, mit der Imagination des Kairos, des geglückten und ekstatisch-erfüllten Augenblicks, des Heraustretens aus dem Fluss der Zeit. Ein illustratives Beispiel für das unterschiedliche Tempo der psychologischen Zeit als Erlebniszeit bietet z.B. William Shakespeare in seinem Stück: „Wie es euch gefällt" (III,2): „Die Zeit reiset in verschiedenem Schritt mit verschiedenen Personen..., sie trabt hart mit einem jungen Mädchen zwischen der Verlobung und dem Hochzeitstage, ... geht den Paß mit einem Priester, dem es an Latein gebricht, und einem reichen Manne, der das Podagra hat, ... sie galoppiert mit dem Diebe zum Galgen ... und steht still mit Advokaten in den Gerichtsferien."

Es gibt auch eine Zeitkategorie, die entscheidend zu sein scheint für den technologischen Zivilisationsfortschritt – „Zeit ist Geld" -, aber auch eine besondere Erlebniszeit, die für das Lebensgefühl des Menschen bestimmend ist. In ihr ist das Unvergessliche jung und das Vergessene wird alt. Den Maßstab dabei aber gibt nicht die Messung ab, sondern der Wert, der Sinn, das Erlebte. Die „Zeitlichkeit" des Menschen ist immer doppelgesichtig, janushaft: Zeit kann auch Wunden heilen und trösten, aber auch Hoffnung wecken; sie kann auf Melancholie stimmen, wenn sie als „unwiederbringlich dahineilende Zeit" (Vergil, Georgica III, 284) den Menschen an seine Vergänglichkeit mahnt oder ihn an seine durch den Tod determinierte Lebenszeit erinnert, das Bestimmt-sein durch das „Sein zum Tode" und damit sein Ausgeliefertsein zeitlebens der Sorge und der Angst.[16] Der Mensch ist ja der Zeit verfallen, hinfällig und vergänglich, lebend „im Kerker der Zeit" (H. Hakel) und gewiesen an „die Klagemauer der Zeit" (D. Luschnat), und oft geschüttelt von Ängsten. E.M. Cioran drückt sein apokalyptisches Weltgefühl mit den Worten aus: „Albrecht Dürer ist mein Prophet. Je mehr ich den Aufmarsch der Jahrhunderte betrachtete, um so mehr überzeuge ich mich davon: das einzige Bild, das ihren Sinn enthüllen könnte, sind die Apokalyptischen Reiter."[17] Und im Horizont des atomaren Zeitalters beschreibt H.M. Enzensberger die Vision eines die Erde vernichtenden „countdowns": „länger als alles (abgesehen/vom meer, von der erde, vom moos/und gewissen himmelserscheinungen)/am längsten dauert der mensch:/solang/bis jener dort in der tiefe/ unsre sekunden gezählt hat/von zehn bis null".[18] Und wie eine Fortsetzung lesen sich Z. Herberts Zeilen: „die uhren gingen normal, also folgte die explosion" (Ed. Suhrkamp, 88, 35).

a. Eine Vorbemerkung

Der Pulsschlag im Menschen ist der Blutstrom, den das Herz antreibt und so dem Körper den Takt angibt. Er wurde früher an der Schläfe gemessen. Zeit und Puls stehen

[16] M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 1927.
[17] E.M. Cioran, Geschichte und Utopie, 1965, 49.
[18] H.M. Enzensberger, Blindenschrift, 47.

also in einer Beziehung und damit Zeit und Lebenszeit. Das lateinische Wort für Zeit ist „tempus", aber auch für „Schläfe". Dient heute das Fühlen des Pulses zur ärztlichen Diagnostik, so war es früher die Schläfe. Sie gab den Zeitsinn an.

Und ein Wanderspruch lautet:
Meist sieht man
des Lebens Frist
vor lauter Alltags-
fristen nicht.

Es gibt die dead-line, die todbegrenzte Lebensfrist aus einer Fülle von Pulsschlägen. Zeit, unsere Zeit ist biografische Zeit zwischen Geburt und Tod. Sie wird oft in Erinnerung verwandelt und so gerettet. Die tragische Linearität des Chronos, der Ablaufzeit, – wie jede Stunde die andere wegschiebt, um sein zu können -, wird außer Kraft gesetzt. In der Erinnerung kommt die vergangene und zunichte gewordene Zeitgestalt zur Auferstehung, und wird auf eine neue Weise wiedergewonnen. So gab Marcel Proust seinem Hauptwerk den Titel: „Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Zeit" (À la recherche du temps perdu).[19] Zeit ist zunächst Menschenzeit. In der griechischen Mythologie begegnen uns die drei Parzen oder Moiren, wonach die jüngste, Klotho, den Lebensfaden am Spinnrad spinnt, Lachésis ihn in den Händen hält und ausspannt, und Atropos, ihr Name bedeutet „die Unabwendbare", ihn bei gekommener Zeit abschneidet. Schon die Griechen haben zwischen zwei Zeitgestalten unterschieden, dem Kairos, der Zeit als Eigenschaft, und dem Chronos, der Zeit als Dauer. Der Kairos meint die ereignisorientierte Zeit, den erlebten und entscheidenden Augenblick, der der Zeit einen Wert einstiftet oder Anteil gibt an einem Schicksal und einer Krise. Der erlebte Augenblick qualifiziert die Zeit. Chronos hingegen ist das irreversible Dahingleiten der Zeit, der physikalischen Zeit als Sequenz von Stunden, Tagen. Chronos ist Dauer, ist Lebenszeit.

Die Zeit ist mit unserem menschlichen Erleben und Handeln eng verknüpft. Augustinus setzt im 11. Buch seiner Confessiones mit dem Thema Zeit auseinander und betont die Rolle des Bewusstseins in der Zeitwahrnehmung. Die Gegenwart bildet den Umschlagpunkt von Vergangenheit und Zukunft: Die Vergangenheit *ist* nicht mehr, die Zukunft noch nicht. Augustinus war sich dessen bewusst, wenn er in seinen Confessiones schreibt: „Wenn mich niemand danach fragt, weiß ich es; will ich es einem Fragenden erklären, weiß ich es nicht" (Conf. XI, 14). In der Folge aber unterscheidet er zwischen zwei Betrachtungsweisen der Zeit, der physikalisch-astronomischen, die mit Hilfe der Uhr und des Kalenders gemessen wird, und der psychologischen Zeit, der Zeit „als Erstreckung der Seele", die „gegenwärtig erinnernd und erwartend... bei Gewesenem und Künftigem" ist. Schon Lukian konstatierte in der Antike: „Das ganze Leben wird dem Glücklichen zu kurz, dem Leidenden nimmt eine Nacht kein Ende". Auch bei manchen Denkern des 20.Jh. geht es um die Zeiterfahrung des Menschen. Henri Bergson[20] unterscheidet zwischen der

[19] H.R. Jauss, Zeit und Erinnerung in Marcel Prousts „À la recherche du temps perdu" (1955).
[20] H. Bergson, Essais sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Paris 1889 (dt. Zeit und Freiheit, Frankfurt/M. 1989).

qualitativen, nur durch Intuition erfassbaren und erlebten Zeit, und der am Raum orientierten Zeit der Physik. Schon nach Aristoteles ist Zeit die gezählte Bewegung, ihr Maß, und nach I. Kant ist sie neben dem Raum die apriorisch, also unbeeinflussbar vorausgesetzte Wahrnehmungsform jeder Anschauung und Erkenntnis. Als subjektive Zeit aber hat sie eine affektive, emotionale Struktur mit einer inneren Bewertung von Qualitäten wie Langeweile, „erfüllte" Zeit usw.

Im Jahre 1913 erschien das Opus Edmund Husserls: „Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie", das für das Philosophieren des 20. Jahrhunderts eine revolutionierende Wende einleitete. Diese besteht in der Rückwendung von den äußeren, vom Positivismus emphatisch als Grundlage und Ziel jeder Erkenntnis postulierten Gegebenheiten, hin zu denen des Bewusstseins selbst und dessen Erkundung. Allein der Mensch hat ein bewusstes Verhältnis zur Zeit, indem er mit ihr umgeht, sie handhabt, sie verbraucht oder verschwendet. Auch Tolstois Erzählung „Die drei Fragen" führte zur Qualifizierung des „Augenblicks" als einer theologischen Kategorie, da Sinnempfang und Sinngebung nicht so sehr „Überschriften" sind für pauschale Lebensentwürfe, sondern Vollzüge im konkreten Zeitmoment des Augenblicks, in dem sie ihre „Fleischwerdung" erlangen. Der „Augen-Blick" wird so zu einem der wichtigsten Zeitmomente gegenüber der flüchtigen Uhr-Zeit, wonach etwas mit der Zeit vergeht.

b. Das Phänomen der Zeit

Im zweiten Abschnitt seines Opus magnum „Sein und Zeit" bringt Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)[21] eine Analyse der Zeitlichkeit menschlichen Daseins. Er führt die Frage nach dem „Sinn von Sein" auf den Fragenden, auf das menschliche Dasein als das sich verstehende Dasein selbst zurück. Als räumlich eröffnetes „In-der-Welt-sein" vollzieht sich das Dasein als Sein zum Tode, als Sorge und Angst. Martin Heidegger, der vier Semester Theologie in Freiburg studiert hatte, erhielt 1907 vom priesterlichen Freund der Familie, dem Freiburger Bischof, Franz Brentanos Arbeit „Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles", das für seinen frühen Denkweg und seine Hermeneutik „Stab und Stecken" werden sollte. Das „Sein" des „Daseins" zeigt sich als ein ständiges „Noch-Nicht", als Bezug auf eine Zukunft, die letztlich der Tod ist. Die „Ganzheit" des menschlichen Dasein ist so grundlegend durch das „Sein zum Tode" bestimmt. In diesem gespannten Zeitvorgriff ragt der Tod seinerseits schon in das Dasein hinein. Dies kommt am deutlichsten im Phänomen der Angst zum Ausdruck, sodass Heidegger notiert: „Die Angst erhebt sich aus dem In-der-Welt-sein als geworfenem Sein zum Tode." Denn: „Das eigentliche Sein zum Tode, d.h. die Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit ist der verborgene Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins." Für M. Heidegger ist der „Sinn von Sein" die Zeit und

[21] M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927), bes. zweiter Abschnitt 1-6; Tübingen 1986. Vgl. G. Figal, Martin Heidegger. Phänomenologie der Freiheit, Frankfurt/M. 1988. F.W. von Herrmann, Subjekt und Dasein. Interpretationen zu „Sein und Zeit", Frankfurt 1974. Vgl. O. Marquard, Zeit und Endlichkeit, in: Ders., Zukunft braucht Herkunft. Philosophische Essays, Stuttgart: Reclam 2003, 220-233.

zwar nicht als die von Jetztpunkten gedachte Sequenz, sondern die Zeit als gespannter Daseinsentwurf auf den Tod hin und das Hineinragen des Todes ins Leben. Zur Eigentlichkeit des Daseins aber gehört es, dieses auf den Tod-hin-Bezogensein auf sich zu nehmen in „vorlaufender Entschlossenheit" zum eigenen Selbstsein, um sich so aus der Verfallenheit an das „Man" zu lösen.

Das Phänomen und Problem der Zeit ist vielschichtig und für das menschliche Dasein bedrängend und notvoll. Tempus edax, die Zeit nagt am Leben des Menschen und ist schwer zu fassen. Die Zeit des menschlichen Daseins ist auf Abruf geborgt und läuft auf das unentrinnbare Ende, auf den Tod zu. Erst in der Verinnerlichung dieser Verknappung erfährt der Mensch existentiell, was Zeit ist, was Lebenszeit ist. Sie ist, mit Ingeborg Bachmann (1926-1973) zu sprechen, „gestundete Zeit" oder mit Qohelet, das jegliches seine Zeit hat. Das Titelgedicht des Gedichtbandes von Ingeborg Bachmann „Die gestundete Zeit" beginnt mit:

Es kommt härtere Tage.
Die auf Widerruf gestundete Zeit
Wird sichtbar am Horizont.
Bald mußt du den Schuh schnüren
Und die Hunde zurückjagen in die Marschhöfe.
...

Eine der großartigsten Reflexionen über die Zeit begegnet uns im 1.Akt des „Rosenkavaliers" von Richard Strauss[22] mit dem Text Hugo von Hofmannsthals erscheint Octavian, der spielerische „Bub", wie ihn die Marschallin nennt, als Fortführung des Mozartschen Cherubino in „Figaros Hochzeit", jene liebesahnende Verkörperung des jungen, zur Liebe erwachenden Menschen. Als Joseph Frhr. v. Eichendorff bei einer Figaro-Aufführung die Gestalt erlebte, spricht er von ihr als „der verzauberten Verliebtheit im ahnungsvollen Morgenlicht". Im Rosenkavalier ist Octavian der Cherubino und als er der Marschallin gegenüber alle seine Liebesschwüre leidenschaftlich-stürmisch beteuert, versucht sie ihm in einem leisen und nachdenklichen Monolog – voll wehmütiger Gedanken, – den Begriff der unausweichlichen Vergänglichkeit und der Zeit nahezubringen, den er in seiner Jungenblüte noch nicht zu begreifen vermag. Dieser Monolog gehört zu den schönsten Stücken der Partitur, ja der Opernliteratur. Um den Text ist tonmalerisch ein zarter Klangteppich gelegt, wenn die Uhren geschildert werden, die die Marschallin manchmal mitten in der Nacht zum Stehen bringt, um so gewissermaßen auch die Zeit stillzustellen. In der Musik hört man das leise Schlagen der Stunden (Celesta und Harfen) zur beinahe geflüsterten Sing-Stimme, die das, was geschehen wird, ruhig und zärtlich sagt. Sie singt:

[22] Der Rosenkavalier. Komödie für Musik in drei Aufzügen von Hugo von Hofmannsthal. Musik von Richard Strauss, Mainz 1987, 49. E. Staiger, Der „Rosenkavalier" als Dichtung, in: Universitas 5/2 (1950) 919-929. Vgl. A. Razumovsky, Über den Text des Rosenkavaliers, in: Zeugnisse, Theodor W. Adorno zum 60. Geburtstag, Frankfurt/M. 1963, 225-240. H. Mayer, Hugo von Hofmannsthal und Richard Strauss, in: Sinn und Form 13 (1961) 888-915.

Die Zeit im Grund, Quinquin, die Zeit,
die ändert doch nichts an den Sachen.
Die Zeit, die ist ein sonderbar Ding.
Wenn man so hinlebt, ist sie rein gar nichts.
Aber dann auf einmal,
da spürt man nichts als sie:
sie ist um uns herum, sie ist auch in uns drinnen.
In den Gesichtern rieselt sie, im Spiegel rieselt sie,
in meinen Schläfen fließt sie.
Und zwischen mir und dir da fließt sie wieder
Lautlos wie eine Sanduhr.
O Quinquin!
Manchmal hör ich sie fließen unaufhaltsam.
Manchmal steh ich auf, mitten in der Nacht,
und laß die Uhren alle stehen.
Allein man muß sich auch vor ihr nicht fürchten.
Auch sie ist ein Geschöpf des Vaters,
der uns alle erschaffen hat.

War die Zeit in den „Terzinen der Vergänglichkeit" von H. von Hofmannsthal noch mit tiefen und dunklen Schatten belegt, so ist ihr hier das schicksalshaft Ausweglose genommen. Auch sie ist ein „Geschöpf des Vaters". Dieses Lächeln unter Tränen des Abschiednehmens hat noch den urwienerischen Rat bei sich: „Leicht muß man sein ... halten und lassen... Die nicht so sind, die straft das Leben und Gott erbarmt sich ihrer nicht."

Wie aber vermag der in seinem Verhalten so vielfach durch die Zeit getriebene und außengesteuerte Mensch innezuhalten, um seiner Lebenszeit Inhalte zu geben, Tiefe und Besinnung? Die Dichterin Nelly Sachs will „die sterbende Zeit... mit Liebe dauerhaft" machen; und Erich Fried: „Und ohne Liebe/müsste man Auge und Herz/schneiden vom Ast der Zeit/... und zu dem Zeitlichen legen/da und dort".[23] Der Künstler sucht durch seine schöpferischen Werke die Zeit zu übersteigen, der Philosoph sie denkerisch einzuordnen (Hegel) und der Stoiker sie gelassen hinzunehmen.

Christlich verstandene Zeit hat eine Mitte im Mysterium der Menschwerdung Christi erhalten, sodass der Glaubende sie von diesem Begegnungsgeschehen her zählt, anno Domini, und sie zielgerichtet sieht auf eine vollendende Vollendung in Gott hin.[24] Der Christ soll seine Zeit durch Glaube, Liebe und Hoffnung neu qualifizieren für Gott und den Menschen. Die geschehenden Lebensvorgänge erhalten für ihn vom Christusgeheimnis her, dem verbum caro factum est (Joh 1,14), eine neue Qualifikation, sodass der nordafrikanische Theologe des 2.Jh., Tertullian es in die Formel fassen kann: caro, cardo

[23] E. Fried, Gedichte, 91.
[24] Vgl. L.W. Flagg, The Becoming of Time: Integrating Physical and Religious Time, 1995. J. Marsch, The Fulness of Time, 1992.

salutis, das Fleisch, d.h. die Annahme unserer hinfälligen, allfälligen Wirklichkeit ist zum Angelpunkt des Heiles geworden. Die Zeit des gläubigen Menschen transzendiert sich hin auf das Mehr-als-Menschliche, hin auf Erfüllung und Heil. Auch Sören Kierkegaard insistierte in seiner „Einübung im Christentum" auf einem Gleichzeitigwerden mit der in Jesus erfüllten Zeit durch die Unmittelbarkeit des Glaubens, der aus dem „Jünger zweiter Hand", also dem Menschen späterer Generationen, einen „Jünger erster Hand" macht. In dem glaubend gelebten „Heute" soll jeder Christus gleichsam als seinem Zeitgenossen begegnen. „Denn im Verhältnis zu dem Absoluten gibt es nur eine Zeit: die Gegenwart; wer mit dem Absoluten nicht gleichzeitig ist, für den ist es gar nicht da. Und da Christus das Absolute ist, so sieht man leicht, daß es im Verhältnis zu ihm nur eine Situation gibt: die der Gleichzeitigkeit; die drei-, sieben-, fünfzehn- oder achtzehnhundert Jahre sind etwas, was weder davon noch dazu tut; sie verändern ihn nicht, machen aber auch nicht offenbar, wer er war. Denn, wer er ist, ist nur für den Glauben offenbar."[25]

Auch die aus dem Glauben vollzogene christliche Liturgie will die drei Grundformen der Zeit – Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft – auf die Zeitentgrenztheit des Mysteriums Christi hin transparent werden lassen, vor allem in der Eucharistie als realer Vergegenwärtigung Christi und seiner Tat. Raum und Zeit werden auf eine transzendente Gegenwart hin gebündelt, in der die Vergangenheit im Jetzt lebendig gemacht wird und die künftige Vollendung im Vorschein vorweggenommen ist. In allem aber soll das Innewerden der transzendenten Kräfte den Glaubenden zum verantwortlichen Handeln in der Zeit entbinden und seinen Glauben in der Liebe wirksam werden lassen (Gal 5,1), d.h. die neue Existenz handelnd realisieren. Die Hingabe an Gott entbindet den Christen zugleich zum Dienst am Menschen und seiner Mitwelt im Heute. So ist das Heute des christlichen Glaubens der Kairos, wo das Vergängliche menschlicher Zeitlichkeit aufgehoben wird in das werdende Ewige, das über Uhr- und Lebenszeit hinausweist. K. Rahner fasst es in die Worte: „Aus der Zeit wird unsere Ewigkeit gezeitigt als die Frucht, in der, wenn sie geworden ist, alles bewahrt ist, was wir in dieser Zeit waren und wurden."[26]

[25] S. Kierkegaard, Einübung im Christentum, 1924, 57.
[26] K. Rahner, Vom Glauben inmitten der Welt, 26.

POVZETEK

Ekstaza in čas: dvojnost dionizičnega in apoliničnega kot vodilnih pojmov

Pričujoči članek razgrinja pojmovni par »apolinično-dionizično«, ki je postal filozofsko-antropološki pojem. Obravnava ga v njegovih raznoterih vidikih iz klasičnega humanizma. Po eni strani gre za kulturno-duhovno, harmonično urejeno, nazorno oblikovano, modrosti polno in etičnih maksim omejeno razsežnost delfskega boga Apolona, nadalje za človeka kot »animal symbolicum« s kulturno-antropološko izrazno močjo (religija, mit, umetnost, znanost), po drugi strani pa za dionizično razsežnost, ki strastno giblje, za ekstazo, za bolečino in krivdo, za strast in očiščenje (katarzo) kot tudi za ekstatično učinkujoče kvalitete (istočasna distanca in bližina, smrtna togost in sugestivna živost) frontalnega pogleda maske »boga maske« Dioniza. Maska omogoča »preobražajočo združitev« in »združujočo preobrazbo«. V svojem prikazovanju človeških višin in globin je maska izraz dionizične tragedije ter tragične zavozlanosti božje volje, človeške volje in usode.

Ključne besede: dionizično, apolinično, ekstaza, čas, človek

BODY FATNESS AND SEXUAL MATURATION STATUS

É. B. BODZSÁR, A. ZSÁKAI, K. JAKAB AND K. B. TÓTH
Department of Biological Anthropology, Eötvös Loránd University
Budapest, Pázmány P. sétány 1/c, H-1117 Hungary,
bodzsar@ludens.elte.hu

ABSTRACT

Purpose: (1) to characterize the maturation status on the basis of breast development in the girls and genital development in the boys, resp. on occurrence or non-occurrence menarche or spermarche; (2) to study the sexual differences in body components during the puberty, (3) to analyze body components in children belonging to the same age group, but different maturation stages and to the various of maturation indicators, but differing in age.

Subjects: The subjects of the present subsample of the 2nd national cross-sectional study were such children that had already begun pubertal development. The chronological age of the girls (n = 2673) and boys (n = 2869) ranged between 10.0 and 16.0 years.

Methods: The girls were subdivided by the maturation stages of the breast, while the boys by those of the genitals. Sexual maturation was assessed visually and rated by Tanner's suggestions (1962). Percentage of body fat was estimated by model of two components (Durnin and Rahaman 1967, Siri 1956), while masses of body components (fat, bone, muscle and residual mass) were assessed by the Drinkwater and Ross' (1980) four-component anthropometric fractionation method. Multiple comparisons of the means were tested by Scheffé's formula at the 5% level.

Results: Sexual differences in body composition, present already in childhood, became more accentuated during puberty, due mainly to growing fat content in the girls and to increasing lean body mass in the boys. In the females early maturers were heavier and contained more fat than less mature girls. This increase relative and absolute fat mass was proportionate to weight gain. In the males increasing fat mass lagged behind the gain in lean body mass both with advancing age and maturity status.

Conclusion: Body composition and maturity status are closely interrelated in both genders while gender-specific tendencies increase dimorphism and the several factors making up the differences between maturation types. Fat content was greater in both sexes in the early maturers. Also the developmental rate of prepubertal fat accumulation was faster in the early maturers when compared to those maturing later. Standards for the age change of body composition can therefore inform us not only about the development of bone, muscle and fat in childhood, but also allow a short-range prediction of pubertal events.

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Key words: Body components, developmental stages of breast, developmental stages of genitals, menarche, spermarche.

INTRODUCTION

Puberty embraces all the processes leading to sexual and physical maturation that involve not only the development of sex organs and secondary sexual characteristics, but the modification of body composition and body shape too. These processes have a relatively independent trend line each but they are simultaneously mutually interrelated.

The endocrine changes in puberty have a strong impact on both the direction and rate of metabolism and on the proliferation of bone, muscle and fat. Because of the accelerated rate of growth more nutrients are needed. The specific requirements in nutrients are almost twice greater than in childhood. So the timing, rate and duration of the pubertal changes in the measurements and the sexual maturation depend on the nutrition status.

Our study dealt with the interrelations of sexual maturation and nutritional status. The goals of this study were to analyze body composition in children belonging to the same age group, but to different stages of maturation as well as displaying the same level of maturation characteristics, but varying in age.

SUBJECTS AND METHODS

Cross-sectional data were collected in Middle-Hungary in 2003. The subjects of the present subsample of the main study were such children that had already begun pubertal development (Table 1).

Age (yr.)	Girls n	Boys n
10.0	188	171
10.5	147	162
11.0	231	224
11.5	255	264
12.0	215	276
12.5	205	241
13.0	237	239
13.5	251	228
14.0	287	309
14.5	269	226
15.0	191	193
15.5	109	172
16.0	184	168
Together	2673	2869

Table 1: Cross-sectional data were collected in Middle-Hungary in 2003.

Nutritional status was estimated by different way: trunk skinfolds (sum of pectoral, subscapular, midaxillary, abdominal, suprailiac skinfolds), extremity skinfolds (sum of triceps, biceps, forearm, medial thigh, medial calf skinfolds), BMI, model of two components: percentage of body fat (Durnin and Rahaman 1967, Siri 1956), model of four components: fat, bone, muscle and residual mass (Drinkwater and Ross 1991).

The sexual characteristics (at girls: breast developmental stages, at boys: genitals developmental stages) were rated according to Tanner's suggestions (1962). Data for determining menarche and spermarche were collected by the "status-quo" method.

The girls were subdivided by using menarcheal status and stages of breast development, while the factors for grouping the boys were spermarche, and stages of genital development.

After computing descriptive statistics the subgroups were compared by one-way ANOVA following which between-group differences were tested by F-tests at the 5% level of random error. Multiple comparisons of the means were tested for significance by Scheffé's formula used at the 10% level of F. Statistical evaluation was made by using the SPSS for Windows software (v. 6.01, 1996).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

When we contrasted pre- and post-menarcheal girls of the same age, significant differences in body composition emerged:

Post-menarcheal girls had significantly greater trunk and extremity skinfolds (Fig. 1) as well as greater value of BMI than pre-menarcheal ones (Fig. 2) than pre-menarcheal age-peers.



Fig. 1: Sum of trunk and extremity skinfolds of pre- (NM) and post-menarcheal (M) girls.



Fig. 2: BMI-values of pre- (NM) and post-menarcheal (M) girls.

The pattern of differences in percentage of body fat shows the same (Fig. 3). The percentage of body fat was practically the same in all post-menarcheal girls while the girls maturing late for their age displayed a decreasing series of relative fat content as their belatedness grew. All these observations prepare the way for the inference that the smaller the extent of fat accumulation, the later menarche would occur.



Fig. 3: Body fat percentage of pre- (NM) and post-menarcheal (M) girls (Siri-method).

Post-menarcheal girls had not only a significantly greater amount of body fat than pre-menarcheal ones, but greater bone and muscle fractions of body mass too (Fig. 4). It means that the smaller fat content the lower growth-rate of bone and muscle.



Fig. 4: Body components of pre- (NM) and post-menarcheal (M) girls (Drinkwater and Ross-method).

When pre- and post-spermarcheal boys were compared, the latter were found to have significantly greater BMI, but their trunk and extremity skinfolds, expect in 11 age-group, were smaller (Figs 5–6).



Fig. 5: Sum of trunk and extremity skinfolds of pre- (NS) and post-spermarcheal (S) boys.



Fig. 6: BMI-values of pre- (NS) and post-spermarcheal (S) boys.

The relative body fat content of the early maturing boys also smaller than the later maturing age-peers, only boys maturing very early e.g. at age 11, have a significantly larger amount of relative fat (Fig. 7).



Fig. 7: Body fat percentage of pre- (NS) and post-spermarcheal (S) boys (Siri-method).

The figure 8 shows the pre - and post-spermarcheal boys differed in all body components. The post-spermarcheal boys have greater bone and muscle mass than the pre-spermarcheal boys of the same chronological age.



Fig. 8: Body components of pre- (NS) and post-spermarcheal (S) boys (Drinkwater and Ross-method).

In comparing the corresponding groups of sexual maturity in the two genders one obviously should be aware of the time difference when menarche, respectively spermarche occur, namely, that they take place in a different phase of adolescent growth.

Menarche occurs when pubertal growth-rate decreases, while boys' growth-rate increases after occurent of spermarche. The relative fat content of the body is smaller around the age of peak height velocity because of the fat loss. Pre-spermarcheal boys that have not yet entered the phase of peak height velocity tend to accumulate fat and very lean ones usually mature later.

Successive stages of female breast development displayed significant differences in bone and muscle mass while there was no marked difference of relative body fat content (Figs 9–10). The only exception was between breast stage 4 and 5.



Fig. 9: Masses of body components of by stages of breast maturation.



Fig. 10: Body fat percentage by stages of breast maturation.

The pattern of changes in body component the similar tendency during shows according to successive stages of male genitals. The development of genitals is associated with a relative fat lots (Figs 11–12).



Fig. 11: Body fat percentage by stages of genitals maturation.

In summary, these observations strongly confirm the inference that maturation status is reflected by body composition and also the age change of body fat depends on it. Body composition and maturity status are closely interrelated in both genders while gender-specific tendencies increase dimorphism and the several factors making up the differences between maturation types. Fat content was greater in both sexes in the early maturers. The larger fat accumulation in prepuberty dues to earlier sexual maturation and higher rate of pubertal growth.

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POVZETEK
SESTAVA TELESA IN SPOLNO DOZOREVANJE

Cilji: 1. Opisati status spolnega dozorevanja na osnovi razvoja prsi pri deklicah in razvoja genitalij pri dečkih, upoštevaje tudi nastop menarhe oz. spermarhe. 2. Raziskati spolne razlike v telesni sestavi med puberteto. 3. Analizirati telesne komponente pri otrocih iste starosti, vendar z različno stopnjo spolnega dozorevanja.

Vzorec: Predmet razprave je vzorec otrok, ki so sodelovali v 2. nacionalni presečni raziskavi in pri katerih se je pubertetni razvoj že začel. Razpon starosti 2673 deklet in 2869 dečkov je od 10 do 16 let.

Metode: Dekleta so razdeljena glede na razvojni štadij prsi, dečki pa glede na razvojni štadij genitalij. Štadiji so ocenjeni vizualno po merilih Tannerja (1962). Odstotki telesne maščobe so ocenjeni po dvodelnem modelu (Durnin in Rahaman 1967, Siri 1956), masa telesnih komponent (maščoba, kosti, mišice in ostanek) pa je ocenjena po štiridelni antropometrični metodi Drinkwaterja in Rossa (1980). Multipla primerjava povprečnih vrednosti je testirana po Scheffelejevi formuli na nivoju 5%.

Rezultati: Spolne razlike v telesni sestavi, ki so prisotne že v otroštvu, postanejo povdarjene v glavnem zaradi naraščajočega maščevja pri deklicah in naraščajoče puste telesne mase pri dečkih. Zgodaj dozorevajoča dekleta so težja in imajo več maščobnega tkiva kot pozno dozorevajoča dekleta. Povečanje relativne in absolutne mišične mase je proporcionalna s pridobljeno težo. Z napredujočo starostjo in dozorelostjo, naraščajoča mišična masa pri fantih zaostaja za prirastom puste telesne mase.

Zaključki: Telesna sestava in zrelosti status sta pri obeh spolih tesno povezana. Spolno specifične tendence povečujejo spolni dimorfizem, posamezni faktorji pa ustvarjajo razlike med dozorevajočimi tipi. Vsebnost maščobe je pri obeh spolih večja pri zgodaj dozorevajočih otrocih. Tudi predpubertetno nalaganje maščobnega tkiva je intenzivnejše pri zgodaj dozorevajočih, če jih primerjamo s pozno dozorevajočimi otroci.

Standardi za starostne spremembe v telesni sestavi nas ne informirajo samo o razvoju okostja, mišičja in maščevja, ampak dopuščajo kratkotrajno napoved pubertetnih dogajanj.

Ključne besede: telesne komponente, razvojni štadiji prsi, razvojni štadiji genitalij, menarha, spermarha.

ŠKERLJ'S STOUTNESS INDEX IN YOUNG MALES IN EAST AFRICA

Ewa Rébacz
Department of Anthropology, University of Szczecin,
ul.Piastów, 40 B, blok 6, 71-065, Szczecin, Poland,
rebae@sus.univ.szczecin.pl

ABSTRACT

The research material in this study was male youth in Kenya (n=423), Tanzania (n=153) and the Sudan (n=154). The survey was carried out in 2000 in boarding schools, where students were fed and their time was fully organized for them. These vocational schools, where students learned the professions of a tailor, a joiner, a bricklayer, a car mechanic, a locksmith, a welder and an electrician provided all the students with accommodation in dormitories. The people examined were in the chronological age of between 18 and 30. The calculated Škerlj's Index allows for determining the body stoutness among young men. This study took advantage of people from several different nations and tribes. In all the groups analyzed the dominant levels of stoutness are "average" and "thin".

Keywords: East Africa, Škerlj's Index , the African people, morphological structure.

INTRODUCTION

Morphological characteristics of a number of African countries' populations are not yet well researched. Anthropometric research in this continent is carried out sporadically and fragmentarily. Research is hampered not only due to geographical conditions, but most of all to consequences of the colonisation era. Following several dozen years of independence modern African states are developing dynamically. At the same time Africa is one of the most diversified, both economically and socially, regions in the world. Transformations of political, economic and social structures result in irreversible cultural and ethnic changes on a scale unequaled in any other part of the globe. The pace of all these changes sets up a conflict between reality and the awareness that the native communities have. The anthropometric material collected in East Africa as well as its studies allow for the recording of the natural, but more and more blurred, biocultural images of the continent.

MATERIAL AND METHOD

The research was carried out in the year 2000 on young males, vocational schools students, from Kenya (n=423), Tanzania (n=153) and Sudan (n=154). These young males enjoyed full board offered by their schools. The range of the calendar age was from 18 to

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30. To select students for my study I used the descendency criterium. I gave priority to youth coming from indigent layers of society. The young men might have, in frequent cases, been undernourished before they came to live in school dormitories. Students of three schools based in different countries underwent anthropometric examinations, which brought measurements such as, among others, body height, body mass and thigh circumference.

The aim of this study is to assess the body build of young male Africans in the light of the [kerlj's stoutness index I=[(thigh circumference : body height)x100]. This index is a simple method of assessing the body build in terms of stoutness (Malinowski & Božiiow 1997). The simplicity of this method and its application are essential in analysing anthropometric material collected in communities other than European ones. The African environment refuses to undergo more complex analyses, that is why the measurements could not interfere with the broadly perceived personal intimacy of Africans. In order to compare the results I used the formula proposed by F. Curtius (Drozdowski 1998), who used the Rohrer's index to describe the type of body build in accordance with the Kretshmer's system.

Material analysis

The Škerlj's stoutness index for Kenyans is contained in the 22, 87-37,17 bracket, for Tanzanians in the 24,37-37,73 bracket and for the Sudanese in the 21,47-33,43 bracket. The lowest arithmetic average equalling 27.15 (with the standard deviation of δ=2.38) is characteristic to the Sudanese group, while the highest one is characteristic to Tanzanians, equalling 31.21 (δ=2.43). Kenyans are between these two, with the arithmetic average higher than that of the Sudanese by 2.64 (δ=2.18) and lower than that of Tanzanians by 1.42. Based on this data we can conclude that the slenderest silhouette is characteristic to the Sudanese. Table 1 presents a collation of percentage results that confirms earlier conclusions.

Table 1: Nationality versus differences between the examined individuals as regards the category of the degree of stoutness (the Škerlj's index)

	thin		average		stout		altogether
	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Kenia	35	8,3	325	76,8	63	14,9	423
Tanzania	6	3,9	93	60,8	54	35,3	153
Sudan	77	50,0	71	46,1	6	3,9	154
altogether	118	16,2	489	67,0	123	16,8	730

Among Kenyans 8.3% of the examined people have a "thin" body build according to the [kerlj's index. However, only 3.9% of Tanzanians and as many as 50% of the Sudanese were classified as "thin". As "stout", in the light of the Škerlj's index, can be described 35.3% of Tanzanians, 14.9% of Kenyans and just 3.9% of the Sudanese.

On the basis of the Rohrer's index I assessed types of body build according to the Kretchmer's system, using the formula proposed by Curtius (Drozdowski 1998). This

comparison confirms results obtained by using the Škerlj's index. As Table 2 suggests, males from different countries differ significantly in relation to the degree of their "slenderness".

Table 2: Nationality versus differences between the examined individuals as regards the category of the degree of slenderness (the Rohere's index)

	slender		medium		stocky		altogether
	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Kenia	34	8,0	331	78,3	58	13,7	423
Tanzania	12	7,8	103	67,3	38	24,8	153
Sudan	80	51,9	70	45,5	4	2,6	154
altogether	126	17,3	504	69	100	13,7	730

Individuals with a slender (leptosomic) body build are most numerous among the Sudanese (51.9%). The average (athletic) type is most frequent among Kenyans (78.3%). The stocky (pyknic) type is most frequent among Tanzanians (24.8%), and least frequent among the Sudanese (2.6%). Such a result confirms a significant slenderness of the Sudanese males and a simultaneous uniqueness of individuals with a stocky, pyknic body build.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the Škerlj's stoutness index it can be concluded that a significant majority of "thin" people is characteristic to the Sudanese, while a large level of stoutness is most frequently presented by Tanzanians who, at the same time, have the lowest number of people with a thin body build (Tab. 1). Apparently, a better morphological construction of Kenyans and Tanzanians is caused by more advantageous socio-economic conditions in those countries. As far as the Sudanese are concerned, however, their weaker build might be a result of harsh natural environmental conditions and the consequences of long years of an ethnic conflict.

The African environment is still attractive to anthropologists. A material analysis can also be conducted when based on basic anthropometric measurements. The use of state-of-the-art research techniques by a European person is frequently impossible due to Africans' social feelings and difficult environmental conditions. Because of that, the Škerlj's index is, among others, a proper tool for assessing the body build.

Cultural transformations, which affect Africa too, cause irreversible changes in these aboriginal communities.

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POVZETEK

Škerljev indeks korpulentnosti pri mladih moških v Vzhodni Afriki

Vzorec predstavlja mlade moške: 423 iz Kenije, 153 iz Tanzanije in 154 iz Sudana. Raziskava je bila izvedena leta 2000 v dijaških domovih, kjer sta prehrana in prenočišče organizirana za vse učence poklicnih šol, kjer se dijaki učijo za poklic krojača, mizarja, zidarja, avtomehanika, ključavničarja, varilca in električarja. Osebe, vključene v raziskavo, so stare od 18 do 30 let, pripadajo pa različnim narodom in plemenom dveh jezikovnih skupin (nilotske in bantu). Na osnovi antropometričnih mer izračunan Škerljev indeks omogoča oceno korpulentnosti telesa. Pri vseh analiziranih skupinah prevladujeta povprečna in »suha« stopnja korpulentnosti.

Ključne besede: Vzhodna Afrika, Škerljev indeks korpulentnosti, Afričani, morfološka struktura

V spomin Obituary In memoriam

Ottó G. EIBEN

Profesor Eiben je bil član mednarodnega sveta Društva antropologov Slovenije in član mednarodnega uredniškega odbora društvene revije *Anthropological Notebooks*. V številki VII/1 je objavil zelo odmeven članek: Spreminjanje starosti ob nastopu menarhe v zadnjih pedesetih letih.

Povabili smo ga v Ljubljano na mednarodno srečanje ob 100. rojstnem dnevu prof.dr. Boža Škerlja v septembru 2004. Vabila je bil zelo vesel in se je prijavil za aktivno udeležbo. Predavati je želel o somatotipih dečkov in deklic v Körmendu. Iz njegovega pisma, ki smo ga prejeli dan pred pričetkom srečanja, smo občutili veliko žalost, ko nam sporoča, da iz osebnih razlogov ne more priti. Pogrešali smo ga. Poslali smo mu pozdrave in dobre želje, a žal že v mesecu in pol prejeli novico, da ga je bolezen premagala. Še poln idej je zaključeval knjigo o raziskavah v Körmendu, načrtoval pa je tudi več potovanj na kongrese v tujino.

Bil je vodja Oddelka za fizično antropologijo pri Eötvös Loránd University of Science v Budimpešti od leta 1975 do 1996. Kot priljubljen pedagoški delavec je bil mentor številnim mladim strokovnjakom. Njegovo raziskovalno delo je bilo v glavnem vezano na področje rasti in razvoja otroka, sekularnega trenda in variabilnosti človeške postave. Največje delo je opravil v mestu Körmend, kjer je izvajal obsežne antropometrične meritve vsakih deset let od 1958 do 1998. S tem zahtevnim delom si je pridobil veliko mednarodno veljavo. Predaval je na več kot tridesetih univerzah ter vodil tečaje o fizični antropologiji in biologiji človeka v več kot dvajsetih državah. Izpeljal in izdelal je prve madžarske rastne standarde (1986) in prvo longitudinalno raziskavo rasti v Budimpešti (1992). Mednarodni kongresi in simpoziji, ki jih je organiziral, so bili vedno dobro obiskani, saj so druženja ustvarjala trdna prijateljstva, ki jih je navdihovala njegova prijaznost in visoka kultiviranost.

Vsem, ki smo ga osebno poznali bo ostal v spominu kot izredno sistematičen pedagog, odličen organizator in iskren prijatelj. Njegova dela: 21 knjig in 292 člankov bodo ostala v trajno spodbudo in pomoč pri delu generacijam antropologov.

Tatjana Tomazo-Ravnik

III. TITLES OF ARTICLES

Titles (in English and Slovene) must be short, informative, and understandable. The title should be followed by the name of the author(s), their position, institutional affiliation, and if possible, by e-mail address.

IV. ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS

The abstract must give concise information about the objective, the method used, the results obtained, and the conclusions. Authors are asked to enclose in English and Slovene an abstract of 100 – 200 words followed by three to five keywords. They must reflect the field of research covered in the article. English abstract should be placed at the beginning of an article and the Slovene one after the references at the end.

V. NOTES

Notes should also be double-spaced and used sparingly. They must be numbered consecutively throughout the text and assembled at the end of the article just before references.

VI. QUOTATIONS

Short quotations (less than 30 words) should be placed in double quotation marks with single marks for quotations within quotations. Longer quotations should be intended without quotation marks except for quotations within quotations (placed in double quotation marks).

VII. GRAPHS, TABLES AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Articles should not contain more than 10 illustrations (graphs, figures, maps, photographs) and tables, and their position in the article should be clearly indicated. Tables with their legends should be submitted on the separate pages. Titles of tables should appear above the tables, and titles of graphs and illustrations below. Tables and illustrations should be shortened when cited in the text (Tab. 1 or Fig. 1). Acknowledge any photograph not your own.

VIII. REFERENCES

References within the text should be cited by the author's last name in the form (Malinowski 1922: 35; Turner 1980: 145) or 'According to Malinowski (1922: 35)...'. List of references should be arranged in alphabetical order and should include the following: surname and name of author(s), date, title, and (for books) place of publication and name of publisher; for articles, the name of a journal in full, the volume, the number in parenthesis, and pagination. Arabic numerals should be used throughout. Examples are:

Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*. London: Routledge.

Tonkinson, Robert. 1988. 'Ideology and Domination' in Aboriginal Australia: A Western Desert Test Case. In: Tim Ingold, David Riches & James Woodburn (eds.), *Hunters and Gatherers*. Oxford: Berg, pp. 170-184.

Turner, Victor. 1980. Social Dramas and Stories About Them. *Critical Inquiry* 7(1): 141-68.

IX. FORMAT AND FORM OF ARTICLES

Articles should be written with Word for Windows using "Times New Roman CE 12" font with double spacing, align left and margins of 3 cm on A4 pages. Paragraphs must be indented rather than separated by an empty line. Foreign words (except proper names) should be italicised. All articles should be proofread for professional and language errors before submission.