

**DRUŠTVO ANTROPOLOGOV SLOVENIJE**  
**SLOVENE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY**

**A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L**

**N O T E B O O K S**

**year VIII, no. 1**

The 80th Anniversary of dr. Franc Pediček

**BIOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY**


Barbara Artnik  
Igor Jerman, Romana Ružič  
Borut Telban

**SOCIAL AND LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY**


Janez Juhant  
Janez Kolenc  
Darko Štrajn  
Igor Ž. Žagar  
Janez Kolenc, Darja Kobal, Nada Lebarič

**EDUCATIONAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL  
ANTHROPOLOGY**

Dušan Rutar  
Bojan Žalec  
Bogomoir Novak, Milena Ivanuš Gremek



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**Š I L I H**

# ANTHROPOLOGICAL NOTEBOOKS VIII/1



Ljubljana 2002

ANTHROPOLOGICAL NOTEBOOKS  
YEAR VIII, No. 1  
REGULAR ISSUE

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SLOVENIJE / SLOVENE ANTHROPOLOGICAL  
SOCIETY

Večna pot 111, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia

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ISSN: 1408 - 032X

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Print: Tiskarna Artelj

**Front page: Portrait of dr. Franc Pediček dedicated to his 80-th anniversary.**

The publication was financed by the Ministry of  
Education, Science and Sport of Republic of Slovenia.

The volume is printed entirely on recycled paper.

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*Anthropological Notebooks VIII/1, 2002*

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**BOOK REVIEWS**

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**TATIANA BAJUK SENČAR:** Latour Bruno. Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1999. 324 pages.

**146**

## Introduction

*The Slovene Anthropological Society - <http://rcul.uni-lj.si/~antropologi> was established in the year 1992. Last year it organized already the third days of Škerlj - 28 - 29 September 2001, with the title *Anthropology at the beginning of the new millenium* («Antropologija na pragu novega tisočletja»). The representers of different anthropological disciplines i. e. biological - physical, medical, cultural, philosophical, sociological, pedagogical and political were there and also the representers who use anthropology interdisciplinarily. Short abstracts of their new knowledge are included in the *Anthology of the abstracts* (Ljubljana, DAS, 2001). The present number of *Antropological Notebooks* consists of some of the contributions to this symposium of the Slovene Anthropological Society such as: Kolenc, J.: *The Transition of political culture to Democracy: Slovenian case study*, D. Štrajn: *Culture and Difference*, B. Novak - M. Ivamiš Grmek: *Anthropological and didactical evaluation of the implementation of the new nine-year school in the context of Slovene school development*, B. Artnik: *Revščina - najpomembnejši rizični dejavnik za neenakost zdravja – medicinska antropologija (celostni pristop)* and Jerman, I., - Ružič, R. : *Man in the ocean of energies*, and Juhant: *Globalization and Anthropology*.*

Juhant in his contribution *Globalization and anthropology* said that postmodernism orients us towards transcending one-dimensional imperialistic globalisation and it demands considering special marginalised and handicapped groups. Such a strategy also requires of all partners that they consider (every) man as person, solidarity and subsidiarity: it is necessary to work locally and to be oriented globally.

The contribution of J. Kolenc *The Transition of political culture to Democracy: Slovenian case study* concerns the political anthropological level. He advocates the thesis that arising complexity of Slovene societies is hindering the development of stable democracy. There remains the open question of how to empower the agents which accelerate it.

Jerman and Ružič in the contribution *Man in the ocean of energies* emphasise the thesis that man has never before been more to exposed radiated energies than today. This become unhealthy, because more and more indicators show that man should limit the artificial sources of energy which influence his body.

D. Štrajn in his contribution *Culture and Difference* shows several aspects for the working of mechanisms of cultural, societal and political environment in the time of globalisation. Štrajn's theoretical starting point in his paper was found in the work of B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. He shows how nationalism is built within nations as "imagined communities". Special attention is paid to some phenomena in former socialist countries and their coping with the challenges of interculturalism and the demands of free market economy. Štrajn's thesis is that globalization is also, with the widespreading mass media, an imagined process.

*Additional contributions was sent from D. Rutar, (Pedagogy of the other Or, the critical pedagogy and the impossible exchange), B. Telban (Medical ethics and the body across cultures), B. Žalec, (Meanings of Identity), I. Ž. Žagar (Argumentation, cognition, and context: can we know that we know what we (seem to) know?) and J. Kolenc, D. Kobal, N. Lebarič: Motivation in school from social - anthropological point of view.*

*In the paper of J. Kolenc, D. Kobal, N. Lebarič: Motivation in school from social - anthropological point of view the theory of motivation of Abraham Maslow and systems model of human behavior are shortly presented. This is represented the theoretical framework to evaluate the hypothesis, that self-concept and self-esteem are decisive factors of motivation of students in Slovenian upper secondary schools.*

*B. Žalec in his contribution Meanings of Identity presents a critical survey of modern views on topics which are marked by such words as identity, self, I, person and similar. The conceptions are classified into several groups and subgroups (psychological, historical, sociological, culturological, anthropological and akin reflections on identity, a philosophical class).*

*I. Ž. Žagar in his contribution Argumentation, cognition, and context: can we know that we know what we (seem to) know? shows that agumentation may well be cognitive in its origin, but it is only when we »inject« it into discourse that we can recognize, understand and describe it as argumentation, analyze it into argument(s) and conclusion(s), and evaluate it. This article is about some of the problems of this »transition« into words.*

*B. Telban, in his contribution Medical ethics and the body across cultures, presents several different examples from different societies and cultures (Western and non-Western) to show how historical changes, cultural values and social relations shape the experience of the human body, health and sickness, and how they situate suffering in local moral worlds.*

*The intention of the published contributions in this number of Anthropological Notebooks is to show the readers the progress of different branches of anthropology, openness of dialogue among them, and their presentation in the international space.*

*Bogomir Novak*



## **POVERTY – THE MOST IMPORTANT RISK FACTOR FOR INEQUALITY IN HEALTH**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Poverty resulting from material shortage and from cultural and social exclusion, which is a conditioning association with a certain socio-economic group, is the biggest health-risk factor. Morbidity or mortality rates are much higher in the socio-economically deprived groups of population than is the case with the groups of population of better socio-economic status. For establishing the inequality in health, the morbidity or mortality rates by gender, age, nationality, geographical area and socio-economic characteristics could be applied. Poor health of people within the society as a whole and within individual social classes is conditioned by the social and economical organisation of the society, therefore the health indicators are also indicators of the socio-economic organisation of a country. The World Health Organization (WHO) is leading its policy on the basis of the fact that the world is one and indivisible and that there are big disparities existing in health condition among different countries as well as within them, representing the main obstacle for development. The data of WHO available are clearly showing big differences among indicators of the health condition between the western and eastern parts of the European Region. The differences are the most evident if following the infant mortality rate (from 3 to 43 per 1000 live births) and the life expectancy at birth (from age 79 to 64). In the year 1998, 11.3 % of Slovene inhabitants were living below the poverty line (measured by the modified OECD equivalence scale) (OECD-Organisation for Economic Co-Operation Development). With such a share, Slovenia is classified among the twelve countries of the EU with the lowest poverty rate, however the data could be misleading since in Slovenia we are not using the uniform methodology.

Socio-economic inequalities in health are a major challenge for health policy, not only because most of these inequalities can be considered unfair, but also because reducing the burden of health problems in disadvantaged groups offers great potential for improving the average health status of the population as a whole. When aiming to reduce inequality in health, a national strategy for combating poverty, awareness of people and increasing the scope of health and social activity is required. Taking such measures is conditioned by the structural and etiological understanding of inequality among individual groups of population within a certain place and time. New databases are being established in

Slovenia and the possibilities are being searched for the connection thereof. We are facing difficulties in defining the variables, in connecting the data among different databases and in efforts towards establishing the information system. At the Institute of Social Medicine of the Faculty of Medicine of Ljubljana and at the Institute of the Republic of Slovenia of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development the research has been started with the purpose of establishing connections among individual socio-economic factors (gender, age, education, profession, activity, marital status, nationality, income, etc.) and the causes of death according to the ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases), for dead persons across Slovenian municipalities in the years 1992, 1995 and 1998.

**KEY WORDS:** poverty, health, WHO, Slovenia, social medicine, disease

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## **HOLISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF HEALTH**

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The contemporary definition of health is no longer formulated by dividing it into physical and mental health, but is characterised by a holistic (integral) comprehension thereof. The World Health Organization's (WHO) definition is very similar: »Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity« (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1978). For the holistic understanding of health, the importance of the reciprocal dependence of selected levels is stressed; health means a balance between biological and mental impacts as well as a person's active approach to the environment, and also the impact of social and other external factors on health are pointed out. The Ottawa Charter (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1986) states that to a large extent a person's health depends on the provision of fundamental living conditions and a stable eco-system, such as a place to live, food, education, income, as well as peace and social equity. To improve health, all the above-mentioned preconditions have to be fulfilled. In this context, health is also a source of human life not only a goal of its own. It is one of the foundations enabling a person to fulfil her aspirations, meet her needs, change the environment and play an active part in it. This makes health an important determinant of the quality of life. At the same time, health can be an indicator of the economic efficiency of a country and the welfare of its population (Hanžek 1998).

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## **WHO: HEALTH FOR ALL IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

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
The policy of the World Health Organization (WHO 1998) is based on the fact that the world is one and indivisible. As stated in the 1998 World Health Declaration, the enjoyment of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being. Health is a precondition for well being and the quality of life. It is a benchmark for measuring progress towards the reduction of poverty, the promotion of social cohesion and the elimination of discrimination.

The health status differing significantly between the Member States of European Region (51 countries) and within them, is representing the major obstacle to development. The regional policy for health for all is a response to the World Health Declaration (WHO, 1998). To achieve health for all in the 21st century, the European Region of WHO has set

21 targets (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1998), which Member States are supposed to achieve between the years 2005 and 2020 (depending on the individual target) by the means of the national policy and regional development's orientations. For equity in health, the first two targets are of the main importance. Equity in health is supposed to be attained by means of solidarity at national level and in the European Region as a whole.

### Target 1: Solidarity for Health in the European Region


Poverty is the major cause of ill health and lack of social cohesion. One third of the population of the eastern part of the European Region, 120 million people, live in extreme poverty. Health has suffered most where social systems have collapsed, and where natural resources have been poorly managed. This is clearly demonstrated by the wide health gap between the western and eastern parts of the Region. The differences in infant mortality rates are the most significant (from 3 to 43 per 1000 live births) (Fig. 1) as well as in life expectancy at



**Fig. 1.** Infant mortality in subregional groups of countries in the European Region within the period 1970 - 1998.

birth (from 79 to 64 years) (Fig. 2).

According to the plans of the WHO (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1998), the present gap in health status between Member States of the European Region should be reduced by at least 30 %. In order to reduce these inequities and to maintain the security and cohesion of the European Region, a much stronger collective effort needs to be made by international institutions, funding agencies and donor countries. Furthermore, external support should be much better integrated through joint inputs into government health development programmes that are given high priority and are firmly based on a national health for all policy in the receiving country.



**Fig. 2.** Life expectancy at birth in subregional groups of countries in the European Region

### **Target 2: Equity in Health**

The second target of the WHO aims to ensure that the differences between socio-economic groups are decreased, since even in the richest countries in the European Region, the better off live several years longer and have fewer illnesses and disabilities than the poor. The health gaps between socio-economic groups within countries are supposed to be reduced by at least one fourth in all Member States, by substantially improving the level of health of disadvantaged groups of inhabitants.

Poverty is the biggest risk factor for health, and income-related differences in health – which stretch in a gradient across all levels of the social hierarchy – are a serious injustice and reflect some of the most powerful influences on health. Financial deprivation also leads to prejudice and social exclusion, with increased level of violence and crime.

There are also great differences in health status between women and men in the European Region. Other health-risk factors which determine association with a certain socio-economic group, are educational level, nationality, etc.

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## **POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN HEALTH**

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### **Definitions**

Poverty is considered an extreme form of inequality in ensuring health and social security. The European Council's definition of poverty (also adopted by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia – SORS) does not encompass only the lack of material resources but also social and cultural exclusion: »A person, family or group of people with resources

(material, cultural and social) too low to ensure a minimum of reasonable living in a certain national environment are classified as poor« (Martin-Guzman, 1993). Cultural and social exclusion are both responsible for and result from material shortage. Poverty is a combination of different types of deprivation (deficits) and limits on life's opportunities. Poverty is connected to a lack of education, unemployment, low income, poor housing conditions, poor health, and low cultural level. All of these shortages are enclosed in a circle of dependency upon the basic sources and living conditions, such as stable eco-system, food, education, income, and first of all peace and social justice and equity. The poor are excluded from social life and prevented from making full use of their cultural and societal possibilities. The poor are thereby exposed to violations of their basic human rights, while their human dignity is undermined. Efforts to reduce poverty and promote human development are therefore efforts to safeguard human, economic, social, and cultural rights (Hanžek & Gregorčič, 2001).

Poverty is such a complex notion that it cannot be studied from one aspect only (Hanžek & Gregorčič, 2001). Different concepts and definitions of poverty, as well as methods of measuring, are used in individual countries. Due to its complexity, different methods and indicators should be applied when measuring poverty, in order to give a clearer picture of its diversity. In order to be able to compare poverty levels in different societies, various measures have been devised which depend on how poverty is defined. The lack of money or material goods can be determined by three definitions: subjective poverty, absolute poverty and relative poverty (Hanžek 1999; Hanžek & Gregorčič, 2001).

Subjective poverty is measured by surveys. It is based on the data given by individuals or all members of a household about their income position or their needs. The notion of subjective poverty is important mainly because it reflects the self-assessment of individuals or groups and their self-definition or self-ranking. This has a number of shortcomings: people are reluctant to give a clear opinion about such intimate issues, and the feeling of poverty also varies between individuals. The latter is supported by information stemming from the Slovene Public Opinion Poll (Toš, 1998), since during the last 20 years the share of people claiming to be poor has never reached the value of 1 %, which is absolutely not the realistic value.

Absolute poverty is defined by a lack of basic goods and services essential to meet minimum biological needs: food, housing, clothing and heating. Absolute poverty shows the share of those who live below the line denoting the shortage of minimum goods and services essential to survival. This line is fixed and is independent of changes in the income position of individuals or households.

Relative poverty is a condition of relative deprivation compared to a certain level of well being in a particular society. It measures inequality within a society rather than the actual poverty. One way of determining relative poverty is based on the households' income or expenditure distribution; poverty is changing in step with changes in income distribution. The most widely used method has been the setting of the poverty line: a certain percentage (40, 50, or 60 %) of the average or median income or expenditure of households in equivalent form is the poverty line. Households living below this line are considered to be poor. International comparisons are most frequently based on relative poverty.

Equivalent income is the ratio of household income to the number of equivalent household members. Equivalent income can be calculated on the basis of two scales: the OECD scale (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development), which gives a

weight of 1.0 to the first adult, a weight of 0.7 to other adult members, and a weight of 0.5 to a child below 16 years of age; or the modified OECD scale, which gives a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, a weight of 0.5 to other adult members, and 0.3 to each child below 14 years of age.

All these measures are no more than technical tools used in taking appropriate steps and allowing comparison. They are based on the assumption that poverty only entails lack of money. However, poverty is a more complex notion and includes other forms of deprivation (poor health, shortage of social contacts, information, knowledge, values, etc.); the United Nations (Ross-Larson, 2000) has devised two complex indices of human poverty, one for poor and one for rich countries. The indices contain information about the health of people, functional illiteracy, income distribution, and unemployment. According to these calculations, the highest rate of poverty among the rich countries is recorded in the USA – 16.5 and the lowest in Sweden – 6.8. The poverty rate in Slovenia amounts to 18.1 mainly because of its high functional illiteracy.

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## **POVERTY IN THE EU COUNTRIES AND IN SLOVENIA**

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In Slovenia, the poverty rate was first assessed by the SORS in 1993 on the basis of data from the Households Expenditure Survey using the modified OECD equivalence scale, and the poverty line was drawn at 50 % of the average expenses of households (unit of observation: a household). The calculations showed that 13.6 % of households were poor in Slovenia in 1993 (Hanžek, 1998; National programme on the fight against poverty and social exclusion 2000).

In the nineties, the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) began to use in its analysis a slightly modified method of calculating poverty. Calculations are still made on the basis of the modified OECD equivalence scale, but examine household incomes (unit of observation: a person). The poverty line was set at 60 % of the median equivalent income. At this point I would like to stress that the poverty rates calculated on the basis of household incomes are as a rule higher than those calculated on the basis of expenditure.

Direct comparison of calculations of the poverty rate for Slovenia with calculations carried out for the twelve countries of the EU is not possible, since the EU countries ceased to use the old methodology already in the years 1987-1989. Nevertheless the calculations can be used for comparison with other countries. On such a basis, Slovenia can be listed among the countries with a relatively low poverty rate. The poverty rate was in Slovenia nearly one half lower in comparison to the EU country with the highest poverty rate, Portugal, but more than three times higher if compared to Denmark with a poverty rate amounting to only 4.2 % (Hanžek 1998, National programme on the fight against poverty and social exclusion 2000) (table 1)

For carrying out international comparison of the poverty rate with regard to households' incomes, the calculation from the years 1997/98 can be applied (the last calculation for Slovenia) and compared to the accessible data from the year 1999 for the EU countries (table 2) (Hanžek & Gregorčič, 2001). At that time, 11.3 % of inhabitants of Slovenia were living below the poverty line. With such a share, Slovenia is classified among the twelve countries of the EU with the lowest poverty rate. However, such a good position is in part

**Table 1:** Poverty rate for households (modified OECD equivalence scale) in the EU countries and in Slovenia, based on households' expenditure (Reference: National programme on the fight against poverty and social exclusion 2000).

COUNTRY	POVERTY RATE IN %
Portugal (1989)	26.5
Italy (1988)	22.0
Greece (1988)	20.8
Spain (1988)	17.5
Great Britain (1988)	17.0
Ireland (1987)	16.4
France (1989)	14.9
Slovenia (1993)	13.6
Germany (1988)	12.0
Luxembourg (1987)	9.2
Belgium (1988)	6.6
The Netherlands (1988)	6.2
Denmark (1987)	4.2

**Table 2:** Poverty rate for persons (modified OECD equivalence scale) in the EU countries and in Slovenia, based on households' income (Reference: Hanžek & Gregorčič, 2001).

COUNTRY	POVERTY RATE IN %
Portugal	22
Greece	21
Italy	19
Great Britain	19
Spain	18
Ireland	18
Belgium	17
EU 12 (1999)	17
Germany	16
France	16
Denmark	12
Luxembourg	12
The Netherlands	12
Slovenia (1997/98)	11

due to the fact that the figures for Slovenia include households' own production and benefits in total income. Eurostat does not include these types of income (yet). Besides that, the poverty line in Slovenia is still drawn at 50 % of the average expenditure while Eurostat set the poverty line at 60 % of median income.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES

The term social exclusion has become widely used with reference to developed countries, which covers not only material deprivation, but also the shortage of social contacts, and the feeling of helplessness. Shortage is well known to represent a direct risk to health, and health risk is known to differ between groups of people (Gillespie & Prior, 1995; Wilkinson, 1997; Bobak et al., 1998). Socio-economic inequalities can be therefore defined as differences in prevalence or incidence of health problems between individual people of higher or lower

socio-economic status (Kunst & Mackenbach, 1994). It is possible for inequality in health to be registered in many ways. For measuring and evaluating the differences (inequalities) in health, the morbidity or mortality rates by gender, age, nationality, geographical area and socio-economic characteristics such as education, profession, income, employment, property, social reputation, etc., could be applied. Socio-economically deprived groups of inhabitants are characterised by the higher morbidity and mortality rates than groups of people of better socio-economic status (Illsley, 1990; Whitehead 1992; Moelek & Rosario Giraldes, 1993). Difference in mortality between lower and higher social classes is still increasing. The mortality rate is usually connected with the cause of death and is therefore usually higher with adult persons than with children (except for babies). Patterns of morbidity are following similar trends as mortality, however the inequality being bigger with children than with adults. In all groups and social classes, mortality is bigger with men than with women. Patterns of inequality in health associated with race and ethnical groups are not so clear (Whitehead, 1990).

Furthermore, health is influenced by behavioural patterns and life-style, which are also conditioning social problems of certain socio-economic groups. Habits injurious to health (smoking, improper nutrition, alcoholism, physical inactivity) can be used as indicators of psycho-social stress affecting the poorer and less educated due to the relative shortage of material goods and social and psychical deprivation (Kunst & Mackenbach 1994). However, the society is placing the blame on the victims and is re-regulating the social and health policy.

Thus classification of people into socio-economic groups is also caused by (not only the consequence of) ill health due to social selection occurring, which is supported also by the natural selection. The health of an individual is strongly negatively linked with his educational and material possibilities. The poor health of people within the society as a whole and within individual social classes is conditioned by the social and economical organisation of the society, therefore the health indicators are also indicators of the socio-economical organisation of a country (Hanžek, 1999).

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## **ADVISABLE GUIDELINES FOR REDUCING INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH**

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Socio-economic inequalities in health are a major challenge for health policy, not only because most of these inequalities can be considered unfair (Whitehead, 1990), but also because reducing the burden of health problems in disadvantaged groups offers great potential for improving the average health status of the population as a whole (Kunst & Mackenbach, 1994). Action should be taken at different levels. Inequalities should be reduced by means of the state strategy (national strategy on the fight against poverty, equity in health, health and social security, etc.), city and community policies, protection of children and families, intersectoral co-operation. The extent of the health and social activities should be planned, co-ordinated and enlarged in a professional and precise manner, with special emphasis laid on children, invalids, pregnant women and elder persons. People as individuals should be aware of and ensured better information on the growth and development of children, life-style and health, endangerment at work, etc. Taking the measures stated hereabove is conditioned by structural and etiological familiarity with inequality between individual groups of population at a certain place and time.

The international community and national governments are turning to the scientific community for advice on how to reduce inequalities in health. Governments are looking, in the words of WHO's strategy for Europe, for »a scientific framework for decision makers« and »a science-based guide to better health development« (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1998). As recommended by the WHO for European Region (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1998), policy-makers should develop a systematic strategy for monitoring socio-economic inequalities in health, following four steps:

- Assessing the data currently available;
- Collecting additional data if necessary;
- Analysing, interpreting and presenting the data;
- Formulating a policy response to the results.

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## **NATIONAL POLICIES FOR REDUCING HEALTH INEQUALITIES**

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Research programmes for studying the condition and for reducing health inequalities have already been introduced by the Netherlands, Finland, New Zealand (Mackenbach et al. 1994; Kunst 1997; Arve-Pares 1998; New Zealand National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability 1998). These countries were recently joined by the UK Government with its programme (Great Britain Independent Inquiry into inequalities in health 1998).

Health policy in the development of health care and health insurance in the Republic of Slovenia until the year 2004, which is determined in the National Health Care Programme of the Republic of Slovenia – Health For All By 2004 (2000) is based on the strategy of increasing the quality of health of the Slovenian inhabitants and adjusting and improving the system's operating in accordance with financial possibilities. For the strategy and development orientations to be realised, numerous tasks are prioritised. The programme is taking into consideration strategic orientation of the document of the WHO Health for All by 2000 (WHO Regional Office for Europe 1989) or its successor Health for All in the 21st Century (WHO Regional Office for Europe 1998). It is stated already in the introduction thereof, that one of the fundamental social objectives of the Republic of Slovenia is to preserve, promote and restore the health of its inhabitants. Reduction of differences in health care and the state of health of the public is stated as one of the priority objectives (second priority objective). As the first measure, the adopted act is stipulating causes for differences to be sought and be reduced.

Presently Slovenia is going through the transitional period by establishing new databases and searching for new possibilities for connecting them. We are facing difficulties in defining the variables, in connecting the data between different databases and with efforts to establish the information system. Since no research has been carried out yet in Slovenia which would present to a wider extent the inequality in health between different socio-economic groups in our country, the Institute of Social Medicine of the Faculty of Medicine in Ljubljana and the Institute of Macroeconomic Analyses and Development decided to analyse the already available data sources and inter-connect them. The research is aimed at investigating the connections between individual socio-economic factors (gender, age, education, profession, activity, marital status, nationality, income, etc.) and causes of death according to the ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases) for dead persons across Slovenian municipalities in the years 1992, 1995 and 1998. The research is legally

based also on the National Health Care Programme of the Republic of Slovenia – Health For All By 2004 (2000) which is analysing the measures for reducing the differences in health of inhabitants and states as follows: »We will produce research into differences in health care and the state of health of different population groups according to sex, age, social status, qualifications and region. The research will also be aimed at studying the different risk factors that most threaten the health and lives of the inhabitants of individual regions. Measures will be aimed at reducing these. Proposals will be made on the basis of this research to reduce the differences.«

This research will contribute to getting familiar with influences of social and economic factors on inequality in health in Slovenia. Estimating the condition of inter-connectedness of socio-economic factors with health condition of the population with regard to the causes of death will also contribute to planning and forming the national programme health for all for the Slovene population so as to attain better health in the future.

## **POVZETEK**

*Revščina je zaradi materialnega pomanjkanja ter kulturne in socialne izključenosti, ki pogojuje pripadnost določeni družbeno-ekonomski skupini največji dejavnik tveganja za zdravje. Družbeno-ekonomsko prikrajšane skupine prebivalstva pogosteje zbolevajo in imajo višjo stopnjo umrljivosti kot skupine prebivalstva z boljšim družbeno-ekonomskim statusom. Za ugotavljanje razlik v zdravju uporabljamo kazalce (indicators) umrljivosti in zbolevnosti, ločeno po spolu, starosti, etnični pripadnosti, geografskemu območju in družbeno-ekonomskih značilnostih. Slabo zdravstveno stanje ljudi v družbi kot celoti in v posameznih socialnih slojih je odvisno od socialne in ekonomske organiziranosti družbe, zato kazalci zdravstvenega stanja kažejo tudi na družbeno-ekonomsko organiziranost države. Politika Svetovne zdravstvene organizacije (SZO) (World Health Organization - WHO) izhaja iz spoznanja, da je svet eden in nedeljiv ter da so velike razlike v zdravstvenem stanju med državami in znotraj njih glavna ovira napredka. Iz razpoložljivih podatkov SZO so jasno vidne velike razlike v kazalcih zdravstvenega stanja med zahodnimi in vzhodnimi evropskimi državami. Najbolj očitne so razlike v umrljivosti dojenčkov (od 3 do 43 na 1000 živorojenih) in v pričakovani življenjski dobi ob rojstvu (od 79 do 64 let). V Sloveniji je leta 1998 živelo pod mejo revščine (merjene z OECD-jevo prirejeno ekvivalenčno lestvico) (OECD-Organisation for Economic Co-Operation Development) 11,3 % oseb. Ta delež uvršča Slovenijo med države evropske dvanajsterice z najnižjo stopnjo revščine, kar je lahko zavajajoče, ker ne uporabljamo enotne metodologije.*

*Družbeno-ekonomska neenakost zdravja je velik izziv za načrtovanje zdravstvene politike ne le zato, ker je takšna neenakost nepravilna, ampak tudi zato, ker bi zmanjšanje zdravstvenih problemov med prikrajšanimi skupinami lahko prispevalo tudi k izboljšanju zdravstvenega stanja celotne populacije. Za zmanjševanje neenakosti do zdravja je treba izdelati nacionalno strategijo boja proti revščini, ozaveščati ljudi ter povečati obseg zdravstvene in socialne dejavnosti. Pogoj za tako ukrepanje je strukturno in etiološko poznavanje neenakosti med posameznimi skupinami populacije v določenem kraju in času. V Sloveniji vzpostavljamo nove baze podatkov in iščemo možnosti povezovanja med njimi. Srečujemo se s težavami v definiranju spremenljivk, v povezovanju podatkov med različnimi bazami podatkov in z napori pri vzpostavljanju informacijskega sis-*

tema. Na Inštitutu za socialno medicino Medicinske fakultete v Ljubljani in Uradu R Slovenije za makroekonomske analize in razvoj (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development) smo začeli z raziskavo, katere namen je ugotavljanje povezav med posameznimi družbeno-ekonomskimi dejavniki (spol, starost, izobrazba, poklic, aktivnost, zakonski status, narodnost, dohodek, itn.) in vzroki smrti po MKB-10 (Mednarodna klasifikacija bolezni - International Classification of Diseases) za umrle v Sloveniji po posameznih regijah v letih 1992, 1995 in 1998.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** revščina, zdravje, WHO, Slovenija, socialna medicina, bolezen

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## MAN IN THE OCEAN OF ELECTROMAGNETIC ENERGIES

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### **ABSTRACT**

Man is a product of a long evolution of life in the ocean of external EM energies and the geomagnetic field. Humans also possess natural sensitivity to some of EM fields (for example the presence of the storm) or to small geomagnetic anomalies, which may trigger a weak muscular response. According to certain studies this could be the basis of understanding dowsing. There are also people, who are allergic, hypersensitive, to some frequencies of EM fields and similarly to people who are allergic to pollen. It is still unclear, what is the meaning of increasing EM pollution today. Various epidemiological studies still did not propose a final conclusion. Healthy people with a strong homeostasis are probably only partially disturbed by EM fields and the effects do not appear. However, especially susceptible people and people, who are additionally exposed to stress, are more prone to be influenced by the environmental EM fields; i.e. they are thrown out of equilibrium, which can lead to number of maladies. By this, there is no linear connection between power density and frequency of EM field and an exposure to it. Beside harmful, there are also beneficial effects of EM fields, especially for some diseases. In future, we can expect more consideration of EM fields either for their harmful or for their beneficial influence. It is possible that in more remote future the fields will help us to regenerate extremities or organs.

**KEY WORDS:** electromagnetic field, geomagnetism, nonionised radiation, human environment, coherent oscillations, electromagnetic pollution, safety standards, protection, epidemiological research, leukemia, cancer, hypersensitivity, mobile phones, healing with magnets, regeneration.

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
### **INTRODUCTION**

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According to many new insights man has gained into the nature of life, a living system is not only a huge collection of molecules, but a highly sophisticated electrodynamic system as well (Del Giudice et al 1988, Vitiello, 2001). Seemingly, the origin of life did not depend only on delicate chemical conditions but also on electric fields and polar molecules (Jerman 1998). These intrinsic and endogenous electric and electromagnetic fields are in constant

communication with the external geomagnetic and electromagnetic (EM) fields. Along with other living beings, man as a sensitive and highly complex multi-level electrodynamic system is a product of a long evolution of life in the ocean of external EM energies. Of course, we do not have in mind ionised EM radiation or visible or infra-red waves, but only EM frequencies below the infra-red band like microwaves, ultra-short waves etc. until we have reached frequencies even below 1 Hz. (Graph 1). In many cultures humans used their natural sensitivity to EM fields or to small geomagnetic anomalies to gain some information about subterranean sources of water or about healthy places to live, at least through more sensitive and trained individuals (König 1975, 142-145; Katajainen & Knave 1995). Even the ancient urbanism and architecture may reflect man's use of sensitivity to EM clues within the territory of living. It seems that in our hi-tech western civilisation the sensitivity to the EM environment has been lost, but it is not the fact. Even in the most developed countries there are individuals who sense the fields, some of them using this ability to help others – but civilisation, seen from the standpoint of its standards, has really lost the EM sensitivity dimension, which may have many consequences. There is a possibility that the increasing EM pollution with its negative health effects will require re-considering EM fields in relation to humans.

There is therefore an EM aspect of anthropology that is perhaps insufficiently explored. In the present article we wish to make an introduction this, mostly neglected aspect of human life. We shall begin with a short presentation of endogenous EM fields supposed to organize countless cellular biochemical interactions. In the next chapter we shall present a description of our EM environment including the natural and artificial sources of EM fields. Later on we shall speak about the health problems and about the




**Graph 1.** Specter of electromagnetic radiation.

application of the artificial EM fields. At the end we shall speculate about possible future changes of our civilisation due to a more in-depth study of the biological role of endogenous and exogenous EM fields.

## ELECTROMAGNETIC NATURE OF LIFE

Organisms, including man, are not only passively exposed to environmental EM fields; according to certain theories and experimental findings they possess an active endogenous EM field as well. The theory of this field stems from the British biophysicist Herbert Fröhlich. In short, on the basis of special electrical characteristics of the living cell, the theory presumes the existence of coherent oscillations (originating from the Bose condensation) of molecular dipoles which together with the endogenous EM field create a coherent EM field at a frequency of  $10^{10} - 10^{11}$  Hz (Fröhlich, 1988). These oscillations are supposed to form a basis for the intramolecular as well as for the intercellular order. In a neoplasm such an order is broken and uncontrolled growth follows. Experimentally, this theory was verified in various ways, either through microdielectrophoresis (which showed somewhat lower frequencies) or erythrocyte rouleaux formation, and through interference and resonance effects with exogenous low intensity mm EM waves. A group of Czech scientists has recently found direct evidence for "Fröhlich's" radiation, even if at somewhat lower frequencies (Pokorny et al 2001). Fröhlich's theory was further elaborated, in terms of a quantum-field theory, by the Italian group around del Giudice (Vitiello 2001). According to this view, the endogenous bioelectromagnetic field is organized into tiny filaments, of a



**Graph 2.** Frequencies of Schumann resonances (for more details see text).


diameter similar to that of microtubules. The filamentous field is supposed to organize biochemical reactions through resonance induction. It should be mainly limited to the interior of the organism, leaking only a little - hence its radiation is ultraweak.

### SOURCES OF NON-IONISED ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION

Natural sources of electromagnetic radiation on Earth consist of the radiation originating from space and from the Earth itself. The latter is the consequence of the material properties and of the Earth's electromagnetic events in the atmosphere (few nT). Numerous storm flashes trigger agitation in the space between the Earth and the ionosphere; the latter acting as an empty resonator. In this way, standing waves with Schumman's resonance frequencies are produced (König 1975, 29-34; Graph 2.). These frequencies (7,8; 13,5; 19,1; 24,7... Hz) are also specific to some biological processes, for example, some of them are typical of the EEG waves (König 1975, 29-34; Aspden 1988; Kenny 1990).

The density of the natural static geomagnetic field is about 30-50  $\mu\text{T}$  depending on the geographical latitude. It did not vary only in the course of history, when the field was reversed many times, but it varies also throughout the day. In our country the geomagnetic field density is around  $46 \pm 4 \mu\text{T}$  (Wiltshcko 1995, 1-13; our own measurements (Graph 3)).

Besides the geomagnetic field, we are also constantly exposed to highly variable electric fields that extend between the ionosphere and the Earth's surface. Most commonly, the clouds are electrically positive and the Earth is electrically negative. This difference in polarity produces a vertical electric field that all humans are exposed to. Its intensity



**Graph 3.** Local measurements of geomagnetic field densities (in  $\mu\text{T}$ ) throughout the day (Ljubljana, May 01, 1992). The arrow shows the time of sundown..

**Table 1.** Magnetic flux densities at 60 Hz near various appliances in the USA (World Health Organization Geneva, 1987)

Appliance	Magnetic flux density ( $\mu\text{T}$ ) at distance $z$		
	$z = 3\text{cm}$	$z = 30\text{cm}$	$z = 1\text{m}$
Can openers	1000 - 2000	3.5 - 30	0.07 - 1
Hair dryers	6 - 2000	< 0.01 - 7	< 0.01 - 0.3
Electric shavers	15 - 1500	0.08 - 9	< 0.01 - 0.3
Sabre and circular saws	250 - 1000	1 - 25	0.01 - 1
Drills	400 - 800	2 - 3.5	0.08 - 0.2
Vacuum cleaners	200 - 800	2 - 20	0.13 - 2
Mixers	60 - 700	0.6 - 10	0.02 - 0.25
Fluorescent desk lamps	40 - 400	0.5 - 2	0.02 - 0.25
Garbage disposals	80 - 250	1 - 2	0.03 - 0.1
Microwave ovens	75 - 200	4 - 8	0.25 - 0.6
Fluorescent fixtures	15 - 200	0.2 - 4	0.01 - 0.3
Electric ranges	6 - 200	0.35 - 4	0.01 - 0.1
Portable heaters	10 - 180	0.15 - 5	0.01 - 0.25
Blenders	25 - 130	0.6 - 2	0.03 - 0.12
Television	2.5 - 50	0.04 - 2	0.01 - 0.15
Electric ovens	1 - 50	15 - 0.5	.01 - 0.04
Clothes washers	0.8 - 50	0.15 - 3	0.01 - 0.15
Irons	8 - 30	0.12 - 0.3	0.01 - 0.025
Fans and blowers	2 - 30	0.03 - 4	0.01 - 0.35
Coffee makers	1.8 do 25	0.08 do 0.15	< 0.01
Dishwashers	3.5 do 20	0.6 do 3	0.07 do 0.3
Toasters	7 do 18	0.06 do 0.7	< 0.01
Crock pots	1.5 do 8	0.08 do 0.15	< 0.01
Clothes dryers	0.3 do 8	0.08 do 0.3	0.02 do 0.06
Refrigerators	0.5 do 1.7	0.01 do 0.25	< 0.01

is around 100V/m. The intensities may change considerably when we are in the area of a storm.

Over the last 50 to 100 years, which represents just a brief moment in the geological and evolutionary time, a much higher number of EM sources with unnatural frequencies and magnetic field densities as well as unusual shapes of EM fields generated by human activities, have been added to the natural sources (König 1975, 58-114; Korpinen 1994). Consequently, man is exposed to the non-ionized EM radiation as a producer of the artificial radiation, which can have predominantly unknown effects, and as a receiver of the artificial and natural sources of EM radiation. The magnetic field densities of some artificial human sources are described in Table 1.

In the last 100 years the level of the non-ionized EM radiation has steeply increased. The electric grid is the most widely spread source of EM radiation. Here the electricity flows as an alternating current with a basic frequency (50Hz in Europe, 60Hz in America) and its higher harmonics which, together with the former, form the shape of the electric grid EM oscillations. The oscillations spread from electric wires into the environment as a very low-frequency EM radiation (ELF-EMFs). Moreover, the majority of the population (at least in more developed countries) are exposed daily to high-frequency EM radiation from TV sets and radio transmitters; today the mobile phone transmitters are rapidly joining them. Actually, there is no place left where we are not exposed to EM radiation from electrical devices such as computers, radios, TV sets, electric clocks, domestic appliances, cars with increasingly more electronics, and other means of transport as well as machinery and even satellites from space travelling around the Earth. We can safely speak about rapidly increasing electromagnetic pollution with unforeseeable consequences not only for humans but for the whole biosphere.

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## **EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RESEARCH**

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Not so long ago, hardly anyone considered the possibility of the harmful effects of using electricity without taking into consideration direct danger from electric shock due to electric contact or other similar causes. However, the situation changed in the late 70's. In 1979 two American scientists, Wertheimer and Leeper, published a study about a possible causal relationship between some child leukemia cases and the closeness of electric transmission lines. In the following years several organizations encouraged or financed researches in this field. One of the largest and most rigorous American researches about the causal relationship between cancer and ELF-EM fields lasted 8 years and was published in the *New England Journal of Medicine* in 1997. It included 1258 children and performed also measurements of EM fields in their environment. The scientists came to the conclusion that there was no statistically significant causal relationship between the fields in households and the child leukemia (Linnet et al., 1997). On the other hand, it is also true that but little is known about the leukemia diseases in infants and adults. Several institutes, e.g. the National Institute of Health in the USA, are working intensively on research programs in this field to better understand possible causes for these diseases. In the year 2001 a German epidemiological study found only a weak causal relationship between leukemia cases and environmental ELF-EM fields. An interesting finding was that the effects were higher or

more statistically reliable when the studied persons were exposed to ELF-EM fields during the night, however, the authors did not reach any conclusions (Schüz et al., 2001).

After many similar researches the general opinion is that some connection between EM fields exposure and physiological effects on humans does exist, however, without a clear mechanistic explanation and more thorough studies on animals, the results only partially support hypotheses about the harmful effects of these fields. Although the ELF-EM fields are listed among carcinogens as a "possible carcinogen", according to some experts there is no experimental or theoretical basis for this statement (NIEHS report 1999). In its report NIEHS recommended decreasing the exposure, if, of course, this is not unreasonably expensive or dangerous. Similar advice was given for the exposure to TV or computer monitors that emit EM radiation with high frequencies. The safety of mobile phones is still a matter of discussion and there are still researches underway (Moulder et al., 1999).

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## **STANDARDS OF PROTECTION AGAINST HARMFUL EFFECTS OF NON-IONISED RADIATION**

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Since there is no plausible scientific proof of harmful effects of non-ionised radiation, safety values are mostly based on the levels of EM fields that produce thermal effects. Slovenia adopted even more rigorous standards for EM radiation in the natural and artificial environments (UL 70, 1996). According to these standards the general public should not be exposed to ELF-EM field intensities exceeding 500 V/m (electric field) and 0.01 mT (magnetic field, both at 50 Hz), which is even lower than in most European countries; however, the permitted density values are gradually decreasing throughout the world.

Unfortunately, all these standards are based on the linear understanding of the relationship between an EM field dose and human health risk, similarly as is known for the ionised radiation. According to the results of many research studies (including our own), it can be stated that weak EM fields affect physiological processes in a non-linear way. This means that a stronger field does not necessarily produce stronger effects, except at very high powers. When weak EM fields are tested, the so-called "window effect" appears, which means that the biological effects became visible only at certain EM field densities or frequencies, and even then only in certain physiological conditions or ontological phases of the tested organism. (Adey 1984; McLeod et al., 1992; Poponin, Winters, 1993; Walleczek, Budinger, 1992; Ružič et al., 1998a, b). It is therefore possible that some weak EM field density can have pronounced physiological effects, but a slightly higher density would only have a weaker effect or none at all.

A review of this research area reveals that the explanation of the physiological effects of non-ionised radiation rests on different physical mechanisms. Some of them have an excellent mathematical elaboration, the others only a weak one. The proposed mechanisms may be classified among the classical and quantum mechanical ones (cit. in: Bistolfi 1991, 13-143; Popp 1994, 33-80; Berg, Zhang, 1993). Of course, this means that our civilisation is still far from exerting intelligent control over its environment that abounds in artificial EM frequencies.

## **HEALING EFFECTS**

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The discovered physiological effects of EM fields are not necessarily harmful. It has been known for some time that through the exposure to alternating EM fields of certain frequencies and intensities, the healing processes such as nerve and bone regeneration can be stimulated. Some researches have also revealed that the applied fields can counteract stress, for instance, weak sinusoidal EM fields can be used as a protection against heart attacks (Han et al. 1998). The results are encouraging, although the exact mechanisms of the healing process are not known. Usually, the best results are obtained with pulsed EM fields.

Since ancient times the healing influence of static magnets has been known and it is used even nowadays. For instance, in 1997 Vallbona et al. achieved a 75 percent healing rate when they treated 50 patients subject to the post-polio syndrome with weak static magnets fixed on places where the patients reported pain in the muscles and arthritis. In another study the neurologist M. Weintraub (1998) reported that 24 patients with painful legs felt relief when using static magnets. Dr. William Pawluk, the co-author of a review book that summarises 30 years of the East-European researches with magnets, states that every magnet has some physiological impact on the body, but the kind of the reaction depends on the type of the magnet used in treatment (Jarabek et al 1998). There are some theories on how static magnets can influence our physiological processes in a beneficial way, but here we are even in deeper darkness than with the dynamic EM fields. It can be understood therefore, why the EM fields are not used more extensively: doctors want to resort to something previously explained and well understood; and this almost always implies the use of pharmaceutical chemicals instead of fields.

In our country healing with electric fields and currents is thoroughly researched and applied for the healing of wounds (Cukjati et al. 2001); the studies are also directed towards the healing of tumors (Miklavčič et al. 1997).

In alternative medicine magnets are used much more frequently than in conventional medicine. Healers mostly recommend magnets for healing and alleviating arthritic pain, pain in the back, against headache and asthma. Magnets should also help against stress. Unfortunately, some studies do not confirm the analgesic effect of magnets (Cleary, 1995).

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## **EM WAVES AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF CHANGES IN HUMAN LIFE PATTERNS**

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Our civilisation is becoming more and more aware of the importance of EM fields for man. First, the fields may be harmful – the extent of which is yet to be established; second, their proper application can be very useful, especially for healing; and third, through knowledge of the intricacies of our own electrodynamic system, new possibilities that were only hoped for in the Human genome project, will open up for mankind. Which can be the changes caused by the first area? First of all, we will have to change the technology of most of our devices so that they will radiate only very small amounts of EM energies and within the intensity and frequency windows that have no physiological influence. The same principle will apply also to our electric grid and various broadcasting stations. Over time we may

also expect a decrease in the use of iron in our factories, business premises, houses and furniture, so that we will be exposed to the natural geomagnetic field again.

Through research involving the second and the third area we may expect revolutionary changes, deeply affecting our life. EM devices may arise that will have strong healing or alleviating effects on many illnesses, without patients taking pills with their side effects or only in very small amounts. This could prove devastating for the pharmaceutical industry, but will certainly ameliorate our lives. When we discover the body's EM language we will be able to provoke the dedifferentiation and the differentiation of tissues. A possibility of the regeneration of limbs and organs will be opened without the ethically questionable cloning of humans.

We may also reinvent the old ways of building houses and streets – something well known to ancient civilisations – so that they will be much better adapted to the magnetic and electromagnetic requirements of our bodies than the present ones. Of course, all this may still be waiting for us in a more distant future, but the past and present bioelectromagnetics researches provide a sound basis for such predictions.

## **POVZETEK**

*Človek se že od nekdaj nahaja v oceanu elektromagnetnih energij in geomagnetnega polja. Marsikaj od tega lahko zaznava na ravni podzavesti, na primer bližino nevihte, nekateri ljudje lahko zaznavajo šibke anomalije geomagnetnega polja, kar jim lahko sproži šibke mišične odzive. Na tej osnovi naj bi po nekaterih raziskavah temeljilo bajaličarstvo. Poznamo tudi ljudi, ki so alergični, preobčutljivi, na nekatere frekvence EM polj in reagirajo podobno kot ljudje, ki so alergični na cvetni prah. Kaj pri vsem tem pomeni današnja naraščajoča EM polucija, je še nejasno. Različne epidemiološke raziskave še niso dale končnega zaključka. Zdrave ljudi z dovolj močno homeostazo umetna polja verjetno samo do neke mere obremenijo in se učinek ne pozna. Posebej občutljive ljudi in ljudi, ki so dodatno izpostavljeni stresu, pa okoliška EM polja lahko vržejo iz ravnovesja, kar lahko vodi v različna bolezenska stanja, pri čemer pa ni linearne povezave med jakostjo in frekvenco EM polj in ogroženostjo. Poleg škodljivih poznamo tudi koristne učinke EM polj, zlasti pri nekaterih boleznih. V bodočnosti lahko pričakujemo mnogo večje upoštevanje EM polj, tako glede njihovega škodljivega kot njihovega koristnega delovanja. Lahko da bodo omogočila celo posege v regeneracijo udov in organov.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** elektromagnetno polje, geomagnetizem, neionizirajoča sevanja, človekovo okolje, koherentne oscilacije, elektromagnetno onesnaževanje, varnostni standardi, zaščita, epidemiološke raziskave, levkemija, rak, preobčutljivost, mobilni telefoni, zdravljenje z magneti, regeneracija.

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## MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE BODY ACROSS CULTURES

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### **ABSTRACT**

By comparing the Western biological, objectified and individualized conceptualization of the human body with the body as lived, experienced, conceptualized, and talked about by the members of different cultures, I would like to show how the European view of the body – based on reason, evolutionary theory, and biomedicine – is far from being universal. To impose, for example in medical ethics, concepts like the mechanical biological body on those people whose history, philosophy and religion did not take a European scientific course implies the imperialism of what is by some believed to be “universal”.<sup>1</sup> I intend to present several different examples from different societies and cultures (Western and non-Western) to show how historical changes, cultural values and social relations shape the experience of the human body, health and sickness, and how they situate suffering in local moral worlds.

**KEY WORDS:** medical ethics, anthropology of the body, human values

In this paper I would like to reflect upon a particular issue which in the era of globalization pertains to human values, morality and ethics: the imperialism of what many believe to be universal, and especially “the universalism” of Western reason and of a common sense based on instrumental rationality. By comparing the Western biological and individual conceptualization of the human body with the body as perceived and understood by the members of different cultures, I will try to show that the European view of the body is far from being common for all societies and cultures, and that it represents rather one of those concepts which can in different situations be seen as being part of the ongoing Western ethnocentrism and political and economic domination.

I agree with those ethical contextualists who argue that there is no “rational” method of morality. In a culturally diverse world, the prime goal of an ethicist is to understand the practice of morality in different situations, times and places by locating it

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<sup>1</sup> The phrase “Imperialism of the universal” is taken from Pascalian Meditations, by Pierre Bourdieu (2000: 78), in which he develops a penetrating critique of scholastic reason which is responsible for our perspective on and understanding of the social and historical world. Earlier versions of the paper were presented first at the Gromki Club, Metelkova street, Ljubljana, and then as a dinner talk at the meeting “Advanced course on ethics in oncology”, Bled, 25 - 28 June, 2000, and at the conference of the Australian Anthropological Society at the University of Western Australia in Perth, 21 - 23 September, 2000.

in its social, cultural and historical context. In other words, one has to take the notion of, as Kleinman says (1988, 1994, 172), “the local moral worlds”. One has to be aware that the entire system of modern Western practices, general attitudes, moral positions and so on serves the interests of those in power, including those involved in colonial power relations, dominant economic arrangements, elites within society, academia, or, for instance, the medical profession (see Good, 1994: 57). If we look at the symptoms of hunger or disease that result from poverty in so many regions of the world we can observe that they “are often medicalized, treated as a condition of individual bodies – ‘diarrhea,’ ‘TB,’ ‘nerves,’ or ‘stress’ – rather than as a collective social and political concern” (Good, 1994: 57-8). “The transformation of political problems into medical concerns is often akin to ‘neutralizing’ critical consciousness, and is thus in keeping with the interests of the hegemonic class. . . . Analysis of illness representations, from this perspective, requires a critical unmasking of the dominant interests, and exposing of the mechanisms by which they are supported by authorized discourse: making clear what is misrepresented in illness” (ibid.: 58). It is in the interest of the powerful that the whole sociocultural and political system becomes part both of common sense for the masses and of a scholastic programme. Once it becomes general theoretical and practical knowledge it generates itself without any critical reflection. Those who do not consent to this system are labelled nonsensical, unreasonable and irrational, and are ridiculed not only as being non-scientific but also as being stupid. They may be excluded from society and culture or even punished by law.

The medical anthropologist Byron Good rightfully argues that important elements of the positivist and empiricist paradigm – which underlies the epistemological framework of the biosciences including biomedicine – “are present in the common-sense view of medical anthropology as the study of beliefs and practices associated with illness by persons from diverse cultures, as well as in the models used to facilitate collaboration among anthropologists, clinicians, epidemiologists, and others in applied settings” (ibid.: 1994: 38). For people to understand a person’s complaint and find it meaningful, a physiological condition has to be reflected in this same complaint. If there is no reference to empirical causes, the very meaningfulness of the complaint is called into question (ibid.: 9-10). If a person’s symptom is not physiologically and empirically explained, it is attributed to beliefs. “‘Belief’ serves as an unexamined proxy for ‘culture’ [and] typically marks the boundaries between lay or popular medical culture and scientific knowledge” (ibid.: 39). We should recognize that people all over the world often unwittingly impose – in an ethnocentric way – different concepts and practices from their own lifeworld on concepts and practices elsewhere. When a person in New Guinea, for example, uses a bamboo knife or a pig’s tooth to remove an arrow head from his fellow man’s body we like to talk about primitive surgery or about ancient “protoscience”, as if the practice represented some kind of an ancestral practice of modern medicine. The use of a bamboo knife or a pig tooth is not “surgery”, less so some kind of remnant from the past, but the easiest way – considering what is available in a particular setting – to help a fellow countryman in trouble. When people recover because they have corrected their wrongdoings, we talk about placebo or about psychosomatic effects, not wanting to accept people’s own explanations – dismissing them as being simply a part of unscientific and lay beliefs – that sick relationships may result in the illness of an individual. It is quite understandable that in this kind of society and culture such an illness is then treated in the same way, that is by restoring relationships to that condition which is in a particular setting historically and socially “normal” or at least

acceptable. Healing is therefore tied also to morality, "since the moral state of the person leads to vulnerability or strength in the face of the threatening agency of spirits and the state of bad feeling within the social network" (Strathern 1996: 109). Because of the link between illness and morality within the local sociocultural world biomedicine is regarded to be unsuitable for locating and removing the "real cause" of illness (*ibid.*: 122, 136).

Since modern biomedicine is founded on Western notions of reason it is for its practitioners a common-sense view that different ethnomedical systems and illness representations are also derived from rational, pragmatic purposeful activities of individuals. "Illness representations are thus largely understood in mentalistic terms, abstracted from 'embodied knowledge', affect, and social and historical forces that shape illness meanings" (Good 1994: 51). Lyon and Barbalet recently argued that bio-medical epistemology "regards the body as an object external to the enquiries which yield knowledge of it" (*ibid.*: 52); the practitioners are in control of the bodies of their patients, and through their bodies of the patients themselves; the practitioners of biomedicine deal with malfunctioning organs and not with the body (e.g. emotional social body) as such. The medical body is passive; it is the body patients have, but not the body patients are. It is a partial body, subordinated to the authority of medical practice and the social institution of medicine (*ibid.*: 52-53).

In this paper I do not intend to speak about human values in general, but will rather contextualize them within local cultural worlds and daily practices. Since this paper was primarily written for an audience composed mainly of practitioners who were born and trained within the terms of a Western scientific paradigm, I would like to concentrate on the conceptualization, articulation and experience of the human body. I would like to compare the body as perceived and understood by the Western scientific tradition with the body as perceived and understood by people elsewhere in the world. Such an approach should allow us to see beyond the simple dichotomies of us and them, of those values which are characteristic of our culture and those which are characteristic of their culture, of tradition and modernity. By following this single but important locus of the human body, we may be able better to comprehend views which go beyond simple beliefs.

Having its source in Western scientific biology, physiology, chemistry, physics, psychology, etc., the human body in the West is objectified, materialized, naturalized, and individualized. Western medicine sees the human body and disease in a culturally distinctive fashion; the medical body, moreover, is distinct from the bodies with which we interact in everyday life (Good, 1994: 65, 72). For Western medicine, disease belongs to "the individual body, and the goal of treatment is to understand surface phenomena with reference to a deeper ontological order, to link symptoms and signs to the physiological structure of functioning and to intervene at that level. Disease has a natural course; the story of the disease is one without a personalized agent" (Good, 1994: 83). For the sufferer, on the other hand, the body is far from being simply a physical object or physiological state, but is rather an essential part of a person (*ibid.*: 116). Moreover, disease, as life itself, "occurs not only in the body... but in time, in place, in history, and in the context of lived experience and the social world. Its effect is on the body in the world!" (*ibid.*: 133). Particular cultural values, social relationships, and micro-level politics, shape the experience of the body and sickness, and situate suffering in local moral worlds (Kleinman 1988, 1994, Good, 1994: 142).

The following two examples demonstrate how a particular view of the female body becomes in some countries an important question of politics, and of social and gender

relationships. In these cases the imposition of rules by a dominating class (often composed of mainly male members) is equivalent to violation of human rights.

As a member of several discussion groups on the internet, I received an e-mail asking me to sign the petition for women's rights in Afghanistan. It was said in the petition that since the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan in 1996, women have had to wear the "burqua" and have been beaten and stoned in public for not having the proper attire, sometimes just the mesh covering in front of their eyes. One woman was beaten to death by an angry mob of fundamentalists for accidentally exposing her arm while she was driving, while another was stoned to death for trying to leave the country with a man who was not her relative. Women – professors, translators, doctors, lawyers, artists and writers – were forced to leave their jobs and were confined to their homes. The windows were painted dark so that they were unable to be seen by outsiders. They had to wear silent shoes so that they would never be heard. The petition continued: "Women who were once educators or doctors or simply used to basic human freedoms are now severely restricted and treated as sub-human in the name of right-wing fundamentalist Islam. It is not their tradition or 'culture', but is alien to them, and it is extreme even for those cultures where fundamentalism is the rule". This example shows how the external appearance of a person and a female body in particular may be heavily imposed on a specific section of a population, regardless of what the suppressed think and feel about it. Such a view has a great impact on women's professional and family life, other social relationships, their health and illness, and so on.

Of all the forms of cultural expression embodied in bodily modifications, the practice of female circumcision which is practiced in Africa, as well as among African communities in US and Europe, has fuelled intense intellectual debates amongst colonial administrators, medical personnel and human rights activists. "While practitioners see female circumcision as an essential aspect of their identity, opponents in the Western countries of the US, Canada and Europe call for its eradication on the grounds that the ritual represents a political act of violence: an ideological mechanism designed to perpetuate women's oppression and undermine their corporeal integrity" (Abusharaf 2000: 17). However, the question arises whether all those who are external to a particular culture can engage in a non-imperialist critique of unfamiliar practices. By listening to the women within the culture where such practices are common the Europeans can support those minorities which challenge these practices within their own cultures. Because of the many migrants from Africa who perpetuate circumcision, the American Congress has forbidden such practices in the US, and all those who deliberately circumcise any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of a person who has not yet reached the age of 18 can be imprisoned for up to five years. African refugees in the US have been put under certain pressure and often unjust treatment by the media, which not only questions their morality and love for their children, but has also accused them of being mutilators and child abusers (ibid.: 18). Female circumcision has been placed on the list of human rights violation inflicted on women. Anthropologists, however, are concerned with the development of "a transcultural system of human rights that is sensitive to cultural ambiguities, respectful of empirical differences among cultures and responsive to enforcement" (ibid.). Moreover, anthropologists have emphasized the need for African women to become part of important local political and economic institutions where their voices and opinions may be heard.

If the body of an individual is extended to the wider social environment we should expect that the abuse and mutilation of bodies, decoration and celebration of bodies, can

be – and often is – related to power relationships between groups and individuals. The perception of the body is often misused. Moreover, as we have seen to some extent in the case of African women, the medicalized body “is not only the product of changing medical knowledge and practice but is at the same time a manifestation of potent, never settled, partially disguised political contests that contribute to the way in which the female body is ‘seen’ and ‘interpreted’” (Lock, 1993: 331).

Not long ago I discussed the possibility of a joint project with Linus Digim’Rina, a Papua New Guinean friend who is the Head of the Anthropology and Sociology Department at the University of Papua New Guinea. He wrote me a letter in which he explained his discussion with a medical doctor at the pathology section of the Port Moresby hospital. Given the current high costs of sending dead bodies of relatives from the capital of Papua New Guinea to their home villages (charter of planes, coffins, funeral homes’ charges, minor preliminary feasts, and so on), my academically educated colleague and his friend the medical doctor thought that by cremating bodies and quietly carrying the ashes home at one’s own convenience would offset about 80% of the economic costs that one would normally incur. Their biggest problem was, however, how to convince the people of the entire country that their goal of reducing economic costs is far more attractive and beneficial than perpetuating the costly kin emotions during such times of loss. Linus Digim’Rina brought out this idea before his brother who was shocked by such a possibility. My friend, knowing that deaths in Port Moresby involve a combination of Christian and traditional mortuary practices, tried to persuade his brother by invoking the biblical line “From dust Man was made and unto dust shall Man return”, but failed to do so. To cremate the body of a kin person was simply not acceptable for Linus’s brother, as it most certainly is not for the majority of Papua New Guineans.

Let us briefly look at the donation of human organs and their transplantations in the West. In the Euro-American market economy, organ transplants are considered “normal” and inevitable, are often regarded anonymous, and can be given anonymously: “kidneys differ in physical condition rather than social identity” (Strathern, 1992: 129). Why did we accept so willingly and so quickly the practice of organ transplantation? One of the possible answers lies in the fact that “organ transplants are grounded in unexamined values which, among other things, promote routinization” (Lock and Honde, 1990: 99). Another answer to the same question may be that organs became objects, materials, free standing entities, and donation – if we forget economic interests – “carries connotations of the charitable gesture, the personal sacrifice for the public good, a gift to society” (Strathern, 1992: 129). In the Euro-American consumer culture, which draws heavily from an impersonal domain such as the market, the donation of a gift (an organ or any object) becomes an extension of the self only when it is filled with personal sentiments which can be expressed toward other persons or directed to abstract entities such as “society” (ibid.: 130). Organ transplantation has become transnational business. Let me choose one example among many. Between 1984 and 1988, for instance, 131 patients from the United Arab Emirates and Oman traveled to Bombay in India where through local brokers they purchased kidneys from living poor people outside this major city of India (Scheper-Hughes, 1992:237-8). “The donor’s ‘extra’ kidney was surgically removed for transplant, and the ‘donor’ was compensated between \$ 2,600 and \$ 3,300 for the missing body part” (ibid.: 238). In a discussion in *The Lancet*, the authors wrote about the high mortality among the Arab recipients without mentioning the “donors”, and condemned the commercialism of the practice in Bombay without even

mentioning the commercialism of the recipients. They accepted the overall ethics of the practice, saying that kidney donation should be seen as a gift of life and arguing that fair compensation was made (*ibid.*). While many people in the West think of organ transplants as gifts, many poor people – especially those from other parts of the world (for example in Brasil) -- think of the practice of transplantation as being rather a business market of the wealthy and powerful who prey on the poor and steal their organs (which are not gifts but their life) as if they were “spare parts” (for a fuller discussion about the traffic in organs and fear of it in Brasil, see Scheper-Hughes, 1992:, 233-39 and *passim*).

In many non-European societies people do not look at the body as a complex biological machine but rather as a “holistic integrated aspect of the person and social relations” (Good, 1994: 26) within a historical and cultural context. In such a context even the term body – which includes the whole Western epistemological understanding of a body – comes under question. Therefore it is not surprising that many languages do not have an adequate term which corresponds to the Western notion of body. It is not, however, a question of having or not having a particular concept or a particular word, but of the cultural significance of and elaboration upon a particular aspect or a particular way of human existence. While many non-European cultures emphasize the historical, cultural, social, intersubjective (relational) dimensions of a person (and the body as a microcosm of all these aspects), European scientifically oriented cultures and societies tend to downplay these issues, and see them as being reserved for a wider society – politics, family, friends and leisure time. We place them in the fields of political sciences, sociology, history, etc., as separate fields of knowledge. In accordance with the powerful Cartesian dualism, which represents our “tradition”, but has now been criticized for a long time, we not only distinguish between mind and body, psyche and soma, reason and emotions, but also – for example at universities – between sciences and arts (humanities), following in this way the dichotomy between pure reason and pure emotion, between thinking and feeling.<sup>2</sup> It is our – i.e. Western – conceptualisation of our historically constructed lifeworld into which we are first thrown by birth, and which later we embrace and embody, through learning, feeling and practice. The world which we ourselves construct, reconstruct and perpetuate, and then try to live through, according to the rules which are perceived and accepted as the common-sense of our existence! It goes without saying that serious illness everywhere provokes a shift in the embodied experience of the lifeworld and does not differentiate between reason and emotion (the dichotomy being artificially perpetuated by the healthy and wealthy Whites of the West). In the situation of severe illness, the sick person unmakes his or her culturally constructed lifeworld (based on the historical tradition of dualistic thinking), and reconstitutes the world in more holistic terms, similar to the ones known to many non-European societies.

Let me be more precise in my discussion of what I mean by the holistic conceptualisation of the human body, and consider some examples from several Oceanic

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<sup>2</sup> We should, however, be aware of the ambiguity and complexity of Cartesianism. As Andrew Strathern (1996) recently asserted, Descartes, working within a framework of Christian theology (for which both God and humanity were central in the cosmos), based his philosophy on the existing religious dichotomy between the soul and the body. Descartes's writings on the soul and the body were transformed into a secularized mind-body problem, in which the theological idea of the soul was expunged. Immanuel Kant “further intellectualized Descartes's ideas and provided a framework of logical categories of mind in terms of which the world was supposedly apprehended, thus bringing together science and philosophy and paving the way for nineteenth-century physics” (Strathern, 1994: 42).

societies. The body among the Tiwi Aborigines of Northern Australia, for example, is shaped, constrained, and invented by society and cosmology. "Human beings live in a socially constructed world and the body can be seen as a metaphor for society as a whole" (Grau, 1998: 72). Historical, social and symbolic time is embodied in the bodies of the people. "Bodily, social, ecological and spiritual worlds are all interconnected and part of a single cosmological universe given signification through the dancers' bodies, which embody land, social relationships, and spiritual beliefs" (ibid.: 73). We can find similar conceptualizations of human existence, for example, among the Are'Are' of the Solomon Islands where "the placenta is buried in ancestral land, linking the living person to a network of ancestral funeral sites... Are'Are' personify the land, territorialise the person. When one understands how the land owns people ... one can understand how people own land" (deCoppet 1985, cited in Strathern, 1992: 126). We can look at another example which explicitly tells us about the differences between Melanesian and European concepts of the human body. When the missionary and anthropologist Maurice Leenhardt during his stay in New Caledonia said to his friend Boesoou that Europeans had introduced the notion of spirit to the Canaque way of thinking, Boesoou objected by saying that they had always acted in accord with the spirit, but what had been introduced was the concept of body (Leenhardt, 1979: 164, cited in Telban, 1998a: 62). While the individual body had always had its own place in Christianity, the natives of New Caledonia never disassociated it from a cosmological and social person.

Among the Karawari-speaking Ambonwari of New Guinea, where I lived and conducted my field research, the body is perceived both through the external appearance of skin and the way it is observed to act. The Ambonwari do not have a term for any kind of physical body removed from the totality of human existence (Telban, 1998a; 62, 1998b). For them the living body cannot be conceptually separated from the person, from family and other social relationships, from the past (sedimented in habits), the present and the future (projective aspect of a habitual practice), from familiar places and practices. We could say in short that for the Ambonwari the "body is in the world as the heart is in organism" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 203). Or in the words of Byron Good: "We act in the world through our bodies; our bodies are the subject of our actions, that through which we experience, comprehend, and act upon the world" (1992: 39). I think that the phenomenological tradition offers an excellent explanation for the human body in the lifeworld of the Ambonwari, but which in our world has been too often pushed aside in favour of several different explanations of many partial worlds, one of which is that of reason and science.

The Ambonwari, in an ongoing process of human relationships, materialize their thoughts and feelings (by using spells and magic, for example) and think and feel with flesh. The central concept of Ambonwari life-world is their concept of *kay* (being, habit, way, ritual, custom, law). *Kay* comes into existence through a combination of personal spirit (*angndarkwanar*, lit. 'watchman of the light', guardian) and understanding-feeling (*wambung*, lit. 'insideness'). This 'insideness' is the seat of memory, feelings as well as of thoughts. This 'insideness' is the seat of agency, of mind, emotion and choice, and survives death by leaving the body together with the personal spirit.<sup>3</sup> What remains of the dead people is their skin (*kambra arm*, lit. 'nothing skin, empty skin'), not their bodies. In the

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<sup>3</sup> The Ambonwari concept of *wambung* resembles the Melpa concept of *noman* and the Paiela concept of *nembo*, both meaning 'mind' (see Strathern 1996: 43, 70, 78-79).

Ambonwari conceptualization of a human being there is no dichotomy between body and mind. Personal spirit and personal insideness show themselves in people's actions, in the ways people perform them. We could say that body among the Ambonwari has meaning through the external appearance of skin and the way it acts (Telban, 1997, 1998 a, b). I shall present an example which will illustrate how people's practices – i.e. the ways in which they are performed – construct and reconstruct their lifeworld. Among the Ambonwari, every person is conceived as both an individual and as someone who is extended to the environment, objects, and other persons, living and dead. Hunters in general do not eat the meat of the pig that they have killed with a spear. Why? A hunter would explain that to eat such a pig would mean to eat his own strength, that is, to eat himself. Hunting with a spear – not so with a gun – brings the hunter and his victim close together. The hunter's "body" is extended first to his spear – which cannot be touched by other people, especially uninitiated women and children – and then to a pig, which he (as a part of himself) gives to his kinsfolk, including women and children. Many food taboos among the Ambonwari are thus related to their practices, and because people have their own distinctive habits they also have many distinctive taboos. Their "body" is related to the food one eats, the things that one uses in a particular activity, and to the activity itself. Here the symbolic aspect is as important as anything else. A pregnant woman, for example, refrains from eating frogs, because otherwise a baby might have a big mouth, a huge belly, and short arms.

Papua New Guineans are often represented as cannibals, regardless of the fact that many societies in this large country were never involved in eating human flesh. Some analysts (e.g. Arens, 1979) argue that these practices never existed. The confessions of many, including some old Ambonwari people, however, situate these practices in local cultural worlds. We should reflect on our horror of cannibalism without denying or euphemizing its existence and what it involves, in the context "of our general unconcern at our (Western medicine's) consumption of the blood and organs of the world's poor – but without denying that this traffic, too, needs to be understood" (Gardner, 1999; 46).

We all know that human bodies were and still are the source of the most ferocious racism. These practices continue regardless of the fact that the Western scientific and popular views based on naturalism and evolutionism – the size and the shape of a skull, for example, in connection with human intelligence – were long ago refuted. We have to understand the exhibition of people in the markets, cages in a zoo or at the "scientific conferences" in the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. As one anthropologist suggested: "the development of British colonialism in Africa as a cultural enterprise was inseparable from the rise of biomedicine as science. The frontiers of 'civilisation' were the margins of a European sense of health as social and bodily order" (Comaroff, 1993: 306). For the West, the natives of Africa were the very embodiment of dirt and disorder. In Africa and elsewhere in the colonized world, people were organized, ruled, controlled, disciplined and punished in the name of sanitation and the control of disease (ibid.). The racial intercourse was linked to the origin of sickness. "[M]edicine drew upon social images to mediate physical realities, giving colonial power relations and alibi in the ailing human body. And colonial regimes, in turn, drew upon medical icons and practices to impose domination upon subjects and collectivities" (ibid.: 307). It is in such a context that we should understand the exhibition of a stuffed human body (of course the body was not of an European but of an African) as late as 1991 in the Catalan town of Banyoles. At that time "the presence of a stuffed Bechuana

tribesman in the Municipal Museum of Natural History threatened a boycott of the Olympic rowing events that were to take place there” (Jahoda, 1999: 209).

We do not need to patronize people and their practices, but try to understand them. We do not need simply to reject them but try to see, hear and comprehend them. It is not enough to say that we want to understand people and their practices simply in the context of their occurrence, because every “contextualisation may be inflicted by the urge to euphemize a practice” (Gardner, 1999:42). But to understand also means to be critically reflective and to deliberate about the reaction (spontaneous and ethically charged) and its aptness (ibid.: 39). Regardless of our negative reactive attitudes toward a certain practice it should always remain an open question as to what should be made of it ethically. We should try to “subvert the link between these negative reactive attitudes and any further, stronger ethical characteristics” (ibid.: 43).

In conclusion we could say that the Western perception and comprehension of the world since the fifth century B.C. – when in Greece the political field achieved autonomy from the religious field, and more so after the philosophy of René Descartes about 400 years ago – has been influenced by the instrumentally rationalized dichotomisation between nature and culture, body and mind, analogical reason and logical reason, sensibility and understanding, practice and theory, art and science, common man and the intellectual, the empirical and the transcendental. This dichotomisation resulted in the boost of technological development in the West. But to impose concepts like the mechanical biological body on those people whose history, philosophy and religion did not take the European course is discriminatory and implies the imperialism of what is believed to be “universal”.

It seems that suffering and chronic illness in general are those areas where European and non-European concepts of human existence come closest together; when for the sufferer – a mourner or a patient with a serious illness – the dichotomy between reason and emotion is blurred, when objectivization of one’s body gives way to a subjectified, historicized, socialized and contextualized person; and when a commonly shared reality breaks down resulting in the unmaking of the old lifeworld and in the making of a new one. There is, however, a great difference between the sick and the healthy in a Western urban, industrial and technological culture. The sick and the healthy live in different life-worlds. It is in the process of the making and unmaking of the world, in the liminal period between not-being-anymore and not-being-yet, in longing for the past and fearing the future, that people searching for new possibilities are most vulnerable. It is during the liminal period that Western people abandon instrumental rationality and romantic naturalism and search for alternatives in metaphysics, magic and religion – all of them, of course, based on their own local cultural worlds. Out of this experience they construct a completely new lifeworld.

In contrast to the West, in many non-Western cultures the sick and healthy live in the same lifeworld, as do their dead and their spirits. Therefore, for all those who live in different non-European local lifeworlds (as well as for those who live in a changed one but are still dominated by the healthy, rich and powerful) Western science – including the academic elite, in its search for scientific explanation and treatment – often inflicts the most severe imperialism of narrowly conceived instrumental rationality. To paraphrase Peter Gow’s (1994:26) argument about the impossibility of aesthetics being a cross-cultural category, we could say that we should not try to establish biomedicine as a cross-cultural category, but instead reflect critically on our own medical projects and practices. Also we should not

simply construct and dwell upon the differences between “us” and “them”, but look for the universalism without uniformity, for cultural differences within a shared humanity.

## **POVZETEK**

*S primerjanjem človekovega telesa, ki je v skladu z Zahodno znanostjo biološko zasnovan, objektiviziran in individualiziran, s telesom, ki ga živijo, izkusijo, konceptualizirajo in o njem govorijo predstavniki različnih kultur, bi avtor rad pokazal, da je evroameriški pogled na telo, ki je zasnovan na razumu, evolucionarni teoriji in biomedicini, daleč od univerzalnega. Pri vsiljevanju mehaničnega biološkega telesa na ljudi, katerih zgodovina, filozofija in religija niso sledile procesu, iz katerega se je razvila evropska znanost – na primer, pri medicinski etiki –, pomeni le novo obliko imperializma. V prispevku avtor predstavi več primerov razumevanja, pojmovanja in odnosa do človekovega telesa v različnih družbah in kulturah po svetu. Na ta način bi rad pokazal kako zgodovinske spremembe, kulturne vrednote in socialni procesi oblikujejo izkušnjo človekovega telesa, zdravja in bolezni ter postavljajo trpljenje v lokalne moralne svetove.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** medicinska etika, antropologija telesa, človeške vrednote

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## GLOBALISATION AND ANTHROPOLOGY

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### **ABSTRACT**

The globalisation of the modern world has been so far oriented primarily towards the economy. Postmodernism as a claim for the possibilities of an individual implies the local and the personal and asks for interpersonal dialogue among the partners. The incidents in the USA, on 11th September, 2001, show us how complicated the process of the critical dialogue between different partners can be. Critical dialogue has become a worldwide necessity if we wish to preserve the mankind. Postmodernism orientates us to transcend the one-dimensional imperialistic globalisation and especially to consider the problems of those who suffer or are in need, as John Rawls shows us in his theory of justice. This strategy requires from all the partners to respect every single man as a person, solidarity and subsidiarity: we have to work locally and we should be oriented globally.

**KEY WORDS:** anthropology, globalisation, postmodernism, religion, Christianity, person, justice, solidarity, subsidiarity

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### **ANTHROPOLOGY AND GLOBALISATION**

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Globalisation of the modern world has been so far oriented primarily towards the economy, it nevertheless causes increasingly obvious cultural and socio-political effects as well as those pertaining to the media. The world is increasingly integrating into a common whole, which is for the time being still shapeless, yet very strictly structured - at least in regard to the economy. An important part of this whole is also European integration, which plays a significant role, especially for the countries with a communist past, since the processes of integration are meant to facilitate easy and successful transformation and thus to actualise their socio-political images according to European democratic standards. Modern, predominantly economically oriented, processes of globalisation increasingly challenge the differences and particularities of nations and cultures, which adds to nationalism, xenophobia, and creates new divisions. A glaring example are the problems connected with the flow of people within the European Union, with the leading countries opposing the inflow of new labour force from the countries which are potential candidates for membership, particularly

to the economic migration from Poland. All this confirms that economic lobbies try to simplify the processes of integration and subordinate them to purely economic goals.

Perhaps the task of anthropology, theology and other humanities is to follow their historical mission and further as well as consolidate the pluralism of ideas which is based upon man as a person - the primary factor and foundation of all socio-political integration. Consequently, modern man should be prepared, trained and provided with the appropriate organisational base to be available in the processes of integration, which cannot and must not abolish his personal inviolability. The simplified economic globalisation also presents a threat to the family and other communities (e.g. religious communities) which try to preserve the interpersonal model as a basis for societal relations. In addition, the role of the nation is also rendered uncertain by these processes.

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### **SPLIT OR DIFFERENCE – THE PROBLEM OF MODERNISM**

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In his treatise on postmodernism, *Saturated Self*, Kenneth Gergen says, »Thinking that totalises has a certain flaw. Such systems not only cut, subjugate and destroy alternative forms of social life, but also pave the way to split. To be convinced of “the truth” of an explanation means to consider alternatives as stupid or redundant, that is to say, to either mock or silence the external world. Fighting stances are developed in which people talk only to those who agree with them, at the same time means are sought to destroy the credibility and influence (as well as lives) of others. All this is paralleled with an increasing sense of self-righteousness. Once modernism imposed its hegemony, religion, for example, lost its place in university curricula and was replaced by science, the industrious replaced the eloquent, school prayer was replaced by school councillors, organisational loyalty of systemic analysis and psychoanalysis were replaced by cognitive therapy.” (Gergen:1996, 397).

The problem of totalitarian thinking was reinforced by the modern absoluteness of different particularisms and it became especially exuberant in conceptual, economic, social and political liberalism, as well as in collective dialectical communism and nationalism (e.g. nazism, fascism). Totalitarianism of thinking made its influence felt in different variants elsewhere, too, in all the “monumental episodes” whose end is announced by postmodernism. The characteristic of totalitarian thinking, as clearly recognised during our experience with communism, is the exclusion of other options and the establishment of absolute standpoints which were even presented as being based on the so-called scientific paradigm. Retroactively, many people wrongly conclude that such totalitarianism of thinking is perceptible only in the conceptual and socio-political order of medieval Christianity. Yet more and more increasingly precise studies of medieval thought confirm the old commonplace truth of its pluralism which started to fade with modern particularism. This was partly facilitated by the predominant and exclusive thomistic particularism of the last few centuries that was provoked as the antipode and competition to particularistic modern modes of thinking. The so-called ancient societies (e.g. Greek and medieval) were not facing the problem of totalitarian thinking because, among other reasons, the structure of their societies was all-inclusive, so their conceptual, economic, moral, political and civilisational options were preserved and maintained on common, primarily cosmological or theological grounds (Horster, 1999, 22). Such societies had common frameworks within which was

determined the role of an individual who knew how to integrate and also had to integrate into the whole. Slaves, of course, were not a part of this whole – they were outside this framework although they, too, enabled the society to produce culture. Many-sided human activity in these societies required no particular argumentation since all people recognised the common ground (which was God, according to Thomas Aquinas (Akivinski, 1999, 338)). The split of thinking was prevented by the universal agreement and willingness to live together, which in turn enabled and provided common conceptual, linguistic and cultural bases. Hellenism already caused a certain turbulence and challenged classical Greek thought, but it also provided classical Greek philosophy with the fitting wider conceptual basis to be later on supplemented and completed by Christianity. Athens (philosophy), Jerusalem (Judaism and Christianity), and Rome (legal order) (Woschitz, 1984; 16-45) are like pillars of mutual influencing and supplementing, which were in the Christian empire (German) also given the political framework (Kallscheuer, 1994, 46-49) upon which all subsequent processes were based. It was this organisational and political framework that reinforced reasons for subsequent conceptual splits, as confirmed also by the schism in the 11th century (Dvornik, 1960, 634). The society was a global whole in which heterogeneous processes took place without destroying its equilibrium. Novalis says, “They were beautiful, glittering times when Europe was a Christian country, when Christianity had the right of domicile in this humanely shaped part of the world, only one great communal interest bound the most remote provinces of this vast Christian kingdom.” (Novalis, 1963).

This “Christian kingdom” was getting more and more specific political, economic-social and cultural contours which marked the conceptual and societal foundations of Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Politics as well as Augustine’s City of God. This kingdom got its utilitarian political frameworks in the medieval state and obtained the (final) foundation in scholastic frameworks of thinking. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) provided a momentous definition for this systemic framework by scholastically treating and synthesising Christianity and Aristotelian thought. This synthesis thus became the basis of ecclesiastical philosophising. Scholastic systematists (Gr. *synistemi* – »I am putting together«) can be thus given the main credit for determining the scientific paradigm par excellence which introduced definitions, consequently also limitations and splits, in the field of humanities as well as in other sciences. These thinkers knew that “every determination is negation” (*Omnis determinatio est negatio*) and pointed out that man can not put together everything, as Kant later put it. Our cognition and action remain within the limits of direct experience, we should be aware that managing the whole is beyond our abilities. For this reason, only some scholastics, the so-called nominalists (e.g. William of Ockham, 1285 – 1347), pointed out the significance of that which is available to direct experience and therefore individual in nature, they emphasised that only faith can equip man to comprehend the whole. Martin Luther (1483 – 1546) from this notion derived the principle that only faith (*sola fides*) saves man, whereas modern science took and confirmed systematism from the scholastic scientific paradigm, especially through the Enlightenment, which regained prominence after the Romantic period. This systematism tried, through and above scientific partiality, to enforce totalitarian knowledge which is possible only if accompanied by an ideology that suggests modern man can become the master of himself and the world. This is the problem of modern “monumental episodes”. In this aspiration lies hidden man’s primordial need to recognise the world as a whole.

Peter Sloterdijk convincingly explains this primordial need for global wholes in his work *Sphären II*, by citing Hans Blumenberg, who says that a city (polis) is “the continuation of a cave with other means” (Sloterdijk, 1999, esp. pp. 251-326). Man wants a well-rounded dwelling place. The basis of human existence is a sphere (Gr. *sphaíra*) which genetically begins with mother’s placenta, that is why Sloterdijk subtitled his first book (*Sphären I*) *Bubbles (Blasen)* – man comes from mother’s placenta and will seek its pristine nature also in the world, he seeks a nest to safeguard his existence. Freud says that man wants to “crouch in the nest”, to be like “a sheaf in the nest”. Modern era has according to Sloterdijk put an end to this wholeness and security of man’s life by triggering global splitting processes which attributed absolute qualities (determined, ultimate) to individual entities (national, scientific, ideological) and thus broke up the global. Parallel systems were developed and their common symbolism failed. The problem of the present globalisation is how to construct the global symbol – not only comprehensible to all people but also enabling us to identify with the symbols of partial systems. Here appears the problem of how to preserve man’s identity or security within the sphere without having to cut off his contacts with others in the light of the fact that he can not secure his well-rounded symbolic whole all by himself. This whole can no longer be secured by a state nor by any scientific, political or other ideological system. The only path to unity leads through the individual’s openness to others and his readiness to associate with different people. According to Cristoph Menke, it was G. F. W. Hegel who put an end to the traditional universal image of reality by double decomposition, namely, by bringing attention to (1) the discrepancy between an individual and the polis-like (politically regulated) community, and (2) the discrepancy in an individual himself, which divided man into a being of self-realisation (inner, emotional, spiritual) and an external legal-political being (Menke, 1996; 239). Menke thus points out an important yet often overlooked dimension of Hegel’s thought. As a philosopher of identity and difference, Hegel is an important harbinger of the modern split into an individual’s happiness and the external collective equity of a political community. This dimension was again emphasised by Nietzsche and Heidegger as well as by other existentialists. The new or modern organisation of the world and living under the influence of science and technology introduces a split into the old unified “objective world” of man and his environment by dividing man into individual experiencing and comprehending on one side, and the objective world of science and technology or social-sociological functioning on the other, the latter is not interested in individual experience but only in the technical-rational functioning of socio-economic processes. The completion and culmination of this process is modernism as the prevalence of technical reason from the Enlightenment and its analytic, splitting, and dividing process with the strategy of splitting man as a person and subjecting him to the frameworks and procedures of the process.

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## **FROM MODERN TO POSTMODERN FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY**

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Keneth Gergen establishes in his work *Oversaturated Self* that the romantic ideal of inner man failed to assert itself, although it provided a basis for the majority of modern concepts of personality: for (moral) sense, passion, suffering, love (*amor*), for conviction based on experience or faith etc. The romantic notion and image of man was, despite the importance of man's feelings, ousted and outshone by the enlightenment-rational image of the man of science and technology which carried on the scholastic ideal of systemic man and rejected man's romantic elements. Freud based the study of man's "instinctual" elements on rational analysis of human personality. His rational image of man is the product of the psycho-analytic method. Man's world is believed to be governed and determined by analytical concepts of science, technology, progress, machinery, production, processing by media and computer. The image of man is according to the psychologist Carl Rogers determined also through self-creation, yet this is not an intrinsic, authentic man, but analytically planned, manufactured man. Man is created by technical-operational as well as by other modern planning frameworks and bases for tailoring his image. These processes have a long tradition which in its first phase began with Low Tech: railway, mail, car, telephone, radio, film and mass production of books. In the 80s, five big countries (USA, West Germany, Great Britain, Canada, and the Soviet Union) together published from 50,000 to 80,000 books per year. In the last phase of modernism, at the dawn of postmodernism, man and society are managed by High Tech – air traffic, television, video and other sophisticated media technology, electronic processing and connections. These agents immensely increase man's abilities for communication. Yet mutual relationships are at the same time becoming planned and stimulated by technology and the media. Paradoxically, we now often know more about people we see on television, e.g. Schumacher, Zahovič etc., than about our neighbours or even our loved ones. Possibilities and the number of relationships are increasing. We can imagine the past and the future (with the help of films and the Internet), the future is becoming increasingly familiar because it is planned, for this very reason it is becoming limited, it clearly presents its traps and exposes us to new uncertainties which even threaten our own existence. This was very explicitly manifested by the recent attack on Pentagon and WTC towers on 11 September 2001. Relationships are therefore multiplied and regulated on the technical-instrumental level. This expands the possibilities and even increases the intensity of (also intimate) interpersonal relationships, yet within new, stereotypical, casual and arbitrary frameworks. Such operating in turn expands man's possibilities and increases tension because man is not able to reach or obtain these possibilities for his own use. The biggest problem is the fact that individual subsystems no longer prove adequate because they renounce interaction and because each subsystem, despite the state-of-the-art means of communication, follows its own separate logic. Establishing mutual co-ordination (for example, between the rich and the poor, between industrial lobbies and ecologists, between "imperialists" and terrorists etc.) demands exceptional efforts because such a task requires examination of even the most fundamental procedures and strategies in individual fields such as science, politics, social security, and even religion. As an example: academicians could once communicate within the relatively uncomplicated field of communication by simple scientific patterns while today this communication is carried out within universities or even individual faculties and disciplines in unlimited forms through electronic links

restricted only by time. The greatest difficulty here is the fact that this communication despite technically unsophisticated connections requires adjustments of (different) languages and their premises. Additionally, man as a person feels more and more unimportant and impotent in the face of boundless data, their variants, and the means of their acquisition itself. The independence of individual scientific systems also reduces the possibility of rationally evaluating the whole, everything becomes a matter of persuasion and acceptance, in which the mind can not give final, explicit and reliable answers. Thus appears the paradox that it was precisely the man of reason who created circumstances which made rational decisions of little consequence. Consequently, the world's foundations are shaking and the Earth opens to that which has no foundation, as Blaise Pascal put it. What does remain, then, to be called the truth? Has the theory of relativity captured with its absolute velocity also man's everyday life and now dictates business operations in the world? Are there really no objective foundations left? To paraphrase Kant - what about the absolute value of man and the state of his freedom? Everything seems to lack foundation, does that entail the fall of freedom together with its bearer - man as a moral being?

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### **FREEDOM: AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIETY**

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Modern society has emphasised an individual as a subject and thus poses the question of freedom and man's relation (as a free being) to his community. Already classic liberalism (J. Lock, A. Smith) was opposed to the arbitrary and absolute rule of an individual, it advocated subordination to the law, yet it encountered problems while trying to establish the mechanisms which should limit the absolute power. That is why Adam Smith included in his writings about economy some theological dimensions, namely, God will punish capitalists and rulers who do not respect equity in economic operations. Such restricting and regulatory mechanisms or theological argumentation had lost their influence through the secularisation that later on accompanied development of liberalism. The theological principles had shaped particularly the American society (Kallscheuer, 1994, 127) while modern pragmatic liberalism provides primarily economic freedom and rights of individuals, it is not concerned with equity and thus ignores the functioning of the society as a whole (Jamnik, 1998; 34). Without regulatory mechanisms, which are applicable to the entire democratic state, and without ethical or theological elements, the functioning becomes problematic or even impossible. Who else could in such circumstances prevent an individual from expanding his economic activities beyond all reasonable limits? Here comes the question of freedom and personal values as well as their place in the society as a whole, or the question of values' priority in regard to the entire community, therefore the question of their general acceptability. It is about the mutual consent that was demanded by John Rawls (Rawls, 1971) and by the philosophers of the so-called communitarian theory of society. Charles Taylor in his book with the same title characterises the morbidity of modernism as degenerated individualism. Taylor enumerates three characteristics of this individualism: (1) shifting the source of morality from the cosmic order to the interior of individual subject; (2) absolute shift of responsibility to the individual, (3) who carries out his personal responsibility also outwards in agreement with others, because he is the exclusive bearer of moral behaviour. Modern man is thus through the aforementioned technical-industrial development of modernism in these processes transforming from the so-called

authentic subject into a new (moral) function. The subject's freedom and morality are now only procedural, determined by the frameworks of action. Taylor sharply criticises this and concludes, "Scientism, faith in science, has completely swallowed morality". If this is happening, according to Taylor, only in Western democratic societies, then the problem is even greater in all post-communist countries, where all systems of control fell apart while the new are being established very slowly. The problem of freedom was particularly aggravated in Marxist societies due to the so-called scientific-scientistic design of society which turned man upside down and tried to anthropologically adjust him to the sociological model of the "scientific collectivistic society". Post-Marxist societies also bear the consequences. Josef Tischner expresses these consequences and problems of post-Marxist man by the title of his book – *Unfortunate Gift of Freedom* (Biel 1996; 171). The economic-procedural effects of globalisation have appeared brutally and inhumanly precisely in the post-Marxist societies, because of transition, absence of legal regulation as well as economic-material concepts of man. A striking example is Russia, though these effects can be easily seen in our country as well.

After the fall of communism it seems that the world is even faster sinking into the new single-mindedness of technical-economic and therefore procedural globalisation. The latter is anthropologically questionable, because it places man among antiquities, as the German-American social critic Günther Anders (Anders, 1992) wrote at the beginning of the 20th century. This state of affairs is also confirmed by the protests of various groups (terrorism represents a deviation in these processes). Francois Furet says in his book *The Passing of an Illusion* that societal models of fascism, nazism, and communism served primarily as a technique and for the rule of the masses (Furet, 1995). Marxist system is only a subtle form of organisational, political and conceptual-anthropological globalisation of man and his society. The major problem is therefore how to join individuals into a whole by "insight and will" (Fichte), not by revolutionary force and violence. In 1905 Nikolaj Berdjajev wrote that *homo sovieticus* is no longer "gentle, kind-hearted, easy-going, bearded, generous Russian man, now he is a shaved, malevolent, aggressive and active man" (Berdjajev, 1952, 257). It is no surprise then, as Herwig Büchele (Büchele, 1996) stated, that the exploitation of man is most brutal in modern post-communist liberalism. Surprising is only the fact that brainwashing collectivism turned so quickly into exploitative, procedural liberalism and thus into extreme individualism. Among important reasons is the Marxist violence, which allowed no dialogue. Similarly, economically oriented processes of globalisation now attempt to reduce alternative social processes into a monologue by which multinational corporations try to silence those who oppose one-way globalisation, even though in principle they can not circumvent this dialogue. Despite this, the dialogue in European integration, OPEC or WTO faces numerous problems. The demonstrations of dissatisfied people or those who disagree with the processes which are planned at the meetings of the eight most industrialised countries (G8 in Seattle, Venice, and in New York) indicate the necessity of broadening the scope of dialogue in these processes to prevent the world from becoming the world of one third of rich and two thirds of increasingly poor. These facts at least conceptually contributed to the tragic events on 11th September 2001 in New York. Postmodern man is becoming aware of difficulties pertaining to democracy and understands K. Popper, who says that governing and the temptation to resort to violence go hand in hand, so the art of democracy is about how to remove the ruling class without bloodshed (Popper, 2000; 208). It is wise to preserve the memory and not to simply forget

how impenetrably and systemically communists protected their power, the same holds true for all other past and present despots. Democracy is therefore man's guarantee for freedom and is even today far from something that can be taken for granted while the shortcomings of democracy are usually manifested during crises. If people are not prepared to protect it they can lose it, too; it turns easily into dictatorship, as proved by nazism, communism and other totalitarian systems which took advantage of democratic levers on their way to absolute power. Taylor thus believes that dialogue as the path of freedom to others is the basis of democratic or anthropologically acceptable economic operating, he is convinced that we are mutually obliged by dialogue and through others qualified as people in the first place. Man is begotten through others, he comes into this world through others, and starts to live as a human being through others. Only the human framework presents man with the possibility of life and is thus the second foundation of his identity and at the same time of his openness to develop as an individual, consequently, it is the foundation of the entire community (Taylor, 1991). This is also the guiding principle of postmodern identity as the revolt against modern, one-way technical-productive globalisation trends. Postmodern culture thus requires dialogue between different partners who cannot claim any priority, they are all already bounded by their premises and thus in principle forced into the position of dialogue.

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## **POSTMODERN GLOBAL STRATEGY**

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Modern global strategy primarily pursues the goal of unifying world economic processes, which includes also political and cultural integration, although the latter, too, is dictated by economic interests. Economic globalisation is guided and supported by means of the media and advertising, which are interested primarily in economic efficiency, consumerism and profits. This creates a one-third society of the rich and two thirds of the increasingly poor (Natter&Riedelsperger, 1988). Globalisation itself conditions and speeds up the postmodern tendency to render all paradigms or trends relative and establish the basis of rendering socio-economic, political, and cultural foundations of human life and action. By doing this, it also limits or renders relative their bearers or the groups, which have to strive towards a more equitable society, because they are forced to accept more and more (all) partners. This represents a firm foundation for a societal strategy which is to a larger extent based on dialogue. Churches and religions are also entangled into these postmodern processes, they can play a very significant role, especially Christianity, because it is a religion of dialogue. Appropriate "strategies" of economic operations should be designed for these new postmodern global environments, and the assumptions on which the society should exist and function must be re-examined. Churches and postmodern culture again bring to our attention man's symbolic conditionality and foundation which determine the world as the world of symbols. According to Kant (Kant, 1956, B XVI), we project the world which is in Veber's words the interim world between facts and the Self, as pointed out also by phenomenologists (Veber, 1921; 4 sl.). Neither facts nor the Self can be expressed in absolute terms. Since every person or a group of persons has their own world, persons and groups should endeavour to exchange or pass on their world through dialogue with others. They should pay attention to the authenticity of their world, here man's emotions play very important role. That is why psychologists nowadays emphasise emotional intel-

ligence and not exclusively rationality as was the case in the period of modernism. All this reinforces the significance of an individual as the protagonist in all events and experiences of the world. Furthermore, this demands internalisation of human speech and culture in general, which will also benefit man's religious sense. Postmodern culture abolishes the myth of ideals capable of progress and puts forward more lasting values of man as a person, it stimulates co-operation. It prefers the culture of relationships to individualism and thus stimulates genuine co-operation. It does not establish absolute systems, but enables us for continual dialogue, correction, and the search after the authenticity of our speech and actions. Postmodern culture is thus stimulating for democratic processes and the culture of dialogue. It provides our world with important adjustments for the one-sided attempts of imperialist globalisation. The alternative movements, too, in this sense express their disapproval of narrow-minded economic globalisation carried out by the World Bank or the eight most industrialised countries (G8). The disastrous consequences of these processes are probably among important reasons for the recent tragedy in the USA. Emphasising personal standpoints also brings to light the differences, postmodern culture thus revives some aspects that European culture borrowed from the Judaes-Christian tradition, which is based upon man as a person. Although the world ethos (Küng, 1990) is, as a sort of conglomeration of different religious ideas and systems, an utopia, the ethos is a necessity for man's life, we have to agree upon it in order to secure our survival on the planet and confirm it with our standpoints and attitudes. Such an ethos is necessarily permeated by dialogue and, by taking into account different partners, represents an opportunity for exchanging and deepening different conceptual and religious viewpoints in a dialogue, thus an opportunity to find common ways of shaping the frameworks which would ensure survival of a particularly lost and discriminated man also by verified cultural and religious foundations. It is a human ethos, so anthropology as the fundamental science, in Kantian sense, has a very important role in these processes. Postmodern identities constitute personal and communal identifications, which should be, now more than ever, agreed upon as well as carefully and open-mindedly understood and embedded into the globe (sphere) of the world, as suggested by Peter Sloterdijk. Churches, especially the Catholic church, are already spread all over the world and can play an important role in these processes. The question is whether churches, especially the Catholic church, pay enough attention to man's oscillating and even drifting within these global strategies to be able to understand his situation and stand by his side during these processes. The social theory under the influence of Judaes-Christian and Greco-Roman cultural patterns has in history provided the basis for conceptualising man as a person. Only those societies which guarantee respect for all people, especially for those who are disadvantaged, marginal or threatened in any other way, offer a suitable basis for enforcing human rights. The UN (UNO) is now preparing the Declaration of Responsibility, which will facilitate solidarity and substitution beginning from below and will provide those in lower strata with opportunities to realise their goals without help (if they do not need wider supportive co-ordination); it will strengthen democratic society and also ensure circumstances for real dialogue, partnership, and the joint search for the truth about man and the world. Such functioning of the society binds us to genuine responsibility which would help avoid the seven deadly sins of the modern world: unprincipled politics, trading without morals, riches without work, education without values, science without humanness, unconscionable pleasure, desiring success without effort and without giving up something in exchange. Anthropology, as a science about man, has the task of preserving the basic

principles which serve man's survival and also of stimulating modern man towards responsibility and thus towards morality and justice. In view of modern globalisation trends, it is important to get properly organised at the interpersonal level so as to enable the community, in its role of the agent of exchange and dialogue, to actualise man and the humane. This can be done only on the condition that we persevere in dialogue in all directions and at all levels. Only thus will it be possible to defy any globalising (economic-monopolist) unification of the world and thus to ward off the new enslavement of man.

## **POVZETEK**

*Globalizacija danes poteka predvsem po ekonomskih kriterijih. Postmodernizem kot zahteva po uveljavljanju posameznega pa vključuje lokalno in torej osebno ter zahteva medsebojni dialog ob upoštevanju vseh partnerjev. Dogodki v ZDA 11. 9. 2001 razodevajo, kako zahteven je ta proces medsebojnega kritičnega dialoga, ker so partnerji pač vedno različni. Kritični dialog pa je danes svetovna nujnost, če hočemo ohraniti človeka. Postmodernizem pa nas usmerja k preseganju enostranske imperialistične globalizacije in zahteva upoštevanje posebno prikrajšanih in prizadetih kot je v svoji teoriji pravičnosti pokazal John Rawls. Takšna strategija pa zahteva od vseh partnerjev upoštevanje (vsakega) človeka kot osebe, solidarnost in subsidarnost: treba je delati lokalno in biti usmerjen globalno.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** antropologija, globalizacija, postmoderna, človek

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## THE TRANSITION OF POLITICAL CULTURE TO

## DEMOCRACY: SLOVENIAN CASE STUDY

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British historical experience:

"The aristocratic Whigs found it possible a coalition with non-conformist merchants and industrialists, to establish securely the principles of parliamentary supremacy and representation. The traditional aristocratic and monarchic forces assimilated enough of this civic culture to compete with the secularist tendencies for popular support and, indeed, to mitigate their rationalism and impart to them a love and respect for the sacredness of the nation and its ancient institutions.

What emerged was a third culture, neither traditional nor modern but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it. This was the civic culture. With this civic culture already consolidated, the working classes could enter into politics and, in a process of trial and error, find the language in which to couch their demands and the means to make them effective."

*Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture, 1963, pp. 7-8*

### **ABSTRACT:**

The results of all three dimensions of political culture (subjective, social and objective) show that social complexity, especially in the transitional period, is increasing rapidly. This contributes to the advancing increase of the instability of the political system and as such represents an objective obstacle for its consolidation and democratization. The specific role and the importance of subjective factors of political culture could increase only on the basis of consolidation of the political system. Consequently, only the efficient functioning of agents of political socialization could reduce the established increase of complexity of the social system to its reasonable control. This process could make way to different forms of modernization and rationalisation of society.

Only then, when the modern forms of social and political action prevail in social life, is it possible to expect the development of more rational ways of thinking and acting.

Only in this way can patterns of democratic, civic and participatory political culture be developed.

Increasing social and political changes, which are mostly initiated from »the top« can accelerate processes typical of the transitional period and at the same time consolidate and reduce the dispersed effects of influential objective factors of political culture. But on the other hand, they can contribute to the fact that the process of »democratic political socialization of citizens« is much slower than it could be, if the occurring changes were co-ordinated at lower levels of the social system.

In fact, a long-term foresight shows to us that the same process of changes can have also completely contradictory results, which can have an especially negative influence on the activity of subjective and social factors of political culture, especially on those which influence only implicitly form values and standards of political culture (for example: families, peer groups, kindergartens, mass media, schools, trade unions and enterprises).

**KEY WORDS:** transition to democracy, political culture, Slovenia, political socialization, political system, ideological political style, pragmatism political style, political parties, trade unions, political anthropology, case study

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## INTRODUCTION

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One may notice that today the researchers of democracy and political culture are concerned with the problem of how to establish and preserve the stability of the political system in the period of even more rapid changes emerging within the social system.

When the political system of the western parliamentary democracy was being established also in Slovenia (1985-1995), the questions related to the political socialization of citizens became set up in all its acuteness. There are appearing even more questions than answers to them exist. One could say, the political culture area remains in Slovenia continually as a non-examined research field, although the well known fact is that political culture variables are influencing the majority of the most important social and political decisions, accepted by different actors of civil and political life.

The following presentation endeavours to demonstrate an approximate but feasible way out of the central dilemma of social research, which had been formulated by Przeworski and Teune as follows:

“Since the number of the relevant determinants of any kind of social behavior is likely to exceed the number of accessible social systems, the objective of a theory free of all proper names will not be easily reached, and thus procedures must be formulated to maximize this objective.” (*Przeworski, Teune, 1970; 31*)

## **THE DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM**

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The pressure of objective historical events and changes, which are going on in Slovenia very rapidly, is condensing and concentrating the "rational core" of any kind of politics so much, that is very difficult to invent and to practice any self-determined political strategy and orientation. Furthermore - and what could be more important - this process of the fermentation in the social world, which is mainly limited to changes in the area of the political system, could in the longer run suspend the process of modernization and rationalization already started with long steps in the social system and in the society as such.

A somewhat longer quotation, formulated by Dirk Berg-Schlosser, will make clearer my attempt to explain the scientific goal and procedures which we used in this study:

"In any case, an historically-oriented comparative analysis at the macro-level of political culture analysis could be successful, when it involves 'big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons' research approach as well (Tilly, 1984). In order not to leave out a priori any potentially fruitful aspects, it seems imperative to begin any single case study in a configurative ("individualizing" in Tilly's terms) manner. Thus, even if the final explanation should be as parsimonious (hypothetical) as possible, the model to start from must be comprehensive and only in subsequent steps, as it has been attempted to demonstrate here, can the complexity of such kind of social studies be reduced to manageable levels. Such procedures may not lead to comprehensive single factor ('universalizing') explanations which are equally valid for all cases considered, but it may involve more complex multi-factor ('encompassing') ones and it at least leaves open the possibility of arriving at several distinct causal patterns or historical "paths" ('variation-finding'). Meaningful and sufficiently operationalized comparisons may not lead to a "royal way" in any sense, but they provide indispensable elements for any kind of empirically-based theory. (...) (Berg-Schlosser, *De Meur*, 1992)

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## **HYPOTHESIS**

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Shortly speaking, I am attempting to evaluate some of above mentioned dilemmas and procedures and use them to examine the validity of my general hypothesis. I would like to recall here the theory and the hypothesis of the cultural lag, introduced by William F. Ogburn (Ogburn, 1964, 1950). Ogburn asserted that, owing to the multiplicity of inventions, made possible by the accumulation of material culture, a social change has been occurring with great rapidity. In other words, the problem faced by modern man is one of adapting his way of thinking and behaving to the state of his technology and material culture. On this basis I would like to present two hypotheses regarding the Slovenian case.

The first one is like this: Because the historical experiences with the formation of our own political and social institutions are very small, libertarian traditions have not developed themselves as they have in other European countries. This "not self-confident" historical heritage of the Slovenian new state is a big objective burden for developing more rational forms of a political communication and modern features of political culture.

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The second hypothesis is: The main consequence of such a situation is a dominating ideological and not a pragmatismal political style performed in everyday political practice by political actors, where the last style could be more efficient in the period of transition of the political system to democracy and in the permanently changing society in general. (Diamond, 1994; 174)

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## **THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF OUR CASE STUDY**

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The following comparative European countries have been taken - on the geopolitical and the geographical size basis - to evaluate the results we have obtained for Slovenia (B) with others (**S** = Survivor Country<sup>1</sup>; **B** = Breakdown Country):

- 1 - Ireland (S)
- 2 - Belgium (S)
- 3 - Netherlands (S)
- 4 - Luxembourg (S)
- 5 - Switzerland (S)
- 6 - Denmark (S)

We are observing two categories of political culture in Slovenia: a) libertarian traditions (state-building traditions) and b) political culture characteristics.

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## **OPERATIONALIZATION OF CATEGORIES AND VARIABLES**

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All categories and variables used in my analysis were measured on ordinal scales. To approve or disapprove our general hypothesis and to provide some empirical evidence for our analysis, the following categories and variables of the political culture have been operationalized:

The variables of early-state-building or the variables of the libertarian tradition were designed on the category of social and historical circumstances on the basis of a selection of social and political indicators<sup>2</sup>, which are defined as follows:

### Variable 1 - Political Rights Index

The index is designed to measure only one aspect of freedom, namely political liberty, (see more in Appendix I., Coding schemes).

### Variable 2 - Civil Rights Index

Civil rights are those rights the individual has vis a vis the state. Particularly important are the freedom of the press and the other media and the independence of the judiciary, (see Appendix I.).

### Variable 3 - Political Discrimination: Percentage Discriminated against and Intensity of Discrimination

The indicators of discrimination measure the scope and intensity of political discrimination based upon ethnic, linguistic, religious, or regional identity. Members of the group or

groups are systematically restricted in their access to some political rights relative to other groups in their society. Intensity refers to the degree of discrimination, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 4 - Economic Discrimination: Percentage Discriminated against and Intensity of Discrimination

The indicators in this table measure the scope and intensity of economic discrimination based upon ethnic, linguistic, religious, or regional identity. Members of the group or groups are systematically restricted in their access to some economic values relative to other groups in their society. Intensity refers to the degree of discrimination, (see Appendix I. and Results).

Variable 5 - Potential Separatism: Percentage Involved and Intensity of Involvement

Intensity is coded on an ordinal scale of four categories that signify the political circumstances under which the separatist group came to be part of the state to which it now belongs. The underlying dimension is the *continuum of consensus to coercion*. The intensity of separatist sentiment is inferred to vary along this dimension, being more intense the greater is the coercion. However valid this assumption is, the coding categories provide information on the historical circumstances of contemporary separatism, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 6 - Voter Turnout as a Percentage of the Adult Population

Voter turnout measures the percentage of the population aged twenty years or older who voted in a national election for the national assembly. Turnout gives some indication of institutionalized mass participation in a political system. It can indicate, at least partially, the degree to which the electorate engages in active and formal political behavior. But it does not make sense to rely on voter turnout alone. The context is very important, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 7 - Party Fractionalization: Based upon Votes

Party fractionalization is based upon the distribution of votes in an election for the national legislature, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 8 - Party Fractionalization: Based upon Legislative Seats

Party fractionalization is based upon the distribution of legislative seats following an election for the national legislature, (see Appendix I., and Results).

Variable 9 - Organized Labour as a Percentage of the Total Labour Force

These data refer to the percentage of the labour force that belongs to organized trade unions, (see Appendix I., and Results)\*.

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\*General Remark: The indexes reported above are concerned more with a specific set of rights traditionally defined as liberty. Categorizing Slovenia according to its level of freedom or oppression dates back at least to Aristotle. The coding schemes are presented in Appendix I., distinguishing between economic and political discrimination and between degrees or intensities of discrimination coded on ordinal scales.

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A set of dichotomous variables was designed on the category of political culture characteristics. The following variables have been dichotomized from the previous inspection of data using a pair comparison method:

- political participation (low/high)
- public guarantee of civil liberties including freedom of expression (no/yes)
- ethno-linguistic cleavages (no/yes)
- religious cleavages (no/yes)
- regional cleavages (no/yes)
- overarching structures (no/yes)
- democratic legitimacy (low/high)
- interest groups: unions (weak/strong)
- interest groups: employers (weak/strong)
- fragmentation of party system: Rae's  $F < 0.8$ (no/yes)
- percentage (of votes) of right and left antisystem parties: 15% (no/yes), and
- independence of judiciary (no/yes).

We have measured a "Boolean" distance as a measure of distance among countries, which measures the number of Boolean (i.e. dichotomized) variables in which two selected countries differ from each other, (see Results).

Altogether 12 variables for 4 countries were included in the research model, where "the most similar" and "the most different systems" have been classified across certain pairs. The effects of the world economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s, as the major stimulus for the eventual survival or breakdown of democratic regimes, have been taken as independent criteria variables.

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## **RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDY**

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The main purpose of my analysis is not to give definite answers to the questions I was setting up previously. Moreover I am trying to evaluate my hypothesis on the basis of some collected data about objective circumstances, which are influencing the norms, content and effects which have formed the political culture and democracy in Slovenia the most. At the same time, I am trying to examine the applicability and the explanatory power of the methods used in this paper.

Thus, the results obtained remain still relatively crude approximations. In spite of that we are providing some quantitative and qualitative data for further analyses, where more exact hypotheses and models could be evaluated.

As Arthur Stinchcombe put it:

"By the simple act of asserting that two instances are alike ... a class, a concept, is created, a generalization about it is offered, some evidence is brought forth, and we are embarked on a scientific enterprise." (1978;123)

## **LIBERTARIAN TRADITIONS**

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**a.** In the 70-s and 80-s Slovenia belonged to the group of those countries, which have had a very low political rights index, scoring on our scale from 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty). As a part of former Yugoslavia, the Slovenian political rights index had been scored with 6, which means, that a political system without elections ruled. When in 1990 the political system was changed, the political rights index increased in Slovenia rapidly, scored by 1 on our scale, which means that the majority of people in Slovenia had the right to participate in the elections. (TV +) \*\*

**b.** When we observed the data for the civil rights index, it could be noticed that the improvements were not so big. The situation has been changed on the scale from 6 to 4, which means that the Slovenian political system has broad areas of freedom, but broad areas of illegality as well. We could notice a better situation in Slovenia now than it was before in former Yugoslavia, where the rights of the state were thought to take priority over the civil rights. (TV -)

**c.** On the scale of a political discrimination it could be noticed that the intensity of discrimination in former Yugoslavia was not so big and that the intensity, scored with 1, does not increase in the new-formed Slovenian state, which means that only some political elite positions and some participatory activities (party membership, voting) are not accessible for minority groups, (TV 0).

**d.** The scale of economic discrimination indicates an increasing curve of the intensity of discrimination scored with 2, which means that the highest and some medium economic-value positions and many specific classes of economic activity depend on the economic power of minority groups (social and political elite's). The process of privatization, which started in 1993, will additionally bring new impulses, which will rapidly increase the intensity of the economic discrimination. The redistribution of the economic power is the main process, which will most probably influence the changes in political culture the most, (TV +).

**e.** The indicator of the potential separatism shows a quite different and opposite situation, because Slovenia definitely separated from the Yugoslav Federal State in 1991. While before 1991 Slovenia was scored with 1, as a region (republic), which had been incorporated into the Yugoslav State by its own request or by mutual agreement, its status had been changed basically after 1991. Since then it exists as an independent, sovereign state, scored with 2 on our scale, established by international agreement and by fiat (caused with civil war!) of a former colonial or a governing power, (TV +).

**f.** Voter turnout as a measure of the mass political participation shows that the situation has not changed greatly, while the valid percentages of the population aged eighteen years or older, who voted in national elections for the national assembly, are almost the same (in former Yugoslavia app. 85% on average; In Slovenia 1992, 82%). We could treat this turnout as an active formal political behavior of voters, who took their rights very seriously. The result for the participation in the Plebiscite for an independent state in 1990 with 86 % additionally proving this assertion, (TV 0).

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\*\* Signs TV +,-,0 means TV = transition variables, which have positive, negative or neutral influence regarding on the rate of change of the political culture and democratic changes in general.

**g.** Party fractionalization (Fv-coefficient) based upon Votes shows that the likelihood that two randomly selected voters will belong to different parties is about 40%. This is a relatively low percent, which indicates that the Slovenian "electorate" has not changed very much and that it is still being homogeneous, where the so called (Easton, 1965) "diffuse support" in the political system has not yet influenced the results of the election, (see Table 1. below).

**h.** Party fractionalization (Fs-coefficient) based upon Legislative Seats (N=90) shows that the likelihood that two randomly selected members of the national assembly (parliament) will belong to different parties is about 82%. This is a relatively high percent, which indicates that the effect of the "diffuse support" having an influence on decisions accepted by parliament and on the features of democratic political culture is here more likely. But, there still exists the problem of the effectiveness of parliament at the same time. (see Table 2 below)

**i.** The percentage of organized labour shows that the situation has been considerably changed. Former socialist trade unions were only transmitted organisations of the communist party policy and a transmitter of the idea of proletarian dictatorship, invented by Lenin. Slovenian trade unions (ZSSS- Free Unions and KNSS - Confederation of the Independent Unions) have lost, with approximately 40% of organized workers, a lot of their former social force and they must at the same time reorganize themselves due to their changed role

**Table 1:** Party fractionalization by votes (coefficient  $f=F$ ); Comparative data,  
Source: According to World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1983)

RANK	COUNTRY	Fv
1	FRANCE	0.840
3	SWITZERLAND	0.643
6	BELGIUM	0.797
13	NETHERLANDS	0.749
20	DENMARK	0.714
28	IRELAND	0.643
-	LUXEMBOURG	MISSING
46	JAMAICA	0.489
47	PHILIPPINES	0.488
48	BANGLADESH	0.474
49	GAMBIA	0.462
50	SINGAPORE	0.457
51	SLOVENIA	0.408
52	GUINEA BISAO	0.360
53	MEXICO	0.348
73	FORMER YU	0.000

**Table 2.** Party fractionalization by seats

coefficient F, Comparative data,

Source: According to World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1983

RANK	COUNTRY	Fs
3	BAHRAIN	1.000
7	SLOVENIA	0.829
8	DENMARK	0.818
9	SWITZERLAND	0.806
11	LUXEMBOURG	0.766
15	BELGIUM	0.740
17	NETHERLANDS	0.735
36	IRELAND	0.584
67	JAMAICA	0.345
71	MEXICO	0.302
72	GAMBIA	0.301
78	PHILIPPINES	0.146
80	BANGLADESH	0.046
101	GUINEA BISAO	0.000
101	FORMER YU	0.000

**Table 3:** Organized labour

Percentage of the labour force that belongs to organized trade unions - Comparative data;

Source: According to World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1983

RANK	COUNTRY	% Percent
1	GUINEA	100
8	DENMARK	65
14	SLOVENIA	approx. 60
14	BRAZIL	50
14	FIJI	50
14	MAURITANIA	50
16	BELGIUM	48
19	LUXEMBOURG	45
26	IRELAND	36
32	NETHERLANDS	33
52	SWITZERLAND	20

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in the new-formed political system. From the historical point of view, there does exist - for the first time in the Slovenian history - the opportunity to establish independent workers organizations inside their own sovereign state. (see Table 3 above)

From the above presented analysis we would like to reveal the following important findings:

**1.** The selected TV = “transition variables” of the libertarian tradition in Slovenia have a diverse and complex influence - positive and negative - on the main social and political processes going on as the transition from a traditional (totalitarian) to a democratic political culture. The index of political rights, the scale of economic discrimination, the potential separatism rate and the party fractionalization based upon seats have, in general, a positive influence (+) on the already achieved degree of freedom, meanwhile the political freedom rate and voter turnout portions have a neutral effect (0); and the civil rights index, the percentage of organized labour and the party fractionalization by votes have a prevalent negative (-) effect on the process of democratization carried out in Slovenia since 1990.

**2.** *Intermediate structures* in the political system (i.e. institutions of the aggregation and articulation of interests), especially representatives of dominant economic interests (workers and employers) and a non-formed “electoral body”, which does not have enough experience in political activities and competitions, are those important structural characteristics which are most holding back the velocity of transition in more free forms of the social and political life.

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## **POLITICAL STYLE (BOOLEAN PAIR-COMPARISON METHOD)**

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Some similar indicators, which could be found in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators are operationalized using the Boolean pair-comparison method already described. We can see from data presented in Table 4. that the main features of political culture characteristics can be described by using the dichotomous categories. In Slovenia there exists a low political participation rate (measured by party members in percentages), a medium public guarantee of civil liberties, absence of any ethno-linguistic cleavages, absence of religious cleavages, presence of regional cleavages, existence of overarching commitments and structures - mainly among the political elite, the low rate of democratic legitimacy, the weak influence of trade unions, the weak influence of employers, a divergent fragmentation of the party system, the presence of antisystem parties (app. 15%) and presence of the independent judiciary.

From the data presented in Table 4. it can be seen that the biggest discrepancies and dissimilarities among selected countries were emerging in (3) three variables: in the legitimacy of democracy, in the social force of trade unions (workers) and in the social force of employers (capitalists and ownership class).

Slovenia differs from all the other compared countries in seven (7) political culture characteristics, when we take all countries together. When we take pair-comparisons, then Slovenia differs in five (5) variables as default. Variables, which could be treated as ‘*differencia specifica*’ for Slovenia are:

- low political participation rate
- absence of ethno-linguistic cleavages

**Table 4:** Boolean pair-comparison (Comparative data); Adapted from: Berg-Schlösser, De Meur, 1991

	Variables	Country			
		SLO (B)	B (S)	IR (S)	NL (S)
		Slovenia	Belgium	Ireland	Netherlands
		I	II	III	IV
1	political participation	0	0	0	1
2	civil liberties	1	1	1	1
3	ethno-linguistic cleavages	0	1	1	0
4	religions cleavages	0	0	1	0
5	regional cleavages	1	1	1	1
6	overarching structures	1	1	1	1
7	democratic legitimacy	0	1	1	1
8	interest groups: trade unions	0	1	1	1
9	interest groups: employers/ownership class	0	1	1	1
10	fragmentation of party system - Rae's F < 0.8	0	0	0	0
11	percentage of votes (R/L): < 15%	1	0	1	0
12	independence of judiciary	1	1	1	1
	Dissimilarities: sum	7	5	5	5
			I NE II	I NE III	I NE IV

**NE** - not equal; code **1** - yes, strong, high; code **0** - no, weak, low

- absence of religious cleavages
- presence of regional cleavages
- low democratic legitimacy rate
- weak social force of trade unions
- weak social force of employers
- high rate of extreme political options.

When we try to explain these findings in the above described theoretical and methodological framework, it is significant to say that Slovenia, - as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918) during World War I., and later, as a part of the Yugoslav Kingdom (1918-1941) -, could be classified in the group of those countries, which do not belong to the SURVIVORS, where a democratic regime survived after the big world economic crisis, beginning in the year 1929. Thus, as a BREAKDOWN country, which is burdened with a non-democratic political past, Slovenia in the first place needs the energy to build democratic institutions of state. It is necessary at the same time to develop its social system at the level of other similar European states for it, to be possible to establish the necessary conditions for transition to the group of SURVIVORS, which have already

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established their own experience of how to preserve and develop democratic forms of social and political life.

In our analysis we have discovered, among the other important influencing factors - which are *not supporting* the great need and, we can say, a historical effort for transition among SURVIVOR countries - several predictor variables, from which could be derived three of the most important for the state of democracy in Slovenia. Namely, Slovenia differs from others the most when we observe its current position from the historical point of view - prospectively and retrospectively - in an antagonistic relationship between work and capital, where efficient instruments of conflict management have not developed yet and, on the other hand, in the very low legitimacy of democratic political institutions (e.g. the legitimacy of parliament, government and judiciary), which is additionally pressed down by the politically inexperienced and not very active electorate.

So, the successful transition in, let's say, "postsocialist" or "postcommunist" forms of democracy depends, first of all, on the efficiency and conceptual solutions by building a new political system - by dividing political power into executive, legislative and juridical - and this transition will be successful only then, when the interests of capital and work will lose their predominantly antagonistic character, where an efficient strategy of market economy will be elaborated in the national economic system framework.

The importance of the process of the privatization of property from the former "socialist property", which had been started in October 1993, is for that reason very big and crucial, and it is at the same time evident from this perspective that there are political culture variables depending more on external than on internal factors - this time again on the successfulness of the reform of the economic system in Slovenia.

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## CONCLUSION

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**1.** Increasing social and political changes, which are mainly performed "from above", could accelerate the process of transition and could consolidate and reduce the effects of objective factors at the same time. But, they would, on the other hand, contribute, to making the process of "democratic political socialization of citizens" much slower as well.

The same process of changes could, in a longer period of time, have very negative effects on the activity of subjective and social agents of political socialization, especially on those which have only implicit influence on the formation of the norms of political culture (i.e. families, peer groups, Kindergartens, mass media, schools, trade unions and enterprises).

**2.** As we know from previous researches in Slovenia, the traditional patterns of political behaviour prevailed. The prolongation of such a traditional way of social and political acting and communicating influenced the way of decision making and will most probably determine the set of the important political decisions at the national level for a longer period of time.

Our analysis shows that some characteristics of the libertarian tradition have been changed: especially in the areas of deconcentration of political power, pluralization of political ideas and movements, formation of the multiparty political system, extension of the political freedom, and similar.

**3.** Consequently it is more an objective than a subjective and socially conditioned intensity and frequency of change that is the main reason for and the generator of all kinds of social and political "blockades", which are not contributing to develop rational ways and modern styles of thinking and acting.

Some qualitative influencing factors have been revealed in this regard, which represent the greatest obstacles for the development of political culture in a more complementary type of social and political relationships. This kind of the most important qualitative influencing factors includes: the low degree of public guarantees of civil rights, the high degree of a multiparty system fractionalization connected with an inexperienced electoral body, the low percentage of organized labour, the competitive and violent pattern of the conflict resolution, the low political participation rate, the presence of regional cleavages, the low democratic legitimacy rate, the non-articulate interests of the work and the capital segments of the national economy, and the relatively high rate of the extreme political options.

### **Ideological political style**

**4.** The main consequence proceeding from the above described situation, where political and cultural activities are even more dependent on the increasing role of "objective historical changes", is the prevalent ideological political style of political actors, who are more occupied with big historical themes and political cleavages proceeding from the past, than with the practical problems of everyday life and the question of survival.

Some political parties, mostly with more nationalistic orientations, are almost obsessed with the questions, of how to define the essential tasks - *summum bonum* - of the whole nation and in its name.

The pragmatism political style<sup>3</sup> is, on the contrary, what Slovenia needs in the period of transition, which could proceed only from the already achieved organization of the social and political life. In the periods of social and economic crises, transitions and more chaotic general historical circumstances, the pragmatism political style, based on more progressive, non-radical and co-operative social and political philosophies, could be more efficient and productive in solving social and political problems, the complexity of which increases from day to day. Many recent treatments of the transition and consolidation processes have recognized (with varying degrees of explicitness) the importance for democracy of developing this moderate, accommodating style of political behavior.

**5.** However, the ideological political style remains dominant, because the following influencing factors of political culture still remain as the most important in Slovenia:

- the influence of "overarching" structure is still very strong (especially the power of the bureaucratic and political elites and their value orientations)
- the legitimacy of democratic institutions remains very low
- the aggregation and articulation of different interests group positions (work : capital) are not very clear, rather they are antagonistic
- the competitive and violent pattern of the conflict resolution remains dominant
- the most important political decisions are mainly accepted in very tiny circles, where the decision-making from above prevailed
- the questions of the role of the military and problems of national defence are becoming even more important.

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## **DISCUSSION**

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I. Very generally speaking, some results of our empirical analysis on the category of libertarian tradition still indicate a very low capability of all social actors to undertake subjective action in the period of transition to democracy. Rustow's <sup>4</sup> essay on democratic transitions has been particularly influential in directing attention to the elite variable, and to political, structural, and conjuncture factors shaping elite choices, interactions, and ultimately shifts in values. In Rustow's model democracy begins to emerge when a relatively small circle of the elite decides, either in stages over time or in a historical period of fundamental changes, "to accept the existence of diversity in unity" and to wage their conflicts peacefully through democratic rules and procedures.

II. The political culture characteristics of the Slovenian society have been developed more under the complete or limited dependency conditions (e.g. from Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Croats and Serbs...), than they have been developed by an independent political activity and with their own political institutions. The main consequence of such a dependent development is the general developmental lag.

For that reason we are still facing the problem, of how to reduce the increasing complexity of the "social world" to a level that will make it possible to establish more complementary social relationships and to delimit competencies between the political state and the civil society. At the same time, the question is opened about the possibility of any self-determination, of any possibility for seeking the personal and social identity of individuals and groups, for it then to be possible to establish a democratic political system with our own forces. Here we are opening the questions about a possible social and personal emancipation of individuals and social groups in general.

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In our opinion, further investigations of Slovenian political culture must be first of all designed more exactly, in order to ascertain the validity of more empirically based hypotheses, which will proceed from the following questions: Which of the subjective and social agents of political socialization are determined the most by the influencing factors which we have discussed here? Which of the subjective, social and explicit political agencies of political socialization are increasing their influence on the formation of Slovenian political culture to that level where they are contributing to the origin and emergence of the modern and democratic political culture?

## **NOTES**

¶ The classification on SURVIVOR and BREAKDOWN countries, which we used in our analysis, has been made on the basis of historical evidence. We took as an independent and criterion variable the effects of the world economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s as the major stimulus for the eventual survival or breakdown of democratic regimes. (See more precisely in: Gisele De Meur, Dirk Berg-Schlosser: *Comparing Political Systems - An Operationalized Approach*, 1992 and in: Linz J. and Stephan A., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Baltimore, 1978)

**2** The political and civil rights indexes reported in this section are documented in Appendix I. See more in: World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Volume 1: Cross-National Attributes and Rates of Change, Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, Third Edition, 1983

**3** Pragmatism - one of the qualities de Tocqueville first identified as a distinctive property of American democracy - facilitates bargaining and compromise by rendering goals negotiable and opinions and beliefs open to engagement and new formation. Such intellectual openness promotes tolerance by accepting "the idea that no one has a monopoly on absolute truth and that there can be no single, correct answer to public policy issues." Thus, pragmatism restrains the role of ideology in politics, and hence the danger of conflict polarization. Moreover, because the goals and beliefs of the pragmatist are implicit and so adaptable to circumstances, they are less likely to be totally abandoned under challenge or stress.

Because pragmatism generates flexible goals, it is consistent with a commitment to democratic procedural norms, which takes precedence over substantive policy objectives. This overriding commitment to democratic proceduralism is a critical political cultural condition for democracy. (Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Larry Diamond et. al., Lynne Rienner, London, 1994, 11)

**4** See more in : Dankwart A. Rustow, Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics 2, (April 1970): 357. For a similar, more recent treatment, see Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America." in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) especially pp. 165-172

### **POVZETEK:**

*Rezultati opazovanja vseh treh razsežnosti politične kulture kažejo, da v Sloveniji skokovito narašča družbena kompleksnost, posebno še v prehodnem obdobju, kar prispeva k nadaljnemu naraščanju nestabilnosti političnega sistema. Takšna nestabilnost predstavlja objektivno oviro za njegovo konsolidacijo in demokratizacijo, saj bi le na osnovi konsolidacije političnega sistema lahko narasla tudi specifična vloga in pomen subjektivnih dejavnikov politične kulture. Iz tega izhaja, da bi samo učinkovito delovanje agentov politične socializacije lahko reduciralo ugotovljeno naraščanje kompleksnosti socialnega sistema do mere njegove obvladljivosti. S tem bi se odprla pot različnim vrstam modernizacije in racionalizacije družbe v celoti.*

*Samo tedaj, ko bodo v družbenem življenju zavladae moderne oblike družbenega in političnega delovanja, je možno pričakovati razvoj bolj racionalnih načinov mišljenja in delovanja in le na ta način se lahko razvijejo vzorci demokratične, državljske in participativne politične kulture.*

*Naraščajoče družbene in politične spremembe, ki so pretežno vzpodbujene "od zgoraj", sicer lahko pospešijo procese značilne za prehodno obdobje in obenem tudi konsolidirajo in reducirajo razpršene učinke vplivnih objektivnih dejavnikov politične kulture. Vendar pa, po drugi strani, prispevajo tudi k temu, da bo proces "demokratične politične socializacije državljanov" veliko počasnejši, kakor bi bil, če bi spremembe nastajale in se koordinirale tudi na nižjih ravneh socialnega sistema.*

*Izkazalo se je torej, da ima lahko, dolgoročno gledano, isti proces sprememb tudi povsem nasprotujoče učinke, ki se še posebej negativno odražajo na dejavnost subjektivnih in socialnih agentov politične kulture, posebno še na delovanje tistih, ki le implicitno vplivajo na oblikovanje vrednot in norm politične kulture (npr. družin, skupin vrstnikov, otroških vrtcev, množičnih medijev, šol, sindikatov in podjetij).*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** prehod v demokracijo, politična kultura, Slovenija, politična socializacija, ideološki politični stil, pragmatični politični stil, politične stranke, sindikati, politična antropologija, študija primera

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## **Appendix I. Coding schemes: Social and Political Indicators**

### **V 1 - Political Rights Index**

Political rights involve the right to play a part in determining who will govern one's country and what the laws will be. Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 (highest degree of liberty) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty), as follows:

1. Political systems in which the great majority of persons or families has both the right and the opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Political parties may be freely formed for the purpose of making the right to compete for public office fairly general.

2. Political systems with an open process, which does not always work well, however, due to extreme poverty, a feudal social structure, violence, or other limitations on potential participants or results. As is the case with countries coded 1, a leader or party can be voted out of office.
3. Political systems in which people may elect their leaders or representatives, but in which coups d'état, large-scale interference with election results, and often nondemocratic procedures occur.
4. Political systems in which full democratic elections are blocked constitutionally or have little significance in determining power distributions.
5. Political systems in which elections are either closely controlled or limited, or in which the results have little significance.
6. Political systems without elections or with elections involving only a single list of candidates in which voting is largely a matter of demonstrating support for the system. Nevertheless, there is some distribution of political power.
7. Political systems that are tyrannies without legitimacy either in tradition or in international relations doctrine.

#### V 2 - Civil Rights Index

Remark: Notably with regard to the political rights index, the normative concern behind this index is the balancing of the political rights of majorities against the civil liberties of minorities.

Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 (greatest civil liberty) to 7 (least civil liberty), as follows:

1. Political systems in which the rule of law is unshaken. Freedom of expression is both possible and evident in a variety of news media.
2. Political systems that aspire to the above level of civil rights but are unable to achieve it because of violence, ignorance, or unavailability of the media, or because they have restrictive laws that seem to be greater than are needed for maintaining order.
3. Political systems that have the trappings of civil liberty and whose governments may be successfully opposed in the courts, although they may be threatened or have unresolvable political deadlocks and may have to rely often upon martial law, jailing for sedition, and suppression of publications.
4. Political systems in which there are broad areas of freedom but also broad areas of illegality. States recently emerging from a revolutionary situation or in transition from traditional society may easily fall into this category.
5. Political systems in which civil rights are often denied but in which there is no doctrine on which the denial is based. The media are often weak, controlled by the government, and censored.
6. Political systems in which no civil rights are thought to take priority over the rights of the state, although criticism is allowed to be stated in limited ways.
7. Political systems of which the outside world never hears criticism, except when it is condemned by the state. Citizens have no rights in relation to the state.

#### V 3 - Political Discrimination: Percentage Discriminated against and Intensity of Discrimination

An ordinal scale of four categories is used to measure the extent to which the discriminated group is disadvantaged. These categories are as follows:

1. Some significant political elite positions or some participatory activities (party membership, voting) are closed to the group.
2. Most or all political elite positions or most participatory activities or some of both are closed to the group.
3. Most or all political elite positions and some participatory activities are closed to the group.
4. Most or all political elite positions and most or all participatory activities are closed to the group.

Remark: The status of small groups cannot be assessed as consistently as large ones for lack of sufficiently detailed information. Therefore the series do not include data for groups that fall below a population threshold of 2 percent. They are coded only when they form a part of a larger aggregation that is known to be subject to discrimination.

#### V 4 - Economic Discrimination: Percentage Discriminated against and Intensity of Discrimination

An ordinal scale of four categories is used to measure the extent to which the discriminated group is disadvantaged. These categories are as follows:

1. Most higher economic-value positions or some specific classes of economic activity are closed to the group.
2. Most higher and some medium economic-value positions or many specific classes of economic activity are closed to the group.
3. Most higher and most medium economic-value positions are closed to the group.
4. Almost all higher and medium and even some lower economic-value positions are closed to the group.

#### V 5 - Potential Separatism: Percentage Involved and Intensity of Involvement

These categories are as follows:

1. The separatist region or group was incorporated by its own request or by mutual agreement.
2. The separatist region or group was designated a part of the country by international agreement or by fiat of a former colonial or governing power, unless circumstances in numbers 3 or 4 below also hold.
3. The separatist region or group was forcibly incorporated into the state prior to the twentieth century or was forcibly conquered by a colonial power prior to the twentieth century.
4. The separatist region or group was forcibly incorporated into the state during the twentieth century or was forcibly reincorporated in the twentieth century after a period of autonomy due to rebellion or other circumstances.

Remark: Potentially separatist groups can be identified with some confidence because the political incorporation and transfer of most peoples and territories is a matter of clear historical record.

#### V 6 - Voter Turnout as a Percentage of Adult Population

In some systems, people may go to the polls and yet be deeply cynical about the electoral process; in others they may be required to vote; in others they may be rewarded with bribes. These contextual variables must be taken into account in interpreting our results (see Results in 5.1.. For this reason, these results, more so than for any other series, should

not be used unthinkingly in statistical analyses assuming linear relationships. It is rather a table for perusal.

**V 7 - Party Fractionalization: Based upon Votes**

Fractionalization is calculated by the following formula:

$$F = 1 - \text{Sum} \left( \frac{n_i}{N} \right) \times \left( \frac{n_i - 1}{N - 1} \right)$$

where  $n_i$  equals the total number of votes received by the  $i$ th party and  $N$  equals the total number of votes cast.

Fractionalization indicates the likelihood that two randomly selected voters will belong to different parties. Data on which the index is based refer to elections to the lower (or only) house of the national legislature. Votes are assumed to be divided into mutually exclusive categories attached to distinct political parties.

**V 8 - Party Fractionalization: Based upon Legislative Seats**

Fractionalization is calculated by the same formula as for V 7:

$$F = 1 - \text{Sum} \left( \frac{n_i}{N} \right) \times \left( \frac{n_i - 1}{N - 1} \right)$$

where  $n_i$  equals the total number of seats received by the  $i$ th party and  $N$  equals the total number of seats in the legislature.

Fractionalization indicates the likelihood that two randomly selected members will belong to different parties. Data on which the index is based refer to seats obtained in the lower (or only) house of the national legislature. Appointed members are excluded from the calculations. Seats are assumed to be divided into mutually exclusive categories attached to distinct political parties.

Official data for calculation are taken from: *Volitve in politika po Slovensko, FDV, 1993*

**V 9 - Organized Labour as a Percentage of the Total Labour Force**

The labour force consists of both employed and unemployed persons who are employers, persons working on their own account, salaried employees, wage earners, unpaid family workers, and members of producers' co-operatives.



## CULTURE AND DIFFERENCE!

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### **ABSTRACT**

The theoretical starting point of this paper was found in the work of Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, which was first published in 1983. The author's thesis about the origin of nations and nationalism comprises an analysis, that shows how printing and market capitalism produced the nationhood. Further on Anderson shows how nationalism is built within nations as "imagined communities". So-called "globalism" in our post-modern age somewhat changes the framework of the (re)production of national identities, as determined by Anderson, and the paper discusses a number of aspects to determine what is changed, how it is changed, which mechanisms are at work nowadays and how are they affecting cultural, social and political environment. Some concepts of Walter Benjamin, concerning so-called mass culture are taken into account. Special attention is paid to some phenomena in former socialist countries and their coping with the challenges of interculturalism and the demands of free market economy.

**KEY WORDS:** nation, nationalism, capitalism, imagined communities, globalism, post-modern age, mass culture, socialism, interculturalism

The film *Rams and Mammoths* (1985) by the Slovene director Filip Robar-Dorin ends in a peculiar, grotesque and ironic visual allegory. Two drunken musicians walk through the mountainous Slovene Alpine country discussing the fact that a sister of one of them has married a Bosnian man. Their dialogue is spoken in a very rude and vulgar manner; among the swearing, chauvinist and nationalist expressions are also heard. Then suddenly, passing a freshly ploughed field, they see a vision of a virgin dressed in white. They reach for the virgin, pull her down and tear at her robe. As the camera moves back, we see them having sexual intercourse with the soil. Beside a Brechtian comic effect especially a Slovene viewer sees that the author is ridiculing the traditional notion of "love for the Slovene soil." Depending on the viewer's attitude the meaning may be grasped as an effective mocking of nationalism or as blasphemy. Considering that the film had been shot in the mid-eighties, when some events were already readable as signs of the approaching deep social and political change, we may say that the film ironically and prophetically anticipated the future.

The creation of the independent state of Slovenia emphasised strongly a range of questions of national identity. This doesn't imply that such questions haven't existed before, at least as much as self-awareness of members of the Slovene ethnicity or culture are con-

cerned. But the acquiring of political independence along with democracy, which made Slovenes a "complete nation," as some recognised public figures put it, represented a shift towards a reconstruction of the very concept of a Slovene nation. Such a shift, of course, triggered a reinterpretation of the whole of Slovene history, which quite often comes close to a complete reconstruction of the national mythology, history etc. On the political side of such trends all parties take care to pay at least some attention to questions of national identity, but some of them are also riding a wave of surging nationalism. Each of these aspects, in its own way, reflects an awareness that "we", namely the Slovenes, are making a difference, which "others" should recognise. At the same time, in many public debates within the country, the question of "who are we?" is a matter of endless deliberations on different levels of public discourse. Of course Slovenia isn't alone in this respect. The question of what a difference a particular nation makes is, to an extent, omnipresent virtually everywhere, but it is much more pointedly so in so called new nations of the recent period.

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## **IMAGINED COMMUNITIES**

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What, however, had changed in the recent period of a decade or so, is the new perspectives in which cultural categories are perceived. These changed perspectives concern even the most sophisticated theories in the increasingly interdisciplinary field of social sciences as well as it concerns common views and opinions of the public at large. Through the change of this perspective the notions and concepts of culture have been submitted to an intensive reformulation since a range of theories has to come to terms with a transformed construction of reality. As we see things now, this transformed perspective is inherent within the broad context of a range of the "post" phenomena, such as post-modernism, post-industrialism, post-socialism, post-traditionalism, etc. Somehow a change in the order of political, social and cultural realities, which was marked by the collapse of communism, functioned as a catalyst for the forming of a new interpretative framework. Within this new framework, which we comprehend under the term of globalisation, "all of a sudden" a number of ideologies, models of interpretation and paradigms became obsolete. However, as much as social sciences were blamed for not anticipating the big historical event, they had provided notions and concepts, which were not only explanatory. They were "produced" within the process of change that, as we may point out nowadays, has run in parallel modes with the East as well as with the West. The inherent institutional reflexivity (a category elaborated upon throughout the work of Anthony Giddens) of contemporary societies makes it difficult to see a clear dividing line between a perception of reality and the "reality itself", since even quite common perceptions are permeated with concepts and categories that were derived from the social sciences. Of course, throughout the existence of any culture there has been complex of mutual relationships between the way people think about the world, a symbolisation of this thinking and whatever is imagined as the world itself. This complexity had grown, but not in a linear mode. Therefore, the symbolic order of cultures has undergone a number of qualitative changes through history. In times of restructuring vast changes have always taken place, that have comprised economy, politics, ideologies, religions, art, etc., and also all kinds of institutions, which one way or another determined communities.

The creation of nations appears to be a crucial result of the political and simultaneously cultural restructuring at the end of the medieval world. Benedict Anderson in his book (first published in 1983) defines nations as "imagined communities":

“It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” (Anderson. 1991; 6)

The starting point of Anderson’s survey originated in his amazement when he faced the fact of so-called “war between communist states,” which happened in Indochina in the years 1978 in 1979 and had involved Vietnam, Cambodia and China. Anderson thus remarks that “none of the belligerents has made more than the most perfunctory attempts to justify the bloodshed in terms of a recognizable *Marxist* theoretical perspective.” (p. 1) Therefore, it is obvious that the ideology, which is based on the “imagining” of a national community, namely nationalism, proves to be much more resistant than many social scientists had reckoned – particularly the Marxist ones. As Anderson points out elsewhere in his book, the force of a nationalist ideology is even more surprising (we may note, especially for intellectuals) since, compared to other mass ideologies of the last two centuries (such as liberalism, conservatism and communism), nationalism lacks intellectually strong founding fathers. Anderson was not alone among many, who found nationalism of any kind somewhat unintelligent and limited in ideology, so much so that the question of where it derives its power from seems even more important and difficult at that. Considering that these “imaginings” of nation in its extreme variations led masses of people to colossal sacrifices, one cannot easily dismiss this question. Our author considers that the “...beginnings of an answer lie in the cultural roots of nationalism.” (p. 7)

Of course there are many different meanings of the category of “culture.” Anybody who is involved in any field of social sciences and humanities somehow cannot avoid taking into account a “cultural” hyper-framework in whatever his/her considerations of any subject may be. In the end we cannot but accept that a basic connotation of “culture,” one way or another, includes a national signifier. Whether we try to decipher some sophisticated discourse or we just prattle about the trivialities of daily life, we somehow take it as a naturally given fact that everybody is determined by being “something” and has a sense of “belonging” to a nation. Therefore, we have to realise that the category of “culture” is unavoidably connected to “nationness”.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, it is no wonder that the category of “nation” is overloaded with a range of meanings, attributes, symbols, etc. Not only radical nationalist discourses on “our nation,” which may be uttered by politicians or other public speakers, usually presume the *existence* of a nation for centuries or even millennia.<sup>2</sup> What we are dealing with in such cases falls under the meaning of what Eric Hobsbawm called the “invented traditions.” (Hobsbawm, 1983.)

What such “inventions” do as a rule is that they disregard the historical facts, so that they absorb, into the history of a nation, a part of the past in which much more diversified and of course different communities have existed. They disregard the fact that the modern nations were “produced” at a certain and not too distant time in history. As much as the creation of nations has been a complex process, which resulted from many interacting and inter-related factors and agents, there have had to be at least a few of them which were decisive. Following Anderson’s elaboration, from which we cannot represent all details and arguments, such factors and agents were cultural – languages above all and also what was happening on the religious front with the emergence of the Protestant Reformation – but supported by the means and mechanisms of the concurrently nascent capitalism.

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“In pre-print Europe, and, of course, elsewhere in the world, the diversity of spoken languages, those languages that for their speakers were (and are) the warp and woof of their lives, was immense; so immense, indeed, that had print-capitalism sought to exploit each potential oral vernacular market, it would have remained a capitalism of petty proportions. But these varied idiolects were capable of being assembled, within definite limits, into print-languages far fewer in number. The very arbitrariness of any system of signs for sounds facilitated the assembling process.” (Anderson, 1991; 43)

The consequences of this were, as Anderson writes (pp. 44/45), decisive for a formation of national consciousness in “...three distinct ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars.” As the author points out elsewhere, of course, due to many political, social and economic reasons, these unified fields do not always correspond to a particular nation in the same manner in all cases. <sup>3</sup> “Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation.” The third aspect comprises a fact of new “languages-of-power” by which, we may add, the first two are completed within a political dimension. The processes that led to these consequences were “unselfconscious” at first, but later they were (and still are) manipulated in different ways. <sup>4</sup>

Anderson’s assertions on the relevance of “print-language” and the capitalist market, represent just another case of the theoretical insight, which makes a reader wonder whether this rather transparent finding is really new. For the reader it looks as if he/she had known about this before with a kind of a *deja vu* effect. Such an effect usually comes forth when a slight change of perspective, due to an epistemological shift, elucidates a truth that has always been there on the surface, too visible to be taken seriously enough. In any event, Anderson’s analysis (of which we have seen only a small fragment) reveals the basic mechanisms, which formed, helped to preserve and developed communities, that are commonly called nations. Of course print-languages became a material for the outstanding development of linguistics, which in their normative capacity helped to consolidate nations as cultural entities. As well as such agents as economy, politics and military power cannot be dismissed as less relevant, Anderson’s survey makes clear that without this cultural aspect, such communities as nations would not be recognisable at all.

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## DE-TRADITIONALIZATION

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Another author, Walter Benjamin, whom Anderson pays tribute to within his book, came across the concept of reproduction decades earlier (more precisely, in the thirties), in a broader sense than the one that comprises solely printing. Benjamin’s essay *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* is a short but very condensed “multi-layered” text, which has proven, in the last decade or so, to be a source of various interpretations of modernity and post-modernity. Many very important aspects of the text concern aesthetics, but we do not have room to deal with them in this paper. Thus, we shall only emphasise his concept of mass culture. Comparing it to what we just have discussed regarding Benedict Anderson, who determined that the printing and capitalist market are producing nations

as particular communities, we may be able to see that Benjamin is actually defining the universalising potential of basically the same agents. (However, Benjamin wrote about this reproduction in a much broader sense and about its impact within the industrial society between the world wars.) The above mentioned essay, namely, gives a most far reaching definition of mass culture, which obviously tends to transcend the boundaries of such particular communities as nations are.

“The mass is a matrix from which all traditional behaviour toward works of art issues today in a new form. Quantity has been transmuted into quality. The greatly increased mass of participants has produced a change in the mode of participation. The fact that the new mode of participation first appeared in a disreputable form must not confuse the spectator.” (Benjamin, 1969; 239)

Speaking in more or less broadly accepted general sociological terms, mass culture is made possible by a large range of structurally interdependent components such as modes of industrial production, individual freedom, general education, leisure and of course the media. The culture of today is mass culture or, as we may say, there is no culture unaffected by mass culture. If, as Benjamin had written, the very notion of art gets thoroughly changed by the process of mechanical reproduction, then we should presume that the world, being mirrored, expressed, articulated...in such art, is somehow transmuted. Benjamin's notion of the mass as a “matrix” clearly refers to sociologically definable realities, and the author's concentration on works of art should be understood as a paradigm of a broader comprehension of culture as it has become transformed in accordance with developments of the industrialised societies. Although Benjamin does not confront the problem of nation in this text, it is, however, implicitly more than understood that his notion of mass culture does not presuppose any boundaries. On the contrary, mass culture, which is based on the reproduction of cultural goods, breaks all kinds of barriers: between classes, between low --and high - brow culture, and between nations as well, in spite of its “disreputable forms” at the outset, by which Benjamin's nemesis in the form of fascism is also meant. Although Berger's and Luckman's notion of “the social construction of reality” had yet to be articulated, we can take Benjamin's analysis as basically pointing to approximately the same meaning. Benjamin's text transcends the boundaries of the age in which it was written. Some political motives, the most visible among them being the intellectual revolt against fascism, clearly belong to historical determinations, which caused Benjamin's strong criticism of the idea of “the autonomous work of art.” Such a stand could be well understood within the logic of the text itself, which is seeking to define artistic production as a kind of a “material force”, as an agency of emancipation – not only as a product of a solitary intellectual effort (which an autonomous work of art is usually recognised to be), but also as a consciousness and the Freudian unconscious creating force. The mechanical reproduction, which according to Benjamin emancipates “the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual” (Benjamin, 1969; 224), thus worked as the mechanism that preceded and prepared the ground for the globalisation of today. Since Benjamin's discourse makes evident through its lucidity that the author anticipated the impact of modern media, we should point out that his assumptions were based on what had been known to him in his time: print, phonograph, photography and film. All these kinds of media still lacked the attribute of interactivity, which we may surmise to be a powerful instrument of globalisation, especially in the

near future. Nevertheless, Benjamin's observation of the effect of reproduction on rituals is a far-reaching insight. As it is freeing art from ritual (and we may broaden this 'space' to culture in general,) reproduction is identified in Benjamin's analysis as a mechanism of transcending the contexts in which the meanings of rituals are functional.

To make this point clearer, we can connect it to some aspects of Giddens' work on the problems of globalisation. The notion of ritual evokes the concept of tradition, which Giddens defines as follows:

"Tradition, I shall say, is bound up with memory, specifically what Maurice Halbwachs terms 'collective memory'; involves ritual; is connected with what I shall call a *formulaic notion of truth*; has 'guardians'; and, unlike custom, has binding force which has a combined moral or emotional content." (Giddens, 1996; 15)

Giddens defines 'tradition' in view of deconstructing it as he confronts it to a transformative impact of forces within 'de-traditionalization'. In this view Giddens states that "...the connection between ritual and formulaic truth gives traditions their qualities of exclusions." (p. 33) For this reason traditions give ground to the distinguishing of the "other": "Tradition hence is a medium of identity." (p. 34) In short, although risking a simplification of Giddens' analysis, Giddens assumes that through a process of de-traditionalization or the 'evacuation of tradition', we arrive at a form of society, which he determines as a *post-traditional* society. This is, in his view, the first form of the global society. Modernity destroys tradition, but, as we can gather, it also creates a space of a reformulation of tradition. However in the context of reflexivity, which becomes intensified at the outset of globalisation, traditions need to be discursively justified. This position of tradition enables a "preparedness to enter into dialogue" or, "otherwise tradition becomes fundamentalism," which in Giddens' words "may be understood as an assertion of formulaic truth without regard to consequences." (p. 56)

Since we have in mind - when we are speaking about traditions and identities in the post-modern context of globalisation - the phenomena of nation, we obviously have to deal with what Homi K. Bhabha understands as "... the splitting of the national subject." (Bhabha, 1994; 147). The cultural attributes obviously play a very important role in determining the field, where an inter-play of identities and traditions is mixed with ideologies, politics, various public discourses etc.

"The boundary that marks the nation's selfhood interrupts the self-generating time of national production and disrupts the signification of the people as homogeneous. The problem is not simply the 'selfhood' of the nation as opposed to the otherness of other nations. We are confronted with the nation split within itself, articulating the heterogeneity of its population. The barred Nation *It/Self*, alienated from its eternal self-generation, becomes a liminal signifying space that is *internally* marked by the discourses of minorities, the heterogeneous histories of contending peoples, antagonistic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference." (Bhabha, 1994;148)

Globalisation has actually just begun and such observations, and more or less sophisticated surveys, point towards changes that are already here and which are still to

come. Nations and nation-states however remain to exist. They are bound to change not only in their political and economic profiles, but as well in their “substances”, hence also in their cultural substructures. Identities, derived from traditions, which are formulated anew, the so called imagined communities, which still are confined to nations etc., are intersected by supranational culture, which is carried by the de-traditionalization and mediated by ever more effective global communication. Of course, especially after the destruction of the political and ideological divisions at the end of the eighties, the global market became the structurally determining force of transformation. The outcome, however, is by no means certain.

We can establish that at this point in time one part of the world is ‘more globalized than the rest’, and we may agree with Bhabha, that these divisions and differences are compulsively internalised by different nations. The result of globalisation is, hence, a series of mostly induced differences within separate cultures, as well as sometimes conflicting and sometimes ‘dialogic’ splits between traditionalism and post-traditionalism. Obviously here we have to deal with some new mechanisms of communication, which makes the notion of a “global Babylon” possible. And, can we compare what is happening now to the age, which Benedict Anderson persuasively describes as the beginning of the era of imagined communities? Is global communication, which is accompanied by the capitalist free market producing a new form of community as the print-languages and capitalist markets were producing new types of communities on their level and in their time?

Today’s media, the interactive ones included, are representing a changed and changing reality, which is marked by an expansion of culture. Never before has the international exchange of goods been so “culturalised.” This includes not only material goods, but also “spiritual” ones within a very broad spectrum. There is a phantasmal universe in which icons are produced to feed any individual imagination almost anywhere in the world, and these icons support a stream of individual identifications with celebrities, patterns of behaviour, and life-styles on a global level. As opposed to the printed materials of previous centuries, the representations of global culture are devising a visual field, where above all the moving images are decidedly determining a range of modes of perception. The Freudian unconscious has never been turned “inside out” so much. These changes are bringing us from “grapho-sphere to video-sphere.” (Debray, 1994) <sup>5</sup> The Babylon of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is a global stage, where an immense plurality comes forth. What is perceived in many texts in the field of cultural analysis as the colonial look, is being increasingly dislocated, although far from being erased. But inevitably the plurality comes forth only to be reduced in its scope. Abstractions and common denominators are absorbing it, as the particular representations are being selected and deselected, according to a self-generating rule of recognisability. Still, one may observe that the global market lives on an exchange, which is comprising everything from food and drinks to the educational services and of course the flow of capital, which with its first looming crisis of the global economy will become somewhat problematic. The signifying elements within this global exchange are precisely different identities, which could be illustrated in an immense number of culturally marked items, as for example: German cars, Dutch flowers, Indian tea, American software, French structuralism, and more recently, even Icelandic genetic coding.

However, the global market and global culture are not in any sense a ground for a working and harmonious global community. There is no doubt that we have to deal with a strong hierarchy of differences and with classes of identities, all of which raise questions as to how to come to a set of working global values and how to create global institutions

capable of managing many problems. As the forming of the imagined communities, the nations, sustained a pattern of constitution of the nation-state, also an emerging global community will have to attain forms of institutionalisation, which, hopefully, will make it possible to confront the consequences of the "unbridled capitalism".<sup>6</sup> Will the imperfect world community, with Giddens' reflexive societies for its background, enable a mastering of the processes, that are triggered by global capitalism? Or, are we bound to "repeat the history" of the nation-states with its variety of forms of domination, violence and wars only now at some new, yet unknown level?

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## A DISPUTED IDENTITY

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The film, which we mentioned at the beginning of this paper, could be understood as a symptom of this current state of affairs, as reflected in a very particular culture, which has been aiming to make its own different identity recognisable, to invest the world - already overloaded with differences - with one difference more. I am talking about the Slovene enacting of the independent state here, but the Slovene case has been just one specific case amongst others. At the time when the dissolution of multi-ethnic socialist conglomerates brought about the perspective of new independent states, an incomprehension in Western political circles was supported with a claim, that these movements run contrary to the prevailing trends towards integration. This incomprehension was based on a degree of ignorance. "Paradoxically, state socialism, which saw itself as the prime revolutionary force in history, proved much more accommodating towards tradition than capitalism has been." (Giddens, 1996; 51) The socialist Yugoslavia, apart from the political reality of a single Party rule, did not suppress the cultural diversity of nations within the federation. On the contrary, the system has been designed to prevent the domination of one nation over the other. Only when the system faced its crisis, the system's mechanisms of prevention of such domination began to dissipate. In the context of the chain of events, which are now making a part of history of the end of communism, the idea to create a new independent state had grown in Slovenia, as the negative answers to the question "why not?" lost their persuasive power. Of course, that was the time, when the *realpolitik* temporarily ceased to exist. Although the Slovene nationalists may claim on the ground of their "invented tradition", that the plan of independence has been around for centuries, it all happened in a situation which had been created by many circumstances and sudden opportunities.<sup>7</sup> In a lively social situation a collective will was formed to make a difference!

Making such a difference meant, at the same time, a reformulation of the Slovene identity. The sociological picture of the Slovene society contrasted quite a bit against the impression one may have had, for instance, while observing the situation in the year 1989. Public life at the time had been permeated by movements for democracy or so called movements of civil society. By way of illustration we may quote a study by Janez Kolenc, who summed up quite extensive research of the public opinion, values, etc. "Analyses of the functioning of some agencies of the political socialization points out that in Slovenia a traditional political culture has been preserved, and it is prevailing. For such a culture the character traits of egotism in personal, social and ethnic sense are visible." (Kolenc, 1993, 232) Further on, Kolenc gives an extensive list of orientations based on the above mentioned patterns of the political culture, among them patriarchal attitudes, tendency

towards uniformity in the way of life and mentality, conservatism, etc. This part of the Slovene political culture still forms the bases for a kind of cultural and consequently political attitudes that run contrary to the investment of the "Slovene difference" within the global context. They view the inevitable global impacts within the Slovene society as "intrusions" or a "great danger" for the Slovene identity – albeit as they understand it. The Catholic Church is contributing its share by repudiating the secularisation or at least pluralistic religious influences (such as the New Age movements) from the global culture. Some political parties are very much scared by opening the Slovene real estate market, claiming that "foreigners will buy all of our beautiful land" and will leave with the Slovene capital.

The identity becomes, therefore, a rather empty signifier of a controversy over the very meaning of what a nation, and a new one at that, in a global context should be. The difficulty, which obviously is not just only Slovene, lies in two modes of viewing this identity. The first mode presupposes identity as a traditionally pre-given heritage and therefore includes it into a kind of unifying, excluding monistic reductionism. The opposite view, already a product of a nascent global community as we may say, understands a particular identity as invested by internal differences and plurality. In such a specific nation as the Slovene one these differing trends instigate a strong controversy. Therefore, the visual allegory of identity as a virgin, who is bound to be raped, seems quite appropriate.

## **POVZETEK**

*Sprememba v redu političnih, družbenih in kulturnih realnosti, ki jo je označil padec komunizma, je učinkovala kot nekakšen katalizator oblikovanja novega interpretativnega okvira. V tem novem okviru, ki ga opredeljujemo s pojmom globalizacije, je "nenadoma" kar nekaj ideologij, modelov interpretacij in paradigem postalo odvečnih. Simbolni red kultur je v tej zgodovini bil potemtakem podvržen vrsti kvalitativnih sprememb. V dobi prestrukturiranja so se vedno dogajale velike spremembe, ki so zajele ekonomijo, politiko, ideologije, religije, umetnost itd., pa tudi vse vrste ustanov, ki na različne načine opredeljujejo skupnosti.*

*Teoretsko izhodišče referata smo našli v delu Benedicta Andersona Zamišljene skupnosti, ki je bilo prvič objavljeno l. 1983. Avtorjeva teza o izviru narodov in nacionalizma obsega analizo, ki pokaže kako sta tisk in tržni kapitalizem proizvedla narodnost. Anderson nadalje pokaže tudi kako je nacionalizem vsebovan v narodu kot "zamišljeni skupnosti". T.i. "globalizem" v našem postmodernem času je nekoliko spremenil okvir (re)produkcije nacionalnih identitet, kot jih razume Anderson. V referatu pretresamo vrsto vidikov, da bi ugotovili kaj se je spremenilo, kako se je spremenilo, kakšni mehanizmi delujejo danes in kako zadevajo kulturna, družbena in politična okolja. Upoštevani so posamezni koncepti Walterja Benjamina o t.i. množični kulturi. Posebno pozornost pa smo namenili nekaterim pojavom v Sloveniji kot nekdanji socialistični deželi.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** narod, nacionalizem, kapitalizem, zamišljene skupnosti, globalizem, post-moderna doba, množične kulture, socializem, interkulturalizem

## **NOTES**

- 1.** There is an exception to this rule, which could be based on an anthropological ground. Some cultures of so called indigenous people could be taken as a separate category, since obviously such increasingly rare cultures are not based on a “nationness” with all usual attributes. The term of “culture” used to be applied in various anthropological discourses in ways which are nowadays critically re-evaluated in a framework of the debate on the “colonial look”.
- 2.** Especially in some “new countries” (like Slovenia or Croatia), which were established after the fall of such socialist multi-ethnic conglomerates as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, a newly acquired statehood instigated assumptions that a “millennium old dream” had come true. Since some 1000 years ago human communities were organised in a way that hadn’t resembled any nation such as has appeared much later, such statements are very clearly pure recent inventions projected into the distant past.
- 3.** There are cases, like the English and Spanish languages, which are used in many different countries, which consider themselves to be homes for different nations. And there are opposite kinds of cases, in which one language is actually used only in one country etc.
- 4.** Anderson gives the example of the Thai government, which “actively discourages attempts by foreign missionaries to provide its hill-tribe minorities with their own transcription-systems and to develop publications in their own languages: the same government is largely indifferent to what these minorities speak.” (Anderson. 1991, p.45)
- 5.** Since my aim is only to put forth some features of the nascent global culture, and not any extensive analysis, I do not quote from the actually vast quantity of very insightful literature, which has been published in recent years on the topic.
- 6.** One of the top contemporary philosophers, *Slavoj Žizek*, who happens to be a Slovene, pointed out in a newspaper article that “people in the chaotic global dynamics increasingly lack what Jameson calls the *cognitive mapping*: comprehensive orientation as a capacity to place one’s experience into a broader semantic framework.” (In the Slovene daily *Delo*, 6<sup>th</sup> February, 1999)
- 7.** Since the creation of independent Slovenia happened in the context of the collapse of Yugoslavia, which brought about one of the most traumatic experiences for modern Europe, there are still many views that accuse Slovenia to be, to a great extent, responsible for the chaos in the former Yugoslavia. Since this paper does not aim to discuss politics in any length, I am leaving these complicated aspects out.

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## ARGUMENTATION, COGNITION, AND CONTEXT:

### CAN WE KNOW THAT WE KNOW WHAT WE (SEEM TO) KNOW?

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#### **ABSTRACT**

Argumentation is supposed to be cognitive and discursive, but once we open our mouths things change radically. Not only do we »inject« concepts into things (and above all, their representations) which were not there before; even our arguments can only be understood as from the conclusions (which are supposed to be the outcome of our arguments). In other words: argumentation may well be cognitive in its origin, but it is only when we »inject« it into discourse that we can recognize, understand and describe it as argumentation, analyze it into argument(s) and conclusion(s), and evaluate it.

This article is about some of the problems of this »transition« into words.

**KEY WORDS:** argumentation, cognition, discourse, conclusion

»My thesis is that argumentation, *as formulated in speech*, is based on scalar principles. Everything that I have said supposes a clear-cut distinction between reasoning and argumentation, and as a linguist, what I am interested in is what goes on in speech, not what goes on in people's heads ... *From the logical point of view, the policeman does not need to rely on a scalar principle but once he opens his mouth, he injects scalarity into things, which in themselves have none.* Scalarity is a constraint which speech imposes upon us.« (Ducrot 1996: 162; all italics are mine)

The thesis referred to in the quote is not mine, but the one Oswald Ducrot advocates (I do agree with it, though). But before it gets us to the distinction between what goes on in speech and what goes on in people's heads, let us have a look at this policeman story, briefly mentioned in the quote.

In his Slovenian Lectures, published in 1996, Oswald Ducrot was defending the thesis that people base their arguments on principles (topoi) which are scalar, and come in four basic forms: +Q +P (The More we are hungry, the more we (have to) eat); -Q -P (the Less we are hungry, the less we (have to) eat); +Q -P (The More we have eaten, the less

hungry we are); -Q +P (the Less we have eaten, the more hungry we are))<sup>1</sup>. For the sake of the argument, he invented the following story (1996; 158-160):

»Let us suppose, for example, that someone has been murdered, even here say, at four thirty, and that he has been stabbed to death (a very important detail for my demonstration). The culprit is being looked for and the police suspect a certain French linguist who is presently in Ljubljana: that linguist had reasons to resent his victim, who had been very unpleasant about the theory of argumentation in general and about scalarity in particular; moreover, the wound could very well have been made with the dagger which that linguist usually has in his luggage. At that moment of the inquiry, a new piece of information reaches the police: the information that at four thirty, the time of the crime, the French linguist was at his hotel and obviously could not have stabbed someone here. In virtue of the following argument, he is found not guilty: 'It cannot be him, as he was at his hotel at four thirty'. Such an example does seem to show that the principles which arguments rest upon are not necessarily scalar. In that case, the argument rests on a principle according to which When a person is not in a place, he cannot do anything there, and there seems to be nothing scalar about that principle at all.«

That is the first part of Ducrot's argument, the part that usually passes without objections. Probably because, in a way, Ducrot is just remodelling or restructuring Stephen Toulmin's (1958/1995; 94-107) argumentative model, where the transition from an argument (data in Toulmin's terminology) to a conclusion (claim in Toulmin's terminology) is based on a topos (warrant in Toulmin's terminology). To do justice to the history of rhetoric and argumentation we have to add that Toulmin himself is actually just reconstructing Quintilian's theory of enthymeme where one of the premises (usually the major one, but not necessarily) – that is kept implicit or not spoken out explicitly because it is presumed that it is shared by the speaker and the addressee – warrants the transition from the other premise to the conclusion. And to be absolutely honest about Toulmin's model of argumentation, we have to add that his »complex pattern« or »complex layout« of argument (1958/1995: 101-104) is conceptually very similar to an elaborated epicheireme, a developed and justified enthymeme, presumably attributed to Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus.

But let us go back to Ducrot. His thesis about scalarity is actually much more radical, and that is how he continues his story (1996; 160):

»We are going back to the same situation. Well, the police have just received the information that at four thirty, the linguist was at his hotel. Then, all of a sudden, some more information reaches them according to which in fact, the linguist was not at his hotel but much further from the place of the crime, for example that he was visiting a castle situated out of the town in the country. Now, having said »At four thirty, he was at his hotel«, a policeman may very well say to correct what he has just said: »In fact, he was *even* visiting the castle«. I think that the policeman would really tend to use an *even* to correct the first piece of information. Now,

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<sup>1</sup> For more about this subject, cf. my presentation at the previous ISSA conference (Žagar 1999: 909-912)

remember my description of *even*. I say that *even* relates two arguments moving towards a common conclusion, the second argument being represented as more forceful than the first. So, 'He was at the castle' is a more forceful argument than 'He was at the hotel' for the conclusion aimed at ('He is not guilty'). Why more forceful? If it is a more forceful argument, it is because the topos which the policeman was using was not *When a person is not in a place, he cannot do anything there* but rather *The further a person is from a place, the lesse he can do something there*, so that the linguist being in the castle at the material time, he was even less likely to have committed the murder than if he had been at the hotel.«

This is Ducrot's thesis that is still under constant attack, even more than his and Anscombe's theory of polyphony that finally managed to gain some respect (though more among linguists than among argumentation theorists). The standard objection to this scalarity-in-speech (representation) thesis, an objection I had to answer to many times myself is: »This is completely artificial. The human mind doesn't reason that way at all«. No (counter)-arguments were given, though.

But, is it really so? Is it true that the human mind doesn't reason that way? Let us have a look at a few everyday situations – real this time, not made up.

**1.** Before coming to this conference, I took my son, who is four, to the seaside. One day, he slipped on a rock, and took a blow, nothing serious, though. But my wife commented:

(1) *A few more centimetres to the left, and it could have been fatal!*

Everything she said was completely hypothetical: he didn't fall a few centimetres to the left (where there was a nasty hole), and it wasn't fatal at all; but what is interesting is that my wife's argument for the severity of our kid's fall was scalar. Let us try to reconstruct it in accordance with Toulmin's (basic) argumentative model<sup>2</sup>:

(1a) Claim (Conclusion) *The kid had a nasty fall.*

What have you got to go on?

(1b) Datum (Argument) *If he had fallen a few more centimetres to the left, it could have been fatal.*

How do you get there?

(1c) Warrant (Topos) *The closer to a dangerous place one falls, the worse the fall is.*

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**2** Toulmin distinguishes between Datum (argument) that argues in favor of a (given) Claim (conclusion), while the transition from the datum to the claim is supported by a Warrant. The scheme, therefore, looks like this: Datum  $\xrightarrow{\text{Warrant}}$  Claim

The fact that the warrant finds itself below the datum and the claim indicates that it is implicit, not spoken out in the process of argumentation.

Let us sum up what really happened: the kid fell. He only got a light bruise. But since there was a dangerous hole in a rock close by, his fall was evaluated as a very dangerous one, and the whole argumentation put in the scalar form. What was going on in my wife's head when she uttered (1) (or a few moments before that), I don't know, and it is not really important: I understood her argument perfectly. I mean: sure, it would be interesting to know how and in what way the mind formulates the arguments. But since they are (i.e. *when* they are, which is not always the case) formulated and represented as scalar, that is completely sufficient for our understanding of them, our evaluation, and (potential) action/re-action (if needed).

**II.** You probably remember a similar exchange yourself, be it from everyday life, the media or somewhere else. It doesn't really matter; what matters is that people obviously use it and understand it as a possible and valid form of argumentation.

(2) *A (coming home): What's for lunch?*

*B: Chicken.*

*A: Chicken? I could eat a horse!*

Everything said was, again, hypothetical, and A was expressing himself metaphorically, of course. It is very obvious, though, that he was using a scalar argument as well. If we analyse and reconstruct it according to Toulmin's model, we get the following:

(2a) Claim (Conclusion) *I am very hungry.*

What have you got to go on?

(2b) Datum (Argument) *I could eat not only a chicken, but a horse.*

How do you get there?

(2c) Warrant (Topos) *The more hungry you are, the more you can eat.*

But that may seem too trivial (though argumentation, permeating all everyday activities, can be trivial). Let us have a look at a scene that took place a few years ago at a Christmas dinner (a scene that is actually very similar to the famous scene from Monty Python's »The Meaning of Life«).

**III.**

(3) A (stuffing himself with food): *Another chocolate cookie, and I'll blow up!*

What he wanted to say, of course, was that he was (more than) full. But clearly, he was emphasizing his fullness in a scalar way: it was not the goose paté, and the crab soup, and ravioli with cream, and the roastbeef, and the apple pie – it was one small (hypothetical) cookie that was going to be too much. Or in Toulmin's terms:

(3a) Claim (Conclusion) *I am (more than) full.*

What have you got to go on?

(3b) Datum (Argument) *I can not eat another cookie.*

How do you get there?

3c) Warrant (Topos) *The more you eat, the less it is needed to be full.*

And if all these examples still seem unimportant everyday anecdotes to you, here is one that should persuade you. In Slovenia, we have a genre of music - officially referred to as »popular ethnic« music – that we call »humpa humpa« music or even »beef« music. When I once discussed this kind of music with an elderly man, and expressed my profound dislike for it, he replied:

#### **IV.**

4) *Then you are not Slovenian enough.*

So, you see, one can not simply be or not be Slovenian, Slovenianness comes in grades: one can even be more or less Slovenian, regardless of his citizenship or passeport (by the way, this kind of music is even more popular in Austria and some parts of Germany). Or in Toulmin's terms again:

(4a) Claim (Conclusion) *You are not not Slovenian enough.*

What have you got to go on?

(4b) Datum (Argument) *You don't like the Slovenian popular ethnic music.*

How do you get there?

(4c) Warrant (Topos) *The more you like the Slovenian popular ethnic music, the more you are Slovenian.*

The usual objection to scalarity claims that topoi or warrants shouldn't be formulated in scalar form, but rather causally (»If P then Q«). But such a formulation wouldn't always warrant the conclusion: the person I was talking to didn't say I wasn't Slovenian at all (he knew he couldn't substantiate such a claim), he said I wasn't Slovenian enough. According to his argumentation, people listening to the beef music are more Slovenian than people who don't.

Also, in our second example, a warrant of the form »If you are hungry, you have to eat« wouldn't adequately explain the situation. The person in question didn't simply say he was hungry, he said he was very hungry, so hungry that just a chicken wouldn't be enough.

But, as already mentioned, Toulmin didn't stop at this simple (even simplified) model, but constructed a much more complex model as well. Looking at his simple model, one could assume that the warrant is an absolute rule to which there are no exceptions. But, of course, such a rule, a rule that stays implicit, can not be universal, which means that in the model we have to make place for exceptions (*rebuttal* in Toulmin's terms), that the claim may have to be weakened by means of a *qualifier*, and that the warrant itself may need some *backing*.

And if we apply this extended model to our scalar examples, we see immediately that, though it may be perfectly clear what the *language* is telling us, it is much less clear what is going on in the *mind* at the same time.

Let's take our first example again:

(1) *A few more centimetres to the left, and it could have been fatal!*

warranted by:

(1c) *The closer to a dangerous place one falls, the worse it is.*

Toulmin's extended model then questions this warrant by asking the nasty question: *Is that always the case?* Is it? Hard to say. It depends on how we (i.e., our mind) process the information. And what counts as information in every particular case. Or to be more exact: what counts as more salient information for the interpreter. I'm not going to speculate about this hypothetical data-to-be to which I have absolutely new access; I would just like to point out a possible *caveat*. Suppose that the mother's (verbal) reaction was not:

1) *A few more centimetres to the left, and it could have been fatal!*

but

5) *Thank God! He's OK!*

Does that mean that her argument wasn't scalar? Not necessarily. It is quite possible, even very likely, that she uttered (5) just *because* she saw this big hole a new centimetres to the left, and *because* she realized (though she didn't word it that explicitly) that a fall a few centimetres to the left could have been fatal. The whole argumentation could thus well read:

5a) Claim (Conclusion) *Thank God! He's OK!*

What have you got to go on?

5b) Datum (Argument) *If he fell a few more centimetres to the left, it could have been fatal.*

How do you get there?

5c) Warrant (Topos)

*The closer to a dangerous place one falls, the worse it is.*

Instead of going for the »negative« conclusion as in 1a (The kid took a nasty fall), the mother argued for the »positive« one (He's OK!), a conclusion that actually *implies* the »negative« one, and makes sense only if we realize how nasty the fall could have been if the kid had fallen a few centimetres to the left. So, the processing of information might have been different, but the wording of the argument(ation) remains scalar.

If, keeping that in mind, we return to the Toulmin's model, we can ask ourselves: if the warrant as we formulated it in (1c) *The closer to a dangerous place one falls, the worse it is* stays the same in (5c), how can we formulate the rebuttal? We hardly can (or, at least, I hardly know how). In Toulmin's case we were dealing with solid facts (Harry is a British subject, Harry was born in Bermuda) - no wonder Toulmin called those *data* and *claim* - in our case we are confronted with a completely hypothetical (and subjectively seen and evaluated) situation. Rationally (and objectively) speaking, we could say that falling *in* a dangerous place is bad, falling *close* to a dangerous place is not, which could yield the following rebuttal:

(1,5d)

*No, but it is often seen (or felt) as such. In reality, falling close to a dangerous place is nothing serious.*

Such a rebuttal, accompanied with the question: *Then you can't be so definite in your claim, can you?*, could lead us to the following qualifier:

(1,5e)

*No, it is only often felt as such.*

But then comes the really tricky question, leading to the backing of the warrant, namely: *What makes you think that taking a fall close to a dangerous place is bad just because it is close to that dangerous place?* And where Toulmin could come up with hard, unshakable data again (It is embodied in the following legislation: ...), all we can say is something like:

(1,5f)

*Obviously, our mind processes the given data in the way that makes it seem that way/us feel that way.*

Which that way is, or what exactly that processing consists of, we don't really know. We are bound to the argumentation we hear, not to the argumentation as it (supposedly) unfolds in our heads. And the argumentation we hear appears to be scalar, in our case even more than that: we are confronted with one and the same argument (1, 5b) yielding two (seemingly) opposite conclusions (1, 5a).

Let me draw your attention to another interesting problem that has to do with the relationship between arguments and conclusions (and the relationship between argumentation and cognition as well). If you look closely at our examples (2) and (3) you'll notice that the place(s) of argument and conclusion can be reversed, without any substantial change in meaning:

(2b) *I could eat not only a chicken, but a horse (Argument)*  
> 2a) *I am very hungry (Conclusion),*

could easily become:

(2a) *I am very hungry (Argument)* > 2b) *I could eat not only a chicken, but a horse (Conclusion).*

Or:

(3b) *I can not eat yet another cookie (Argument)* > (3a) *I am (more than) full! (Conclusion)*

could well become:

(3a) *I am (more than) full! (Argument)* > (3b) *I can not eat yet another cookie (Conclusion).*

The only difference between both versions is that the conclusion of the »original« version could (also) be taken as an implicature (i.e., implicit, not spoken out) - the »original« version thus becoming an enthymeme with the missing major premise *and* the missing conclusion - while the conclusion of the reversed version could (probably) not (featuring such particular items as »chicken«, »horse«, and »cookie«, it is (probably) not general enough). Everything else, including the warrant, stays the same.

Now, let us have a look at the following example, taken again from Ducrot (1996: 156) (he refers to it as his »sempiternal« example, and I've used it several times myself). Somebody suggests a walk by saying:

(6) *It's warm (Argument), let's go for a walk!*  
(Conclusion),

and I answer with:

(7) *It's warm, but I'm tired.*

Such an answer can clearly be understood as a refusal: in the first part of the argument, I did agree that it was warm, thus agreeing with my interlocutor that warm weather *is* a good (acceptable, sufficient, ...) argument for suggesting a walk. But in the second part of the argument I argued that I was tired, which was understood as a stronger argument, overriding the first one, and thus rejecting the offer for a walk. But, why was the second argument felt as a stronger one: because tiredness is considered a stronger argument than warmth, or was it, maybe, because of the order of arguments?

Let us perform an experiment, and reverse the order of arguments in (7), so that we get:

(7') *I'm tired, but it's warm.*

Clearly, our refusal changed has to acceptance now. What is interesting about this reversal of arguments is that everything is exactly the same as it was in the case of refusal: the

weather is still warm, and I'm still tired. But in one case, I refused the offer, and in the other, I accepted it. Why is that, where is the difference? Obviously, I must have processed the information differently. Why and how, I don't really know. What I *do* know is that the connective *but* must have played an important role in my argumentation (as put into words, and heard by my interlocutor). It must have been *but*, as a marker of contrast (and opposition), that reversed the argumentative orientation of the whole argumentative string from refusal (in (7)) to acceptance (in (7')). In other words: argumentative orientation inherent to *but* or »written into it«, if you want, must be such that it reverses or cancels the argumentative orientation of the argument preceding it, regardless of the context. Or put differently: if we have to deal with a compound argument (made up of several arguments), whatever the context may be, the conclusion will always follow from the discourse segment following *but*, not the one preceding it. Thus, from the argument:

(7) *It is warm, but I'm tired*

(uttered as a reply to somebody who suggested a walk, on the grounds that it was warm), we can only conclude in the direction of *No walk* (argument *I am tired*, warranted by *If we are tired, it isn't pleasant to walk* (no need for scalarity in this case!), overriding the argument *It is warm*, warranted by *If it is warm, it is pleasant to walk*). While from the argument:

(7') *I'm tired, but it is warm,*

we can only conclude in the direction of *Let's go for a walk* (argument *It is warm*, warranted by *If it is warm, it is pleasant to walk*, overriding the argument *I'm tired*, warranted by *If we are tired, it is not pleasant to walk*), and not the other way round.

Why is that and how can that be? The only possible answer seems to be twofold:

1) Argumentation always comes in blocks, consisting of an argument (at least one) and a conclusion, and that *we always have to consider them together*, in relation to one another. As we saw from our initial example (1), there is no absolute and independent orientation an argument can have: it is always limited, explained, and interpreted by the conclusion. And one and the same argument can have (at least?) two different, even opposite, conclusions (whether that really makes it the »same argument« is a topic for another paper). Therefore, when assessing and evaluating an argument, we always have to do it in relation to the conclusion reached, within the framework of a given topic, never in isolation.

2) Which, again, raises an interesting question: does language dominate our cognition or is it our cognition that dominates language? Namely, if the extra-linguistic reality (e.g. the hole in the rock, the fall, ...) stays the same, how come that one and the same argument, describing this reality, can lead to two opposite conclusions? My fumbling answer would be that this »extra-linguistic reality« is never given »as such«, as it is *per se* (if there is anything *per se* at all), but always as already mediated and represented in language. We can only understand this »extra-linguistic reality« *through* language, and as it is represented *in* language (which, of course, cancels its »extra-linguistic« status), we don't understand it in some unknown and unintelligible way, and only then translate it into language. And since reality *is* (in) the language, and the language *is* reality, we can manipulate reality as we

manipulate language. The problem, however, remains, whether by manipulating reality as (we manipulate) language, we work out everything there is of reality? And, furthermore, if there are any doubts about that (and there should be, at least from the methodological and epistemological point of view), whether we really know what we are doing all the way? We may know what we are doing when we manipulate language (though the major part of our linguistic choices is done unconsciously), but do we really know what are the effects of this manipulation *in* the reality, and *on* the reality (as existing beyond language)? An old Kantian (or even pre-Kantian) problem that still needs to be resolved to general satisfaction.

## **POVZETEK**

*Argumentacija naj bi bila kognitivna in diskurzivna, toda ko odpremo usta se stvari radikalno spremenijo. Ne samo, da v stvari (predvsem pa njihove predstave) »vtisnemo« koncepte, ki jih tam prej ni bilo; celo naše argumente je mogoče razumeti le, če izhajamo iz sklepov (ki naj bi bili šele rezultat naših argumentov). Ali z drugimi besedami: argumentacija je izvirno morda res kognitivna, toda šele potem, ko jo »vtisnemo« v diskurz jo lahko prepoznamo, razumemo in opišemo kot argumentacijo, jo analiziramo v argument(e) in sklep(e) in jo ovrednotimo.*

*Ta članek govori o nekaterih problemih tega »prehoda« v besede.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** argumentacija, mišljenje, diskurz, konkluzija

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## **MOTIVATION IN SCHOOL FROM THE SOCIAL- ANTHROPOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW**

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### **ABSTRACT**

In this paper the theory of motivation of Abraham Maslow and the systems model of human behavior are briefly presented. This represents the theoretical framework to evaluate the hypothesis that self-concept and self-esteem are decisive factors of motivation of students in Slovenian upper secondary schools. If we observe the results of our empirical study from the system theory of human behavior it is indicative that cognitive and behavioral patterns are those which most determine the regulatory system of human behavior. Then it becomes obvious that emotional systems do not influence the motivation and behavior of our students. Very well developed self-concept and self-esteem of students influences their way of self-actualization, however the spiritual dimension of personality is missing, which would enable then to transcend their behavior. Only then, when students would transcend their behavior in the sense that they would help others to find self-fulfillment and realize their potential, could they exceed their egocentrism, which is now present in the feature of pleasantness as a personal characteristic. In this way they would become more open (extroverted) to the world in which they live.

**KEY WORDS:** motivation, educational anthropology, systems theory, self-concept, self-esteem, theory of personality, cognitive development, emotional growth, behavior, students of upper secondary schools, Slovenia, empirical study, extroversion, introversion

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### **INTRODUCTION**

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Abraham Maslow (1954) attempted to synthesize a large body of research related to human motivation. Prior to Maslow, researchers generally focused separately on such factors as biology, achievement, or the power to explain what energizes, directs, and sustains human behavior. Maslow posited a hierarchy of human needs (see Figure 1.) based on two groupings: deficiency needs and growth needs. Within the deficiency needs, each lower need must be met before moving to the next higher level. Once each of these needs has been


satisfied, if at some future time a deficiency is detected, the individual will act to remove the deficiency. The first four levels are:

- 1) Physiological: hunger, thirst, bodily comforts, etc.;
- 2) Safety/security: out of danger;
- 3) Belongingness and Love: affiliate with others, be accepted; and
- 4) Esteem: to achieve, be competent, gain approval and recognition.

If and only if the deficiency needs are met is the individual ready to act upon the growth needs. Maslow's initial conceptualization included only one growth need -self-actualization. Self-actualized people are characterized by: 1) being problem-focused; 2) incorporating an ongoing freshness of appreciation of life; 3) a concern about personal growth; and 4) the ability to have peak experiences. Maslow later differentiated the growth of self-actualization, adding two growth needs prior to self-actualization and one beyond that level. They are:

- 5) Cognitive: to know, to understand, and explore;
- 6) Aesthetic: symmetry, order, and beauty;
- 7) Self-actualization: to find self-fulfillment and realize one's potential; and
- 8) Transcendence: to help others find self-fulfillment and realize their potential.

Maslow's basic position is that as one becomes more self-actualized and transcendent, one becomes more wise (develops wisdom) and automatically knows what to do in a wide variety of situations.



**Figure 1.** Maslow's hierarchy of Human Needs (Source: Maslow, 1954)

Maslow published his first conceptualization of his theory over 50 years ago (Maslow, 1943) and it has since become one of the most popular and often cited theories of human motivation. An interesting phenomenon related to Maslow's work is that in spite of a lack of evidence to support his hierarchy, it enjoys wide acceptance (Wahba & Bridgewell, 1976; Soper, Milford & Rosenthal, 1995).

The few major studies that have been completed on the hierarchy seem to support the proposals of William James (1892/1962) and Mathes (1981) that there are only three levels of human needs. James hypothesized the levels of material (physiological, safety), social (belongingness, esteem), and spiritual. Mathes' three levels were physiological, belongingness, and self-actualization; he considered security and self-esteem as unwarranted. Alderfer (1972) (see Table 1.) developed a comparable hierarchy with his ERG (existence, relatedness, and growth) theory. His approach modified Maslow's theory based on the work of Gordon Allport (1960, 1961) who incorporated concepts from systems theory into his work on personality.

**Table 1.** Alderfer's Hierarchy of Motivational Needs

Source: Alderfer (1972), Maslow (1954)

Level of Need	Definition	Properties
Existence	Includes all of the various forms of material and psychological desires	When divided among people one person's gain is another's loss if resources are limited
Relatedness	Involves relationships with significant others	Satisfied by mutually sharing thoughts and feelings; acceptance, confirmation, understanding, and influence are elements
Growth	Impels a person to make creative or productive effects on himself and his environment.	Satisfied through using capabilities in engaging problems; creates a greater sense of wholeness and fullness as a human being

Maslow recognized that not all personalities followed his proposed hierarchy. While a variety of personality dimensions might be considered as related to motivational needs, one of the most often cited is that of introversion and extroversion (see Table 2.). Reorganizing Maslow's hierarchy based on the work of Alderfer and considering the

**Table 2.** A Reorganization of Maslow's and Alderfer's Hierarchies

Level	Introversion	Extroversion
Self (Existence)	Physiological, biological (including basic emotional needs)	Connectedness, security
Other (Relatedness)	Personal identification with group, significant others (Belongingness)	Value of person by group (Esteem)
Growth	Self-Actualization (development of competencies [knowledge, attitudes, and skills] and character)	Transcendence (assisting in the development of others' competencies and character; relationships to the unknown, unknowable)

introversion/extroversion dimension of personality results in three levels, each with an introverted and extroverted component. This organization suggests there may be two aspects of each level that differentiate how people relate to each set of needs. Different personalities might relate more to one dimension than the other. For example, an introvert at the level of Other/Relatedness might be more concerned with his or her own perceptions of being included in a group, whereas an extrovert at that same level would pay more attention to how others value that membership.

At this point there is little agreement about the identification of basic human needs and how they are ordered. For example, Deci and Ryan (1991) also suggest three needs, although they are not necessarily ordered: the need for autonomy, the need for competence, and the need for relatedness. Franken (1994) suggests this lack of accord may be a result of different philosophies of researchers rather than differences among human beings. In addition, he reviews research which shows that a person's explanatory style will modify the list of basic needs. Therefore, it seems appropriate to ask people what they want and how their needs could be met rather than relying on an unsupported theory. There is much work still to be done in this area before we can rely on a theory to be more informative than simply collecting data. However, this body of research can be very important to parents, educators, administrators and others concerned with developing and using human potential. It provides an outline of some important issues that must be addressed if human beings are to achieve the levels of character and competencies necessary to be successful in the information age.

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## **SYSTEMS MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR**

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There are a number of assumptions that provide the foundation for this systems model. First, the basis of the model stems from an acceptance of the three major aspects of human beings (Mind, Body and Spirit) that have been the focus of study since the ancient Greeks. In terms of mind (or human personality, as it is sometimes called), there is wide support for three dimensions (e.g. Miller, 1991; Eysenck, 1947; 1) cognition (knowing, understanding, thinking); 2) affect (attitudes, predispositions, emotions, feelings); and 3) conation (intentions to act, reasons for doing, will). Body can be considered in terms of 1) biological or genetic influences; 2) bodily functioning, and 3) overt behavior or output. Overt behavior has been extensively studied by the behaviorists (e.g., Bandura, 1977; Skinner, 1953).

Second, human beings do not develop in isolation; they develop in a variety of contexts -- environments which surround the individual human being and with which he/she is in constant interaction play a major role in development (e.g., Bridge, Judd & Mook, 1979; Bronfenbrenner, 1977, 1979, 1989)

Third, there are a variety of sources of knowledge about human beings and human nature. While an attempt has been made to stay within the parameters of a scientific approach to developing understanding and discerning truth, I acknowledge that other sources of knowledge (e.g., my personal experience and intuition, my spiritual and religious training and background, and my study of philosophy) have also influenced the development of this model. I would expect the same to be true for everyone. As this course is based on knowledge derived using the scientific method, there will likely be instances where the findings presented in class do not match knowledge you have acquired through

other sources. View these times of dissonance as opportunities to develop new understandings or to integrate previous understandings in new ways. It is not always necessary to completely discard knowledge derived from other sources, but interpretations may need to be modified in order to include the findings derived from science. I encourage others to develop their own models that might highlight other aspects of human behavior that do not receive adequate attention in this model.


The model of human behavior presented below (see Figure 3.4. and 5.) is based on systems theory and cybernetics and reflects a transactional approach to educational and developmental psychology (e.g. Gordon, 1975; Schiamburg & Smith, 1982; Thompson, 1971). This model also reflects an approach that defines human beings as having both biological and spiritual components of their nature.(e.g., Danesh, 1994; Frankl, 1998).

Bronfenbrenner (1977, 1979, 1989) identifies several layers of context or ecology: microsystem -- the most immediate and earliest influences such as family, school, religious institutions and peer groups.


mesosystem -- an intermediate level of influences such as local neighborhood or community, social institutions and culture.

While we sometimes tend to focus on family or school influences on human development, we should always remember that there are other important influences. An African, as well as Native American, tradition states that it takes a whole community to raise a child.


macrosystem -- the most removed influences such as international region or global changes.



**Figure 2.** Systems model of human behavior (microsystem)  
Source: Huitt (1994), Bronfenbrenner (1977), Norman (1980)



**Figure 3.** Systems model of human behavior (mesosystem)  
Source: Huit (1994), Bronfenbrenner (1977), Norman (1980)



**Figure 4.** Systems model of human behavior (macrosystem)  
Source: Huit (1994), Bronfenbrenner (1977), Norman (1980)

The systems model presented here uses these three components of the mind to organize any of the major issues and topics discussed in educational anthropology. The regulatory system is redefined as the aspect of the mental system that regulates input and output functions. This model also highlights the fact the mind receives information and displays action through the body; adds a biological and spiritual influence to the development and functioning of the components of mind, and adds a feedback loop connecting overt responses (labeled "output") and resulting stimuli from the environment.

There are therefore four major components of the individual in this systems model of human behavior

1. Cognitive system -- Perceives, stores, processes, and retrieves information
2. Affective system -- Can modify perceptions and thoughts before and after they are processed cognitively
3. Regulatory system -- Directs and manages input and output functioning
4. Behavioral system -- Overt action of organism (output of the individual)

It is hypothesized that an individual's thinking (cognition), feeling (affect), and willing (conation) as well as overt behavior develop as a result of:

1. transactions among the various components of mind as
2. influenced by biological maturation, bodily functioning and the spiritual dimension of the individual,
3. the environment or context of the individual, and
4. the feedback from the environment as a result of an individual's overt behavior

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### **SOME EMPIRICAL FINDINGS CONCERNING MOTIVATION IN SCHOOL**

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In our empirical study we were interested to find, to what extent it is possible motivate students for learning. We are trying to do this through observation of different dimensions of personality (through observation of self-concept, self-esteem, personal style and learning style). We followed the systems model of human behavior, presented above, to make the theoretical framework of our study. We have observed motivation to learn by using the terminology of systems theory, by which human behavior is divided into four major components as presented above. These components have been operationalized in the set of different variables. For that reason, the cognitive component/system of human motivation/development has been operationalized on: mathematical ability, verbal self-concept, academic self-concept, creativity, general self-concept, contemplative observation, active experimentation, self-esteem and abstract conceptualization. The affective component/system has been operationalized on: religion, emotional stability and emotional stability II. The behavioral component/system consists of: motivation to learn, physical abilities, external appearance, relationships with peer groups of the same gender, relationships with peer groups of different gender, relationships with parents, sincerity, concrete experience, extrovertness, conscientiousness, openness and pleasantness. The regulatory component/system directs and manages the other three components in an integrative person.

With our analysis we are trying to discover relationships between the different dimensions of particular instruments which we apply (see Table 1. their reliability) and the answers of students from the sample (see Table 2.). In this way we are estimating the

adequateness of the instrumentarium which we used on the one hand, and we are trying to find out the interrelated influence of the self-concept, self-esteem, motivation to learn, personal style and learning style of students on the other hand.

**Table 1.** Reliability measures; Source: Kobal et.al. (2001)

Questionnaire / Measures	Cronbach - alpha coefficient	Guttman split-half coefficient
Motivation to learn	0.8227	0.7359
Learning styles	0.2644	0.7637
Self-esteem	0.8619	0.7605
Self-concept	0.8481	0.8137
Personal characteristics	0.7640	0.8846

## **HYPOTHESIS**

We started from the assumption that the self-concept of students in the fourth grade of upper secondary schools is in the closest relation with their self-esteem. The higher is the self-concept among students, the better is their self-esteem developed (Kobal, 2001). The general self-concept is related with some personal styles (e.g. extrovertness, emotional stability, relationships with peer groups etc.). If students have a higher self-concept, then they have a more developed personal style which is characterized by better relationships with peer groups, extrovertness, emotional stability etc. (Kobal, 2001). We are assuming that self-concept and motivation to learn are in positive correlation: The higher is the self-concept of students, the higher is their motivation to learn, and the better developed is their learning style.

## **RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY**

Table 3. shows basic statistical data for particular variables. The results related to self-concept show that respondents have relatively high expressed areas of the self-concept. The highest expressed area of the self-concept refers to relationship with parents (M=18.5 points, SD=3.34), while the lowest refers to mathematical ability (M=11.6 points, SD=4.21). Such a result tells us that our students have emphasized the behavioral component/system more than the cognitive component/system, although all areas of self-concept, consisting of the cognitive component, are relatively highly expressed (e.g. general self-concept M=17.0 points, verbal self-concept M=16.5 points and creativity M=16.6 points). Among learning styles the concrete experience (M=17.0 points) is more emphasized than others, which are represented proportionally as almost equal (from M=15.2 to M=15.7 points). Self-esteem among our respondents is also relatively high expressed (M=28.9 points, SD=7.26 points), which contributes also to higher cognitive based behavior. When we observed personal styles data, the most expressed area is pleasantness (M=42.4 points) and the lowest is emo-

**Table 2.** Descriptive statistics - Sample; Source: Kobal et.al. (2001)

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Modality</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage %</b>	<b>Cum. percentage %</b>
Gender	Male	114	39.7	39.7
	Female	173	60.3	100.0
Age	16	1	0.3	0.3
	17	83	28.9	29.3
	18	187	65.2	94.4
	19	16	5.6	100.0
The last year's school achievement	1	1	0.3	0.3
	2	32	11.1	11.5
	3	129	44.9	56.6
	4	101	35.2	92.0
	5	23	8.0	100.0
The last year's /3 school achievement	2	33	11.5	11.5
	3	129	44.9	56.6
	4	124	43.2	100.0
Mother's education	Undefined	3	1.0	1.0
	Unfinished ES	6	2.1	3.1
	Elementary school	20	7.0	10.1
	Vocational school	46	16.0	26.1
	Upper secondary school	90	31.4	57.5
	High school	49	17.1	74.6
	Faculty	73	25.4	
	Total	287		100.0
Father's education	Undefined	6	2.1	2.1
	Unfinished ES	6	2.1	4.2
	Elementary school	13	4.5	8.7
	Vocational school	74	25.8	34.5
	Upper secondary school	74	25.8	60.3
	High school	34	11.8	72.1
	Faculty	80	27.9	
	Total	287		100.0
Which study would he/she select:	Art	28	9.8	10.0
	Science	54	18.8	29.4
	Technology	27	9.4	39.1
	Social sciences	126	43.9	84.2
	Humanistic	23	8.0	92.5
	Biomedicine	21	7.3	100.0
	Undefined	8	2.8	
	Total	287		100.0

**Table 3.** Descriptive statistics - Factors of motivation at school; Source: Kobal et.al. (2001)

	Variable	N	Min.	Max.	M	SD	Kurtosis	Skewness
UM	Motivation to learn	285	17	111	68.4	13.53	0.341	-0.070
SP1	Mathematical ability	286	4	19	11.6	4.21	0.287	0.144
SP2	Verbal self-concept	286	4	20	16.5	4.02	-0.391	-0.205
SP3	Academic self-concept	286	4	23	15.4	2.98	0.626	-0.403
SP4	Creativity	286	9	24	16.6	3.07	-0.140	-0.019
SP5	Physical abilities	286	4	24	16.4	5.00	-0.558	-0.358
SP6	External appearance	286	4	24	15.9	3.88	-0.344	-0.367
SP7	Relationships with peer groups of the same gender	286	7	24	17.2	3.02	0.341	-0.368
SP8	Relationships with peer groups of different gender	285	4	24	17.5	4.10	-0.039	-0.540
SP9	Relationships with parents	286	7	24	18.5	3.34	0.409	-0.778
SP10	Religion	284	4	24	10.9	5.09	-0.618	0.430
SP11	Sincerity	286	4	24	16.6	3.32	0.601	-0.309
SP12	Emotional stability	285	4	24	15.6	4.04	-0.124	-0.463
SP13	General self-concept	286	4	24	17.0	4.45	0.018	-0.542
RO	Contemplative observation	284	8	22	15.2	3.16	-0.474	0.054
AE	Active experimentation	284	6	23	15.5	3.05	0.014	-0.230
AK	Abstract conceptualization	285	8	23	15.7	2.72	-0.067	-0.018
KI	Concrete experience	284	7	24	17.0	3.03	-0.211	-0.269
SS	Self-esteem	287	4	40	28.9	7.26	0.329	-0.781
CS	Emotional stability II.	286	13	56	37.9	8.04	0.129	-0.386
E	Extrovertness	286	18	56	38.8	8.18	-0.462	-0.128
V	Conscientiousness	285	20	69	40.5	6.94	0.388	0.065
O	Openness	285	23	56	41.7	6.40	-0.196	-0.143
P	Pleasantness	286	20	56	42.4	6.33	0.385	-0.576

tional stability II. (M=37.9 points). This means that the affective component/system is not so important for our population, when we are observing the human behavior/motivation of our respondents in total.

We used one-way analysis of variance to determine which are the most influential variables considering this topic. When we asked ourselves which variables influence decisions of students regarding which study would he/she select the most (see Table 4.), we got the following results. Mathematical ability ( $F=5.772$ ,  $p=0.000$ ) and verbal self-concept ( $F=7.235$ ,  $p=0.000$ ) are those cognitive variables which most determine the decision of students regarding their further studies. Among other variables the active experimentation ( $F=6.114$ ,  $p=0.000$ ), one of learning styles, is that variable which contributes to the decision about further studies at the same level as do the first two. Concrete experience ( $F=3.874$ ;  $p=0.002$ ) is the fourth variable which influences the decision about further studies among our students. These results show that the cognitive component/sys-

**Table 4.** Which study would he/she select with regard to learning styles, self-esteem, self-concept and personal characteristics (one-way analysis of variance); Source: Kobal et.al. (2001)

	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	P
<b>Self-esteem</b>					
SE	315,862	5	63.172	1.219	.300
<b>Self-concept</b>					
Mathematical ability	479.293	5	95.859	5.772	.000***
Religion	67.934	5	13.587	.518	.763
Sincerity	76.624	5	15.325	1.401	.224
Emotional stability	107.002	5	21.400	1.272	.235
General self-concept	136.683	5	27.337	1.452	.206
Verbal self-concept	529.597	5	105.919	7.235	.000***
Academic self-concept	15.373	5	3.075	.338	.890
Creativity	68.725	5	13.754	1.460	.203
Physical abilities	65.028	5	13.006	.511	.768
External appearance	27.970	5	5.594	.375	.866
Relationships with peer groups of the same gender	58.053	5	11.611	1.282	.272
Relationships with peer groups of different gender	107.048	5	21.410	1.296	.266
Relationships with parents	12.305	5	2.461	.218	.955
<b>Learning style</b>					
Active experimentation	254.555	5	50.911	6.114	.000***
Abstract conceptualization	29.229	5	5.846	.782	.564
Concrete experience	170.873	5	34.175	3.874	.002**
Contemplative observation	40.108	5	8.022	.809	.544
<b>Personal characteristics</b>					
Emotional stability II.	417.464	5	83.493	1.312	.259
Extrovertness	308.621	5	61.724	.929	.463
Openness	213.399	5	42.680	1.038	.396
Pleasantness	124.669	5	24.934	.623	.683
Conscientiousness	126.595	5	25.319	.516	.764

\* differences with regard to which study would he/she select are statistically significant (p<.05)

\*\* differences with regard to which study would he/she select are statistically significant (p<.01)

\*\*\* differences with regard to which study would he/she select are statistically significant (p<.001)

**Table 5.** Differences according to gender with regard to learning styles, self-esteem, self-concept and personal characteristics (one-way analysis of variance); Source: Kobal et.al. (2001)

	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	P
<b>Self-esteem</b>					
SE	986.320	1	49.450	19.946	.000***
<b>Self-concept</b>					
Mathematical ability	55.073	1	17.621	3.125	.078
Religion	262.138	1	25.145	10.425	.001***
Sincerity	18.451	1	11.004	1.677	.196
Emotional stability	134.176	1	15.907	8.435	.004**
General self-concept	291.739	1	18.824	15.498	.000***
Verbal self-concept	122.967	1	15.803	7.781	.006**
Academic self-concept	8.569	1	8.868	.966	.326
Creativity	58.007	1	9.290	6.244	.013*
Physical abilities	102.370	1	24.789	4.130	.043*
External appearance	176.422	1	14.549	12.126	.001***
Relationships with peer groups of the same gender	.318	1	9.153	.035	.852
Relationships with peer groups of different gender	18.947	1	16.813	1.127	.289
Relationships with parents	50.425	1	11.032	4.571	.033*
<b>Learning style</b>					
Active experimentation	30.715	1	9.261	3.316	.070
Abstract conceptualization	96.395	1	7.069	13.637	.000***
Concrete experience	225.375	1	8.419	26.769	.000***
Contemplative observation	.350	1	10.043	.035	.852
<b>Personal characteristics</b>					
Emotional stability II.	570.614	1	62.839	9.081	.003**
Extrovertness	169.228	1	66.638	2.539	.112
Openness	190.438	1	40.450	4.708	.031*
Pleasantness	3.393	1	40.300	.084	.772
Conscientiousness	136.992	1	47.908	2.859	.092

\* differences with regard to gender are statistically significant ( $p < .05$ )

\*\* differences with regard to gender are statistically significant ( $p < .01$ )

\*\*\* differences with regard to gender are statistically significant ( $p < .001$ )

tem and behavioral system are those parts of the person which most determine decisions about further studies in our population. Other variables in the observation do not contribute statistically significantly to decisions about our students further studies. Obviously our students make decisions on a rational rather than emotional or personal characteristics basis.

Differences between gender (see Table 5.) depend on variables that are widespread through all dimensions of personality we took to measure human motivation/behavior. Self-esteem ( $F=19.946$ ;  $p=0.000$ ) and concrete experience ( $F=26.769$ ,  $p=0.000$ ) are variables which make the biggest difference regarding gender. As important influence on differences between male and female population is also seen in: religion ( $F=10.425$ ;  $p=0.001$ ), emotional stability ( $F=8.435$ ;  $p=0.004$ ), general self-concept ( $F=15.498$ ;  $p=0.000$ ), verbal self-concept ( $F=7.781$ ;  $p=0.006$ ), creativity ( $F=6.244$ ;  $p=0.013$ ), physical abilities ( $F=4.130$ ;  $p=0.043$ ), external appearance ( $F=12.126$ ;  $p=0.001$ ), relationships with parents ( $F=4.571$ ;  $p=0.033$ ), abstract conceptualization ( $F=13.637$ ,  $p=0.000$ ), emotional stability II. ( $F=9.081$ ;  $p=0.003$ ) and openness ( $F=4.708$ ;  $p=0.031$ ). From results we have obtained we can accentuate the following findings:

1. We can not extract any specific area of human behavior (self-concept, self-esteem, learning styles or personal characteristics), which separate our population by gender.
2. There are two variables which explain the difference between boys and girls the most. Higher self-esteem is more characteristic of boys and concrete experience for girls.
3. We could say that differences between boys and girls proceed from all dimensions we have observed.

The far most important variable influencing the school achievement (see Table 6.) is academic self-concept ( $F=18.913$ ;  $p=0.000$ ) followed by mathematical ability ( $F=8.716$ ;  $p=0.000$ ). Other important variables in this regard are: self-esteem ( $F=3.348$ ;  $p=0.036$ ) and general self-concept ( $F=4.723$ ;  $p=0.009$ ), which represent the cognitive component/system in our theoretical model of human behavior. The important variables in this regard are also: extrovertness ( $F=4.925$ ;  $p=0.007$ ) and conscientiousness ( $F=6.599$ ;  $p=0.001$ ) which are representatives of personal characteristics and in this regard representatives of the behavioral component/system in our theoretical model. The last important variable influenced school achievement is motivation to learn ( $F=5.190$ ;  $p=0.006$ ). Thus, we could say that the cognitive and behavioral variables explain the most variability we could find inside school achievement. These are the results we could expect also if we rely only on common sense thinking.

We hypothesized that internal factors, like self-concept and self-esteem, influenced the human motivation/behavior more than external do. When we observed the data presented in Table 7. it is evident that external variable, background variable, such as the father's education is, is not related to the majority of variables in our theoretical model. Father's education is related only to religion ( $F=4.172$ ;  $p=0.000$ ) which is a part of the self-concept and a part of the affective component/system in our theoretical framework.

In Table 8. we could find quite a different picture to the one we found in the previous table. Mother's education is obviously the background variable which influences the

**Table 6.** Differences according to the last year's school achievement with regard to learning styles, self-esteem, self-concept and personal characteristics (one-way analysis of variance); Source: Kobal et.al. (2001)

	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	P
<b>Self-esteem</b>					
SE	347.076	2	173.538	3.348	.036*
<b>Self-concept</b>					
Mathematical ability	293.804	2	146.902	8.716	.000***
Religion	114.866	2	57.433	2.236	.108
Sincerity	32.846	2	16.423	1.495	.226
Emotional stability	40.732	2	20.366	1.260	.285
General self-concept	181.583	2	90.791	4.723	.009**
Verbal self-concept	42.087	2	21.043	1.311	.271
Academic self-concept	298.833	2	149.416	18.913	.000***
Creativity	13.091	2	6.545	.689	.503
Physical abilities	16.478	2	8.239	.326	.722
External appearance	81.516	2	40.758	2.743	.066
Relationships with peer groups of the same gender	52.623	2	26.312	2.939	.054
Relationships with peer groups of different gender	98.220	2	49.110	2.976	.052
Relationships with parents	47.453	2	23.726	2.147	.118
<b>Learning style</b>					
Active experimentation	32.960	2	16.480	1.797	.167
Abstract conceptualization	40.647	2	20.323	2.8027	.062
Concrete experience	11.324	2	5.662	.614	.542
Contemplative observation	31.198	2	15.599	1.578	.208
<b>Personal characteristics</b>					
Emotional stability II.	38.373	2	19.186	.296	.744
Extrovertness	636.610	2	318.305	4.925	.007**
Openness	104.544	2	52.272	1.293	.276
Pleasantness	6.0676	2	3.033	.075	.928
Conscientiousness	610.412	2	305.206	6.599	.001***
Motivation to learn (Sum)	1846.452	2	923.226	5.190	.006**

\*differences with regard to school achievement are statistically significant ( $p < .05$ )

\*\* differences with regard to school achievement are statistically significant ( $p < .01$ )

\*\*\* differences with regard to school achievement are statistically significant ( $p < .001$ )

**Table 7.** Differences according to father's education with regard to learning styles, self-esteem, self-concept and personal characteristics (one-way analysis of variance ); Source: Kobal et.al. (2001)

	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	P
<b>Self-esteem</b>					
SE	400.384	6	66.731	1.273	.270
<b>Self-concept</b>					
Mathematical ability	111.672	6	18.612	1.050	.393
Religion	609.447	6	101.575	4.172	.000***
Sincerity	62.173	6	10.362	.938	.468
Emotional stability	93.294	6	15.549	.952	.459
General self-concept	145.513	6	24.252	1.232	.290
Verbal self-concept	124.545	6	20.757	1.291	.261
Academic self-concept	77.396	6	12.899	1.469	.189
Creativity	36.729	6	6.121	.642	.696
Physical abilities	123.676	6	20.613	.819	.556
External appearance	89.844	6	14.974	.990	.432
Relationships with peer groups of the same gender	45.071	6	7.512	.820	.555
Relationships with peer groups of different gender	187.687	6	31.281	1.895	.082
Relationships with parents	36.451	6	6.075	.539	.779
<b>Learning style</b>					
Active experimentation	42.848	6	7.141	.761	.601
Abstract conceptualization	76.453	6	12.742	1.753	.109
Concrete experience	70.680	6	11.780	1.290	.262
Contemplative observation	55.572	6	9.262	.924	.478
<b>Personal characteristics</b>					
Emotional stability II.	567.017	6	94.503	1.477	.186
Extrovertness	610.765	6	101.794	1.537	.166
Openness	277.469	6	46.245	1.132	.344
Pleasantness	160.494	6	26.749	.661	.681
Conscientiousness	344.525	6	57.421	1.196	.309

\* differences with regard to father's education are statistically significant (p<.05)

\*\* differences with regard to father's education are statistically significant (p<.01)

\*\*\* differences with regard to father's education are statistically significant (p<.001)

**Table 8.** Differences according to mother's education with regard to learning styles, self-esteem, self-concept and personal characteristics (one-way analysis of variance); Source: Kobal et.al. (2001)

	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	P
<b>Self-esteem</b>					
SE	986.320	1	986.320	19.946	.000***
<b>Self-concept</b>					
Mathematical ability	55.073	1	55.073	3.125	.078
Religion	262.138	1	262.138	10.425	.001***
Sincerity	18.451	1	18.451	1.677	.196
Emotional stability	134.176	1	134.176	8.435	.004**
General self-concept	291.739	1	291.739	15.498	.000***
Verbal self-concept	122.967	1	122.967	7.781	.006**
Academic self-concept	8.569	1	8.569	.966	.326
Creativity	58.007	1	58.007	6.244	.013*
Physical abilities	102.370	1	102.370	4.130	.043*
External appearance	176.422	1	176.422	12.126	.001***
Relationships with peer groups of the same gender	.318	1	.318	.035	.852
Relationships with peer groups of different gender	18.947	1	18.947	1.127	.289
Relationships with parents	50.425	1	50.425	4.571	.033*
<b>Learning style</b>					
Active experimentation	30.715	1	30.715	3.316	.070
Abstract conceptualization	96.395	1	96.395	13.637	.000***
Concrete experience	225.375	1	225.375	26.769	.000***
Contemplative observation	.350	1	.350	.035	.852
<b>Personal characteristics</b>					
Emotional stability II.	570.614	1	570.614	9.081	.003**
Extrovertness	169.228	1	169.228	2.539	.112
Openness	190.438	1	190.438	4.708	.031*
Pleasantness	3.393	1	3.393	.084	.772
Conscientiousness	136.992	1	136.992	2.859	.092

\* differences with regard to mother's education are statistically significant ( $p < .05$ )

\*\* differences with regard to mother's education are statistically significant ( $p < .01$ )

\*\*\* differences with regard to mother's education are statistically significant ( $p < .001$ )

majority of variables in our theoretical model. In this regard mother's education influences self-esteem the most ( $F=19.946$ ;  $p=0.000$ ) and from learning styles concrete experience ( $F= 26.769$ ;  $p=0.000$ ). Variables which are influenced by mother's education also include: religion ( $F=10.425$ ;  $p=0.001$ , emotional stability ( $F=8.435$ ;  $p=0.004$ ), general self-concept ( $F=15.498$ ,  $p=0.000$ ), verbal self-concept ( $F=7.781$ ;  $p=0.006$ ), creativity ( $F= 6.244$ ;  $p=0.013$ ), physical abilities ( $F=4.130$ ;  $p=0.043$ ), external appearance ( $F=12.126$ ;  $p=0.001$ ) and relationships with parents ( $F= 4.571$ ;  $p=0.033$ ). Beside this, mother's education influences also abstract conceptualization ( $F=13.637$ ;  $p=0.000$ ), emotional stability II. ( $F=9.081$ ;  $p=0.003$ ) and openness ( $F=4.708$ ;  $p=0.031$ ). So, we could say that differences in mother's education influence the majority of differences in other parts of our systems model, especially when we are take into account the microsystem model of human behavior.

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## **CONCLUSION**

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If we observe the results of our empirical study inside the conception drawn by Abraham Maslow, then we can conclude that the motives of students in Slovenian upper secondary schools are prevailing at the higher levels in the hierarchy of human needs. Motives for action, such as physiological needs and safety and security needs are, in the big portion satisfied and they are not any more the factor of motivation in school.

On the basis of the values of some variables, such as religion and emotional stability, we could state that in our population of students the motives of belongingness and love are very weakly expressed. Meanwhile the self-esteem and self-concept are very strong motivators in school (Kobal, 2001). Especially when we are take into account differences by gender, when we are considering the achievement in school and when it goes for the role of the mother's education as an external factor, which is influencing the behavior of students in school.

The cognitive component/system, across all the variables, which we have measured, is very strongly expressed, when we are take into account decisions of students about their further studies, when it goes for differences by gender, for school achievement or for mother's education.

When but we are observing the results of our analysis from the perspective of the systems model of human behavior, we can conclude that the emotional system is not in the centre of motivational forces for the behavior of our students. Emotional stability and religion are not variables which would occur as motivators for the behavior of our students in school. For that reason the emotional system is not connected either with regulatory or with cognitive system as shown in Figures 3., 4., and 5. above. Because the cognitive system is the strongest motivator for the behavior of students, this influences the emotional system, and the emotional system influences the regulatory system, with the assistance of which student's behavioral patterns develop.

We can say that our students are achieving, first of all with developed self-esteem and self-concept, the motive of self-actualization, meanwhile however the spiritual dimension of personality is lacking in them, by which they could transcend their behavior. In this case, the motive of their acting should be to help others to find self-fulfillment and realize their potential. Finally, we can conclude that the specific level of egocentrism is presented

by our students, as is indicated with the highly expressed motive of pleasantness as a personal characteristic of students. In this regard our students stay continually more introverted than extroverted and open to the world around them (compare Table 2. above), which is being developed by the big steps in the information age.

## **POVZETEK**

*V pričujočem prispevku sta na kratko predstavljene teorija motivacije Abrahama Maslowa in sistemski model človekovega vedenja. To nam predstavlja teoretični okvir za preverjanje hipoteze, da sta samopodoba in samospoštovanje odločilna dejavnika motivacije dijakov srednjih šol v Sloveniji. Če opazujemo rezultate empirične študije z vidika sistemske teorije človekovega vedenja se izkaže, da so kognitivni in vedenjski vzorci tisti, ki najbolj določajo regulatorni sistem človekovega vedenja in potem emocionalni sistem ne vpliva na motivacijo in vedenje dijakov slovenskih srednjih šol. Razvita samopodoba in samospoštovanje dijakov vpliva na njihovo pot samouresničevanja, vendar pa manjka duhovna razsežnost v njihovi odraščajoči osebnosti, da bi lahko svoje vedenje transcendirali. Šele ko bi dijaki svoje vedenje transcendirali v tem smislu, da bi pomagali drugim priti do samoizpolnitve in uresničanja njihovih potencialov, bi presegli svoj izražen egocentričen, ki je najbolj razviden iz poudarjene osebnostne lastnosti prijetnosti, tako, da bi postali bolj odprti (ekstrovertirani) svetu v katerem živijo.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** motivacija, antropologija vzgoje in izobraževanja, sistemska teorija, samopodoba, samospoštovanje, teorija osebnosti, kognitivni razvoj, emocionalni razvoj, vedenje, dijaki srednjih šol, Slovenija, empirična študija, ekstrovertnost, introvertnost

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## PEDAGOGY OF THE OTHER

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## OR, THE CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND THE IMPOSSIBLE

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## EXCHANGE

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**DUŠAN RUTAR**

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### **ABSTRACT**

In our rather short study, we have introduced three indispensable basic concepts that are needed if we want to understand what critical pedagogy is. The concepts are: 1) the concept of alterity or otherness; 2) the concept of critical literacy; 3) the concept of simulaera. Our thesis is that Paulo Freire, Jean Baudrillard and Emmanuel Lévinas have provided some very strong theoretical and practical tools which can be used to radically change the institution which has been called the school. In our view the pedagogy should be an ethical enterprise, and the problem-posing pedagogy which we argue for is that ethical enterprise.

**KEY WORDS:** otherness, other, critical pedagogy, critical literacy, problem-posing pedagogy, ethics

We would like to start our short article about critical pedagogy and its role in post-modern schools at the beginning of XXI. century with a thesis that seems rather strange and even unnecessary: Paulo Freire was, and still is, one of the most convincing educational activists, teachers and scientists in the world. We believe that his theoretical work and his activism were basically oriented toward very complex ideas about the other, although he never developed the concept of the other. His work is therefore strongly connected to the ideas of Emmanuel Lévinas and Jean Baudrillard.<sup>1</sup> Today, we would like to contribute some theoretical remarks to this connection because we believe that we, as teachers, should read together the works of Freire, Lévinas and Baudrillard.

The pedagogy of the other is certainly a philosophical and epistemological concept which is totally unknown in our schools. For example: even when school teachers talk about pupils as human beings with their right to become fully human members of communities or their right to become so called fully human beings, they don't use the ideas or concepts of

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Clarence Joldersma (1999). The Tension Between Justice and Freedom in Paulo Freire's Faith-Full Pedagogy. [<http://www.calvin.edu/~cjolders/WHAM99paper.html>]

Paulo Freire, Donaldo Macedo, Henry Giroux, Emmanuel Lévinas or Jean Baudrillard, if we mention only some of the authors that have developed the strongest concepts about this very complex idea: pedagogy of the oppressed, critical literacy, problem-posing pedagogy, the other.<sup>2</sup>

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## **PART ONE: TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF THE OTHER**

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The basic idea of Paulo Freire was that every child has the right to become a creative human being. The purpose of every educational praxis is therefore to establish institutionally conditioned situations where the children will have at their disposal all necessary opportunities to become fully creative. This must be understood strictly philosophically, not psychologically. And Emmanuel Lévinas is the philosopher who has created some very strong concepts about this ethical, not ontological, position of every possible human being.

First of all, Freire was convinced that today an average school doesn't really provide, set up or organize good conditions for the development of autonomous and creative [young] people. He also recognized that education isn't an institution which is genuinely interested in social justice. Instead, Freire realizes that much of education is dehumanizing, taking the form of what he calls "banking education".<sup>3</sup> Hence, young people, through the years of their schooling, don't become creative human beings. Instead, they slowly become more and more dehumanized human beings.

Ethics precedes ontology, said Lévinas. He began his thinking about the human being with an ethical »I« which is not a psychological being, personality, ego or self. This is very important, because nowadays there is too much psychology present in the classrooms [and everywhere else, too]. For Lévinas, the self is possible only if it recognizes itself as something other than itself. This recognition [in the other] carries basic responsibility toward what is irreducibly different. And »the self« is the first thing that is different (from itself). There is something strange inside every human being because a woman or a man is not identical with herself or himself. There is no such thing as a homogenous self-identical self inside human being.

And knowledge, continues Lévinas, must be preceded by an ethical relationship. It cannot be otherwise: knowledge is not a tool for our ethical (or non-ethical) behavior. It doesn't tell us what to do to improve the quality of our life. The ethics is also the very condition of every possible [future] knowledge and the quality of life.

For Freire, the task of education is to promote the liberation of children. The liberation is the only way for a human being to become fully aware of society and itself. And every human being has the duty to become fully aware of himself/herself and his/her surrounding environment. But first of all: our ethical duty is to recognize and understand the nature of the other.

The other is not our neighbor, is not our fellow human being, because the idea of the other is something that applies to every possible human being. That means that every human being is — ethically and ontologically — in a position to recognize the other which

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Emmanuel Lévinas (1987). *Time and the Other*. Duquesne University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Douglas Kellner. *Critical Pedagogy, Cultural Studies, and Radical Democracy at the Turn of the Millennium: Reflections on the Work of Henry Giroux*. [<http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/GIROUX-CSART.htm>]

is the other of every one. Alterity, the otherness of the other, gives radical and ultimate obligation, said Lévinas. Alterity now traces itself across the face of the other person and is something that we cannot recognize at the first sight. This is not possible because the other is not something that we would ever look at. The other is a concept of radical alterity and even more: the other is a direct connection between a human being and god.

The concept of the other is a result of radical human inversion, which means that human beings can only recognize their relationship to themselves as something that enables them individually to become fully aware of their own human nature. That nature is not “inside” one’s body or soul, it is radically “outside”. Through this inversion we recognize that we have lost our ties to any possible “origin” of our “nature” and because of that we find ourselves to be utterly alien. Hence, the other is “outside”. Finally, we understand what it means to be the other of oneself. The human being is therefore not himself/herself but is the other [to himself/herself]. We can say, following Hegel, that our human identity is difference. Or, as Derrida would put it: the other is *différance*.

Who, then, is the other? The other is not the self or ego. It is not the positive and substantive inner I of the human being. It is not “something”, it is nothing positive or substantive. The other is a difference between the human being and himself. It is a difference between the world and itself, it is *différance*. It is the ultimate or absolute goal of every possible way of thinking; it is the border of every possible world.

With this basic insight into the problem of human identity we can proceed.

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## **PART TWO: TOWARD THE PROBLEM-POSING PEDAGOGY**

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Our second thesis is very simple: we need a problem-posing pedagogy. This is not a traditional pedagogy of a teacher who knows everything and of a pupil who knows nothing. It is a pedagogy as a process of the creation of the very possibilities for the production of knowledge. What we really need today in the classroom is a dialogue. And when we talk about the concept of dialogue we would like to emphasize the basic dimension of it: a dialogue is only possible between extremes and not between two different positions.<sup>4</sup>

A dialogue is a discourse. And there is no dialogue without the other. The other is not our fellow human being, as we said before; it is something radical — the other is radical otherness. The concept of the other is indispensable if we want to talk about a dialogue in modern schools. There can be no dialogue without the otherness. When we develop or create the concept of the otherness we can try to explain what we call the real world. We are not really able to explain the world without the concept of otherness.<sup>5</sup>

Critical pedagogy is thus a praxis. It is a radical praxis. The praxis is a critical and radical return to the signifying practices of the human being. A human being is namely a signifying being. His basic tool to understand the world is language.

The language itself generates signifying practices which are not transparent. It demonstrates the very nature of the world and the human being. Because of the language,

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Dialogic Response in the Culture of Silence: James Berlin’s Social-Epistemic Rhetoric and Freirian Politics as a Means to Student Voice in the Contemporary English Classroom.[<http://www.uwplatt.edu/~ciesield/berlinfreire.htm>] Presented at The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, a conference on Paulo Freire, at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, April 18, 1997

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *ibid.* Contemporary education must be aimed toward a real-world discourse/dialogue..

the human being is always the other, and the world or reality is never self-identical. There is always the other world. When we talk about the world, we are ipso facto able to talk about the other world.

In the classroom we need a dialogue. We don't need static knowledge because there is no static knowledge and there is no static world. There are only illusions and there is the truth of every illusion and the truth of every static knowledge. We need that truth.

Our pupils (and teachers, of course) need interpretative tools, interpretative skills and interpretative praxis in order to become able to understand the truth of everything that is. They need to learn how to use interpretative skills, they need to learn how to use language in different [other] ways. We need critical inquiry into our present world, history and static knowledge. We need new cultural and symbolic practices, procedures. We don't need the simple maintenance of static codes and institutions. We need problem-posing (not solving) pedagogy. We need new [productive] questions and new problems.

Let us put this in a different way: we need historical investigation, rhetorical repositioning, i. e., social-epistemic rhetoric.<sup>6</sup>

In our schools there are too many obstacles to inquiry, there are too many ideological boundaries of discovery. We need critical literacy.<sup>7</sup>

With critical pedagogy, problem-posing pedagogy, critical inquiry and critical literacy we can change the artificial environment of the classroom into the very real situations of a real-world existence.<sup>8</sup>

Without critical inquiry and critical literacy we will remain forever trapped in what Freire called the culture of silence. We will remain silent and obsessed by positive and static knowledge, we will be the slaves of the illusions of the "real world". Even more: we will remain dependent upon modern digital technologies and obscure traditions.

Giroux thus argues that pedagogy needs to see the importance of cultural studies. It needs to recognize how important is its commitment to radical democratic social transformation. The primary goal of pedagogy, therefore, should not be the formation of young people who will be later able to use and enjoy popular culture, its goal should be to develop fully aware young people who will understand that culture. Educationally, this leads Freire to develop his central notion of critical consciousness or conscientization.<sup>9</sup>

We are, of course, fully aware that right now many people eagerly want only static knowledge, discipline and order, but in the long run they will understand that they are only members of the culture of silence. They will recognize that they were all their lives dependent upon authorities, spectacles, digital technologies and simulacra. And some day in the future they will understand what is cultural maturity and what is the difference between the culture of silence and cultural maturity.

Critical pedagogy or problem-posing pedagogy, in order to develop critical inquiry in the classrooms, needs the other human being as its ethical (and pedagogical) goal. If we want to liberate people we must teach them how to use language as a strong interpretative

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *ibid.* Critical literacy is important here because it offers students the skills to see their experience as readable text, something that can be interpreted and evaluated through many of the same critical processes once reserved for canonical texts and classroom oriented situations.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Douglas Kellner.

tool.<sup>10</sup> We don't need more science literacy; on the contrary: we need more critical literacy. We need it because we must understand what is going on around us.<sup>11</sup>

We are basically symbolic and political beings and our freedom, our knowledge and our critical inquiry are also political. Hence, we must dare to set up political knowledge, critical literacy as political, historical and economical literacy.<sup>12</sup>

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### **PART THREE: TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY**

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Our responsibility, as teachers, is first and foremost ethical responsibility. As symbolic and ethical beings we (as the others) must create new opportunities for the liberation of human beings, of every human being.

Why do we really need this responsibility? On the one hand, we need it because it is the basis and the core of our "nature". On the other hand, without ethical responsibility we are not able to change anything in the world. And when we talk about the world we don't only name it. This naming process is never neutral with respect to reality. So, if we are naive and we believe that our world is an "objective whole" and that we only "neutrally" describe it, we already share a prejudice against its alterity.

When we talk about the critical investigation of the world, we try to articulate the truth about it. By the same token, we try to articulate the modern human "nature", which is today over-coded by the language of digital technologies and simulacra.<sup>13</sup> The world is therefore not "objective" and "neutral"; it is always already overcoded.<sup>14</sup>

Freire was one of those who claim: When men lack critical understanding of their reality, apprehending it in fragments they do not perceive as interacting constituent elements of the whole, they cannot truly know reality.<sup>15</sup>

Traditional education was mainly the system of indoctrination. It suffers from so called "narration sickness". That sickness means: The teacher talks (narrates) about ("objective") reality and the students listen.<sup>16</sup> Education is therefore only a system or a movement which has become a very strong partner in the process of post-modern production of simulacra. Be honest: from the outset, students must cope with the banal. Through the years, their education becomes synonymous with boredom, a bulimic pedagogy consisting of the mass accumulation of "objective" facts and then examinations, the process interrupted rarely by so-called "experiments" where the results are predestined and the work tedious.

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**10** Cf. *Dialogic Response in the Culture of Silence: James Berlin's Social-Epistemic Rhetoric and Freirian Politics as a Means to Student Voice in the Contemporary English Classroom.* To know language as a tool for investigation and dialogue rather than simply as a way to say "yes teacher" and repeat the correct information, is the major goal of a liberatory education.

**11** This cultural turn is animated by the hope of reconstructing schooling with critical perspectives that can help us to better understand and transform contemporary culture and society in the contemporary era (cf. Douglas Kellner).

**12** Cf. *Dialogic Response in the Culture of Silence: James Berlin's Social-Epistemic Rhetoric and Freirian Politics as a Means to Student Voice in the Contemporary English Classroom.* Freire's own "conscientizacao," a term which refers to one's "learning to perceive social, political, economic contradictions and to take action against oppressive elements of reality".

**13** The simulacra are basically the post-modern digital hyperrealities.

**14** Paulo Freire has believed that objectification of the world is nothing but a form of domesticating the world as other, by getting it to surrender, forcing it to "lay itself open to grasp".

**15** Cf. *ibid.*

**16** Cf. *ibid.*

Conclusion. Only the dialogue, which requires the human being as his/her otherness can create the otherness. And the otherness is the main predisposition for the constitution of the communities of libertarian life styles. The "objective" and "neutral" digitally over-coded world needs its alterity which has been denied for a long time.

Jean Baudrillard taught us that today we are more and more dependent upon artificial global simulacra and not upon the "objective" and "neutral" world. The lives we live right now in that global simulacra are only possible because impossible exchange took power over the world. Impossible exchange is a bizarre procedure that replaced the uniqueness of the human being with something new and impossible: digital simulation of his/her uniqueness.<sup>17</sup> And that is the ultimate reason why we need the critical pedagogy or problem-posing pedagogy which requires critically thinking [young] people.

And if there is a lack of critically thinking people in digital hyperrealities we certainly must create them. With a little help from the critical pedagogist we will succeed.

### **POVZETEK**

*V naši precej kratki študiji smo se lotili treh osnovnih in nepogrešljivih konceptih, ki so potrebni za razumevanje kritične pedagogike. Ti koncepti so: 1) koncept drugosti ali alternativnosti; 2) koncept kritične pismenosti; 3) koncept simulakrov. Naša teza je bila, da so Paulo Freire, Emmanuel Lévinas in Jean Baudrillard razvili nekaj zelo močnih teoretičnih in praktičnih orodij, s katerimi je mogoče korenito spremeniti šolo. V tej perspektivi moramo kritično pedagogiko razumeti kot etično pobudo. Pedagogika-ki-zastavlja-vprašanja je taka etična pobuda, za katero se zavzemamo v pričujočem besedilu.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** drugost, drugi, kritična pedagogika, kritična pismenost, pedagogika-ki-postavlja-vprašanja, etika

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. Jean Baudrillard (2001). Impossible exchange. London: Verso.



## MEANINGS OF IDENTITY<sup>1</sup>

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### **ABSTRACT**

The text is an essay on philosophical anthropology. Its aim is to present a critical survey of modern views on topics which are marked by such words as identity, self, I, person and similar. The conceptions are classified in several groups and subgroups (psychological, historical, sociological, culturological, anthropological and akin reflections on identity, a philosophical class). The comparison of such a huge spectrum of views is rarely done, but it is nevertheless needed, because it is one of the principle goals of scientific activity to establish general claims. The main findings and conclusions that the author finds correct are the following: A topic, which occupied (Heidegger) and still occupies (Taylor) an important part of philosophy of man, is authenticity. One of the great merits of Martin Buber is that he showed that a successful philosophical anthropology can be, for purely fundamental inherently philosophical reasons, neither individualistic even less collectivistic. Man and a person are in a certain sense functional concepts. Further, we cannot comprehend persons and their unities independently from some narrative. A man is a story-telling animal. Antiessentialism goes hand in hand with some kind of pragmatism, which can be positive in a certain measure. A contemporary pragmatist refutes the grounding and justification of ethics or morality respectively. A moral stance is not a matter of rationality. This is acceptable till the moment when this pragmatism does not become in fact a dogmatic demagoguery which, with its talking about the irrationality of morality covers, hides a possibility of a rational explication or demonstration of (certain) implications or consequences of the position in question. Here the ethics is a very rational matter and eo ipso so also is the philosophical anthropology.

**KEY WORDS:** man, person, identity, anthropology, philosophy

<sup>1</sup> The text presents some results of the research in the framework of the project »Contemporary approaches to motivation and competition in self-concept models: cross-cultural study <J5 3322-0553-01>« which is financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia

## **THE PLACE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY**

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The birth of modern philosophy is by some thinkers (Arendt, 1998) characterised as a special consideration of self, subjectivity, existence and related topics initiated in a crucial way by Kierkegaard. It was an attempt to save subjectivity, individuality, particularity from (Hegelian) the general. It was the birth (or rebirth (Sloterdijk, 2000)) of the philosophy of non-identity, which has found its adherents in the 20th century in philosophers like Ernst Bloch, Theodor Adorno and the controversial Peter Sloterdijk (Žalec, 2000).

Who am I? What are my starting-points, directions, principles? What and which are my views: political, ethical, national, religious, metaphysical, scientific, aesthetical? What is my self-image, my self-esteem, my evaluation of my capacities, potentials, my moral self-evaluation, my psychological self-image? Is it possible to articulate me, you, human being in concepts? What are my origins? What do I really think about the meaning of life, about transcendence of human nature, about the mystery of life? About the value of survival, of being compared to other values? About hedonism, sensuality? About freedom, about love?

The above questions are crucial and most important and have to be actualised and (re)answered again and again even if we have accepted the thesis that our culture is a post-modern culture, a culture that rejects generalising views, big narratives, which claims that there is no ground and no centre of man or world respectively, which strives for pluralism. Maybe as a starting-point could serve the point on which many thinkers, and people I am sympathetic to, agree: to be honest is the greatest welfare, benefit. Thomas Aquinas has written that we must carry out and love the good (*Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi* 6). That is the basic sentence of preconsciousness (Pieper, 1999; 90; Pieper, 2000; 15). The fundamental criterion of ethics for France Veber in his *Ethics* (1923) is conscience. The central axiom of ethics states that we must act according to our conscience. If we act so, we feel pleasure; otherwise we feel regret, which is a kind of discomfort, uneasiness, pain. We could formulate the question »Who am I?« in the form »What is my conscience? What does it say to me about the above questions?«

Very important is our attitude towards the question: Is the human being transcendent? This question has two aspects, two meanings: dynamic/active/subjective and static/passive/objective. The first is the question about our experience or knowledge respectively of transcendence. The second is principally about the limits of our knowledge of ourselves or man respectively. The awareness of transcendence questions is especially important in our age of outstanding, decided and conspicuous dominancy of the scientific form of consciousness. Naturalists and in particular some theologians are in their way declaring the nontranscendental nature of man or his nonmysteriousness respectively. While on the other hand several confessionals and nonconfessionals stress the transcendental nature of man, his principal nonintelligibility, his mysteriousness.

Philosophical anthropology offers a manifold reflection of the human condition. What does it matter to this manifold reflection for its bearer and for others, for the society? We must realise that it is in a way impossible to give a decisive answer to those philosophical questions which are concerned with a person, human nature and the similar. That is not true for the question of what the benefit is and to whom it pertains, no matter which answer

we take for granted. If we accept for instance that a man is by his nature a competitive being, this has great implications for our practical views and actions.<sup>2</sup>

The concept of man is a concept of contingent and historical being, not of abstract and atemporal entity (e.g. as mathematical entities are). For such entities we do not have perfect definitions in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions. The human being can be split into different parts surely only mentally, methodologically, because of a simpler reflection upon some things, and not de facto.

The Slovene philosopher Veber has defined philosophy as a science which investigates man as such. Natural sciences investigate a specific natural point of man, whereas social sciences and humanities already presuppose man, since they investigate those entities which would not exist without man: language, history, law (Veber, 2000 <1930>). It is an old and insistent idea that it is the self-knowledge which is the highest aim of the philosophical research. In the oppositions among different philosophical streams this has remained undenied. All new conceptions have had the purpose of opening new ways to the knowledge of man and in the history of thought scepticism has been often only a counterpart of determined humanism (Cassirer; 1970;1).

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## **A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT ON MAN AND PERSON**

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The thought about man is as old as culture, which is true also for the West, where the first to be mentioned is Heraclitus. He puts forward as a condition for appropriate understanding of the Universe the understanding of man, although his thought is partly still (naturally) cosmological. The second milestone represents the philosophy of Socrates who however has not left behind himself to us a definition of man as such, but only a definition of man's qualities. The essence of man consists in his putting forward questions about himself and in his trying to answer them, in his dialogical nature. Stoicism has also stressed the knowledge about ourselves. The way to happiness is constituted by self-knowledge, in penetrating our own depths. Augustine and with him the whole of Christianity has, contrary to stoicism, put in focus the knowledge of God and proclaimed a dependency of man's knowledge of himself on his knowledge about God. Modern thought has stressed mathematical knowledge as a paradigm also for the knowledge of man (Descartes, Galileo, Leibniz, Spinoza). This attitude was sharply criticised by the mathematician Pascal, who has stressed the oppositions in human nature which is inaccessible to the geometrical mind which is governed by the top principal of excluded contradiction. What is relevant is religious thought full of mysteriousness, which is the only proper thought about man. Only the thought or the religion which articulates mysteriousness is appropriate and only the thought which gives reason to that mystery is informative. Copernician cosmology has represented a new challenge for philosophical thought. It was seen by many as a liberation of knowledge of man, not only as his dethronement. Darwin's theory has placed on the throne the investigation of the contingent, empirical data about man, and it outshone mathematics as an ideal of knowledge about man. Yet a mere collecting of data and facts is not enough; we

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<sup>2</sup> Mostly, the thesis that competition is a part of human nature is supported by people who would like to preserve the status quo (cf. Kohn, 1992).

must classify and hierarchize the data. That has led to a discentred situation regarding the view on man. Theologians, politicians, sociologists, biologists, psychologists, economists, ethnologists,..., all consider man from their own standpoint or aspect respectively. The personal factors, individual temper etc. are more and more important. This is the situation of the modern philosophy of man (Cassirer, 1970;1-22).

There is little agreement about the answer to the question: What are persons? Such a situation could be interpreted as mirroring the conceptual confusion or indeterminacy respectively, or maybe the fact that there is still a possibility, task or need in front of us to develop a satisfactory understanding of a person. The term person has its history in the legal and in the theological contexts. Apart from that, it is often used as a synonym for human being. Hence the history of the thought on persons is the moment of changing legal, theological, social trends and of more general reflections on the nature of a human subject or I respectively. Some questions from this field could be traced deeply in philosophical history. Some other questions, as for instance the question on personal identity, have arisen only from the Renaissance on. Pace Cartesian dualism a human being is essentially a conscious being, and by consciousness is meant the reflexive kind. John Locke and other thinkers of the 17th century are worthy of the prominence of viewing the nature of human thinking as a reflexive one. Lockean as well as Leibnizian philosophy reflects an at that time arising liberal conception of an individual, which is not only the centre or a substance of mental states, but also the subject of merit and blame and the holder of rights. The tendency in the theory on persons, to prescind physical facts about bodily existence as well as the placement of humans in their social, historical etc. contexts has contributed to a special position of the individual: 18th century Kant conceived it as an autonomous and free being, 19th century utilitarian and liberal theories of Bentham and Mill as a possessor of a complicated web of desires (Brennan, 1991). Scepticism about one self, which stretches through our entire life, is represented by the Humean account that persons are no more than bundles of perceptions. Hume touched an important philosophical nerve by following, so dedicatedly, his sensationalism. However, his account should not entirely satisfy us for we must bear in mind that not all sentences using the first person pronoun »I« could be without loss eliminated from our talk about our psychosocial life (Chisholm, 1994; Žalec, 1995).

The aim of this essay is to present a critical survey of modern views on topics which are marked by such words as identity, self, I, person and similar. Let us classify the conceptions for the sake of a better overview into several groups or subgroups respectively. The first group of views I will call in short psychological, despite the fact that I am aware, that in many respects this is not appropriate. Here belong the theories of James, Mead, Freud, Jung and more recent psychological theories of structures that constitute the structure we call (our)self. In the following I will not consider these theories. The reason lies not in their philosophical lack of attraction or in their small importance. The fact is rather the contrary. One of the reasons is rather that they have been treated or developed respectively by several Slovene philosophers and psychologists (cf. for instance Musek, 1996; Kopal, 2000). I called them psychological not only by virtue of the fact that most of their creators were psychologists or of a discipline somehow akin to psychology (or both), but also because we find the more or less brief outline of these ideas in almost every psychological textbook on the above mentioned topics. However, the Jamesian distinction between empirical me and nonobjectual I is well known in philosophy long before James (for instance by Kant) and developed in detail in phenomenology, of which Scheler is an

important representative. The ideas of social construction of self-image, identity etc. are present and elaborated in contemporary theories which I consider more closely in this article. But Taylor and MacIntyre, neopragmatists like Rorty and also modern culturologists have added to them an important component of a (more developed) historical perspective. Freudian ideas enjoy a high respect in poststructuralist circles at one hand, but on the other hand some authors from the present text (Scheler, Taylor) have articulated a though general, yet also very principled and decided criticism of his psychoanalysis. It is my impression that the Jungian approach is not very alive and present in modern theoretical efforts, though the ideas of Jung and his followers (for instance Erich Neumann (Neumann, 2001)) enjoy a status of somehow classic reference (for instance in the work of Walter J. Ong (Ong, 1981)). The second main class is constituted by historical, sociological, cultural, anthropological and akin reflections on identity. Whoever we are (or think we are), our identity is constituted and formed by many equalisations. Their genesis, history, changing of their importance, dominance, and their reproduction is extensively studied by the social sciences. It is needless to add that there is also a lot of philosophy at work (often implicitly). The first members of the third group, a philosophical class in a narrower sense, are modern analytical philosophers and their debates on a personal identity. The second class I will consider comprises the ideas of modern continental philosophers on man or person respectively. By modern continental philosophers I mean the continental philosophy in the 20th century. The ideas of neoscholasticism, Max Scheler, France Veber, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Buber and Ernst Cassirer will be considered. The third philosophical subgroup embraces the views of two representatives of what we may call new Anglosaxonic historicism. Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre are the thinkers I have in mind.

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## **MODERN CONTINENTAL THEORIES OF MAN**

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These could be importantly regarded from two aspects: 1) are they actualistic? 2) are they monadic or relational? (Nosbüsch, 1998). What makes a human being human is, according to neoscholasticism, the spirit, which is however individuated by matter, hence it is an individuated entity. Max Scheler also thought that the *differentia specifica* of a person is spirit <Geist> and not, for instance, intelligence. Spirit is a qualitative difference, intelligence only a quantitative one. A spirital being is not bounded to the organic, to instincts and to the world that surrounds it. It is »open into the world«. The spirit is able to »lift« the centers of the resistance and of the reactions into the objects and to grasp principally the whatness of the objects itself. In that sense an animal does not have any objects in the narrow sense of the word. The essential feature of the spirit is broadening of the surrounding world into the dimension of the world and objectifying of the resistances. Because of the spirit, man is capable of objectifying his own physiological and psychological (psychological is not spiritual) whatness. The capability of intending the essences is a foundation of almost all other characteristics of the spirit. Intending essences means to grasp the essential whatness of the world and its forms of becoming. This grasping is independent from the content and number of observations, from inductive reasoning, performed by intelligence. The knowledge acquired in that way is valid for all entities of a particular essence, not only for the actual world, but also for every possible world. This knowledge is a priori

knowledge. What is essential for a human is not knowledge, but the fact that it is capable of reaching a priori essences. The core of such an intending is an act of abolishing of the character of reality of the thing and of the world, and only a spirit in the form of pure will is capable of depriving things of their realistic »power«. Nevertheless, there is no constant organisation of mind; this organisation is in principle subjected to changes; only the mind and its capacity to build new forms of knowledge by functionalising essential insights is constant. However, the spirit itself is not capable of being objectified. A person exists only in her acts and through her freely carrying out of her acts. She is pure actuality. We could only collect ourselves toward our center, our person. The real object of love is for instance a person, not something else. In that sense Scheler refers to Goethe's words that he loved Lili too much to observe her.<sup>3</sup> Scheler repudiated two basic theories of the origin and power of the spirit. The first type of theories, so called classical theories, maintains that the spirit possesses its own power, whereas the second, so called negative theories (Freud, Schopenhauer, Buddha's doctrine) assert that the spirit itself and all the activities creating the human culture originate exclusively from repression or hindering of the instincts, drives and the like. Scheler on the one hand stressed that the spirit does not possess any energy of its own, but on the other hand he accused the negative theories of already assuming what they would like to explain. The only »effect« the spirit is capable of is hindering and liberating of the instincts and their directing by presentation of the idea and of the value that are subsequently carried out by instinct and drives. The spirit could not increase any energy. It is the core of sublimation and therefore could not itself originate from sublimation.<sup>4</sup>

Despite some of Hartmann's criticism of Scheler's doctrine of man, his view on person is very similar to Scheler's, only that it is somehow more statical, but above all the gap between the person and other layers of the human being is firmer and in a sense unbridgeable. A person belongs to a spiritual layer and is grounded on anorganic, organic and psychological layers. The spirit lets the lower layers working according to their own structure, yet they must serve to the spirit (Nosbüsch, 1998; 24-25).

One of the central terms of Heidegger's (early)<sup>5</sup> philosophy is Dasein. Roughly and inexactly we can say that it is Heidegger's term for a man, a human being. A better formulation is that it is Heidegger's term for us. Dasein is a being that is in relation to its own being. Heidegger's question in *Sein und Zeit* is Who a Dasein every time <je>is (Heidegger, 1963 (§25): 114) and his answer is that in a certain sense the self-evident answer is that I am who every time a Dasein is (ibid.: 115). But he warned us to be careful in our understanding of this last sentence. According to Heidegger we are the existence, or our goal (Nosbüsch, 1998. 28) is to exist respectively. An existence is an individually proper way of being of Dasein. Being with others is also only in the function of existence. The existence is momentary: we could lose it and we could fall into mediocrity. Existence is our own proper way of being. The »essence« of a Dasein is his existence (Heidegger,

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<sup>3</sup> The Slovene philosopher France Veber articulated very similar views on the person in his book *Filozofija. Načelni nauk o loveku in njegovem mestu v stvarstvu*. (Philosophy. A principal doctrine about the human and his position in creation) (Veber, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> In his *Das Problem des Menschen* (Buber, 1998) Buber mistakenly ascribed to Scheler a belief that the spirit is created by sublimation. Buber thought that the idea of sublimation is a result of the pathological state of our culture. Similar refutation of the idea of sublimation we find in the work of Simon Weil (Weil, 1998)

<sup>5</sup> Sentences in this text about Heidegger take into account only his earlier thought, in the first line his ideas from his most famous and in a sense main work *Being and Time* «*Sein und Zeit*» (1927) (Heidegger, 1963). They are probably rather not completely appropriate for his later philosophy.

1963 (§9): 42). We can not ask What is a human?, we could only ask Who is a human? Characteristic of Dasein is that it is considered with its own proper mode of being. This fundamental structure Heidegger called care. The being, which a Dasein cares for, is existence.

All these three theories are more or less monadic. They do not regard a human being in relation to other beings, or else they define or articulate, respectively, her essence or her characteristic in principle without a relation to other humans. Neoscholastic theory is, contrary to Scheler's, not actualistic (also young children and mentally retarded humans are persons) and the same could be said for Heidegger's hermeneutics of Dasein, though we should be aware of its precision.<sup>6</sup>

Cassirer thought that there are many characteristics of man that make him different compared to other beings: myth, religion, language, art, history, science. Which of them is sufficient or necessary for man is hard to say. On the one hand Cassirer writes that there is no common, universal and unifying characteristic of man. Man is not a substance, but rather a dialectical unity, a Heraclitian harmony of bow and lyre. He is a dynamic hidden unity which is a result of the contest of oppositions (Cassirer, 1970: 223). Man is, in contrast to animal, not limited to eternal repeating of patterns of life. His further characteristic is that he is capable of spreading his achievements to other people and human generations. Man cannot live his life without expressing it (Cassirer, 1970: 224). Different forms of this expression constitute a new world, they live an independent, their own life. Characteristic of this sphere are the opposing tendencies from which Cassirer has particularly exposed the tendency between preserving, stabilizing elements and changing or creating factors respectively. On the other hand Cassirer nevertheless husked a common feature of all otherwise heterogeneous forms of culture. Pace Cassirer a unity of man is functional (ibid.: 222). The forms of culture are not similar by identity of their nature, but by being adjusted to the same task (ibid.: 223). We can describe human culture as a progressing self-liberation. Through different forms of culture man creates a new world, an »ideal« world. Forms of culture are phases in that process. Each opens a new horizon, represents a new aspect of human nature. Philosophy seeks a unity in these forms, but it cannot overlook tensions between them. But these tensions are not mutually exclusive, but mutually dependent (ibid.: 228). The definition of man that we can nevertheless discern is that man is the only known (terminal) being who (can) liberate himself. He liberates himself precisely through the above dimensions, which differentiate him from the rest of the world. The meaning of self-liberation as Cassirer used the word is axiologically neutral. Man's own world, which he has built, can enslave him and can become a real hell. Hence this self-liberation does not necessarily have a positive meaning and quite often that self-liberation is not liberation at all.

Martin Buber argued relatively influentially against individualism in philosophical anthropology: We cannot understand a (human) individual solely by virtue of what is happening in him but only by regarding his relations with things and beings. An individualistic

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<sup>6</sup> Hannah Arendt ascribed to Heidegger an attempt to deconstruct human beings into group of modes of being and she regarded it as an implicit functionalism (Arendt, 1998: 44). She saw in Heidegger's philosophy an effort to put a human in the place of God. The abandoning of a definition of a (human) being as given in advance is an effort to regard a human not as being similar to God, but as being godlike, divine (Arendt, 1998: 41). This ambition of being God is also reflected in the tension of Heidegger's philosophy: Dasein is in the world, but it is impossible to become self, the god of traditional ontology, in the world among »equal« beings. The only exit is separation, isolation, death. Every individual represents the whole of humanity, thought Kant. In Heidegger the self as a conscience has entered the place of humanity, and to be a self the place of being a human (Arendt, 1998: 39-52).

anthropology in essence considers only the relation of a human being to himself, relations between his instincts, tribes and between the spirit in him etc. (Buber, 1999: 119-20). But not only individualism, collectivism, which does not see man, but also society, is mistaken as well. They are a result of the same process: of cosmical and social homelessness, and of fear of the world and life, which flow one into another, thus constituting a state of existential loneliness, which in such a measure has probably not been ever known before our times (Buber, 1998; 121). However, a fundamental fact of the human existence is neither an individual nor a community as such. They are both only abstractions. An individual is a fact of existence only in as far as he establishes a living relation with other individuals; on the other hand a community is a fact of existence only in the measure in which it is built from living relational units. A fundamental fact of the human existence is human with human, man with man.

What characterises the human world above all is that here is happening between being and being something, which could not be found anywhere in nature and which makes a human being human. It is rooted in the fact that one being thinks of the other being as the other, as that particular being in order to communicate with him in an area that is common to both of them, but which stretches over the areas that are owned by each of two persons. This area, restored by the existence of a man as a man, Buber called an area of mutuality <das Zwischen>. This is pace Buber a pre-category of human reality, though it is actualised in very different degrees. From this area the real third something must originate (ibid.: 125). A true conversation, a true lesson, a true hang; the essential thing in all these events happens neither in the first or the other participant, nor in the neutral world that embraces both of them and all other things. It happens between both the persons, in a dimension that is accessible only to the two of them. It is a zone where souls end and the world has not started yet (126). This fact could be found also in very short moments, which we are almost not aware of: the looks of two strangers in an air-raid shelter, a basic dialogical relation between two people who do not know each other in the darkness of an opera house, who with the same intensity experience the music, and which ended long before lights were switched on. Beyond subjectivity, on this side of objectivity, at the thin edge where you and I meet, is the kingdom of mutuality. Buber thought that the knowledge of this, the third, will crucially contribute to mankind, with great effort, regaining an authentic person, and to the founding of an authentic community. This reality represents the starting-point for philosophical anthropology from which it could on the one hand progress in the direction of a changed understanding of person, and on the other hand in the direction of changed comprehension of the community. Its central subject is neither individual nor collective, but man with man. Only in this living relationship can we directly acquire the knowledge of a peculiar, special essence of man (ibid.: 127). If we regard a human being with a human being we always see a dynamical twoness, which is the essence of a man: what he gives, what he gets, offensive and defensive force, the nature of exploring, investigating and the nature of giving answers; always both in one, mutually supplemented, completed. Now, being aware of these facts, we can turn our attention to the individual and as a human we recognize him by his capability of existing in a relationship; we can now turn to a community and we recognize it as human by its fullness of relation. We can come close to an answer to the question of what is a man only if we learn to understand him in his dialogics in which the mutually present attitude of two together <Zu-zweien-sein> is every time realised in an encounter of one with the other (ibid.: 128).

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## **NONESSENTIALISTIC CULTUROLOGY**

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An important part of culturology has found its philosophical basis in the rejection of essentialism. Essences are a class of attributes or constituents which x could not lack without ceasing to be x. Antiessentialism is in culturology comprehended as a view that there are some constant, nonchangeable essences of objects or meanings of the concepts or terms respectively, as for instance »Slovene«, »woman«, »white«....

Many culturologists are using the poststructuralist theoretical apparatus (Stankovič, 2002: 51-59). Probably the most influential poststructuralist is Jacques Derrida. Poststructuralism has accepted many principles of structuralism, but has rejected some of its central claims as well. One of the beliefs of structuralism was that meaning is stable and clear. The poststructuralist culturology has accepted the claim that the meaning of a sign is not fixed even at its denotative level; it is polysignificant, nontransparent and changing. Poststructuralism is significant for culturology because it allows the use of »softer« terms and makes possible the problematising of unjust hierarchies. The second point directly concerns identity. Poststructuralists see little difference (or importance of it) between language and thought. We enter the culture through our language. Contrary to the western humanistic tradition, people are not free choosers, claim culturologists; from the very beginning they are placed in some subject positions, which language allows to us. We are »imprisoned« in language or cultural relations respectively. In language the relations of power are inscribed. Several chains of designators, discourses, form our subject, I, in the games of power. For instance, the binary opposition man/woman. This biological difference could be interpreted in many ways. Different interpretations are cultural constructions, that offer or allow man or woman some subject positions. The central aim of poststructural culturology is a deconstruction, elaboration or replacement of some identities that reflect or establish some unjust hierarchy; the theoretical foundation of this enterprise is the thesis of instability, changeability, nonessentiality, of the construction of identity (ibid.: 53). In culturology by identity are meant the positions we occupy and with whom we identify. They are not arbitrary, they are shaped by discourses we are subjected to or which are at our disposal in our culture respectively. Identity is essentially relational. It is always formed in opposition to something different, to something else. Identities are not static; they are points of connectedness with subject positions that discursive praxises offer to us (Luthar, B., 2002). The poststructuralists claim that our identity is usually understood as nonchangeable, eternal essence. Antiessentialism asserts that identities do not refer to any essences in us. Antiessentialism provides a firm basis for problematising of the existing social hierarchies. The poststructuralist culturologists stress that new identities are also only constructions, constructed by philosophers and intellectuals. They are no more real than some other identities. But they should be more just. Insisting on the universal, eternal truths leads to unbearable reductionism. The poststructuralist emancipatory theory is important, claim many culturologists, because it allows us to criticise the existing hierarchies of power without falling into reductionistic universalistic totalitarianism. If one identity is not useful for justice, not just enough, we could replace it by some other at any time (Stankovič, 2002: 55). In the focus of the poststructuralist culturology are primarily gender, racial and national or ethnical identities. We can notice a certain component of pragmatism in the view of the poststructuralist or nonessentialistic attitudes toward identities. Nonessentialism, denying of any good use of the ideas of objective truth, rationality, human nature, maintaining of

historicism and relativism are central claims of one of the most famous contemporary philosophers, who declares himself to be a pragmatist, namely Richard Rorty (cf. for instance Rorty, 1982, 1988, 2000).

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## **ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY**

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The nature of the personal identity is of great practical significance. That question is related to the question of the possibility of the survival of bodily death, which is the central idea of almost all religions. The concept of personal identity is connected with our concept of personal responsibility for our acts and our praxis of paying respect and disrespect. Our own pasts and futures are the objects of many of our central emotions and attitudes. If we really abandoned the concept of a unified continuous person, it is hard to imagine the entire impact this would have on our picture of the world and on our emotional and moral reactions. So it is not a surprise that also analytical philosophers pay so much attention to the personal identity. Let us look a little bit closer at their main accounts and arguments.

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## **BODILY CRITERIA IN THE WIDER SENSE**

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A bodily criterion in the narrow sense is the following: person P1 at t1 is identical to the person P2 at t2 if and only if P1 has the same body as P2. An objection that repudiates convincingly the above criterion is the possibility of a transplantation of the brain into some other body. This leads us to the brain criterion: P1 at t1 is identical to P2 at t2 if and only if P1 has the same brain as P2. There is a possibility of dividing of the two brain hemispheres of the same brain (person). Not both of the hemispheres are necessary for survival.<sup>7</sup> So we can imagine a possible case of a person surviving a destruction of one of her hemispheres. So there would be the same person, but without brain identity. If we transplant her remaining hemisphere to some other body, we get the same person, with neither bodily neither brain identity. But this case still does not force us to accept that personal identity does not consist in the persistence of some physical entity. We could still resort to the so called physical criterion (Noonan, 1993: XIII-XIV): P2 at t2 is identical to P1 at t1 if and only if enough of the brain of P1 at t1 survives in P2 at t2 to be the brain of the living person. An objection to that criterion was put forward by Bernard Williams (Williams, 1970, 1973). The ground premise of his argument is that it is possible to remove the information from the brain into some storage device whence it is then put back into the same or another brain. This information constitutes a psychological identity. But the implicit premise in the position of the defender of the physical criterion is that (part of) the brain carries with it the psychological identity. Hence the removal of information from the brain and putting

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<sup>7</sup> The human brain has two very similar hemispheres, each of them has its own role. In a normal adult the two hemispheres are connected and communicate by a bundle of fibres – corpus callosum. In the treatment of some epileptics those fibres were cut. That led to the discovery of an independent functioning of the two hemispheres. When the patients were tested the leading investigator on the field and one of the surgeons described his observations as follows: »... two independent spheres of conscious awareness, one in each hemisphere, each of which is cut off from the mental experience of the other ... each hemisphere seems to have its own sensations, perceptions, concepts, impulses to act ... Following the surgery each hemisphere has its own memories (Sperry, 1986: 724, quoted by Noonan, 1993: XII.)« For more data about the literature on split brains cf. Nagel, 1993: 90-91.

it back into the brain makes possible the psychological identity without identity of the brain or part of the brain, for a man should be counted the same if this has been done and in the process he were given a new brain. To accept above argument means that we ought to abandon the bodily criteria, which leads us to alternative accounts of personal identity. One of them is the position that personal identity is constituted by psychological factors (Noonan, 1993; XIV ss).

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## **PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERIA**

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According to the memory (Lockean) criterion, the crucial factor in personal identity is an experience-memory of the person about her own experiences and acts, as she reports about them in her first person memory statements. Between a person now and a person ten years ago there exist direct memory connections if the person now can remember that she had some experiences or done some acts that have happened to her or that she had performed ten years ago. Even in the case that there are no such direct memory connections we can still justifiably talk about continuity of the memory in the last ten years if there exist overlapping chains of direct memory. If for instance person P remembers her experiences from the previous year and P remembered a year ago her experiences from the year before ... and she remembered nine years ago her experiences from ten years ago. The Lockean account of the personal identity could be formulated in the following way: P2 at t2 is the same person as P1 at t1 only if P2 is connected with a continuous chain of the experience-memory with P1. This is the memory criterion of the personal identity. Many modern philosophers who are otherwise sympathetic to the Lockean idea maintain that there are still other psychological factors, not only the experience-memory, that must be taken into account in our definition of the personal identity. Besides direct memory there are still several other kinds of direct memory connections: a connection between intention and the later act in which that intention was carried out, connections which hold when a belief or a desire or some other psychological features persist. Psychological continuity consists of such direct psychological connections. P2 at t2 is the same person as P1 at t1 if and only if P2 is psychologically continuous with P1. This is a psychological continuity criterion of personal identity (PCC)(Noonan, 1993; XIV). This proposal is not without problems.

There are two main lines of objection: the circularity objection and the reduplication argument. The first argument (ibid.: XIV-XV) was originally brought against Locke by Bishop Butler. Memory cannot account for the personal identity for it already assumes it. We distinguish without difficulties between veridical and apparent memory: people can seem (to themselves) to remember that they have experienced or done certain things, but in fact this has never been the case. Shoemaker (Shoemaker, 1993) offered as a refutation of that objection a concept of quasi-memory, which he thinks is not subjected to the objection, though in all other important respects it is similar to our usual concept of memory. Whereas the fact that one remembers some events implies that she was aware of this event at the time of its occurring, the quasi-memory requires only that somebody, whoever, was aware of it at the time of its occurring (ibid.:25). All veridical quasi-memories in our world are memories. Hence the veridical memory is a good criterion for personal identity since it, as a quasi-memory, does not imply or assume respectively personal identity. Quasi-memories in our world are accidental memories. If the state of the person who remembers does not

correspond to the state of a person who was aware of the event at the time of its occurrence, they are nonveridical (only apparent). We do not need the concept of the same person to define the difference between apparent and veridical memory just as we do not need it to define the quasi-memory. It is an unnecessary, accidental, contingent fact that in our world the quasi-memory is a memory. We can define personal identity in our world in terms of the quasi-memory: P2 at t2 is the same person as P1 at t1 if P2 is in the quasi-memory connection with P1. Because in our world every quasi-memory is a memory, a memory performs in our world all the functions of the quasi-memory including that of providing the criterion for the personal identity. But neither the concept of the quasi-memory, nor distinguishing between the apparent and veridical quasi-memory, includes the concept of the same person. Therefore our definition of the same person in terms of the quasi-memory is not circular. In a world in which there would be the quasi-memory - which would not be a memory (in a world where a fission of the brain hemispheres would be something usual) - also the concept of personal identity would not be of such a significance or importance as it is in our world.

The second main objection to PCC (Noonan, 1993: XV ss) we find in Williams's text »Personal identity and individuation« (Williams, 1956-7). Williams imagined an example of a man, Charles, who in 20th century claims that he is Guy Fawkes. All that he claims corresponds to the data accepted by historians. He told also the things that fit into the entire story in such a way that we are inclined to say that these are the things that only Fawkes could know himself. So it could seem rational to assert that Charles is a reincarnation of Guy Fawkes. Yet Williams maintains that one is not obliged to do so, moreover, it would be vacuous to do so. It is possible that another person would appear, called Robert, who would be an equally good candidate for Fawkes. Since two persons could not be the same person as Guy Fawkes, argued Williams, none of them could be him. But if we could not identify Charles with Guy Fawkes in the case of existence of the Robert, nor should we do so in the case of his absence, since the identity is an intrinsic relation and it does not depend on external circumstances. Whether the person P1 is identical to person P2 does not depend on the facts about people other than P1 and P2. Williams' arguments do not represent objections only to reincarnation but also to cases that should be taken by every partizan of PCC as undeniable examples of personal identity. Let us take a Brown/Brownson example, where one hemisphere (together with all the memory traits) of the Brown has been transplanted into Robinson's body. We get the Brownson for whom the partizan of PCC ought to maintain that he is properly speaking Brown. If we transplant the other hemisphere into the body of Smith, we get the Browth, who is an equally good candidate for Brown. The Williams challenge could not be ignored by defenders of PCC. The reactions to it represent the core of the current debate on personal identity in analytical philosophy (Noonan, 1993: XVI ss).

Wiggins (Wiggins, 1976) offered an answer by applying the concept of real possibility. It is a necessary, albeit aposteriori truth that the person does not undergo fission, because the concept of a person is (akin to) a natural kind concept. The last assertion meets several difficulties (Robinson, 1985). Some philosophers reject Williams' argument by repudiating its premise, called the only x and y principle. If we abandon this principle then we can assert the following: P2 at t2 is the same person as P1 at t1 only if P2 is psychologically continuous with P1 and there is no rival candidate P2\* at t2 who would also be psychologically continuous with P1. Most of philosophers who repudiate Williams'

argument by rejecting the only *x* and *y* principle do not argue for the no candidate theory, but for the best candidate theory: P2 can be identical to P1 even in the case of an existing P2\* providing that P2 is the best candidate (Shoemaker, 1970; Parfit, 1971a, 1984; Nozick, 1981). Whether this position can be sustained is a matter of current controversy (Perry, 1972; Noonan, 1985; Coburn, 1985; Johnston, 1989; Garrett, 1990). An objection to the revised PCC can be brought out by reflecting on the split-brain transplant case (Noonan, 1993: XVI-XVII). Let us imagine that I was told that my brain would be split on the left and the right hemisphere and transplanted into two other bodies. Let us imagine that I accept PCC: I think that I won't survive the fission. But if I succeeded in persuading somebody, a nurse for instance, to destroy for instance my left hemisphere, then I would survive, *pace* PCC. At this point we hit upon the intuitive unacceptability of PCC: how could I contribute to my existence by destroying one of my parts and how could be my existence logically dependent on the nonexistence of somebody else?

Some contemporary philosophers (Perry, 1972; Lewis, 1976) have asserted that we can retain the only *x* and *y* principle and still reject the thesis that postfissional offshoots are new persons, persons who did not exist before the fission. It makes sense to affirm that the two persons have existed all along but have only become spatially distinct (Noonan, 1993: XVII). What determines that the two persons are at the certain time *t*<sub>1</sub> two may be facts from some other time *t*<sub>n</sub>, facts extrinsic to *t*<sub>1</sub>. This view is known in the literature as the multiple occupancy theory. Williams thinks that the reduplication argument repudiates psychological theories and it seems that he has concluded that the personal identity demands some form of physical persistence. But, if there is any cogency in the reduplication argument, then it repudiates also every theory of the bodily view. Such a position serves to some philosophers as a (partial) justification for the thesis that the personal identity is a simple, nonanalysable fact, different from anything that we could experience and which could provide an evidence for it. Persons are separately existing entities, different from the body and from experiences. They are spiritual substances (Swinburne, 1973-4, 1984). Parfit (1984) called this position a simple view. Can we imagine that in some circumstances it would be indeterminate whether I still exist or not? If so, with whom was I then identical? Can we imagine a situation in which it would be the only cogent thing to do for me to ask for the answer to these matters in a law court? The defenders of the simple view insist that we must answer negatively to these questions (determinacy thesis) and that only the simple view allows such an answer.

Very famous and influential is the view of the Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit (Parfit, 1971a, 1971b, 1982, 1984, 1986) that our continuous existence is of no special interest to us. Contrary to our usual belief there is no basic and nonconstructed, noninferred interest for our future persistence and well-being. What is of a fundamental interest to us is that in the future there would exist people who would be connected with us, as we are now, with the chains of psychological continuity, so called Parfitian survivors. In the actual world the only way to have Parfitian survivors is that we ourselves survive. But with the transplantation of the brain, Star Trek technology and the similar it would be possible to have Parfitian survivors without personal survival. To have Parfitian survivors surely does not request (logically) my own survival. There is no reason, *pace* Parfit, to prefer a future in which we ourselves exist, instead of the one in which there exist only our Parfitian survivors. To many people this sounds quite unacceptable. We think that, contrary to the most of all other entities, we ourselves are not replaceable in that sense. In our case, it is the

identity of a token, not the identity of a type that matters. Yet, Parfit advanced an argument that many have found convincing (Noonan, 1993; XIX-XX). He starts with a description of the fission, transplantation of the hemispheres of one brain into two bodies. Then he asserts that the original donator of the hemispheres ceases to exist after the fission and that she would continue to exist if there existed only one hemisphere (revised PCC). But it would be totally irrational if we were so concerned about fission as we are concerned about our death, or if we begged somebody to destroy one of the hemispheres to make possible our survival. If we accept the above claims, then we must pace Parfit accept also the thesis that our basic desires, concerns and interests are not those that we think they are, and that they do not include our noninferred desire for our continuous existence and for our well-being. According to Parfit this is the only acceptable explanation of our apparently inconsistent intuitions. The position described above, thinks Parfit, also enables us to successfully defend a revised PCC against Williams' reduplication argument. This argument builds upon the only x and y principle. A plausibility of this principle rests on the supposition that it is the personal identity which matters in survival. Parfit's argument represents a strong challenge to those philosophers who accept the common sense thinking that the personal identity matters in survival and who at the same time refuse the simple view.

»... no consensus has yet emerged as to the proper response to Parfit, but it is certain that this work has brought about a radical change in recent philosophical debate about personal identity. Whether, when the dust has settled a consensus will emerge remains to be seen (ibid.: XX).«

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### **A STORY TELLING ANIMAL AND AUTHENTICITY**

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As a starting-point of this brief consideration of Alasdair MacIntyre's philosophical anthropology can serve Prior's argument against the Humean view that we cannot validly infer ought from is: He is a seacaptain. He ought to do what a seacaptain ought to do (MacIntyre, 2000: 57). A father ought to do, what a father ought to do, a philosopher ought to do, what a philosopher ought to do ... According to MacIntyre, a man and also a person are functional concepts like for instance a clock: to their whatness belongs their function, from what they are it follows what the things of these concepts (ought to) do. I can only understand what a clock is, when I understand its function, what it does (ibid.: 58-9). MacIntyre's central claim regarding the concept of a person is that its nature is narrative (ibid.: 216-18). A person is a character in a drama (of her life). It is practically very important to know to what or which story I belong, since I could not know what to do. MacIntyre understands a person's act as an abstraction from the whole narration. The lack of seeing oneself as a character in a drama of one's own life, of one's proper role, could have very drastic consequences, including suicide.

It is obvious that MacIntyre opposes the existentialists' (Sartrean) views on self, freedom, spontaneity, nonessentiality and similar (ibid.: 217). But he disagrees also with the approach and accounts of analytical philosophers. Empiricists have tried to give an account of personal identity in terms of psychological states. Analytical philosophers have wrestled, and still do, with those states and strict identity according to Leibniz law. But they both

omitted what is necessary to account for personal identity: a narrative character of it. A person is always a person of some story, a character of some narrative, a subject that constitutes a story that makes sense, and it is therefore cogent to treat her as identical, one person of a particular narrative. And these narratives are discussed by me and you: I am asking you, you and you, myself about my character, my narrative, your character, your narrative and so on. That too is a part of the answer as to why our identity is dialogical. Man is in his action and practice as well as in his fiction is essentially a story-telling animal. We must account by telling a sensible, intelligible narrative how it is possible that x is through all his changes (psychological, physiological, situational) still the same person. Without such a character there is no subject to whom personal identity could be ascribed.

Charles Taylor (Žalec, 2000) thinks that our culture is a culture of self-fulfillment. There is a strong ideal at work in it. It is an ideal of being faithful to myself, with other words being authentic (Taylor, 2000: 14). It means carrying out a potentiality that is only mine, my own, proper originality. To articulate it means to defend myself. We are not dealing with some form of hedonism, of irresponsibility, not dealing with a feature of spoiled, egocentric generations, as some critics of modern individualism, of the 60s etc. tend to think. To be authentic is something that I must achieve, that I must desire to desire, even if I do not desire it factually: it is a value or an ideal respectively; it is something that I must reach to exist on a higher level. An articulate and cogent discussion about ideals is possible. This discussion can have positive effects. We must reflect an ideal of authenticity, we must detach it from its degraded forms and on the basis of such a cleaned ideal try to develop our society in a proper direction.

The formation of our identity is a dialogical and not a monological process. Our identity is built in relation to the important others. It also could not be formed without important entities, which are independent of us and which are called horizons by Taylor (*ibid.*: 35). To resign our bounds with others, with the past, history, God, nature etc. would mean eliminating all the candidates for important matters, and a nontrivial definition of me, you, him, her would be impossible. But, without such self-definition we cannot, *pace* Taylor, live authentically. Authenticity on the one hand includes creativity, construction and investigation of originality, quite often also an opposition to social rules; on the other hand the authenticity requests a regard of horizons, which constitute a background on which things could be important, and it also requests a dialogical definition of oneself (*ibid.*: 60). On that basis Taylor repudiates a set of views that accept only the first component of authenticity: Nietzsche's doctrine, several cults of violence (for instance futurism), postmodern neo-freudian doctrines of deconstruction (Derrida, Foucault), talking about self-determining freedom. These views, which are, at least some of them, attractive because they give a feeling of freedom and of power, are in their core anthropocentric or even less than that and as such *pace* Taylor they result in a loss of the meaning of life. A tension between both the elements of authenticity, the onesided, anthropocentric conceptions and pressures of an atomised and atomising society push the culture of authenticity into subjectivism.

The value of authenticity is that it demands of us a more responsible way of life and it makes possible a life, which is more manifold, more adjusted to every individual (*ibid.*: 66). We cannot ignore the power of the ideal of authenticity in our culture. The attempts to eradicate it do not make sense. We must shell out the best from that ideal and try to bring our praxis up to that level (*ibid.*: 68). We cannot expect a final solution. There is and will be a contest between the lower forms of authenticity, bureaucratic society and their

opposition. On that foundation Taylor rejects the too pessimistic and also the too optimistic views on the development of a modern society (Žalec, 2000; 133-136).

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## CONCLUSION

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Maybe somebody might complain of this essay that it should be an essay only on identity, not on the question What is a man? But we are human beings. And it seems obvious to me that part of the answer to Who or what am I? is constituted by our relation, our attitude to the philosophically anthropological question about man. The latter crucially determines the former. Our attitude towards the possibilities articulated by relevant philosophy<sup>8</sup> is a part of our nontrivial identity. Last, but not least, we may use words of Richard Rorty, with whom, as with Hegel in *Phenomenologie des Geistes*, we often find more than one text in one: everything is relational.

The topic, which occupied (Heidegger) and still occupies (Taylor) an important part of the philosophy of man is authenticity. It seems to me that Taylor has importantly deepened the discussion on that topic and that he has hit upon the real nerve of the contemporary problem of authenticity, individualism and relativism. He has offered an explanation as to why authenticity is like its bigger brother individualism: we can no longer do without it, but it demands a great effort of us to find a proper way to live it.

One of the great merits of Martin Buber is that he has succeeded in helping us essentially to see that philosophical anthropology cannot be successful for purely fundamental, inherently philosophical reasons, nor can it be individualistic, even less collectivistic. It could be such neither as a discipline which seeks or collects *differentia specifica* of man, nor as a visionary, if you like utopian, hence morally and politically anthropologically grounded philosophical thought. As such it actually oversees the potentials of human beings that are crucial for forming and creating a more acceptable world. We cannot outline important possibilities to throw light upon essential values and state-justified norms if we are blind to the things Buber has illuminated. But if the (idea of) mutuality starts to pervade us or our world, respectively, then the possible world of which the description starts with the words »Let's imagine the world in which mutuality plays a dominant role...« is a source of energy and a bright goal from which we cannot turn away anymore (despite the eventual utopicity), in short a full, efficacious, dominant, all-pervading value. A philosophy and its anthropology are, if not very poor, then still utopian and counterfactual. As such anthropology is, whether we like it or not, also a practical philosophy (it suggests to us what to do) and of an axiologically-moral nature. When we see a certain thing, even only in imagination, developed and clearly intuitively graspable depicted, we take, independently of our intention or will, also an axiologically-moral attitude to it.

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<sup>8</sup> (Historically) relevant philosophy is far from being detached from life, but represents an articulation of the problems, interests and intuitions of several social groups. In that sense relevant philosophy is practical and it is not arbitrary (compare MacIntyre, 2000). There is an analogy with politics. We often tend to think that politics is detached, alienated from us. But there is a sense in which our politics is our mirror: we have the politics we deserve: in Hitler's Germany, in Milošević's Serbia, in U.S.A., in our Slovenia, ...

A man and a person are in a certain sense functional concepts, as became clear also due to the credit of Cassirer and MacIntyre. And it seems to me evident that we cannot comprehend persons and their unities independently of some narrative.

Nonessentialism goes hand in hand with some kind of pragmatism, which is in a certain measure positive. A modern pragmatist refutes the grounding and justification of ethics or morality respectively. A moral stance is not a matter of rationality. If the moral »taste« is only a construction, all right. If it is something more »basic«, all right, too. About taste we cannot and we won't discuss. This sounds fine to me till the moment when this pragmatism becomes in fact a dogmatic demagoguery that with its talking about the irrationality of morality covers, hiding the possibility of a rational explication or demonstration of (certain) implications or consequences of the position in question. Here the ethics is a very rational matter and eo ipso is such also the philosophical anthropology. Again, »everything is relational«, as Rorty has written in trying to articulate the nerve of pragmatism.

## **POVZETEK**

*Gre za razpravo s področja filozofske antropologije. Njen namen je kritičen pregled sodobnih pogledov na teme, ki jih zaznamujejo besede, kot so identiteta, sebstvo, jaz, oseba in podobne. Pojmovanja so razvrščena v razne skupine in podskupine (psihološka, zatem zgodovinska, sociološka, kulturološka, antropološka in sorodna pojmovanja identitete ter filozofski razred). Primerjava tako obsežne pahljače pogledov morda ni tako pogosta, vendarle pa je potrebna, saj je eden od temeljnih ciljev znanosti ugotavljanje splošnih dejstev. Najpomembnejša dognanja in sklepi, ki so po avtorjevem mnenju pravilni, so naslednji: tema, s katero se je ukvarjal (Heidegger) in se še ukvarja (Taylor) pomembnen del filozofske misli o človeku, je pristnost. Ena od velikih zaslug Martina Bubra je, da je pokazal, da uspešna filozofska antropologija ne more biti, že zaradi čisto temeljnih, inherentno filozofskih razlogov, niti individualistična, še manj kolektivistična. Človek in oseba sta v določenem smislu funkcionalistična pojma. Nadalje, ne moremo razumeti oseb ali njihovih enotnosti ločeno od kakšne pripovedi. Človek je žival, ki pripoveduje zgodbe. Antiesencializem gre z roko v roki s pragmatizmom, kar je v določeni meri lahko dobro. Sodobni pragmatisti zavračajo utemeljevanje in upravičevanje morale oz. etike. Moralno stališče ni stvar racionalnosti. To je sprejemljivo do trenutka, ko ta pragmatizem ne postane dogmatična demagogija, ki s svojim govorjenjem o aracionalnosti morale zakriva, prikriva možnosti racionalne eksplikacije in demonstracije (določenih) implikacij ali posledic zadevnega stališča. Tukaj etika postane zelo racionalna zadeva in eo ipso tudi filozofska antropologija.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** človek, oseba, identiteta, antropologija, filozofija

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## **ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND DIDACTICAL EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW NINE-YEAR SCHOOL IN THE CONTEXT OF SLOVENE SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT**

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### **ABSTRACT**

The development of school towards a paradigm – partial or holistic, transmissive or transformational, automatic or holistic – depends on the answer to a basic anthropological question, i. e. whether school educates a divided or integrative individual and human personality. The question is whether this open, limited and mortal person can be holistic. To a holistic person just a holistic education suits. Our aim is to determine whether the curricular reform, completed in 1999, put forward a thorough anthropological transformation from a divided to a uniform person reflected in the relation between the existent eight-year and the evolving nine-year school.

By comparing the learning, teaching and thinking styles in the eight- and nine-year school (on a small random selection of 3 nine-year and 3 eight-year schools), we have tried to establish whether the characteristics of the transmissive school model have already changed in some respect and in which terms they are supposed to change in order to make the teaching and learning human being – homo educator and homo educans – more uniform.

In transformation school, teaching styles denote learning in the broadest sense. This means the use of such flexible styles of teaching, thinking and learning that entail many layers of existence and not just one, e.g. the rational or the empirical. At the outset we observed didactical performance and/or improvement in teaching one scientific and one social subject and one language at the six chosen schools. We have based our findings on interpretation of the empirical research instruments, e.g. questionnaires and interviews for teachers and students.

Most of the Slovene primary schools are still of the eight-year. The curricular reform has not yet gained ground. Therefore, no unambiguous answer can be given to the above mentioned question. However, it is encouraging to note that there are signs of

a transformation process in the eight-year school even though it is probable that the transmission model is prevailing due to the known factors.

**KEY WORDS:** transmissive school paradigm, transformational school paradigm, critical thinking, learning, primary school, educational anthropology

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## **POLEMICS REGARDING STARTING POINTS OF THE REFORM OF THE SLOVENE SCHOOL – A WAY TOWARDS A CRITICAL CONCEPT OF THE EDUCATION HUMAN BEING**

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It was the idea of former minister of education GABER to open up the current school system for organisational and functional upgrading. This is a good starting point for discussion on the transformational school model, are the teachers' answers to the questionnaires which indicate their beliefs that they develop pupils' critical thinking sufficiently, exercise inter-personal interaction and make use of dialogues through which pupils can establish their independence and strengthen their personality. We will recognize different answers to the main question of how qualitative education is possible.

Every new school represents an educational and anthropological challenge<sup>1</sup>. With Slovene independence, Slovene schools have become pluralistic – there is now more than one type of school (e. g. WALDORF primary school, different types of grammar schools and of other types of secondary schools) and they assume a different concept of a human being according to which side of the human being is given most prominence. The WALDORF school follows the teaching of its initiator STEINER and stresses the importance of the spiritual side of a human being; denominational grammar schools stress the religious side; classical grammar schools develop a human being as a being of languages; the new nine-year primary school brings to the fore development of pupils' critical thinking, putting pupils in less stressful situations, interdisciplinary approaches to teaching etc. (Primary School of TRNOVO, 2000). The school of JANKO GLAZER is based on the concept of W. GLASSER (1994). However, not only systemic changes lead to educational plurality but also changes in educational practice bringing about new theoretical challenges: the post-modern discussions on the human being can be seen as discussions on the spirit of the time<sup>2</sup>.

The question of the relation between external control and self-control of students is springing up again. Some public schools have been still too controlled and have not had enough self-regulation and self-control, which should be necessary because of multiculturalism in society. The institutional agents of political and educational culture have been discordant and diffused. There are JANKO GLAZER primary school, working in accordance with the model of control theory of William GLASSER, a primary school comprising elements of Montessori pedagogics, the WALDORF kindergarten, primary school and also

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<sup>1</sup> Educational and anthropological reactions to the challenge of practical teaching are numerous. Recently two publications have been issued: *Proceedings lovek in kurikulum* (Ed. NOVAK, 2000) and *Anthropological Notebooks*. Year 2000, No 1.

<sup>2</sup> For the interdisciplinary concept of the post-modern human being, see SUPEK (1996) and for the philosophical concept see RUS (2000).

a first grade of the WALDORF grammar school. There are also many types of grammar school: general, classic, technical, art grammar school and a grammar school with concession (PLEVNİK, 1998). Striving for quality and pluralism of culture and different kinds of schools without bureaucratic security is just as important as differentiation between public and private alternative schools. Differentiation of educational culture is thus reflected.

An analogical situation is found in pedagogy. Spiritual pedagogy prioritises wisdom i. e. educational knowledge that can help us by personal and spiritual growth. Pragmatic pedagogy prioritises knowledge that equips us for successful social functioning, reform pedagogy gives priority to experience over cognition and social critical pedagogy discovers the double nature of knowledge, which on the other hand leads to control over our behaviour and on the other hand prepares us for emancipation (ERMANC, 2000). In response to public opinion, the Slovenian liberal school policy has introduced the pragmatic concept of assessment which is based on the partial knowledge.

In the recent past, the concept of the uniform, socialistic and self-managing school made the process of nationalisation possible, entailing the leading role of the League of Communists and a uniform educational purpose of the all-round personality. In the last decade, the liberal-democratic and laic bases of the pluralistic primary school provide for an open anthropological concept which is not uniform in content, instead it develops just particular segments. There are many reasons why only one explicit concept of (primary) school is no longer possible: (1) there is no uniform concept of a human being, (2) there are more anthropological and educational concepts than could be put into educational practice (WULF, 1994, SCAGLIOSO, 1998), (3) the school is a complex institution in an ever more complex society (ŠTRAJN, 1998), (4) there is no monopolistic ideology. Private schools opt for one of the many educational and anthropological concepts as their foundation. The centralised public school – state - dependent – does not accept any of the concepts as the state does not set any educational objectives within their scope. The way to a new educational concept of a particular public school is the way to their autonomy. This is a long and bumpy road.

In the last decade the Slovene school has turned from a school of education/upbringing to school of knowledge (MARENTIČ POŽARNIK, 1998). As the concepts of transmission (in the sense of teaching), acquisition (in the sense of learning) and assessment of knowledge were differentiated, the shift does not in itself mean a shift of the school paradigm<sup>3</sup> from transmissive to transformational, from autocratic to democratic, from mainly reproductive to innovative, from programme-centred to ecological, from a strictly rational school of specialised argumentation to a school where not only scientific literacy but also emotional literacy is considered, and from a school as an inert institution to a dynamic school. Although this shift cannot be seen at some schools, and can hardly be seen at the others, educational anthropology<sup>4</sup> has still to identify these movements, assign them some reason and has to find an answer as to what a transition to the transformational, holistic

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**3** In the philosophy of science, T. Kuhn was the first to question the suitability of a paradigm. He assigned various meanings to a paradigm. Theoreticians of the '80s marked a divide between the old scientific paradigm - also referred to as Cartesian, mechanical, Newtonian - and the new one which is evolutionary, self-organisational, organic, holistic, new and organisational. In connection with this, transition from the transmissive school paradigm (pattern, model) to the transformational is mentioned.

**4** - Some papers in the proceedings look in kurikulum aim at analysing the differences between the human beings as they were designed and as they are. A similar situation is found in physical anthropology. There exist more archeological discoveries than this science can adequately recognise with its theory (CREMO, THOMPSON, 1996).

paradigm means at the turn of the century coinciding with the transition from the industrial to the informational society.

The contemporary Slovene public school is not a school for work and further education (with the exception of professional and vocational schools) but it is a school where knowledge is prevalent. Gradually, differentiation of knowledge is gaining ground, bringing about the new culture of assessing and evaluation; however, this knowledge still does not incorporate wisdom. Even the subjects such as ethics and society, religion and ethics could not fill this gap; however, the subject of civic education in the last but one grade both of primary school and the civic culture in the last grade put forward a human being as a political being and an active and well-read citizen of the Republic of Slovenia. The optional subjects learning to be in the last triad of the primary school, and learning to learn in the grammar school, considering Memorandum on Lifelong Learning (Council of Europe, 2001), research camps, research projects and project work have given more prominence to the human being as a learning being (Latin *homo educans*). At the same time, development of learning differentiates between the teaching styles of *homo educator*.

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## **EXCELLING THE TRANSMISSIVE SCHOOL PARADIGM**

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The school paradigm is defined by (lack of) autonomy of participants in education and of school in relation to the politics. Only an autonomous school can become a central institution of the society but decentred from the school policy. The Slovene school is centralised; however this does not make it a monopolistic and ideological state apparatus as long as the state gives up ideology. However, the school is still under the influence of the liberal ideology (PEDIČEK, 1998). It can also be characterised by lack of time for subjectiveness and subjective knowledge which leads to pupils' lack of internal motivation.

PEDIČEK (1992, 1994, 1998) laid the foundations for educational anthropology - a discipline offering an answer to the essential questions of the changing school paradigm from mechanical to holistic. As the Slovene liberal school did not make this shift with the attainment of the attainment of Slovene independence, PEDIČEK, like SVETINA, (1992) addressed critical remarks to it with reference to the spiritual dimension of a human being. Unlike PEDIČEK, SVETINA stressed the importance of competitiveness of the Slovene school regarding the position it takes between the eastern and western culture. PEDIČEK also stressed the significance of the educational, organisational, political and systemic dimensions of school. SVETINA limited himself just to the structural layers of a human being, ranging from biological, psychological, social or cultural to spiritual, whereas PEDIČEK also considered the phase-development of a human being, going from birth to death. Thus both of them have opened up a way to specification of lifelong learning according to special periods of life.

It is yet to become clear which model of spiritual culture our schools will take as a paradigm for its development. SVETINA (1992) wanted to integrate our schools in an international flow of Eastern and Western cultures. Realisation of SVETINA's model in school is questionable because it is not acceptable for each type of state and private school.

SVETINA'S and WALTERS' (WALTERS, 1990) vision of the upbringing for human life have included also preventive action based on old wisdom. Despite its pru-

dence, the wisdom does not belong essentially to our public school system. The teaching of the nature of inner man is lacking in the primary and secondary school. The students get a little information about it from the teacher of psychology, the Slovene language and sometimes in some other class. So the subject of philosophy exists only in the fourth class of grammar school. In the coming years two new facultative subjects will be introduced into school: the subject of religion and ethics into primary school and culture and ethics into secondary school.

The aim of school is to teach students how they can control the external material world, because if they can control the inner psychological world, they can also control the external one. Therefore the right education is self-education with the utensil of maturity (WALTERS, 1990). Our civilisation and culture intend to control the external world, but the upbringing for the future should insist on the control of our subjective world and prove that we can regulate ourselves.

Educational anthropology is an experiment in the interdisciplinary synthesis of all sciences which are occupied with educational questions. It is less developed in our country than in the Central and Western European Countries.

The policy has to regulate education in the sense which foresees developmental degrees and the flexible adaptation to anticipated cultural needs of the future. School administration does not try to introduce SVETINA'S, WALTERS' or GLASSER'S model of the good school because of its pragmatic policies.

The Educational anthropology maintains that the development of education is associated with the development of an individual human personality and with social development. The main problem in this development is the issue of its many-sidedness and, related to it, of its sustainability. Today, a hypothesis that is becoming upheld is that human development will be less sustainable and future-oriented the more human education becomes one-sided, and therefore the development of all human layers or dimensions will be neglected. The holistic paradigm should enable enforcement of sustainable development and quality of life. On the one hand, a human being, designed to be holistic, can organise the educational process holistically, on the other, the critical analysis of the results of learning and learning efficiency indicates that this objective has only partly reached. We can establish that the current curricular reform has not sufficiently set the development of pupils' and teachers' many-sided and various dimensions of a human being and partner, but the same could be asserted also for any other reform because the holism is a utopia – it makes sense to try to achieve it but due to the difference between the possible and the reality, it can never be completed. Due to the different and conflicting interests of education, the post-modern education is by no means a less perfect project than was the (pre-)modern education.

The openness and imperfection of the modern human being manifest themselves in education<sup>5</sup> – many external and internal factors having an influence on the school paradigm, which is consequently affected. The school paradigm is internally determined by the method of organising school management (DRUCKER, 2000), introduction of contemplation and meditation into schools, collaboration of schools (ERČULJ, TRUNK-ŠIRCA, 2000), school atmosphere, prevalence of one or another teaching and learning style, quality

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<sup>5</sup> For more, see ZALFČ, B. (2000) Education from the anthropological point of view. In *Anthropological Notebooks*, Year VI, no.1, pp. 9-19

of communication between the participants of education (in particular, teachers and pupils); and externally, it is determined by the political and cultural environment<sup>6</sup>. Education gives rise to new tendencies, to a different school management, to creating a school and class atmosphere, to flexible organisation of work, to working together of teachers (team teaching), to implementation of new teaching, learning and thinking styles. Among the changes in the relationship of school towards politics, national and local school policies should be mentioned as they support school autonomy, introduce partnership of parents in school management and organise schools in networks.

The model of the last curricular reform - which was completed in Slovenia in 1999 - provides for a well-read, educated, functional human being and for a being adapted to the capitalist system as much as possible. It has been virtually impossible to reach an overall national consensus regarding nationally-important educational objectives because the democratic educational and political cultures are not highly developed<sup>7</sup>. The Educational system in Slovenia enjoys the greatest popular support among the social subsystems. Hence, the public believes in the power of education and debates at least as much as it does in the use of force. Anthropologically, this marks the beginning of giving preference to and acknowledging a learning human being (lat. homo educans) over aggressive human beings asserting themselves by the policy of power (lat. homo brutalis). This is the basis for implementing a school of rational argumentation instead of school of memorising. The new curricula provide for transfer of some rational (thinking) patterns but they do not sufficiently provide for critical confrontation with the main social problems, and therefore they do not raise an independent personality but a mass of available people (URBANČIČ, 2000). Instructive subjects are making a come-back through civic education, civic culture and also through some optional contents that can be further differentiated.

The holistic model opens up room for changes because it anticipates any possible realisation. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the current school system insufficiently implements the basis and is insufficiently in conformity with a holistic human being, the whole human tradition and hence, the holistic ethical foundations for the life of a young person in modern society, in spite of the fact that it was published in the White Paper and adopted in Izhodišča kurikularne prenove (the Outline of curricular reform) (1995).

As we know, the school system can be narrow, repressive and rigid or receptive, open and liberal in the democratic sense as it »comprises a broad range of humanistic and artistic contents« (SVETINA, 1989). In the Slovene schools, the characteristics of the transmissive (mechanical, industrial) model are predominant despite some elements of the organic and cultural model. In terms of everyday problems, the integral model would be most appropriate; according to SVETINA (1989), only those teachers in the Slovene school for the new millennium could implement it »who know how to create a real spiritual environment and encourage genuine spiritual growth« (SVETINA, 1992: 234-235). In implementing the holistic school paradigm, the focus is not on the contradictory relation with the mechanical, Newtonian, Cartesian, industrial paradigm but mainly on integrity of the old and new paradigm.

<sup>6</sup> For the relationship between the similarities and differences between educational and political culture see NOVAK, B. 1998. Odnos med politično in pedagoško kulturo. In: ŠTRAJN, D. (Ed.). Družbene spremembe in izobraževanje. Ljubljana, Pedagoški inštitut, pp. 115-138.

<sup>7</sup> See TOŠ, N. et al., 2000. Vrednote v prehodu II. Slovensko javno mnenje 1990-1998. Ljubljana, IDV - CJMMK.

The Slovene school has programme characteristics (of various degrees) of the transformational school paradigm, such as: (1) implementation of the integrated curriculum; (2) application of interactive communication in concentric circles: pupils and their teacher, teachers among themselves, teachers and the head-teacher, teachers and parents, school and environment; (3) consistent development of biological, psychosocial and spiritual layers; (4) inter-institutional school ties (local community, enterprises, health centres, other schools); (5) modification of thinking, learning and teaching styles.

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### **IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CULTURE OF ASSESSMENT IN THE NINE-YEAR PRIMARY SCHOOL AS AN EXAMPLE OF TRANSCENDING THE TRANSMISSIVE MODEL**

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Modern school is knowledge-based; therefore, it matters how pupils learn and how the knowledge acquired is assessed by teachers. Assessment comprises testing, which refers to determining knowledge, and assessment proper which refers to determining and evaluating the knowledge acquired. Assessment is an integral part of educational process and like the curriculum, it determines the content and how it can be taught and learnt in school. It could be said that it significantly affects the quality of classes (BUCIK, 2001; 41-42).

Assessment proper has various roles to perform in the school system: to distribute and select pupils, to direct teacher's work, provide information to parents on their child's achievements and provide school policy with the same data, to monitor the attaining of national standards of knowledge. However, the central function of assessment is to promote quality learning (MARENTIČ POŽARNIK, 2001; 55-56). It has to be established that in the cognitive model, the key factor of achievement in school is how pupils and teachers perceive learning circumstances. Assessment crucially intervenes between the »input characteristics« of a pupil (capabilities, motivation) and his/her school results: the teaching approach and quality of school results depend on assessment. Therefore, the quality (sustainability and applicability) of the pupil's knowledge acquired provide a basis for making conclusions regarding the quality of processes leading to the result.

One of the objectives of the reform of the obligatory school is quality learning, teaching and assessment. Consequently, the evaluation study<sup>8</sup> focused on examination of the quality of the assessment process. A questionnaire on teaching styles was designed. The sample consisted of 78 teachers of a subject at primary schools, of which 37 teachers were at the eight-year primary school and 41 teachers at the nine-year school.

Assessment raises about the crucial question of the teacher's priorities in the assessment process: mere reproduction of the facts learnt or the reaction of pupils to various problem-oriented situations. The answers given by teachers of eight-year and nine-year primary schools to the questionnaires lead to the conclusion that the preference is not given to the reaction of pupils to various problem-oriented situations over the reproduction of facts learnt. Nevertheless, unlike the teachers of the eight-year schools, teachers of nine-year schools accept the challenges of a problem. A similar attitude of teachers toward the

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<sup>8</sup> This evaluation study of the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of Slovenia (2000-2002) is entitled: 'The importance of implementing new learning, thinking and teaching styles to ease the mind of pupils in the nine-year primary school (principal investigator) B. NOVAK, co-operators: M. IVANUŠ GRMEK, J. KOLENC.'

quality of the knowledge gained is evident from the value assigned to learning by heart and reformulation. It is important whether a teacher requires pupils to learn by heart or encourages pupils to understand the content and to reformulate it. The teachers answering the questionnaires were of the opinion that they give priority to reformulation of the contents learnt over learning by heart – in this case the teachers of eight-year school more frequently did answer that question positively than did their counterparts in the nine-year schools. Furthermore, a teachers' guiding pupils towards critical judgement is also important for the quality of learning, teaching and assessment. The teachers' answers point to a tendency to often assess attempts at independent critical judgement. This tendency occurs more frequently with the nine-year school teachers.

From the educational and anthropological aspect, the question of considering active participation of pupils in classes is relevant as far as assessment of pupils' knowledge is concerned. Many educational and didactical concepts suggest that it makes sense to involve pupils in the teaching process (development of partnership, of co-operative learning, of critical thinking, of the interest in the subject, of good atmosphere, of dialogue etc.) On the basis of teachers' answers it can be concluded that teachers in assessment quite often take into account pupils' initiatives and co-operation – teachers of nine-year schools do so more often than their counterparts in the eight-year school.

On the basis of comparison of teachers' answers of the eight-year schools and nine-year schools, it can be established that there are no statistically relevant differences between their answers. However, a tendency can be perceived with the nine-year school teachers who slightly more often than their counterparts of the eight-year school: encourage pupils to reformulate the learning contents, to try independent critical judgement and, in giving the mark, consider the pupil's participation and initiative-taking in the class.

The mentioned differences in answers given by teachers of the eight-year school and of the nine-year school cannot be explained with total certainty. The difference can depend on the personal approach of a teacher, on the teacher's positive attitude and the attitude of the school management toward introducing nine-year schools, on the atmosphere at school, on the support of professional education of teachers-colleagues, parents and headmaster, and on the influence of others factors that still have not been defined.

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## **CONCLUSION**

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The school of transmission with its focus on memorising, non-reflective learning and mainly rational thinking cannot comprise all four of Delors's pillars of learning. This is possible only for a school of transformation teaching of creative and critical thinking. It can be proved at several levels of the school system that the Slovene school has still belonged to the transmissive and not yet to the transformational model. Democratic educational and political cultures are not yet highly developed. The Slovene public school is still predominantly achievement-oriented. If the Slovene school should develop self-confident, tolerant, responsible, self-controlled, critically thinking, emancipated, educated and active citizens, who are not only rational but also emotional beings, then they should learn holistically.

The Cartesian school paradigm is a basis for a transmissive paradigm. It is surpassed at many levels of learning (DRYDEN, VOS, J., 2001), thinking (HENTIG, 1997), spiritual wisdom, teaching, thinking and learning styles and other didactical innovations

which contribute to a better quality of education. Nevertheless, it seems that in public schools a dual personality is predominant, meaning that homo educator and homo educans are still divided, similarly to the process of teaching at school and the process of learning at the pupil's home.

In conclusion, it could be said that implementation of the new nine-year primary school gives rise to new anthropological and educational questions. But a final answer cannot be given just yet. The primary school is to become more complex. As long as it follows the lines of transformation to a more stable democracy, and development of educational (school) and political cultures, the educational anthropology can help it by assigning theoretical reason to actual teaching; on the other hand the educational anthropology thus faces new challenges. However, if the school is static – at some segments it has to be – the educational anthropology can just reiterate the well-known standpoints.

### **POVZETEK**

*Razvoj šole v smeri parcialne ali celovite, transmissijske ali transformacijske, mehanske ali holistične paradigme je odvisen od odgovora na osnovno antropološko vprašanje, ali šola vzgoja in izobražuje razdvojeno, individualno človeško osebnost ali celovito in integrativno. Vprašanje je, ali je odprt, omejen in smrten človek lahko celovit. Celovitemu človeku ustreza le celovita edukacija. Naš namen je presoditi, ali je kurikularna reforma, ki se je končala 1999, izpostavila korenit antropološki preobrat od razdvojenega k celovitemu človeku, ki se zrcali v odnosu med še obstoječo osemletno in novo nastajajočo devetletno osnovno šolo.*

*S primerjavo učnih, poučevalnih in mišljenjskih stilov v osemletki in devetletki na izbranem, manjšem slučajnem vzorcu 3 devetletk in 3 osemletk smo skušali ugotoviti, ali so se značilnosti transmissijskega modela šole že v čem spremenile in v čem naj bi se, da bi človek kot homo educator in homo educandus, poučevalno in učeče se bitje lahko pojavljal celoviteje.*

*V transformacijski šoli bodo poučevalni stili postavljeni v vlogo učenja v najširšem smislu z uporabo takšnih fleksibilnih stilov poučevanja, mišljenja in učenja, ki vključujejo več ravni bivanja in ne le eno npr. racionalno ali empirično. Izhajali smo iz opazovanja didaktičnih izvedb oz. izboljšav pouka enega naravoslovnega, družboslovnega in jezikoslovnega predmeta na omenjenih šestih šolah, pri čemer smo se opirali na interpretacijo empiričnega raziskovalnega instrumentacija kot so ankete in intervjuji za učitelje in učence.*

*Večina osnovnih šol v Sloveniji je trenutno še osemletk. Kurikularna reforma se še ni prav prijela. Zato enoznačnega odgovora na zastavljeno vprašanje še nimamo. Spodobno pa je, da je mogoče opaziti znamenja transformacijskih procesov že znotraj osemletne osnovne šole, čeprav je verjetno, da je transmissijski model zaradi znanih pogojev še prevladujoč.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** transmissijska paradigma šole, transformacijska paradigma šole, kritično mišljenje, učenje, osnovna šola, pedagoška antropologija

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Bruno Latour has been one of the key figures in the field of cultural studies of science for almost twenty years, both in France and in the United States. In collaboration with Steve Woolgar, Latour conducted in the late 1970s one of the first ethnographic laboratory studies, the end product of which was published as *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts*. Works such as these revolutionized budding science studies research as they incorporated a new way of investigating science in the spirit of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, whose pioneering works have been recently translated into Slovene. *Pandora's Hope* is but the most recent of a series of Latour's influential works, including *The Pasteurization of France*; *We Have Never Been Modern*; *Aramis*, or *The Love of Technology*; and *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society*.

*Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies* is an edited collection of essays with which Latour attempts to answer a question asked of him at a conference: »Do you believe in reality?« While at first glance this question may seem absurd, it is in effect an accurate indicator of the level of communication and/or misunderstanding between scientists and science studies researchers. A great deal of science studies research, including research in the anthropology of science, has come under attack in recent years. Criticism of such research includes books such as *Higher Superstition: The Academic Left*

and its *Quarrels with Science* written by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt as well as NYU physics professor Alan Sokal's prank on the editors of the journal *Social Text* by successfully submitting for publication a nonsensical essay applying postmodern theory to quantum physics (*Social Text* 46(1996)). While Latour does not engage in another round of what has been referred to as the »science wars«, his collection of essays comprise the most comprehensive depiction of his position as a science studies researcher thus far. As he himself writes, his scientist colleague's question »Do you believe in reality?« signalled to him the extent to which his research and that of other social science researchers has been misinterpreted. »What I would call 'adding realism to science' was actually seen...as a threat to the calling of science, as a way of decreasing its stake in truth and its claims to certainty...The distance between what I thought we had achieved in science studies and what was implied by this question was so vast that I needed to retrace my steps a bit. And so this book was born« (p. 3).

Latour's aim in this work is to unravel the differences in references made to reality by scientists and science studies researchers as well as to analyze why scientists would ask this sort of question (»Do you believe in reality?«) of science studies researchers. Latour explains that the position of science studies researchers does not advocate the position opposite to that of scientists: »that there is no reality out there; that everything goes; that science has no conceptual content; that the more ignorant one is the better; that everything is political anyway; that subjectivity should be mingled with objectivity; that the mightiest, manliest, and hairiest scientist always wins provided he has enough 'allies' in high places« (p. 300), and so on. Instead Latour argues that science studies' focus

on scientific practice enables researchers to view the work of scientists from a point of view independent of the way that scientists view themselves and their work, a point of view that scientists cannot assimilate into their way of thinking. Hence the question: »Do you believe in reality?«

While at first this question seems straightforward, Latour explains that it in turn presumes a set of questions, none of which can be defined separately: »the epistemological question of how we can know the outside world, the psychological question of how a mind can maintain a connection with the outside world, the political question of how we can keep order in society, and the moral question of how we can live a good life« (p. 310). In order to argue the case for reality in science studies, Latour addresses all the different aspects of this question. Such a task requires of him a thoroughness and lucidity of argument that ultimately makes this work accessible and interesting for all sorts of readers. Furthermore, Latour is very balanced in his presentation of science and science studies researchers; while occasionally irreverent in style (he depicts Descartes' bodiless observer as a mind-in-a-vat), he avoids being reductive in his criticism.

In the first chapter Latour outlines the intellectual history of the question posed to him, tracing its philosophical roots to Descartes and Kant. The question as it posed by scientists presumes a relation of absolute knowledge between a disembodied mind and an outside world: subject and object. In this sort of relationship the social, i.e. society, as well as the outside world is presumed to be objective and passive, to be acted upon by the bodiless observer. Latour dedicates the remaining chapters to explaining how and why science studies' focus on scientific practice has up-ended the presumed relationship among these factors. In chapter two Latour

argues that in observing the scientists in action one soon is faced with the inaccuracy of the presumed relation between a disembodied mind and a pristine, outside world. Such a relation presumes a range of instruments and disciplines to which scientists have constant access and that always already mediate the supposed confrontation between mind and object that is continually written out of scientific discourse. In chapter three Latour turns to the distinction made between the context and content of science, and employs the story of physicist Frederic Joliot's efforts at producing the first artificial nuclear chain reaction to demonstrate how one cannot analyze science separate from the rest of society. Instead, in constructing a circulatory system model of scientific facts, Latour tries to point to a different sort of relationship between science and society.

In chapters four, five and six he focuses on the outside world of objects in relation to the issues of fabrication and construction (are objects real or are they fabricated?) often identified with science studies, particularly insofar as there are associated with social constructivism. Through a discussion of Pasteur's laboratory experiments with lactic acid ferment, Latour compares the relationship presumed between scientist and object upon which the question of construction is based, and the one that can be gleaned from observing laboratory experiments. Rethinking the distribution of agency and temporality between subject and object, and becoming aware of changes both in subjects AND objects in a laboratory setting may enable us to modify our understanding of construction, particularly its supposed opposition to autonomy identified with reality. Instead of identifying autonomy with reality, Latour argues that it is the relations between what are termed subjects and objects (which he refers to as humans and nonhumans exist-

ing together in a collective) that render both subjects and objects real.

After having addressed the relationship between science and society in chapter three, Latour turns his attention in chapters seven and eight to the roots of the distinction between science and society presumed by scientists. According to Latour, the opposition to science studies' statements concerning the constructedness of reality (which scientists equate with artificiality) lies in scientists' fear that reality be reduced to depending on whatever society wants it to be: the ancient division between might vs. right. In a search for another way to imagine the interaction between science and society, Latour traces this opposition back to the Gorgias, Socrates' famous debates with the Sophists and to particular definitions of rhetoric, politics, and the polity (society) reduced to brute force.

In the final chapter Latour once again brings to bear science studies' focus on scientific practice to re-evaluate the distinction between reality and fabrication, fact and fetish. Observation of science in action reveals what is erased from science in theory, namely that both facts and fetishes are constructed, and that scientists' agency depends on their eliding their roles in the construction of scientific facts while in turn disclosing the constructedness of fetishes. However, Latour argues, science studies should not content itself with revealing the constructedness of scientific facts (which is what scientists do with fetishes) but instead focus on why some are considered facts and some fetishes.

Given the state of affairs in the »science wars«, it is doubtful that Pandora's Hope will win over any converts. However, it is a very welcome addition to the discussions between scientists and science studies researchers, as Latour brings two decades of experience in the field of science studies to bear on his efforts to

clarify his position, particularly against the generalizations made about the field. In this fashion Pandora's Hope will be interesting reading for scientists, for science studies specialists, and for those who are searching for a useful introduction to the field of science studies and the anthropology of science.

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