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

year II, no. 1

MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

edited by Borut Telban

LJUBLJANA 1996

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ANTHROPOLOGICAL NOTEBOOKS II/1 - SPECIAL ISSUE

MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

Edited by Borut Telban

DRUŠTVO ANTROPOLOGOV SLOVENIJE
SLOVENE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY
LJUBLJANA, 1996

MULTIPLE IDENTITIES
Edited by Borut Telban
ANTHROPOLOGICAL NOTEBOOKS
YEAR II, NO. 1
SPECIAL ISSUE

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Editorial Board:
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Design: Mima Suhadolc
Cover, obituary and bookmark photo: © 1987 FINANCIAL TIMES. Photograph by Ashley Ashwood
Print: Tiskarna Artelj

According to the opinion issued by the Ministry of Education and Sport of Republic of Slovenia No. 415 - 181/96 from October 3, 1996, this publication is subject to 5 percent tax on distribution of goods.

The publication was financed by the Open Society Institute - Slovenia.

The volume is printed entirely on recycled paper.

ISSN: 1408 - 032X

CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji
Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana

39:316
316.7

MULTIPLE identities / edited by Borut Telban. - Ljubljana: Društvo antropologov Slovenije = Slovene Anthropological Society, 1996. - (Anthropological notebooks; 2, no. 1)

ISBN: 961-90451-0-6
1. Telban, Borut
63901440

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INTRODUCTION: THE MYSTERY OF IDENTITY

BORUT TELBAN*

> *The anguish and disorientation which finds expression in this hunger to belong, and hence in the "politics of identity" - not necessarily national identity - is no more a moving force of history than the hunger for "law and order" which is an equally understandable response to another aspect of social disorganization. Both are symptoms of sickness rather than diagnosis, let alone therapy.*
>
> Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780.*

> *To forget and - I will venture to say - to get one's history wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation.*
>
> Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*

On my return from Australia to Europe I was approached by a Slovene anthropologist, a PhD student, who has over the past few years put substantial effort into creating and preserving a journal which would provide all those trying to make their living as Slovene anthropologists with a place to publish and a forum for exchanging their ideas. She also had international ambitions for *Anthropological Notebooks*, which seemed, however, in view of the many anthropological journals around the world, somewhat unrealistic. Nevertheless, I believed and still believe in her brave attempt to provide, if nothing else, all those interested in anthropology in Slovenia with something specifically anthropological published within this new nation-state. So I accepted her offer to edit one issue and without thinking very much about it I proposed the general theme of identity. Also, as I learned shortly afterwards, a Slovene professor of social and political anthropology had just published a book with the title *Identity* (Južnič 1993) in which he systematically addressed different concepts and contexts he found to be important in the formation and preservation of individual and collective identities. As I was, in December 1994, just about to attend the Basel Conference of the European Society for Oceanists, with its central theme *Knowing Oceania: Constituting Knowledge and Identities*, I thought that I would ask some of the participants for their contributions. Although I had used the term identity in the subtitle of my PhD dissertation based on fieldwork in Papua New Guinea, the more I read about identity and related subjects such as nation, nationality, nationalism, ethnicity, race, gender and the like, and the more I monitored the discourse of identity in politics and popular journals, the more aware I became of

---

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the complexity of the issue. While it seemed that collective identity in a Papua New Guinean village was an inseparable part of everyday life, the conceptualizations of identities in terms of nationality, ethnicity and so on seemed to be more detached from persons, and more abstract and mysterious than I previously thought. So I decided to write an introduction to the present set of papers which would compare something which at first glance may seem non-comparable: the identity of people from Ambonwari village of Papua New Guinea, and the identity of Slovenes. The latter will be looked at in two different contexts: in Australia and in Slovenia. I am aware that a village in a barely accessible rainforest, lacking all kinds of institutions which are indispensable to the constitution and functioning of a nation-state, cannot simply be equated to a community of migrants or to a new nation-state within rapidly changing Europe. On the other hand, the differences between two conceptualisations of identity may provide some interesting insights about both Ambonwari and our own lives as Europeans.

My aim in this introduction is not to review the literature on nationality, ethnicity and identity, as Ana María Alonso (1994), for example, has recently done. When I entered the key word into the library computer at the University of Manchester I was given 653 items with "identity" in their titles. I also do not intend to talk about ethnicity and migrants from other parts of former Yugoslavia. I do, however, want to present some of my views based mainly on my own experiences, and pose some questions and answers about the politics of identity in Slovenia and the issues of nationalism.

When I returned to Slovenia in June 1994, it was not just the nation itself but nationalism which made me feel uncomfortable and unfree. All "etiquettes" and national symbols (including the Slovene language) used in political and popular discourse seemed to me to be mystifying abstractions or ephemeral concepts which could change according to the political and ideological conceptualizations of those in power, that is, of all those who manipulate collective sentiments and manage to construct "imagined communities" (Anderson 1991 [1983]). All the changes, however, struck me as the painful reality of the historical period in which we live. Like many others, I was first a citizen of Yugoslavia and now I am a citizen of Slovenia. My official country has changed. Language, territory (with borders), "culture" and independent government became issues which, by relying on an artificially generated national sentiment, served politicians to justify the formation of a new nation-state. Slovenes did not invent anything particularly new with our nation and nationalism but were simply caught up in a wider process which began in the latter half of the eighteenth century.[1]

For sociobiologists (who see ethnicity as an extension of kinship) and all those who conform to the primordialist position, nations and ethnic communities are innate aspects of human identity; they are perennial and natural units of history. After the publication of *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte* (*Yet Another Philosophy of History*) in 1774, Herder's notion of "cultural historicism" (that is, of history as "the means of grasping the cultural unity and collectivity", Giddens 1985:216), influenced German Romanticism which privileged folklore and the acculturation and nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe, especially those of the Slavic speaking peoples (Dumont 1986:120; Hobsbawm 1992). It was Marxist and Stalinist thought, strengthened by historicism, which promoted the notion that patriotism and even nationalism are natural and eternal truths (Lefebvre 1991:111). It comes as no surprise that the Soviet ethnographers, whose influence on Yugoslav and Slovene ethnology cannot be ignored, were most clearly primordial (see Banks 1996). Among the analysts who reject such a view are those (Cohen and Gellner, for example) who see nation and ethnicity as artefacts produced by people for some common purpose. For so called "instrumentalists", nation and ethnicity are inseparable from economics and politics, therefore forming a "political ethnicity" which is built upon some pre-existing form of cultural identity (Banks 1996:35, 39). Gellner, among others, entirely rejects the primordialist position, saying that regarding nations as a natural way of classifying humans or as having inherent political destinies is a myth: "nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: **that** is a reality" (1983:48-9).

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[1] Nations and nationalisms are modern phenomena, products of, among other things, capitalism, bureaucracy, secular utilitarinism and industrialism (Banks 1996:126; Smith 1986:8). For Gellner, "[n]ationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent... Nationalist **sentiment** is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment" (1983:1).

Nationalisms characterize the socio-political processes of our age. As Kapferer suggested, in nationalist movements culture is objectified and becomes a thing of worship and the servant of power (1988:209).[2] The objectification of culture, "[t]urned into an instrument of nationalism ... becomes totalitarian in form, collapsing 'diverse realities' into its own uniformity" (Cohen 1994:158 after Kapferer 1988:4). The movement of nationalism, as Gellner has argued, is not the product of ideological aberration nor of emotional excess, but "the external manifestation of a deep adjustment in the relationship between polity and culture which is quite unavoidable" (1983:35). In reality, it is "the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state" (*ibid.*:48). It seems that in Slovenia, for example, such an objectification, adjustment and modification of culture and politics suffers from false consciousness. It claims (obsessively doing so) to safeguard and preserve tradition, old folk cultural values, concern for national territory and the Slovene language, while in fact forging a high culture and "helping to build up an anonymous mass society" (Gellner 1993:124). Such a claim ignores and denies the continuous process of change in folk and peasant societies. In short, the stress on Sloveneness in its most traditional sense is a deception carried out by those in power, especially the nationalists.[3] While the emphasised Slovene conscience might be justified as the protection of a minority during the threat of attacks by the Yugoslav army and seemed necessary for the constitution of independence

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[2] This view is somewhat similar to the one of Žižek who, while approaching the question of nationalism (the eruption of "enjoyment" into the social field) from a different, i.e. Lacanian perspective, asserts that "[n]ational identification is by definition sustained by a relationship toward the Nation qua Thing... If we are asked how we can recognize the presence of this Thing, the only consistent answer is that the Thing is present in that elusive entity called 'our way of life'" (1993:201).

[3] "Throughout Europe, the rise of nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries was given impetus by the scholarly activities of lexicographers, grammarians, folklorists, and philologists, who standardized language forms, produced dictionaries, and published folklore collections in the so-called national languages" (Badone 1992:812; see also Smith 1986:138,181). Slovene ethnology is still trapped in this kind of "tradition", which has had, during the process of social change and the nationalistic struggle for independence, even solidified its dominance and justified its ethnographic research of their own "folk". While arguments about what is ethnology and what anthropology, who are ethnologists and who anthropologists, continue to prevail in the struggle for dominance, none of the actors involved recognize their common habitus, which underlies their thoughts and practices (including scholary activities) and restricts their ability to see, think and feel the world differently and to practice their subject in a more open-minded way. On the other hand, the majority of those who try to do so, neglect longterm fieldwork and show their enthusiasm primarily for Western (mainly American) postmodernist and feminist ideas (anthropology and anthropologists of other Eastern European countries encounter similar problems, see Kürti 1996).

(following the history of the constitution of nation-states and the Janus-faced character of nationalism), the nationalism which succeeded it became outward oriented, illtreating the unprotected minorities and expelling them from the new nation-state.

In what follows, I will first discuss the conceptualization of identity in Ambonwari, Papua New Guinea, where I did my fieldwork, and then of Slovenes in Australia and in Slovenia. At the end I will provide a short summary of the articles which follow this introduction. Although each paper addresses the issue of identity they were not written specifically for this edition. All but one of the articles have not been previously published. The contributors Christine Jourdan, Jean Lave, Rozanna Lilley, Robert Tonkinson and Michael Young were kind enough to send me papers which they could easily publish in other, more prestigious journals. With their geographical diversity dealing with subjects as different as Australian Aborigines of the Western Desert, the citizens of Honiara in the Solomon Islands, people living in Hong Kong and the British community in Portugal, peasants from the Lesquire region in France, Massim islanders and Hageners of Papua New Guinea, and with their focus on different aspects of identity, the articles present an excellent range of examples of the complexity of peoples' continual struggle for identity within the changing world. Because for many years I have studied the writings of Pierre Bourdieu and Marilyn Strathern, I asked each of them for a contribution. Bourdieu proposed that we reprint his article which was previously, in 1989, published in *Études Rurales* (the only article in this issue published in French) and Strathern provided me with a paper written in 1983 which has been cited from time to time but was never actually published. She suggested that we could, by publishing it, participate in its "archival rescue". All the books reviewed at the end of the journal were deliberately chosen for their focus on identity, ethnicity and nationalism. The journal includes an obituary for the late Ernest Gellner whose work over the decades has illuminated many issues of national identity, especially those of nationalism.[4] As is evident, his scholarship has also proved indispensable in the preparation of this introduction.

AMBONWARI

Ambonwari people, of East Sepik Province in Papua New Guinea, consider themselves to be an independent group, while at the same time acknowledging totemic relationships with communities beyond their own. There are eight main villages, Ambonwari being the largest one, in which about 2000 people speak Karawari language (people call it "our mouth"). This is classified as a member of the Lower Sepik Family which belongs to the large group of Papuan languages (Foley 1986; Telban in press a). People recognize their past and present relations (both amicable and hostile) with other Karawari-speaking people, as well as with individual villages from other surrounding language groups, such as Arafundi, Biwat and Yimas. The latter's language and culture is closest to Karawari.

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[4] In an obituary published in *Anthropology Today*, Adam Kuper summarizes Gellner's main thesis: "that industrial and secular modern societies would inevitably become nationalistic. Traditional societies were stratified, culturally plural, religious. Their stability was guaranteed by the limited horizons and repetitive experience of local communities. Industrial societies had to foster a complex division of labour, labour mobility, universal literacy, competitive individualism, and cultural homogeneity; and only a nationalist ideology, or perhaps a puritan version of Islam, could motivate the political arrangements necessary to manage these great social changes" (1996:20).

Ambonwari people call their place Ambanwyurin. The name actually refers to the nearby sago forest where the original village stood long ago. People refer to themselves as Ambanwurinmas if men, Ambanwurinkmbi if children, and Ambanwuringa if women. If a collective term is needed for the people of the village (though such a concept is seldom used), the last, feminine term is employed. The literal translation of the name means "the people who plan at night" or "the night people from a dense jungle". I never heard Ambonwari people group themselves under the wider Karawari name. It is interesting and important to note that many linguistically and culturally related groups in Papua New Guinea seldom identify themselves by one name, the one which would emphasize either their linguistic, their cultural or their territorial connection. Explorers, missionaries, linguists, anthropologists and other visitors imposed on peoples and their languages the collective names which they themselves did not use. Thus, for example, Tuzin calls the wider cultural and dialect group of people (living in seven villages) Ilahita Arapesh after their largest village of Ilahita in which he conducted most of his research (1976:xxi, 20). Aware of the problem, especially in grouping people into linguistic families, he notes: "In fairness, I hasten to point out that in New Guinea assigning names to cultural and/or linguistic groups is a difficult and thankless task, one in which all interests and preferences cannot be accommodated simultaneously" (ibid.:18 f.n.10). To take another, more recent example, Jenkins (1987) has applied the spurious term Hagahai to people in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea who comprise the following groups: Aramo, Luyaluya, Mamusi, Miamia, Pinai and Penale. Hagahai loosely means "Hey, you folks" (Jenkins 1988), and understandably, the people have never called themselves by this term (Telban 1988a:41 n.1; 1988b:166 n.2).[5]

People say that only humans and spirits can make *imngga* (village), a place which "stands" (*imng-*), and is built by humans and spirits to live in. What distinguishes Ambonwari people from other humans and spirits is their own way of being, i.e. the way they "stand". This "way" (*kay*) is for Ambonwari the crucial term in the language of identity. However, it is a term which signifies much more than just "way", as I show briefly below and as I have discussed at length elsewhere (Telban 1994).

Ambonwari refer to their collective identity as *imnggan kay* ("the way of the village"). This represents the habitual practices of daily life, collective ceremonies, and the entire valued past as an embodied collective history which "functions at every moment as a **matrix of perception, appreciation, and actions**" (Bourdieu 1977:83). *Kay* (habit, way, manner, ritual, being) relates to the whole realm of practice: from mundane food gathering to the most important ritual. For Ambonwari, it includes both the collective and the idiosyncratic; moreover, it denotes not just the practice as such but the manner in which it is carried out too. Only through its "way" does a practice achieve its specificity. Furthermore, *kay* relates not only to the subject who performs the action, but is also comprehended through the object or subject (as an extension of a being) on which or with which this activity is performed. Thus, the things used by people in their daily activities are inseparable from *kay*. *Kay* (way, manner, habit) also becomes the main characteristic of an individual, whose existence is secured by his or her personal spirit and whose understanding of and reflection upon the world, present, past, and future, is a consequence of his or her "insideness" (understanding, Heart; see Telban 1993).

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[5] Among Australian Aborigines, too, language was not a commonly used label of self-reference (Tonkinson, this issue). Giddens (1985:117) also supports the argument that in small tribal communities language was not a significant index of identity.

A child is born into the village, into a ward, into a clan and lineage, and into a household. A child obtains a name and is cared for. The name **is** a person, which means that it carries with it both collective and individual, past and present characteristics of a person. Christian names, on the other hand, are without power and do not convey any mythical or ancestral meanings and values. Beyond their pragmatic daily use, they are unimportant for people's identity; they are useless for spirits and sorcerers, because a Christian name cannot be identified with an Ambonwari person. Christian names did not bring the people those benefits which they, from the perspective of their own naming system, associated with and expected from them (Telban 1994, 1995).

An Ambonwari person is born into an intimate environment of flowering plants, the smell of sago pudding and smoked fish, the taste of soft sago grubs and refreshing green coconuts, into the sight of foggy mornings, rising water in creeks, into the painful touch of sago palm thorns. She or he is introduced into the ways of living within this intimate environment and the ways of dealing with it (processing sago, using fish traps, paddling canoes...). She or he acquires these practices mimetically. By being born, a person is defined by all those spatial, bodily and narrative identifiers (descent, kinship, myths, names, language, land to use, land to live on, and so on) which provide the basis for a person's life in a particular community. These identifiers place an individual in the historical horizon of the community. An individual assimilates stories, familiar ones with which he or she can identify, or foreign ones which because of their "difference" continuously build his or her identity. "To a large extent, in fact, the identity of a person or a community is made up of these identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes *in* which the person or the community recognizes itself" (Ricoeur 1992:121). With such an identity a person enters village life, a familiar environment and interpersonal and inter-group relationships. In the case of a family, relationships, reciprocity, intersubjectivity, and identity exist in a relatively closed system. To become aware of and to recognize identity in its wider meanings, the household must be transcended. Only after a child perceives the world beyond its own household can the latter be apprehended as providing the child with its essential identity. This echoes Lévi-Strauss's notion (1969:51) that the elementary form of human kinship lies not in the isolated family but in the relations between several.

When referring to ceremonies, habitual practices, people's thought and speech, myths and stories, people's movements between wards, their marriages and exchanges, in short, anything they see as part of "their way" (*imnggan kay*) - that which gives them individual and collective identity - Ambonwari use three key expressions: *kay* itself, *konggong* (path; marriage) and *mariawk* (speech, discourse, thought; story, myth). With the additional word *kupambn* all the above concepts become related to the past: *kupambn kay* ("the way of the ancestors"), *kupambn konggong* ("the path of the ancestors") and *kupambn mariawk* ("the story of the ancestors") which are either used as generalizing terms for their past or refer to a particular ritual, marriage or myth, respectively. When used with *kupambn* (ancestral), *kay* refers to the past, ancestral identity of the whole village, being thus the most important aspect of *imnggan kay* ("the way of the village"). In contrast, *kupambn mariawk* (myth) and *kupambn konggong* (ancestral path, ancestral marriage) are specific for every clan, differentiating them from one another. *Mariawk* (speech) and *konggong* (path) always remain the two dimensions of identity which differentiate clans, lineages and households. Neither *mariawk* nor *konggong* are used together with *imnggan* ("of the village").

Ambonwari cosmology, social structure, kinship, marriages and different institutions (see Telban 1994, 1996) all allow and oblige the community and its culture to perpetuate themselves. If for the sake of the argument we take Ambonwari-like societies and their traditions as being "premodern", this does not yet mean that "[i]n premodern societies, identity was unproblematical and not subject to reflection or discussion" (Kellner 1992:141). For us human beings, identity has always been problematic and the subject of reflection and discussion. In Ambonwari almost 40 percent of the population had been given away (mainly as children) from one lineage to another, from one clan to another. In such a way people's identity changes and, moreover, does not necessarily remain the same for the rest of their lives. Some already adult men give up their identity and adopt the identity of some other clan or lineage which had, for example, died out in the past. People give their own roles and statuses to others to facilitate their inclusion into the society or a group. Identifying symbols, signs, myths, narratives, names and spirit-things of one clan may be forgotten, lost or may be given away to individuals and groups from other clans (or even other villages and other language groups), or they can be contested and even stolen as Simon Harrison (1990) has shown for Manambu people from the same province of New Guinea. Other groups may appropriate them and use them as their own. A group can thus become "homeless". Changes in power and hierarchy occur as other groups claim the paths and therefore land, primacy in ritual or leadership. During disputes, especially about the land, people's identities rely on both "a historical right to specific territory and a territorial right to a particular history" (Alonso 1988:41). Opposing groups tend to generate different myths; they narrate variations to support their own political interests. In such situations, myth and ritual are not a "chorus of harmony" but a language of argument (Appadurai 1981:202; Leach 1965). In this way a particular group or an individual gains a new identity which changes their status in a particular community.

Many Ambonwari people have multiple identities, each of which becomes important in a particular situation, in a particular moment of crisis. It is true that kinship, marriage and social structure in the past work of anthropologists were, partially because of their complexity and incomprehensibility to European thought, presented in a way which gave them a fixed, solid and stable image. This image was canvassed by an ahistorical approach. But within such a group of people, and that is what we look at when we talk about our own societies, neither kinship nor marriage nor social structure were or are fixed but had and have to be continuously negotiated. In Ambonwari, for example, there was a particularly drastic case of changing identity. Two clans who joined the village three or so generations ago were still unsure if they wanted to be Ambonwari. Though they gave up their own language, they could still not incorporate their stories, their ways of doing things (the relationships with their ancestral spirits) and their paths (including marriages). Sometimes they tried to be Ambonwari (they joined the village initiation practices, for example, see Telban in press c); at other times they tried to separate (by building a men's house at their old place and presenting their previous spirits with a pig's head). Despite trying to accomodate the "newcomers", other Ambonwari people did not want to give them too much hierarchical power. The "newcomers", and especially those who were high in their own hierarchical scale, suffered from a situation in which they did not have the same status as they would if they returned to their old place. Witnessing such an existential confusion during a period of eighteen months, I really cannot agree with Kellner when he says that "in pre-modern societies

... [i]ndividuals did not undergo identity crises, or radically modify their identity. One was a hunter and a member of the tribe and that was that" (1992:141). *Pace* Kellner, despite the undeniable complexity of modern identities in the world of nations, to disregard the complexity of identity in tribal societies is an oversimplification based on an Eurocentric view.

But what about Ambonwari in a wider Papua New Guinean context? Almost everyone in the village also speaks Tok Pisin (though people use it only on special occasions), which, along with Motu and English, is one of the official languages in a country where some 750 languages are spoken and which gained its independence in 1975. Some of the neighbouring groups, such as Murik and to some extent Yimas, for instance, have almost totally replaced their own language with Tok Pisin (Christine Jourdan, this issue, discusses people's use of Pijin in the Solomon Islands). However, in losing their own language, Yimas and Murik are still Yimas and Murik. Though Ambonwari people see themselves as being "Sepik" and Papua New Guineans (the latter concept being imposed on them first by colonial and later by national governments), while at the same time recognizing the differences between groups, it is their mental attitude and enjoyment of their own expressions which preserve their language (cf. Foley 1986:28). Although they acknowledge that they feel remote from urban life, Ambonwari do make use of all the things to which they have access as citizens of Papua New Guinea. These things have become part of their practices and therefore of their *kay*. Daily activities such as hunting and fishing in which people use guns, mass-produced nets, lines and hooks and torches are obvious examples of these changes. People use cotton mosquito nets, kerosine lamps, and outboard motors and know how to repair them. Moreover, the villagers produce rubber, work on tourist boats and at the Karawari Lodge, and they try their hand at business by opening trade stores. They attend local school, visit the aid post when they are sick, eat rice and tinned fish, and make a Christian holiday of Sunday. All these features, characteristic of other Sepik societies and New Guinea at large, are certainly part of contemporary Ambonwari "way of the village". All these practices and things are appropriated through their own cosmology and therefore receive Ambonwari-specific identities. They also listen to the radio with its news of a world of computers, space travel and war, which they in some vague sense share but which are not part of their *kay*. Most of these changes could be grouped under the term "economic changes" while institutions such as Christianity or school education remain secondary to their own ways of doing things. Therefore, the whole notion of citizenship and the feeling of belonging to Papua New Guinea as a nation are only reserved for communication with infrequent expatriate and governmental visitors.

In contrast to Chambri with their Chambri Camp, for example, Ambonwari do not have their own settlement in Wewak, the capital of the East Sepik Province. From the 1930s through the 1950s Wewak was a place of departure for the labour migrants who went to work on the plantations of New Britain and New Ireland (Gewertz and Errington 1991). Many Ambonwari joined these temporary migrations too. By the early 1970s, however, Chambri began to travel to Wewak in larger numbers to earn money, much of which they sent back to their villages. "[T]he camp came to look and function like a Chambri village" (*ibid.*:101-2). While Chambri are now caught up in processes of social and cultural change, both in town and in their home villages, Ambonwari (and Karawari at large) incorporate these changes mainly within their own places. Only a few individuals leave their villages for more than a year or two and even fewer remain permanently in town.

I am aware that it is hard to comprehend Ambonwari conceptualisations of their life-world through such an abbreviated summary. However, for the purpose of this

Introduction I wanted to point out that it is not a set of seemingly fixed concepts, such as culture and physical appearance, language and territory, which Ambonwari use to express their conceptualization of identity but rather "way of doing things", "speech" and "paths". And this, I think, is not unique to them but, as I will argue below, is the universal experience of being-in-the-world. In the following section I address some of the issues which preoccupied Slovenes in both Australia and Slovenia over the last decade. These issues are a way of introducing institutions and concepts typical of nation-states in general.

BEING SLOVENE IN AUSTRALIA AND BEING SLOVENE IN SLOVENIA

Slovenes migrated to North and South America, Canada and Western Europe at the beginning of this century, but Australia became important for Slovene migrants only after the Second World War.[6] The first were so-called political emigrants. Fear of Russians, communism and later the effects of industrialisation followed by the movements from villages to towns (in the 1950s and 1960s), along with various social and economic problems encouraged migration to Australia. This reached its peak in 1957 (Čebulj-Sajko 1992:60). The first migrants were followed by family members and spouses, many of whom were married by proxy, that is, husband and wife were in different parts of the world at the time of marriage. This kind of chain migration was characteristic of Slovenes especially after the 1960s. However, it has never developed to the same extent that it did among other Yugoslav "ethnic" groups. People from the Balkans did not easily accept the Western way of life in Australia and their habits remained foreign to other Australians. In psychiatric hospitals in New South Wales and Victoria in 1981-82 most of the patients were Yugoslavs. They, like many other nationalities, simply could not be incorporated into the dominant Australian model of assimilation. During the 80's the politics of multiculturalism provided an alternative (*ibid.*:33-4).

Slovenes in Australia often talk about dismemberment between two worlds, between homeland and a foreign country. It is not just Slovene territory as such which makes people long for the homeland but, as two of Čebulj-Sajko's informants explained, dreams about "**that** view over the field", "**those** days in the year, Christmas, for example", "**that** kitchen", "**our** mountains", "**the old** lime-tree", **the old** house', "**our** path", "**that** valley", "**the clear** river Soča', "**the feeling** that you are, **the feeling** of belonging" (*ibid.*: 78). Another woman explained: "I go to Slovenia. My home is there. My brother lives there. But I go home to **sit at the front of the house**, because nobody can change **that** valley. That is the nicest picture that was ever painted in this world... **That** valley, that is unique. When you come over the hill, I cannot express this [feeling] with words" (*ibid.*: 166-7). Jože Čuješ, another informant, said that one never forgets his or her youth, the place where one grows up. His own homeland is there all the time in his consciousness. "The same Slovenia, same people are there and here. We are connected by something. **Not the language!** The language is not that which is most important, but some kind of consciousness that we have something in common... as Australians say: 'This is state of mind.'" When he is asked where did he come from, he says from Yugoslavia. And when people ask him from which part of Yugoslavia, he answers them: "From Slovenia, from the most beautiful part of Yugoslavia" (*ibid.*:135-6). What these Slovenes are talking about is their emotions about their own places transformed into and perceived as a national sentiment which in Smith's words (1982:167-9) encompasses a "strong and widely diffused consciousness of belonging" fueled with passion for and imagination of national community (cf. Bendix 1992:770).

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[6] In analysing this subject I will make use of the narratives collected by Breda Čebulj-Sajko who conducted her ethnographic research among Slovenes in Australia, beginning in 1981-82 and continuing in 1984-85 and 1990. The interviews used here are from the 1981-82 period. Free translations into English and all emphases are mine. I also rely on my own personal experience from the late 1980s when I often lived in the homes of Slovenes in Australia, visited their club in Canberra and listened to their personal problems.

Slovenes in Australia are not Slovenes because of the government in Slovenia or because of the Slovene territory, and not even because of the Slovene language or because of Slovene "culture". Slovenes in Australia have their own Slovene "culture". With other migrant groups in Australia they share common stories: of how they migrated and of how hard they worked at the time of their arrival. Though the Australian government now advocates multiculturalism as one particular version of Australian national identity, the old ethnocentric, sexist and racist ideologies and practices continue (see Tonkinson, this issue).[7] Slovenes were not immune to such ideologies and they incorporated them into their own views of relationships with different peoples in Australia as well as with different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia.

Despite people's regular visits to Slovenia, their attachment to their homeland reflects their memories of it, their "poetics of space", and their illusionary images rather than the reality of today's life in this country. It comes as no surprise then that when people visit Slovenia their adjustment to their homeland is not smooth. Mirko Ritlop says: "When I come home I am not the same as they are. They are **connected** between themselves, they **live** among themselves. They think that I come home just as a guest. But my home is still there" (Čebulj-Sajko 1992:160). Despite their stress on Sloveneness, the migrants have unconsciously changed their identity.

Let me now move briefly to Slovenes in Slovenia. While Slovenia for Slovene migrants in Australia is mostly perceived through the most intimate landscapes of their youth (and in this way their discourse resembles that of Ambonwari), the country for Slovenes in Slovenia is not talked about in terms of our fields, kitchens, lime-trees, houses and so on. We take such things more or less for granted. They are inseparable from our daily life. By "ourselves", of course, I do not wish to speak for Slovene society in general, but rather simply to identify myself with all those who are, like myself, exposed to the variety of recent political ideas and cultural images within the country. For many living in the new nation-state the language of politics which includes re-defining historical roots and the continuity of the nation, the origin of Slovene language, the re-construction of tradition and the territorial borders, became most important just before and since independence in 1991. Many stories, objects and places gained additional symbolic meanings in the constitution of national identity. The abstract space of "territory" was re-created as a familiar national landscape.

Slovene mountains present a good example.[8] As the source of Slovene rivers they symbolize place of birth (which is the original meaning of the Latin term *natio*, i.e. birth, origin, descent). As sheltering ramparts of popular myths and tales since the Romantic period they entered the collective sentiment as the familiar, intimate home (Erjavec 1994:217-8). The mountains represent not only source and shelter but are, at the same time, the most impressive part of the national territory. Beside being a real geographical feature, the Slovene Alps, as Erjavec (1994) has so lucidly argued, function as an abstract, metaphorical and ideological representation of Slovene national identity. It is no coincidence that Slovenes in Sydney named one of their clubs after the highest mountain in Slovenia, Triglav. Mountains, redolent of wilderness and powerful storms, tend an image of toughness to Slovenes in a similar way that the Australian bush gives such an image to Australians. In both countries such images can rather more easily be recognized in legendary heroes than in actual people. Erjavec further relates national identity to Althusser's description of ideology as a "representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals in their real conditions of existence...What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of the individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the relations in which they live" (Althusser 1971:162,165; cited in Erjavec 1994:223). Despite being an imaginary entity, a nation and its immigrants build "a whole network of symbolic representations which enable its members to feel a common identity" (Erjavec 1994:225).

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[7] For example, in 1974 Clyde Cameron (then Minister responsible for immigration) was at pains to reassure honourable members of the Australian Parliament that the Turks were not "a dark-skinned people who have nothing in common with the Australian people. He also recommended setting up immigration offices in Ljubljana and Zagreb on the grounds that Croats and Slovenians are 'more suitable to the Australian way of life than Serbs who live around Belgrade'" (Castles et al. 1990:55).

Because of their orientation towards a future community, Slovenes in Slovenia struggle not just with their own isolated identity, but with their identity in relation to and in comparison with "others". Slovene identity is constructed oppositionally toward different parts and peoples of their previous country. Renaming objects and places, replacing symbols and inventing new metaphors of Slovene continuity and homogeneity became the most important events of daily life (TV, newspapers, unofficial and official discourses, etc.). This means that Slovenes strive to disassociate themselves from the past (and therefore from past relationships with other peoples who lived in former Yugoslavia) and simultaneously strive for the expected association with the European Community. The stand which some Slovenes take is one of superiority, so characteristic of many modern irrationalisms and racist movements around the world. The supposed inferiority of "others", in particular all those who live south of our new border, provides a foundation for the elaboration of our own "virtues" and is expressed through discrimination and nationalism.

What appears as another problem in Slovenia is re-construction and re-formulation of Slovene habitus, in dealing with the many inventions of the modern industrial world and discrepances between modern and postmodern values. Slovenes have not yet absorbed the "abstract space" produced by capitalism and neocapitalism with its "'world of commodities', its 'logic', and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that of the political state" (Lefebvre 1991:53). Slovenes will have to put more emphasis on the new practices of education and communication. At the global level, education is oriented toward the socialization of people outside their local communities. Such "exo-socialization" (Gellner 1983:38) requires state and culture to be linked. People have to act and communi-

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8 Nature imagery, biological symbolism, indigenous populations (who are identified with "the natural") and kinship metaphors (motherland and fatherland), have been central to many nationalisms and ideologies of modern nation-states (see Alonso 1994:383-5; Smith 1986:183-190; Swedenburg 1990). All these tropes fabricate an impression that the nation is a primordial and natural entity in which blood and genes connect the whole population. These same views reduce women's roles to biological reproduction and images of "mother earth". Such views have recently been questioned and contested by several feminist scholars.

cate in some comprehensible way within their fields of interest and outside them. As Gellner argues:

> The employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals, typically, and for the majority of men now hinges on their **education**; and the limits of the culture within which they were educated are also the limits of the world within which they can, morally and professionally, breathe. A man's education is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on him (1983:36).

Borders (linguistic, cultural, territorial) not only protect the nation but at the same time restrict people, in a claustrophobic sense, and confine them from exploring the world beyond these borders. Slovenes have to deal with new power relationships and with new social spaces impregnated with economic, cultural (education), social (professional identities, titles, statuses) and symbolic (reputation, fame) capitals (see Bourdieu 1991:230). A work of art, for example, has to enter the world of comparative imagination where fame and glory (i.e. symbolic capital) are evaluated in the artistic field. In the former Yugoslavia, artists had such an opportunity within the borders of the country itself. Today, in small Slovenia, artists and their art (if they are not renown enough to cross the borders or when they are obsessed with national issues) remain trapped within the personal relationships of their local communities. On the other hand, the excessive stress on materialism and consumerism (i.e. economic capital), results in new power relations and alienation between people, who, not being able yet to change their hierarchy of values, experience it as happening at the expense of personal relationships (i.e. social capital) and spiritual and cultural wellbeing (i.e. cultural capital). This alienation is emotionally painful and is similar to forms of alienation in other new and small Eastern European nation-states. Firstly, because of the former political system and the ethnocultural (and not political) understanding of nationhood; secondly, because of the sudden, uncontrolled and not fully comprehended political and economic changes; thirdly, because people do not yet understand, less so master the new communication and education systems; and fourthly, because people have not yet adjusted to the process of changing values. Despite egalitarian expectations, all of these factors produce sudden, new conspicuous inequalities, political tension, and misery.

I suspect that many people in Slovenia wrongly perceive that the problems within the new nation-state have arisen only because of its small size. It is true that Slovenia has a relatively small population: people live close to each other and often know, if not the next person himself or herself, then at least one or two of his or her family members or friends. Therefore, resentment is inseparable from daily life in Slovenia. But it is not smallness which is the actual cause of problems such as "neuroticism", irrationality, anxiety, insecurity, provincialism, and nationalism. People cannot be emotionless while going through the period of transformation, when less advantaged people feel pushed aside, wronged or underprivileged. Such a condition is doubless characteristic of every emergent nation-state. As people sense this, their turbulent emotions are wrongly accommodated in the form of nationalist sentiments and are turned against "others". The nationalist movement in Slovenia, as Gellner (1983:74) has argued for nationalisms in general, has seized on all three diacritical features to separate the privileged and underprivileged: on language, on supposedly genetically transmitted traits ("racism"), and on culture.

Let me now return to Slovene migrants in Australia. Pavla Gruden, another of Čebulj-Sajko's informant, tries to present a critical view of Sloveneness in Australia. She explains how Slovenes meet at their clubs. They come to get drunk **in a Slovene way**, to fill themselves with food **in a Slovene way** and to dance "polka" **in a Slovene way**. If someone plays something else they get annoyed. Gruden continues: "Now I do not know if this is their cultural or national consciousness... They do not accept anything from other nations... I still hope that we will get a cultural renaissance. I think that there should first be a national renaissance; it appears to me that they do not have cultural consciousness because they do not have the right national consciousness" (Čebulj-Sajko 1992:108-9). One should be aware that all these interviews were conducted in 1981-2, when Yugoslavia was still a single country. My own experience from 1985-6, 1988, and 1990 is that Slovenes, in Canberra at least, became very nationalistic and wanted independence long before Slovenes in Slovenia began to talk about its possibility. It seems that the strong wish for independence was created by illusions and a dreamlike conceptualization of "home".

The stress on culture, though in a somewhat different way, is again expressed by another Slovenian living in Australia. Alfred Breznik talks about migrations to Slovenia from other parts of Yugoslavia: "For me Sloveneness does not mean a Slovene who can prove his or her family origin. No! For me a Slovene is the one who accepted Slovene habits, culture, and preserves that! And if people come from south and accept this, that is fine. If this means that we will lose Slovene identity, than I am against any Yugoslav, German or whatever influence" (*ibid.*:191). By denying the importance of descent (i.e. "race"), his view rejects discrimination and racism based on physical differences. He dwells, however, on another aspect of differentiation - culture (and cultural racism). Such a view is common among those Slovenes who do not accept living alongside people with different cultures. They see it as a threat for their own well-being. For them, the solution lies either in the assimilation or expulsion of all non-nationals.

But being Slovene in Australia has another dimension. Emphasizing his or her place of origin, every Slovene person seems to find also his or her individuality in a wider Australian society. Sloveneness makes a person special, with a particular character and differentiates her or him from others. Instead of merging with a community at large, instead of being an anonymous person, one fulfills an ambition of being someone, of having an idiosyncratic role, a distinctive say. In this way, being Slovene, like being Italian or French, comes closer to a professional status such as being an engineer, a professor, a cook, a pilot or a businessman, and not simply a number among numbers. In Slovenia, on the other hand, the fact of being Slovene does not, of course, suffice for building one's own individuality and specificity. At the same time, those practices which are characteristic of Slovene communities in Australia (such as building large houses filled with Slovene folkloric artifacts) become those issues which determine Sloveneness, serve the competition among Slovene individuals and groups, and identify the community from the outsider's perspective. With regard to this, Jean Lave's contribution (this issue) on the identity of the British community in the town of Porto in Portugal, is illustrative. She analyses the struggle of "being British in the port trade" in the context of changing political-economic and social relations. From their own perspective and from the perspective of British visitors, they are "more British than the British". Likewise, considering their ways of doing things, the persisting interest in Slovene folklore, music, food, sporting activities (such as playing bowls, for example), and so on, the same conclusion can be drawn of Slovenes in Australia. They are in many ways more Slovene than the Slovenes. However, the continuity of Sloveneness in Australia has yet to be tested.

Let me emphasise the differences between Ambonwari cosmological conceptions of the world and Slovene politico-ideological conceptualization. The Slovene struggle in the world of nation-states is far from unique amongst the countries of Central or Eastern Europe, but resembles the struggles for identity elsewhere. Ambonwari cosmology, at its highest ritual level, strives towards oneness and wholeness in every sense of the term, where even age, gender, status, roles and other differences disappear (see Telban 1994). Slovene political ideology also strives towards oneness and wholeness. In contrast with Ambonwari, however, it emphasizes differences in age, gender, status and role and seeks unity and uniqueness through concepts unimportant or even nonexistent in Ambonwari cosmology, such as language, territory, physical appearance and culture. Slovenes distinguish between religion and politics, between cosmos and society, while Ambonwari, like other Melanesian societies (see the contributions to the recent book edited by Daniel de Coppet and André Iteanu, 1995), do not, but rather see them as being part of one and the same life-world. This life-world is not simply a unity of "nature" and "culture" as many would believe, but is hierarchically and symbolically ordered through different institutions and different concepts and is based upon quite different values.

First, for Ambonwari, in contrast to the general view of Slovenes in Slovenia, it is not language but speech, discourse and communication (and stories, legends, myths), together with the "signs" of values and authority, which determine their identity and relate Ambonwari people to their ancestors, to their past, to their origin and to others. Stories (and gossip, slander, lies, arguments and insults) are extensions of events and are not separated from the actual reality. A myth is not just a narrated poetic or imaginative story from the past. Myths in Ambonwari, as elsewhere in Melanesia, are **lived** as Michael Young (1983) has shown for Kalauna. A person and his or her life-world are not separated. When children learn their language (or languages) they do not think about its structures but acquire grammar by speaking it. Socialization and language acquisition take place at the same time; the latter is also an acquisition of knowledge, lifestyle and social relationships (Ochs 1988; Schieffelin and Ochs 1986). It is not just the language *per se* which determines your identity within and beyond a paricular community, but first who you are within particular social contexts and only then what you say, when, where and how you say it. In short, it is not language as an institution (as in nation-states) but a practical activity of linguistic exchange based on social-historical conditions (cf. Bourdieu 1991).[9] There are varieties, called "registers", "associated with situations of use: baby talk, foreigner talk, religious speech, newscaster"s talk, mother-in-law speech, doctor-patient speech...When children acquire knowledge of relations between linguistic features and contexts of use, they acquire knowledge of **expectations** associated with these relations" (Ochs 1988:11,13). Moreover, identity is formed and transformed by the symbolic power of language, the social meaning of utterances with metaphors and other tropes attached to speech, felt and understood by people who share a particular life-world.

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[9] The conjunction of language and nation-state in the modern world, and the force of language-based nationalist movements was recognized by Smith (1986:220). Hobsbawm argues that national languages are almost always semi-artificial constructs or even invented: "They are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be, namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national mind" (1992:54). For Anderson too, language is a decisive issue. The first European nationalisms suppressed or marginalized minority languages within the state (Anderson 1983:75; Banks 1996:135; Južnič 1993:284-5). For a sociolinguistic and social psychological study of the relationship between language and ethnic identity see the contributions to the volume edited by Gudykunst (1988). Bourdieu also argued against the idea of any community having a completely homogeneous language. Such an idealization of linguistic practices (which have emerged historically and have certain social conditions of existence) is the source of "the illusion of linguistic communism" (1991:43; see also Thompson's Introduction to Bourdieu, p.5). "To speak of the language, without further specification, as linguists do, is tacitly to accept the **official** definition of the **official** language of a political unit. This language is the one which, within the territorial limits of that unit, imposes itself on the whole population as the only legitimate language... The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the construction of a unified linguistic market, dominated by the official language...Thus, only when the making of the 'nation', an entirely abstract group based on law,

Second, for Ambonwari, contrary to the view of nationalist intellectuals in Slovenia (but similar to the views of Slovenes in Australia), it is not land or territory (with borders), but both present and past familiar paths and movements which determine people's spatiotemporal identity. For Ambonwari, all those people in the wider Sepik area who shared their paths, share also their ancestral past and their identity, not just those who shared or once lived on their present land. The movements through the landscape, where every place has its name, constitute the social space of relations, which are important in the construction of both collective and individual identities.[10] This can be said, too, of Slovene peasants and all those who own their own land. They do not need "territory". The space surrounding their home is their real landscape. Social, temporal and spatial relations constitute people's memory and identity. It is the urban, landless population which, in accord with political ideology, constructs not "real" but rather mythical and symbolic national territory as their common landscape. Not only the economic market but also the market of symbolic goods, represents for peasants a threatening domination of values and ideas of those living in the cities (see Bourdieu, this issue). It is a locus of power relations which exists and which gives to a geographical space its social reality.

Third, for Ambonwari, it is neither the physical characteristics of the human body (or "skin", as Ambonwari do not have a concept of and a term for body at all, see Telban in press b), but *kay* (way of doing things, habit, ritual) which determines their identity and connects the people to their predecessors and successors.[11] As Ambonwari do not have a concept of culture (see also Strathern, this issue), their *kay* obviates the possibility of either dichotomising or unifying nature and culture. It integrates a person with his or her activity or practice, and with qualitative aspects of life. Through its central meaning of "being", *kay* covers the totality of human existence including its corporeality, both in collective and individual terms, and in past and present terms, and it incorporates also the "ways of speaking" and the "ways of moving around" that constitute their narrative and spatial identity.

In modern social formations such as Slovenia, where I do not see most of the people, where I do not touch them, where I do not talk to them and where there are many places which I have never even heard about, I have a different kind of relationship with these unknown persons and places. In nation-states people do not share temporality and historicity with each other in their daily lives. They are, to use Schutz's terms, contemporaries but

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creates new usages and functions does it become indispensable to forge a **standard** language, impersonal and anonymous like the official uses it has to serve, and by the same token to undertake the work of normalizing the products of the linguistic habitus" (Bourdieu 1991:45, 48).

[10] Paths and movements connecting places with names in different contexts (songs, for example) construct people's memory in terms of mapping their landscape (see Feld 1982; Jackson 1989; Munn 1995; Schuster 1990; Wassmann 1991; Weiner 1991).

[11] Henrietta Moore argues that "the western folk model underlying anthropological theorizing does not accommodate itself easily to the suggestion that the body is not always the source and locus of identity, and that the interior self is not necessarily the source or locus of intention or agency" (1994:33, see also 36).

not consociates. Simply, daily practices, paths and stories of Slovenes in Slovenia are not uniform. Those who live in the south differ from those who live in the north and both differ from those living in the west which again differ from those living in the east. Of course, there are differences within these regions too. It is easy to imagine that in a larger and more populated country each of these groups of peoples from different areas could claim their own nationality or at least sub-nationality. People in Slovenia truly belong to local communities of which we are, according to the situation and those involved, typically, either proud or ashamed. All these different local communities represent the "flesh" of the nation, which, in Anthony Cohen's view, "exists as a vague impersonal force that imposes itself upon local people, that demands linguistic and other kinds of homogeneity, but which appears to have no purpose about it, no agency" (Banks 1996:147). The unique Slovene "culture" is constructed and authorized by those in power and then presented to those without it, as if it were theirs. Sustained by propaganda, the invented "culture" (made of selected variants of different folk cultures) is represented as Slovene tradition on which an allegedly historical political unit - the nation - is built (cf. Gellner 1983:97).[12]

It seems to me that we Slovenes, insisting on our local communities, have not yet succeeded in grouping ourselves into a larger society and, despite its official existence and the symbolic meaning of our mountains, into a nation. Instead of grouping ourselves together under education-based systems of communication, we tried to do this through politics and religion (which are very sensitive areas in Slovenia). We are still in the process of building our educational system which will serve as a basis for communication with the rest of the world. I suspect that this is the reason why many, quite correctly, see the continual arguments between different groups as "petite gardening". This is a Slovene metaphor for localism, in which everyone looks after their own interests, thus emphasizing the smallness, closedness and ideological and cultural persistence of each group. Slovenes have yet to adjust to a growing productivity and to a new complex division of labour, which will require mobility, flexibility and a constant accommodation of and adjustment to novelty.

It also comes as no surprise that many Slovenes see the period of the struggle for independence as the only time when they experienced collectivity as if they were all an inseparable part of one and the same society (this was deceptive, as it was the concept of nation and nationalism which brought people together and not the reality of belonging to one society). One of the differences between a small community and a large one is that in the latter differences have to be accommodated through broader common features which are not just mere abstractions but are also lived. As Durkheim argued, against those who opposed the ideal society to the real one as abstractions: "[t]he ideal society is not outside of the real society; it is a part of it... For a society is not made up merely of the mass of individuals who compose it, the ground which they occupy, the things which they use and the movements which they perform, but above all is the idea which it forms of itself" (Durkheim 1915:422). In Slovenia we still have to construct and re-construct our ideas about ourselves to become a modern large society (based on communication and education). We still have to resolve the problems of social classifications and representations of "reality" while the present state of the nation and nationalism group us only in terms of a political unit and a distribution of power.[13] As Lefebvre has argued, those who see the nation either as a natural or an ideological entity do not consider that nationhood also implies the existence of a market which is "a complex ensemble of commercial relations and communication networks" (1991:112). Moreover, nationhood implies violence, that is "a political power controlling and exploiting the resources of the market... in order to maintain and further its rule" (*ibid.;* see also Giddens 1985).

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[12] Giddens writes: "The persistence of custom and tradition in village communities, even if strongly divergent from the beliefs and practices of those in ruling circles, usually solidifies state power rather than tending in any way to undermine it" (1985:59).

The familiarity with people, places and things along with the experience of feeling at home is achieved in both Ambonwari and Slovenia through familiar patterns of life within familiar communities amid familiar landscapes. Such familiarity provides people with a feeling of security and stability. Radical social, cultural, political and economic changes in the new eastern European nation-states have, since the late 1980s, induced drastic changes in people's ways of doing things. In addition, the postmodern world into which Slovenes lately entered (almost by skipping over the whole period of modernity), offers a multiplicity of discardable identities and options. The loss of solidity and of former "durable" values have helped bring about a lifestyle which abolishes past and future and exists mainly in a continuous present.

CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS VOLUME

One aim of this volume is to show some of the problems which people confront in the processes of re-formulating their identity in different parts of the world today.

In his contribution **Bob Tonkinson** gives a lucid account of the rise of a pan-Aboriginal identity and of the internal tensions between two ideologies: the "cultural", i.e. tradition-oriented ideologies of remote communities, and the "political", i.e. historically-defined ideologies which developed in opposition to Whites and are based on Aboriginal experiences of powerlessness, exclusion, oppression and racism. Aboriginal political consciousness and the formation of a self-conscious ethnicity are part of processes known as ethnogenesis. Tonkinson discusses a new form of collective identity of the Western Desert Aboriginal communities, called "mob", which is a result of both inter-community Aboriginal politics and diffusion of their cultural characteristics. Tonkinson argues against the suggestion of Jones and Hill-Burnett that processes of Aboriginal ethnogenesis entail competition between "cultural" and "political" ideologies. He sees these two dimensions of identity as invariably present, interdependent and operating simultaneously as contrary tendencies.

Christine Jourdan's contribution deals with Solomon Islands Pijin. When she first lived in Honiara, the capital, it seemed to her that Pijin was an "illegitimate language" or "nobody's language", by which she meant that nobody fully identified with it. Identification with this colonially-produced language was even less prominent in the villages. At the same time, however, Pijin was integral to city life and to social and commercial relations. Jourdan argues that the acquisition of legitimacy by Solomons Pijin was simultaneous with the development of urban culture and the nativization of the language. This process has been accelerated by an urban elite who seek foundations for a national identity. Jourdan asks which is the culture that Pijin in the Solomon Islands can identify with. She finds the answer in the culture of contact with Europeans, a culture between two worlds, a Pijin culture.

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[13] Bourdieu writes that "struggles over ethnic or regional identity... are a particular case of the different struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to **make and unmake groups**. What is at stake here is the power of imposing a vision of the social world through principles of di-vision which, when they are imposed on a whole group, establish meaning and a consensus about meaning, and in particular about the identity and unity of the group, which creates the reality of the unity and the identity of the group" (1991:221, see also 224).

Similar to the processes of the constitution of Aboriginal identity and the one of Honiara town-dwellers in the Solomon Islands, "in-between" identity is, as **Rozanna Lilley** shows in her article, a characteristic of the people of Hong Kong too. As the British will hand over Hong Kong to the control of the People's Republic of China in 1997, questions about the future "Hong Kong identity" are currently of immense importance. The complexity of the different contexts which inform Hong Kong identity is caught between two political and cultural domains, that of the colonial British and that of the communist Chinese. Lilley's detailed outline of the intricacy of this issue is enriched by fragments of the performances of Zuni Icosahedron, a local theatre group which is renown for challenging taboos and the puritanical morality of Hong Kong society (exemplified by suppressed sexuality, for example). The performances of this subversive avant-garde theatre group which "devours traditions" are "neither 'about' enforced identity or counter-identities nor 'about' accommodation versus resistance". They are constituted "in their intersection and in the articulation of past and future in the present".

A different situation of identity construction of the British in Porto, Portugal, is examined by **Jean Lave** in her contribution. First, a foreign culture was not imposed on them by colonizers as was the case with societies in all three previous articles. The British in Porto seem preoccupied with maintaining the advantages of elite "Britishness". They have voluntarily left their own country and settled as an enclave of powerful and influential foreigners in a new one. Lave tries to show the complexity of the port trade, which should not be seen simply as an economic enterprise but as something embedded in the British social communities living in Porto. Lave argues that struggles within the British community over identity are "struggles to establish advantaged positions for stakeholders... in the future of the community". Such a struggle manifests itself, for example, in the education of children and people's disputes over proper forms of schooling.

In his contribution *Forbidden Reproduction: The Symbolic Dimension of Economic Domination*, **Pierre Bourdieu** returns to reflect upon the theme of celibacy (a subject he earlier addressed in 1962) in peasant societies, both in general and in the Lesquire region in particular. The identity of people living in rural communities is approached through the change of values, not only economic but more importantly symbolic, which occured in a matrimonial market. Peasant women (from Lesquire and elsewhere) look for their spouses in towns and not in their own or neighbouring hamlets. More so than men, women are willing to migrate and adopt the models and ideas of city life. They even feel reluctance to marry a peasant. The citizen's image of a peasant became imposed on the consciousness of a peasant. The unfortunate result is women's flight from their hamlets and men remaining bachelors, leaving the land without heirs. The unification of the market of symbolic and economic goods imposed by city life, represents that kind of domination which undermines even those peasant values which were in the past capable of opposing the dominant, mainly economic, values. The institution of "household", which used to be the foundation of the whole system of reproduction strategies, has come under threat.

Identity in Kalauna, eastern Goodenough Island of Papua New Guinea is symbolically expressed in the practices connected with food-giving and food-hoarding, as **Michael**

Young has argued in his previous writings. Elaborate competitive food exchanges mimic obsolete warfare. Kalauna men's preoccupation with food and death can also be detected in dreams, as Young suggests in his contribution to this issue. Dreams in general are rarely interpreted in a way which would involve the dreamer and his close kin. They are, rather, about others. Dreams in Kalauna, in which persons are other than they seem, reveal people's ethos of duplicity no less than do myths and the practices of everyday life. The notion of double identity found in local mythology pervades the social and political ideologies of Kalauna. Socially rather than psychologically explained and because of the possible disclosure of other people's secrets, dreams are kept private and are seldom topics of conversation. For the sake of clarity, Young discusses and illustrates four types of dream in Kalauna each of which raises its own particular issues of personal (and sometimes group) identity: inconsequential, portentous, diagnostic, and possession dreams. He concludes, reflexively, with a dream of his own, which allows his Kalauna friends to reflect on him as the Other in terms of their own imaginative interpretations.

The last article in this issue on identity is by **Marilyn Strathern**. It is concerned more about the identity of and relationship between anthropology and history. Strathern begins her contribution by looking at the self/other dichotomy and the impossibility of someone simultaneously being both. This becomes a central problem for an ideal interpretation. It informs the practice of anthropology which through the use of categories of analysis drawn from its own society and culture seeks an interpretation of others. At the same time, anthropology tries to understand other cultures in their own terms. Strathern goes on to recapitulate the reciprocal relation between anthropology (its subject matter being "relations") and history (its subject matter being unique events organized in a chronological order) from an anthropological perspective. Examining Sahlins' work *Historical metaphors and mythical realities*, she looks at the interaction between structure and history. For Hageners of Papua New Guinea (where she did her fieldwork) there is no basis for a self-conceptualisation of culture as "culture" as there is no theory which would detach the constructed culture from the natural individual. Therefore they do not speculate about the internal structures of "others" and produce neither "history" nor "anthropology". Strathern concludes her essay in accord with its title *No culture, no history* by saying: "Before society can have a view of 'its past', it has to have a view of 'itself'".

As the consequence of both chosen and forced historical movements, the modern world is characterized by numerous displaced communities signified today by the term "diaspora" (Clifford 1994; Grossberg 1996:92). One can apply this, in different ways of course, to Slovenes in Australia, British in Portugal, or to the movements of Solomon Islanders, Australian Aborigines or Lesquire peasants to towns. At the same time, these "displaced communities" instigate the re-construction and re-formulation of identities of those groups and people who settled in particular places earlier.

The mystery of the relationship between seemingly fixed or static identities and of a continuous, never concluded, process of identification, is a mystery of human life. It comes as no surprise therefore that towards the end of millennium the theme of identity constituted the main focus of several recent conferences, workshops and debates. For example, the conference in Poland in August 1996 was entitled *Memory and History: European Identity at the Millennium*; the central objective of the conference in Edinburgh in October 1996 was *Boundaries and Identities*; and Humanities Research Centre at the Australian

National University will dedicate the whole of 1997 to Identity. The questions "Who are you?" and "Where did the world come from?", which confronted a fourteen-year-old Norwegian schoolgirl in Jostein Gaarder's bestselling book *Sophie's World* (1995) are those which people everywhere ask over and over again.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I gratefully acknowledge the Open Society Institute's financial assistance in the production of this issue. My employer, the Scientific Research Centre of the Slovene Academy of Sciences and Arts, continues to offer me all the support that I need. I thank Zvezdana Bizjak Pitamic for re-typing two of the articles in this volume. This introduction was written during my tenure of a Leach/RAI Fellowship at the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Manchester. I thank Jean Lave, Rozanna Lilley and especially Michael Young for their comments on earlier drafts. None of them, of course, is responsible for whatever errors or shortcomings remain.

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THE DYNAMICS OF ABORIGINAL IDENTITY IN REMOTE AUSTRALIA

ROBERT TONKINSON*

INTRODUCTION

Whether in remote or urban settings, Aboriginal identity in contemporary Australian society is constituted as an amalgam of two different but interrelated elements, one stemming from continuities with the traditional past and the other from changes wrought by the European invasion.[1] In the past thirty years, the interplay of these elements has become increasingly evident as Aboriginal endeavours aimed at nation-building and the creation of a pan-Aboriginal identity have intensified. The rise of Aboriginal political consciousness and activism, and the growth of a self-conscious ethnicity, are part of processes known as ethnogenesis. In the rise of a pan-Aboriginal identity, there is a tension between two ethnic ideologies: the "cultural", dominant among the fully descended, more tradition-oriented population in the interior and north of Australia; and the "political", which is typical of Aboriginal people of mixed descent, most of whom live in cities and towns in the south (Jones and Hill-Burnett 1982:223).[2] "Cultural" ideologies are characteristic of the remote communities discussed here, and were forged in terms of group contrasts and boundaries that pertained exclusively to the Aboriginal cultural domain. In contrast, "political" ideologies have been largely defined historically in contrast and opposition to Whites in situations of Aboriginal powerlessness and experience of exclusion, oppression and racism. This political dimension of identity, once conceptualised in terms of Aboriginal acquiescence or accommodation, has become increasingly identified in writings by anthropologists and by Aboriginal people with notions of "resistance" to colonial domination (cf. Morris 1988, 1989; Trigger 1992).[3]

In the Western Desert, which is the setting for this paper, one consequence of Aboriginal migration to settlements was the emergence of a new level of collective identity, that of the "mob", which had no exact counterpart in the society prior to the advent of European influences. "Mobs" can also be seen as the outcome of both "political" and "cultural" factors. Besides pressures to settle Aborigines in one location and the exercise of paternalistic control by Whites, there were also changes taking place within the Aboriginal domain, such as increased intermarriage, the rise of a settlement-born generation, the pooling of religious knowledge and the creation of a single body of elders directing and maintaining the religious life. "Mob" identity arose also in the context of inter-community Aboriginal politics, centred strongly on the conduct of the religious life at the regional level, where traditionally a high rate of intergroup contact and widespread diffusion of rituals, etc. had been maintained, if not intensified, among the many and scattered Western Desert Aboriginal communities (cf. Tonkinson 1974; Sackett 1978).

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[1] This paper is based on field research conducted at Jigalong between 1963 and 1994. For their helpful comments on an earlier draft, I thank Myrna Tonkinson, David Trigger and Bob Lawrance.

[2] The current Aboriginal population in Australia is approximately 260,000 or c. 1.5% of the total Australian population A majority of Aboriginal people are of mixed descent. In 1991, according to the Commonwealth Census, 27% of the indigenous population was living in cities with more than 100,000 persons (Horton 1994).

[3] Major dimensions of Aboriginal identity in Australia today are discussed by M. Tonkinson (1991), whose approach deals diachronically and synchronically with both tradition-oriented Aborigines, including those at Jigalong, and urban peoples.

Since the early 1970s, major changes in government policy favouring much greater Aboriginal self-management have accelerated the intrusion of Western influences into the Aboriginal cultural domain, and have forced Western Desert Aborigines increasingly into an engagement with both "traditional" and Western matters affecting their lives. For example, the advent of "outstations" and the migration of many settlement people into towns have led to significant change in the size and significance of the settlement-based "mob".[4] Cultural definitions of identity continue to be dominant in most of the contexts in which desert Aborigines interact; however, the need to accommodate to greatly increased pressures emanating from the wider society has increasingly entailed modifications in line with changed political realities.

The advent and growth of outstations, while indicative in certain respects of a broadening of major parameters of identity, at another level is bringing about a degree of dissolution of the formerly dominant Jigalong "mob" into smaller and increasingly separate entities. Two major outstations have become fully incorporated communities in their own right, with important implications for identity. Several more outstations have been established from Jigalong and some of these may also eventually achieve independence from the centre. Migration to the mining town of Newman has also been an important factor affecting "mob" solidarity, such that Jigalong stands at a crossroads, with its inhabitants being pulled in two opposite directions that have different implications for their futures. The "Jigalong mob" has thus shrunk in size and in political influence in the region.

The evolution of administratively separate communities, in combination with the establishment of an umbrella regional Aboriginal body, has seen the rise to prominence of a new label to embrace this broader regional, sociopolitical identity: "Martu" (the word for "people/Aboriginal people" in a local dialect). In 1992 came the High Court of Australia's historic Mabo decision, followed by the enabling federal legislation, The Native Title Act 1993 (see Tonkinson 1994a).[5] In the wake of the Mabo decision, the regional corporation filed a land claim for a large area of the desert homelands of the people now calling themselves Martu. This initiative has thus reinforced the reality of the regional collectivity within the culturally homogeneous Western Desert bloc, and has important implications for the politics of identity.

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[4] Outstations are small settlements whose inhabitants tend to be closely related and strongly linked to the territory in which they have relocated from a larger settlement. The movement began in northern Australia in the 1960s in response to a number of factors, including disturbances to homeland sites in the course of mining exploration activities, a desire to escape from increasingly severe social problems and conflicts in large settlement situations, and the desire of many Aboriginal people to live on and protect their own land. The movement has not entailed either the return to a fully "traditional" hunting and gathering life or the rejection of the wider society, since the survival of the outstations continues to depend on the provision of goods and services from established centres.

[5] Prior to June 3rd, 1992, Australia was the only former British colony that had failed to recognise in law the prior land ownership of its indigenous inhabitants (Hocking 1993b:184). On that day, in *Eddie Mabo and others v the State of Queensland*, the High Court of Australia handed down an historic judgment that signalled an important legal as well as symbolic change in relations between the nation's two indigenous peoples and Australian society at large. For the first time, the Court accepted the argument that, under common law, the native title of Australia's indigenous inhabitants could be recognised. In so doing, the Court abandoned a 200 year old legal fiction (formally articulated in a 1971 judgment) which held that, at the time of first British settlement, the continent was *terra nullius*, "a land without owners".

This paper begins with a short discussion of Aboriginal identity in historical context, then gives an overview of the consequences of sedentarisation for Aboriginal identity in the era prior to the advent of self-management policies. The third section deals with enforced changes in political consciousness resulting from the Jigalong community's legal incorporation and subsequent fusion of "Whitefella business" and "Law business".[6] It notes the hardening of political boundaries as a consequence of ideological conflict with a neighbouring Aboriginal group, then examines more recent changes against a background of Aboriginal aspirations centring on land rights. The final section details the rise of regionalism in response to perceptions of external threat to traditional homelands posed by resource developers and in relation to recent developments relating to land rights, particularly since the Mabo decision has opened up new possibilities for claims to be heard. The formation of a regional land council, the mounting of a large land claim, and the continuing establishment of outstations are discussed in relation to the dynamics of identity formation, maintenance and change. Finally, the emergence of a symbiosis between "cultural" and "political" dimensions of Aboriginal identity is considered in the light of Jones and Hill-Burnett's comments on the relationship of these dimensions in Aboriginal ethnogenesis.

"TRADITIONAL" CULTURAL IDENTITY

Some of the Martu alive today were born and raised in the desert with minimal, if any, contact with Whites, and cultural continuities with their "traditional" past have been so strong in this area. Reconstruction of the major constituents of identities prior to European influences is therefore not difficult (see M. Tonkinson 1990; Tonkinson 1991). To speak of an exclusively "cultural" identity is, of course, **not** to deny the presence of political elements, yet prior to European colonisation these existed in an exclusively Aboriginal social field. Furthermore, their competitive potential was blunted or muted by the harsh conditions of life in an extremely marginal desert environment. For solid ecological as well as cultural reasons, then, cooperation and an expansive conception of "society" predominated, strongly constraining local-level ethnocentrism, boundary closure and intergroup conflict (Tonkinson 1987, 1988a).

Identity, for the Aborigines who now refer to themselves as Martu, was the outcome of a large number of cross-cutting group and category memberships, based on such things as the place of conception or birth, descent, kinship, "residence", initiation, totemic connections, ritual statuses, and so on. These various memberships simultaneously embraced both unifying, solidarity-enhancing dimensions (each individual sharing a large number of memberships with different groups or categories of others) and unitive, ego-enhancing dimensions, such that no two individuals possessed exactly the same set of shared memberships and hence each was constituted as unique in social terms (Burridge 1973:133-34). The Aboriginal self was an indivisible summation of a very large number of spiritual, topographic and social referents that linked every person to the immutable dimension of the Dreaming (a complex religious concept that is the key symbol of Aboriginal culture), to the landscape and significant sites thereon, and to other individuals, groups and categories. Egocentrically traced webs of kinship were the major locus of a person's identity in everyday life, and sociocentrically defined membership in the section system (a division of the society into four named categories) and other groupings (including named and ranked ritual statuses attained during the life cycle) helped to position individuals firmly in the social system (Berndt and Berndt 1977; Scheffler 1978; Tonkinson 1987, 1994b).

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[6] Used in its capitalised form, Law refers to the body of rules, beliefs, moral precepts, etc. that in sum constitute the legacy of the creative period, or Dreaming, when the "master-plan" for human life was, according to Aboriginal belief, set in place for all time by the creative beings.

Obviously, people identified themselves to others in different ways depending on social context, but for the most part their identity appears to have been solidly grounded, stable, unproblematic and unquestioned. The territorial locus of identity was generally expressed in terms of birthplace, place of "residence" (i.e. one or a number of important sites that were part of one's home "estate"; cf. Stanner 1965; Barker 1976; Peterson 1986; Tonkinson 1991:67-70), or, more broadly, in terms of what has been loosely termed "linguistic unit" membership (Berndt 1959) but is more accurately designated as "language/dialect named unit" (cf. Rumsey 1989). This designation, in the desert area under discussion, refers to a territorial area associated with a particular dialect, and to those who identify accordingly, regardless of which dialect(s) such people actually speak (cf. Dixon 1976). Available evidence on the traditional status of this label suggests that it was used by neighbouring groups to describe the dialect associated with a particular area, and its speakers, and was probably not a commonly used label of self-reference, since it would have been for most social purposes too broad (Douglas 1958).

In the Western Desert region, which embraces about one sixth of the entire continent, there were neither clan structures nor "cult-lodges".[7] The largest and most inclusive level of grouping was the "big meeting", held once or twice a year at a pre-arranged venue, for ceremonial and social purposes, and involving an ever-changing membership depending on where it was held and who could coordinate their movements so as to attend (Berndt 1959, Tonkinson 1991:40). Many elements of the culture suggested a striving towards maximum inclusiveness, and a view of "society" as boundless, embracing the entire Western Desert cultural bloc. Within this huge region, bands were small, mobility was high, and a great deal of cultural diffusion, which was a major prerequisite for social reproduction, habitually took place (Tonkinson 1987). All other people encountered in one's lifetime were potentially kin,[8] and certain roles of major social importance, such as those of "host" or "visitor", were temporary, situationally defined and therefore accessible to all (cf. Silberbauer 1981). The political aspects of identity were most likely to be manifest in the organisation and execution of a complex religious life; again, however, outside the generalised control exerted by mature men, ritual leadership was notably context-dependent (cf. Tonkinson 1988c).

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[7] Elkin (1954) uses the term cult "lodge" to describe a ceremonial group whose unity is based on their shared identity with a given totem or totems, and their responsibility for the periodic performance of rituals associated with such totems.

[8] An exception to this would have been *jinakarrpil* ("feather-feet", so named for the feather moccasins they wore to cover their tracks), ritual killers who came typically from distant areas, were bent on homicide and tried to avoid interaction with local groups.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE SETTLEMENT-BASED "MOB"

Over a number of decades, Martu migrated in small groups from the desert heartland and eventually settled in fringe communities, initially on pastoral properties in many cases, and later on Christian missions or in small towns. Of necessity, the demands of adaptation to a sedentary existence led to abandonment not only of the band as the face-to-face economic unit but also termination of a highly mobile lifestyle, traditional subsistence patterns and physical relationships to their estates. Despite such major transformations in lifestyle and degree of autonomy, however, integral elements of the traditional culture were strongly retained, including kinship and marriage systems, religious activities and spiritual links to the ancestral homelands. A rapidly acquired taste for European foodstuffs, tobacco and alcohol and the fact of their administrative encapsulation within a paternalistic nation-state guaranteed that the ensuing changes would be predominantly one-way, in the direction of increasing Westernisation. Under these circumstances, the retention of a distinct and positively valued Aboriginal identity - one that would increasingly be counterposed ethnocentrically to that of the Whites - would be a centrally important factor in their attempts to cope with a permanent and powerful alien presence in their lives. Jigalong was originally a small maintenance depot on the Rabbit-Proof Fence, which had been built in a vain attempt to stop the depredations of this introduced pest. Later, it became a ration distribution point for Aborigines who had begun to congregate there, and then (1946-1969) a Christian mission station. Once they came into contact with Whites, the Aborigines were, as some put it, "captured" by tea, sugar, flour and tobacco and found it increasingly difficult, then impossible, to make the break and return to their desert homelands. With the advent of the Mission, they came under the control of an extremely paternalistic structure, largely funded and backed by the power of the State Government through its Native Welfare Department, which administered Aboriginal affairs but left the everyday running of Missions largely to the churches. As welfare recipients and virtual wards of the state, the Aborigines were allowed little or no opportunity to negotiate with the missionaries or government officials concerning their captive status within the dominant Australian society. This situation is described in detail elsewhere (Tonkinson 1974), so here I focus only on the emergence in the settlement milieu of a new dimension of identity, "the mob".

The flow of emigrants westwards from their homelands brought together in the one settlement Aborigines from several different regions of the Western Desert. These people, while sharing a broadly similar culture and speaking mutually intelligible dialects, may never have come into contact prior to emigration, such was the distance that separated some of their home territories. They had congregated, and now lived on a permanent basis, in a community of a size once, if ever, attained only fleetingly during their periodic "big meetings".[9] Whereas the major dimensions of personal identity for those born in the desert changed little, if at all, those born in the settlement acquired important facets of identity (territorial and group membership, for instance) via inheritance from one or both of their parents (with a tendency to favour the patriline). Increasingly, intermarriage and linguistic blending blunted the old distinctions, and the half-dozen or more linguistically-identified units of old were gradually reduced to two major divisions: the earlier immigrants, from areas surrounding a huge salt lake, *Kumpupintil* (Lake Disappointment), and identifying with the largest such group, the Kartujarra; and the more recent immigrants, the Manyjilyjarra, who came from areas further north and east of the Lake, and who eventually outnumbered the earlier emigrants. All, however, were increasingly speaking a combined dialect that became known eventually as *Martu Wangka* (*wangka* = "speech"/"language"; cf. Marsh 1992).

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[9] "Big meetings" were the periodic gatherings that brought together large numbers of Aborigines from different language-named units to conduct the business of the "society" at large. This business included dispute settlement, the exchange of gifts and information, the conduct of initiatory and other rituals, the planning of future gatherings, and so on (cf. Tonkinson 1991:195).

There were some clear differences in cultural practices, in addition to their dialects, between the two groups. In the earlier years, mutual suspicion was strong and accusations of sorcery were traded. The two major groups maintained a degree of social distance, besides camping at opposite ends of the camping area, and at one stage a major dispute led to a traditional dispute-settlement ritual, which enjoined both parties to refrain from any further hostilities. The successful maintenance of peaceful relations was partly a result of this sanction, but can also be seen as a function of intermarriage, individual kinship and friendship links, and participation in a single moral and religious community. Right across the Western Desert cultural bloc strong uniformities in social and cultural elements were underwritten by a shared Law (the heritage of the Dreamtime epoch, when Aboriginal society first came into being and the rules for social life were believed to have been laid down, once and for all time). In other words, the uniformities in culture greatly outweighed the differences, and this fact helped consolidate a settlement-wide identity. It was based on their residence at Jigalong and their shared responsibilities for the proper functioning of the Aboriginal community there, as well as for the conduct and maintenance of its religious life - **the** major imperative of the Law.

This aspect of identity carried much less valence internally than it did when the Aborigines were away from Jigalong (many of the able-bodied men worked on pastoral properties for varying periods throughout the year) and in relationships with other similar communities around the fringes of the Western Desert area. In these contexts, the "Jigalong mob" label carried an important message of identity and, in the pursuit of highly valued regional activities such as the holding of "big meetings", it also signalled a political entity, defined by residence and a single cache of secret-sacred objects on which certain major rituals were based. This designation of Jigalong as a "Law centre" - one of the strongest and most tradition-oriented in the entire Western Desert region - became a major index of the status of the settlement in Aboriginal regional affairs. Both in playing host to large numbers of visiting Aborigines who assembled for "big meetings", and in visiting other Law centres to attend similar meetings, the Jigalong mob acted as a single entity.

In the mission period, the Jigalong Aborigines maintained a strict division between their autonomy in internal affairs and what they commonly referred to as "Whitefella business", an arena in which the missionaries exercised uncontested control of bureaucratic relationships between the Aborigines and the state. The two domains were encapsulated in the contrast between "camp" and "mission", and strong boundaries were maintained by both sides. For example, the Aborigines were willing to surrender control over their children as long as the missionaries kept away from the Aboriginal domain and did not interfere in the all-important business of the religious life (cf. Tonkinson 1982). The missionaries were never seen as a real threat to the integrity of the Law, yet the new label of "mob" membership undoubtedly contained an element of contrast with Whites, in addition to its more overt reference to collective identity in the context of Aboriginal inter-community politics.

Of even greater concern to Jigalong Aborigines than the missionaries were a group of their northern neighbours, known as the Pindan (later Strelley) Mob. Under the strong leadership of a White man, who saw it as his mission to unite all the Aborigines of this part of the state, the Pindan Mob had made repeated but unsuccessful attempts since the late 1940s to recruit the entire Jigalong community to its side. In the late 1960s, though, they succeeded in persuading a considerable number of Manyjilyjarra Aborigines to join them. In political terms, this conflict assumed greater importance for the Jigalong people than did any aspect of their relationships with Whites and the wider society in general. It was a struggle waged between two "mobs", collectivities of various language-named units, rather than traditional entities such as bands or estate-groups.

Yet the **content** of the disputes related centrally to power, autonomy, the dictates of the traditional Law, and to assessments of behaviour based on that Law. Thus, at this stage in the evolution of the Jigalong community, a "cultural" ideology remained the dominant constituent of identity, and its importance in defining political differences among Aborigines, particularly at the level of the inter-community "mob" relations, was much greater than its salience for relationships between Aborigines and the nation-state.

COMMUNITY SELF-MANAGEMENT AND THE FUSION OF DOMAINS

The mission withdrew from Jigalong in 1969 after a quarter century of largely unsuccessful endeavour to make Christians of the Aborigines. In 1973, following the inception of new federal government policies promoting Aboriginal self-management, the settlement became an incorporated community with an all-Aboriginal council. The contrast with the prior paternalistic set-up was huge, and it proved quite difficult for the Aborigines to adapt readily to the demands of self-management, following their former total exclusion from bureaucratic engagement with the nation-state (cf. Tonkinson 1982, 1988b). With the missionaries gone and the community floundering in an administrative vacuum in the early 1970s, the Jigalong mob had no choice but to go along with the new policy, especially since it seemed to promise so much. It certainly invested them, as an incorporated body, with property, power and responsibilities unimagined in the colonial era.

Above all, though, an ever-increasing volume of intrusive outside influences, from all sources including the state, demanded a breaching of the two domains that the Aborigines had been largely successful in keeping separate. For example, the notion that the White workers at Jigalong were **their** employees, and could be dismissed by them, was but one example of revolutionary change. Certainly, one positive outcome has been a steady increase in Aboriginal political awareness and assertiveness in dealings with the agents and agencies of the wider Australian society.

Largely through the medium of its Council, the Jigalong mob was brought face to face with what had formerly been "Whitefella business" in all its intricacies and with all its demands for proper procedures, accountability and so on. So great and inescapable were these demands that they rendered untenable any further attempts to keep such business at bay and maintain the boundaries between the "camp" and "house" domains. It also brought to light a number of social problems, whose seriousness had not become apparent to the Aborigines because they had been dealt with by a paternalistic and activist mission staff. Some of these problems are abiding and the community continues to search for effective coping strategies (Tonkinson 1981, 1988b).

In the period since 1973, many members of the community have served as Councillors (elections are held annually), and have come to understand the gulf between government policy and practise (Tonkinson 1977, 1978; Tonkinson and Howard 1990). Many important developments aimed at bringing about improved living standards have occurred: Jigalong today now has proper water supply, power and sewerage systems, many houses, telephone, television and its own supermarket. Yet for most people these improvements are overshadowed by the intractability of certain social problems, most particularly those associated with alcohol and concomitant disruption, violence, injury and death. In addition, worrying political differences with their northern neighbours, the Strelley Mob, continued to preoccupy community members (in the early 1980s there was even an attempt by the latter to wrest control of the Jigalong community from its Council). On the administrative side, heavy reliance continued to be placed on White staff, but the same problems of conflict, high turnover and quality hampered the Council's efforts to recruit and retain good personnel of the Jigalong community from its Council). On the administrative side, heavy reliance continued to be placed on White staff, but theefforts to undermine their authority.

Independently of the question of inclination, there has been a noticeable lessening of time available for the uninterrupted pursuit of valued cultural activities relating to the religious life. One noticeable consequence of the enormous increase in the wider society's impingement on Jigalong has been the number of official visitors to the community, and the demands this makes on Aborigines' time, in the form of Council and public meetings. Most are inconsequential, in the Aboriginal view, and it has been increasingly difficult to call the community together for such gatherings, regardless of their alleged importance. A comment by one young man: "I don't believe in meetings", summed up this attitude. The requirements of community development employment programs which entail a certain minimum number of hours of work per week, ostensibly on community projects, may also collide with cultural concerns, especially in those periods of the year when "big meetings" are held, either at Jigalong or elsewhere in the desert, and the mobilisation of most of the community's human resources is required.

These many and competing demands have thus made it increasingly difficult for the Aborigines of Jigalong to maintain a viable conceptual dichotomy between "Whitefella business" and "Law business". They are being swamped by influences from the outside world. The old dichotomy, which enabled them to insulate the crucial essence of the Law from exogenous cultural and political influences, has thus been steadily crumbling. Bureaucratically, the state regarded communities as a single entity, and dealt with them very largely in these terms, so much of their formal response to the nation-state has been derived from the same level. For reasons of cost and administrative efficiency, among others, the state was resistant to the development of outstations until groups of Aborigines took unilateral action in the face of perceived threats to their homelands from resource developers.

There has been a sharpening of contrasts as the Aborigines' understanding of, and their political involvement with, the wider society has deepened. Their sense of powerlessness has not thereby necessarily increased, since they had long regarded White society, and its local agents, such as missionaries and policemen, as virtually omnipotent. Rather, among the more politically active middle-aged community members, there is a better understanding of where Aborigines are located in the Australian political spectrum, and a growing conviction that "the government", however defined, tends to be deaf to Aboriginal entreaties. Thus, they realise that they cannot avoid having to deal bureaucratically with government, but they are pessimistic as to the likelihood that any outcomes would be congruent with

Aboriginal desires. This has not, however, led to any concerted attempts at disengagement or even to any expressions of isolationism as a possible strategy.

Another dimension of identity - one that highlights the tension between the "cultural" and "political" constituents of Aboriginal identity - concerns the increasing Aboriginalisation of government agencies dealing with Aboriginal Affairs. This process has led to a growing number of Aborigines of mixed descent (mostly southerners with little knowledge of desert Aboriginal cultures, and therefore uninitiated) working in regional centres from which most communications between government and the grass roots originate. The realisation that such agencies cannot meet the expectations held of them by Aborigines in communities like Jigalong, that there is never enough money to do what Aborigines think needs to be done, has implications for perceptions of these bureaucrats. Whatever view the latter have of their shared Aboriginality with fully descended people in communities like Jigalong (i.e. an identity fully concordant with a "political ideology" in Jones and Hill-Burnett's terms), this is often not reciprocated. The Martu are suspicious, partly because these functionaries are seen as part of the problem of government neglect, parsimony or intransigence, and partly because the Martu in this instance cleave to a cultural ideology which excludes all those who are not under the Law and who are perceived to think, speak and act "White". Expressing some of this antipathy, a prominent Aboriginal elder (in a community well north of Jigalong) said recently, to a visiting committee concerned with heritage matters, "We are all full-blood Aborigines, looking after our Law; we want to deal with full-blood Whites". I wish to stress that the issue here is primarily not one of colour, but of culture, in that local Aborigines of mixed descent who are full participants in the Law are not differentiated from the rest of the community on this basis.

In the matter of Aboriginal regional politics, important changes have occurred within the past decade. The Manyjilyjarra group that broke away from Jigalong in the 1960s to join the Strelley Mob was later involved in the establishment of a remote outstation in the desert, designed primarily to function as a "punishment and drying-out" settlement for recalcitrant and alcoholic Mob members. Differences over resource allocation led to a complete political breakaway on the part of the outstation people, who then established themselves as an independent community, called Punmu. They later realigned themselves with Jigalong, where they had strong kinship ties, through the medium of the Western Desert Land Council, which represented the desert communities of the eastern Pilbara District of Western Australia. It was established in 1984, primarily in response to the burgeoning activities of a large number of mining companies, and later became WDPAC (see below). Jigalong remained nervous of the Strelley Mob, whose later refusal to join the Land Council (and other developments discussed below) did nothing to improve relationships between the two communities. Since the late 1980s, the Strelley Mob has undergone considerable change, and the level of tension between it and the Martu groups has lessened considerably.

MINING AND OUTSTATIONS: REGIONALISM AND FRAGMENTATION

The Jigalong Aborigines always took for granted the fact that their traditional homelands remained inalienably theirs, whether they were physically present on them or not. In 1977 they initiated claims to these homelands, largely as a result of squabbles among several different government agencies over a proposed nature reserve in the area, and because of increased tourist traffic along the old Canning Stock Route, which passes close to major sacred sites belonging to Aborigines at Jigalong. At that stage, mining exploration was not perceived as a major threat, but within a short time the Western Desert became the locus of a great deal of exploration for minerals.

One company in particular, already notorious among many Aboriginal groups for some of its more unorthodox activities in the Kimberley region (which lies to the north of the desert), had undertaken exploration in the Rudall River area, unbeknown to the Aborigines for some time, and had disturbed some important sites. This area, part of which had also been gazetted as a National Park, was the traditional homeland of the language-named group, the Warnman. It was also a magnet for many other groups who attended big meetings there, and a conduit for many desert people who lived in the area en route to the frontier pastoral properties to the west and southwest. Many of the Jigalong Aborigines could claim a traditional association with the area via either their Warnman descent or their residence there. Shocked at what had happened, and at the intransigence of the mining company, some of the Jigalong Aborigines decided to establish an outstation in the vicinity of the exploration activity so that a proper watch could be kept on the company's exploration activities and, it was hoped, further disturbance to sites would be minimised.

Both the Punmu community and the new outstation (Parnngurr or Cotten Creek) were within the boundaries of the National Park, and the fact that the company had made a major find, of uranium ore, inside the Park boundary, and had begun limited mining operations, meant the involvement also of the Conservation and Land Management authority (CALM). Through their regional organisation, the Land Council, the Punmu and Jigalong communities and their outstations expressed their total opposition to exploration and mining in the Rudall River area, especially of uranium, which had been discovered in a locality traditionally avoided as *yinirarri* (a dangerous and illness-inducing site).

When, in 1987, the company set up a camp on, and thus disturbed, a major big meeting site on the Rudall River itself, the Land Council protested to the State Government and demanded that action be taken. In response to a request by the Western Australian Museum's Aboriginal Sites Department to conduct an investigation, I visited the site, which lies on the border between two language-named units, the Warnman and the Gurajarra. Significantly, every individual interviewed who could have claimed rights to speak for the area, on the basis of traditional land tenure rules and membership of the appropriate unit, disclaimed any such right in favour of collective representation via the Land Council. These disclaimers were advanced on the grounds that many other Aborigines also had earned the right to speak for the area, based on legitimate criteria such as residence, birth, and totemic connections, all of which are valid in traditional terms. Their stance reflected the kind of openness and inclusiveness indicated above as strongly characteristic of Western Desert peoples.

In this sense, the strong support for a regional body, wider than a single community, was clearly congruent with traditional cultural values supporting the widest possible definition of "society". Politically, then, the regional body could be seen as an affirmation of the continuing importance of a culturally based idiom of identity, but forged within a context of opposition to powerful alien interests whose activities threatened fundamental aspects of the traditional bases of that identity. This is not the kind of pan-Aboriginality that Jones and Hill-Burnett have in mind as the basis for a political ideology of identity, but it does involve a significant broadening of the earlier post-contact trend towards a political identity bounded by the settlement, the local "mob".

Another important element, related to tensions between the Martu and the Strelley Mob, was the latter's pro-mining stance, which had led them to propose a separate settlement with the company, based on claims by two male elders of traditional ownership of the area concerned. That both men had legitimate grounds for asserting their claim was a fact readily conceded by the Land Council members. On that basis, the Martu repeatedly called for a meeting of the disputing Aboriginal parties so that their side of things, at least, could be resolved. What they would not concede, however, was that two **individuals** could "own" this vast area of land, in contradiction of traditional Western Desert land tenure principles. In the first place, many more members of the Land Council have tradition-based claims to this area than the Strelley Mob, most of whom come from further north and west and include coastal peoples. Secondly, the Strelley Mob lived far from the region and until that time had evinced no interest at all in the Rudall area, whereas the people closest to the proposed mine and most affected by mining and exploration activities were the inhabitants of Parnngurr, and to a lesser extent, Punmu. As the groups living on the land and therefore responsible for its maintenance, they repeatedly represented themselves in discussion and debate as "battling" for their country and its sites, and having to cope with disturbances to them and their food resources by the company's activities in the area.[10]

The situation was complicated by a number of factors, including: the absence of state land rights legislation; a State Government which was in partnership with this mining company elsewhere in the state, and was frightened of an electoral backlash should it be seen as supporting Aboriginal causes related to land; the interests of CALM, the governmental body charged with conservation and land management matter, in whose National Park were both resource developers and Aborigines; a federal Labor Party policy which restricted the number of uranium mines operating in Australia to three. Between 1991 and 1993, the State Government engaged in negotiations with the Martu over the tenure of their desert homelands, and imposed a moratorium on mining on this land.

With the change of State Government in 1993, the victorious conservative coalition quickly legislated to extinguish all native title and substitute something called "rights of traditional usage" - a far weaker tenure than proposed under the federal Mabo legislation (Tarrant 1994). In turn, the Martu, acting through their regional land council and the Aboriginal Legal Service in Western Australia, launched a High Court challenge to the State Government's legislation, challenging its validity. At the time of writing, neither this action nor the State Government's subsequent challenge to the constitutional validity of the federal Native Title Act legislation has been resolved.

At one level, this legal challenge demonstrates the prominence of the new regional political identity in Martu interaction with the dominant society. However, Martu political identity as expressed through membership of the restructured and renamed regional umbrella organisation, the Western Desert Puntukurtuparna Aboriginal Corporation (WDPAC), remains firmly grounded in cultural continuities from the traditional past and historical factors giving rise to "mob" collective identity as a basis for action within and between both indigenous and exogenous socio-political domains. At a different, more local, level another kind of boundary shift pertaining to identity has also occurred and is therefore significant for this discussion. It is the re-emergence of the Warnman identity as a result of the above developments.

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[10] Despite considerable public relations work by the company among its Aboriginal neighbours at Parnngurr, especially in the past few years, the Martu collectively, as represented by the Land Council, have continued to oppose the company's operations in the area, and have achieved a limited degree of success in restricting its activities in the vicinity of the Parnngurr outstation.

The Warnman dialect has some significant differences from the other neighbouring Western Desert dialects, and in some features it is unique in Aboriginal Australia (N. Thieburger, personal communication). In the late 1980s, it became the focus of a dictionary project being organised by the Punmu community. Some twenty five years earlier, at Jigalong, where the two numerically dominant groups were the Manyjilyjarra and Kartujarra speakers, I had noted a tendency among members of the smaller language-named units, such as the Warnman, Putijarra and Giyajarra, to identify themselves via linkages to one of the two dominant groups. During genealogy-gathering and other research, I found it necessary to question further in most cases in order to elicit connections via descent to these smaller groups; then people would respond saying, "I'm really Warnman" or "really half-Putijarra", and so on, indicating that they retained such identities but preferred to emphasise links to the dominant groups. By the 1960s, then, the practice of intermarriage among the various language-named units had created multiple links among members of the various language-named groups found in the settlement, and fewer and fewer people were identifying themselves as Warnman.

Some time in the 1980s, however, this situation changed, as some of the outstation inhabitants began to name Warnman as their primary language identity. The return to their ancestral homelands was doubtless an important impetus to a reawakening and strengthening of local territorially-based identities. The subsequent legal recognition by the state of the two major outstations as settlements in their own right, structurally independent of Jigalong though unified politically through the regional WDPAC body, would also have influenced the self-identification of the outstations' inhabitants. Although by that stage virtually all Martu who were members of communities within WDPAC were speaking the mixed dialect, Martu Wangka, knowledge of the separate dialects remained strong, particularly among those who had been born in the desert. Another contributing factor could have been the activities of researchers enquiring into historical and linguistic connections to the areas surrounding both outstations, and to the Canning Stock Route, which runs through the heart of Martu territories.[11] These researchers elicited tape-recorded samples from men and women in the Warnman dialect, as well as their stories concerning first contacts with Whites and life in the desert prior to these contacts.

Opting for a Warnman label in self-reference can be construed as both an element of "cultural revival" and a politically motivated choice, made on legitimate grounds but in opposition to perceived threats to that identity posed by the invasion of Warnman country by miners (the massive uranium deposit and associated base camps lie in the Warnman heartland, not far from the Parnngurr settlement). These changing emphases in self-identification appear to be signalling an intensifying symbiosis between the cultural and political ideologies underlying identity, prompted by the continuing presence of resource developers who in Australia have shown themselves to be determined, powerful and at times threatening opponents of Aboriginal aspirations aimed at securing land rights.

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[11] The thousand mile chain of wells linking the southern Kimberley region with the railhead at Wiluna was called the Canning Stock Route. It was surveyed and constructed between 1906-1909, became a major Aboriginal thoroughfare, and for many older Martu was the site of their first contacts with Whites.

At the regional level, important transformations have also occurred to increase the political importance and strength of the collectivity identifying as Martu. For years, the Land Council struggled to survive because of inadequate funding of either infrastructure or field operation at a time of very intense resource exploration activity throughout the region, and a tendency by certain mining companies to ignore Aboriginal people except when government regulations made contact compulsory. In the past few years, however, reform of the federal Aboriginal affairs structures and the creation of ATSIC, the national Aboriginal administrative body, has altered the situation markedly.[12] One result has been greatly increased funding for WDPAC, which is headquartered not in the desert but in the coastal town of Port Hedland, the central administrative referent for most of the Martu communities. The consolidation of WDPAC as the blanket organisation for the Martu's political dealings with the nation state is exemplified by the Martu land claim and the current High Court challenge mounted by the Martu to the State Government's legislation invalidating native title in Western Australia.

As pressures towards the establishment of new outstations continue - some Martu in Punmu and Parnngurr are already planning to establish satellite settlements on land with which they identify strongly - further refinement of collective identities is likely. In the case of the establishment of outstations from Jigalong, there was a strong desire to live closer to major heartland sites so that the activities of mining companies can be monitored more closely and these sites protected against disturbance. "Push" factors also included a desire on the part of some Martu to distance themselves from the devastating effects of alcohol and from other social problems that were increasingly visible in the main settlement. Jigalong had grown rapidly (to more than 500 people prior to the beginning of the outstation movement) and the inability of the Council and community to devise adequate coping strategies was apparent to most inhabitants (Tonkinson 1988b).

Another factor, which is emerging as one of the most significant, is the perception that those individuals and groups who establish new outstations gain increased access to and control over valued material resources. Tensions that had built up over the distribution of resources, involving mutual suspicion of unfairness on the part of both Jigalong councillors and outstation inhabitants, were a major reason why the two longest established and largest outstations, Punmu and Parnngurr, sought and achieved independence from Jigalong, while retaining membership of the regional body, WDPAC.

Viewed in the longer term, what is occurring is a reversal of the original aggregating process that began with Aboriginal migration into settlements around the Western Desert's margins. Two distinct movements are in train: the regional entity of the Martu collectivity is being enhanced by the land claim and activities of WDPAC, whose constituent communities and outstations are taking on a higher profile and consolidating their particular identities; at the same time, the former centre, Jigalong, and the entity known as the "Jigalong Mob" have grown smaller in population and less influential in regional Martu political affairs, since Jigalong has lost its status as the only incorporated community. Thus "the mob", a post-contact artefact, is on the one hand being deconstructed into "the mobs", while on the other, WDPAC has become in structural terms the new "society" in the sense that it represents all Martu, reflecting at the same time both the political advantages of greater size, strength and access to resources and the increased visibility of the residential and political sub-unit, the outstation-become-independent community.

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[12] ATSIC is the acronym for the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, which was set up in 1990 to replace the old Department of Aboriginal Affairs (cf. O'Donoghue 1994).

For the Martu, survival in the nation state revolves around concerns such as securing adequate funding, strengthening their regional organisation, exerting a measure of control over the activities of resource developers, and distancing themselves physically from certain major social problems that impede the proper maintenance of an ordered and orderly social life. Their desire to retain highly valued aspects of the Law remains strong, but the totality of their encapsulation within the nation state and the relentlessness of Westernising pressures operate as powerful erosive influences, from which effective escape is impossible. The interplay of local and regional identities, and the shifting boundaries of local, dialect- and land-based identities that accompany further movement into newly established outstations, will continue to engage overtly "cultural" criteria as essential components of these identities. At the same time, however, the realities of encapsulation demand political responses, which cannot help but become increasingly important elements of emerging Aboriginal identities.

To return to the important paper by Jones and Hill-Burnett's on Aboriginal ethnogenesis, mentioned in my introduction, the data presented in this paper challenge their suggestion that processes of Aboriginal ethnogenesis entail **competition** between what they identify as the two major ethnic ideologies, the "cultural" and the "political". To depict their relationship as centrally one of competition is to overemphasise difference and separateness between these two dimensions of identity, and thereby to underplay their essential interdependence. These two ideologies are always co-present and exist in mutual tension, but more importantly, they operate simultaneously as contrary tendencies, working at one level to narrow boundaries and reinforce tendencies towards individuation and at another to invoke and strengthen wider collective identities.

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LEGITIMACY OF SOLOMON ISLANDS PIJIN[1]

CHRISTINE JOURDAN*

When I was in Honiara (the capital city of the Solomon Islands) for the first time (1982) doing research on the creolization of Solomon Islands Pijin, a strange thought occurred to me: this language, spoken by almost everybody in town on an everyday basis, was in reality nobody's language. By nobody's language I meant that this was a language with which nobody seemed to identify, which nobody claimed as his or hers and in which nobody had any vested interest, linguistic or social. An illegitimate language of some sort, as no speaker seemed to claim it, or express allegiance or commitment toward it. And yet, this language was so much part of the town life that anyone who wanted to establish or maintain social and commercial relations in Honiara - outside of the *wantok* system[2], that is - would have to learn it.

Was this contradiction a reflection of the pragmatic sociolinguistic realities of the town? At the time, that seemed obvious. However, things are changing in Honiara and Pijin is in the process of acquiring some forms of legitimacy. I will argue here that the acquisition of legitimacy by Solomons Pijin has partly to do with the development of an urban culture of which it is the essential medium, and with nativization of the language (this is the acquisition of Pijin as a native language, the process traditionally referred to as creolization). Both phenomena are seminal to the development of Pijin's cultural rootedness, a sinking of cultural roots more widely that it had earlier lacked. But I will argue as well that some form of legitimacy "from the top" is being given to the language by members of the urban elite who, looking for foundations on which to build national identity, have begun to recognize and to promote the use of Pijin in the everyday affairs of the country. With these social changes impinging on Pijin, we could expect that the language would undergo major concomitant linguistic transformations that go beyond the changes brought about in any language by the passage of generations.

My purpose here is to look into the development of Pijin's legitimacy in the light of the social changes that are taking place in Honiara. I will deal only indirectly with linguistic changes in Pijin, which are the focus of a forthcoming book.

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[1] This paper is based on fieldwork research done in Honiara, capital city of the Solomon Islands, over the years 1982, 1983, 1984 and more recently in 1989, 1990, 1993 and 1995. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada in the form of research grants that made possible for me to go back to the Solomons Islands regularly. My thanks to the Government of the Solomon Islands who has granted permission to carry out research on Pijin and to the people of Honiara who have taught me Pijin.

[2] *Wantok:* From English "one talk": one who shares the same language and thus belongs to the same language/ethnic group. The definition of *wantok* seems nowadays to be encapsulating ideological notions of group identity as well as of linguistic group boundaries.

LEGITIMACY

The concept of legitimacy applied to a language incorporates at least three aspects: "de jure" legitimacy, sociocultural legitimacy, and "de facto" legitimacy. Each form of legitimacy is developed or is achieved at different stages in the history of a language, if it is ever achieved at all; each form carries a different weight for its speakers.

As a category, "de facto" legitimacy is redundant. Truly, as soon as a language is being spoken within a community, it is functionally legitimate. The question of the legitimacy of that language should not even be raised, and usually is not raised in unilingual societies. For me to understand you, in a particular code, and for you to understand me, requires a reciprocal recognition of the code's acceptability as well as intelligibility. However, sociolinguistic legitimacy is a rather more complex matter and I will expand on it below. Societies are internally complex - vertically stratified, and often ethnically complex as well. Language fetishism (Bourdieu and Boltansky 1975) on the part of the speakers of various speech levels or dialects leads to the development and expansion of a linguistic market, in which language varieties, and thus speakers, will compete. This competition is camouflaged by the seemingly universal accessibility of the language to the speakers. It hides the high symbolic and tangible rewards that are at stake (Elder and Cobb 1983), which are revealed through the monopolistic rights secured by some speakers over one language variety (such as varieties used in religious rituals or in oratory art). These rewards will lead social groups or social classes to aim at the establishment of social legitimacy, associated or not with "de jure" legitimacy, for one variety of language: theirs. Language fetishism thus alters the seemingly neutral relationship between registers and dialects and confers symbolic value, in a sociolinguistic market place, to particular registers, dialects or languages. In social environments that are linguistically complex, languages, dialects and registers are thus in competition, a highly political process. Legitimacy of one linguistic variety entails that other varieties will be measured against the most valued one. The interplay of linguistic and sociolinguistic norms ensures the symbolic exclusion of non-normative varieties and the marginalisation of their non-conforming speakers. Sociolinguistic legitimacy is associated as well with an elitist view of culture that considers language as the reflection of one's intellectual achievements rather than as a tool of communication.

"De jure" legitimacy is the granting to a language of an explicit, societal legal charter: a recognized, defined, and guaranteed place in public life. Not all languages "achieve" this "de jure" form of legitimacy: nor do they need to do so to be useful to their speakers. "De jure" legitimacy is associated with the state, and more specifically with the nation-state. For along with the concept of legitimacy, one finds oppositions between dominant and minority language, official and national language, standard language and dialect, and so forth. Each of these oppositions reflects underlying social, ethnic and religious tensions within the society. What makes a language functionally legitimate - its ability to satisfy the communicative needs of a population - may then not be sufficient to make it the socially legitimate language, or even the official language, of a country. Hence the many situations the world over where the language of a minority (and in post-colonial situations, the language of a foreign power) is the official language of a country. "De jure" legitimacy of a language implies legislation and hence lies in the realms of politics and ideology. Clearly, any legislation (or absence of legislation) aiming at promoting, or condoning, the socioeconomic or sociocultural position of a language is a political statement. It is a form of linguistic legitimation that is intimately related, either to class interest, or to ethnic interest, or very often to both.

Therefore, any effort made to justify such political statements as answers to economic necessities, or to gloss them in terms of cultural realities, represents mystification. Habermas's discussion of the legitimation problems in the modern state (1979:181) can equally, and usefully, be applied to legitimation of languages. For as we all very well know, languages do not live in vacuo. They are intimately associated with the lives and socioeconomic positions of their speakers. Thus the legitimated language (or variety of language) will become the criterion (cf. Bourdieu's [1982] concept of *étalon linguistique*) against which all other languages, or varieties of languages, will be measured. Speakers of the non-valued languages or non-valued varieties of languages may, of course, not accept this normative definition.

Linguistic domination can also, of course, be a matter of contestation as well as hegemony - as a resident of Quebec can scarcely fail to notice. We see in the contemporary world a proliferation of separatist and nationalist movements in which languages that had been suppressed or subordinated within structures of the state have become symbols of cultural heritages and of distinct ethnic origins and primordial roots. Recall the use made of minority languages as symbols of ethnic separatism, counterhegemonic struggle, and identity in an earlier époque of European nationalism, in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Swedish empires, for instance.

SOCIOCULTURAL LEGITIMACY

When we deal with the legitimacy of a pidgin language, the situation is even more complex. A pidgin develops in an interlingual situation, marginal to the quotidian lives of participants. Where, in special historical circumstances such as those that prevailed in the southwestern Pacific, a pidgin continues to be used in a colonial society, it remains marginal: a lingua franca of plantations, police, colonial dealings with the indigeneous population. The elements of the local population who speak the language all learned the pidgin in adulthood and use it as a second language. Not only does a pidgin coexist with the vernacular, but it is relegated at the social margins of the society adopting it, in realms of activities that are not central to the local social organization. This marginality may, as in the Melanesian countries of the southwestern Pacific, continue into the postcolonial era. The new nation-states of the postcolonial world comprise "societies" that have been pieced together from multiple pre-colonial tribal or ethnic groups, each with their own language and culture. As we know, a people's language is symbolic of their history, their culture, their identity. Because a pidgin is a relatively new and marginal language in the history of a society, it lacks the historical and cultural depth that most other languages spoken in that society have, a depth which gave them cultural legitimacy. By historical and cultural depth, I refer not only to a particular time frame, but as well to the intimate relationship established between a society and its language(s) throughout their common history.[3] This intimate relationship is at the basis of cultural legitimacy and reinforces it. It allows the development of a body of oral or written texts, which serve as the cultural anchoring and the frame of reference of the subsequent generations. This cultural anchoring takes place, traditionally, through the mother tongue. Does a pidgin language, by definition the product of a marginal - even liminal - sociolinguistic situation, lack a culture of which it could be symbol as well as vehicle? Certainaly not. Despite the fact that pidgin languages lack native speakers (at least according to the classic definition[4]), they are not languages without cultures. Pidgin languages do not live in a cultural vacuum. They exist precisely because a new cultural context has arisen that both required and allowed a new language to appear and stabilize. However, the social universes within which pidgin languages are the medium have minimalist or partial cultures, which are not the primary cultures of their members. With regards to Solomons Pijin, we want to ask the following question: what is the culture with which Pijin in the Solomons (and everywhere in Melanesia, I surmise) shares a common history and in which it may be rooted? One comes to mind. It is the culture of contacts with Europeans, the culture of the plantations: a culture in between two worlds (Chowning 1986; Keesing 1986; Jourdan 1987), for a language in between two sets of languages: a pidgin culture in some sense. Workers on plantations did not identify with the culture they were developing, nor did they identify with the language of that culture. Their attitude toward both was very pragmatic: plantations were places one went to in order to get money to pay the head tax (Bennett 1987), to get steel tools and other western goods, to gain experience outside of and shelter from the social realms of the village (Corris 1973), to seek excitement, and induction into sophisticated manhood.[5] Plantations cultures were contextually bound (in time, place and forms of social relations) and so was the involvement of workers with them. This was the case because ultimately, the village remained the worker's pole of identification. Pijin on plantations was a liminal language: a second language to everyone, it was as contextually bound as the culture of which it was the medium. It was the only language shared by owners or managers and workers alike, each having the impression that they were, in some ways, speaking the language of the other. And it was often the only language in which the workers themselves could communicate, both in the work situation and outside it (and often as a medium of solidarity in resistance against its injustices). However, it was through the vernaculars that ethnic identity was crystallized and that cultural depth was developed. Pijin on the other hand, was used but unclaimed, precisely because Pijin in the Solomon Islands lacked the historical and cultural depth that would allow speakers to identify with it. Pijin was then everyone's language, but no one's language as well.

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[3] This relationship has, of course, been the focus of research since the romantic days of Humboldt. Some aspects of Habermas' theory of communication are impregnated with this romantic approach to language and nationalism.

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[4] According to the classic definition, "pidgins are vehicular languages, coined with elements of at least two languages (or systems of languages); their simplified and reduced structure paralleles the limited communicative contexts of their use; they are always a second language for their speakers and, as such, answer the communication needs of speakers having no other language in common" (Jourdan 1991:191). Pidgins are always contrasted with creoles that are "pidgins that have acquired native speakers, and concomitantly, a more complicated structure, in parallel with the expanded communicative context of use as a mother tongue" (idem). I proposed (1991) a more pragmatic definition based not, on the second language ns that have acquired native speakers, and cpposition understood in terms of secondary language (pidgin) and main language (creole).

[5] It is worth noting, however, that in the old days of plantation and police work, a normative attitude seems to have existed toward a fluent command of Pijin. Sophistication in dealing with Europeans and the plantation system was a mark of status for Islanders, and fluency in Pijin (seemingly, even a somewhat anglicized register) was a mark of that sophistication. (In the plantation system, young recruits were arriving with little or no command of Pijin, so fluency in Pijin was very much a status marker). Similarly, for Europeans, fluency in Pijin (usually far from perfect) was a mark of sophistication in dealing with "natives".

With regards to sociocultural legitimacy, a pidgin language such as Solomon Islands Pijin faces another type of difficulty: the parallel presence in the society of languages that are ideologically dominant.[6] Both groups of languages derive their status either from the status of their speakers (in the case of English), or from historical and cultural depth (in the case of the vernaculars). Over the years of British presence in the country, Solomon Islanders and Pijin speakers in particular have been bombarded by the negative attitudes and prejudices of the British and Australians toward Pijin. Moreover, English was, and still is, the language spoken by the people who held power and had the material wealth many Islanders hoped to enjoy eventually. This has led many Solomon Islanders to consider English as the "legitimate" language of the archipelago, an ironic situation when we know 1) that Pijin is the most widely spoken language in the country and 2) that very few people outside of Honiara have a sustained enough contact with English to ensure fluency in the language. Moreover, English benefits from its status as the official language of the country, and from being the language of education. As it is only the written language of the country in which a wide literature and written information is available, English fits easily into an elitist view of culture, both by Solomon Islanders who have access to it and those who do not. In the post-independence Solomons, the elite of the country has been instrumental in perpetuating the sociolinguistic supremacy of English that they inherited from the British colonial government. Fluency in English is still considered a symbol, as well as a guarantee, of social and material success. Until very recently, members of the elite were adamant that they would prevent Pijin from officially entering the education system and from being recognized as a valid medium of education, while they themselves used that language for most of the day-to-day communication having to do with the running of their Ministries, administration, and businesses. Lately, a new generation within the political elite is appearing: unlike their predecessors, they have been trained in an independent Solomon Islands. If some of them may have retained the prejudices towards Pijin and the class interests in an English that reinforces that priviliged status, most of them seem to realize that Pijin represents an important asset in building nationhood in this country. As they witness the cultural expansion of Pijin in the archipelago, and assess its powerful possibilities as a binding agent, the elite are considering the lingua franca in a more positive way: more studies on the diffusion of the language in the country are being commissionned; projects of Pijin literacy for adults are being devised; efforts are made to augment the use of Pijin in classrooms as an unofficial teaching medium; posters in Pijin appear in administrative and commercial buildings; comic books are being printed; radio commercials are created. All this semi-official social recognition of Pijin from above has become possible because some degree of cultural depth has now developed at the grass roots level. The elite is building on the "de facto" legitimacy that Pijin has progressively acquired. As a country that received independence from Britain (1978) on a silver tray, the Solomon Islands have never had to struggle to become a nation. The post-colonial elite is now realizing that with the smooth transfer to independance, they have inherited many British customs and institutions. At a time when the intellectual and political elite are trying to shake the influence of expatriates on the political and economic life of the country, while at the same time infusing some sense of national sentiment to an otherwise apathetic citizenry, Pijin, as a potential cement of unity and symbol of linguistic independance could prove to be an important nationalist symbol.

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[6] I am well aware of the limitation of the "dominant ideology" thesis. However, for the purpose of my demonstration, I will use it as a short cut.

Since the 50's the role played by Pijin in the life of Solomon Islanders has changed dramatically: the language has become the medium of communication of the urban life of Honiara, the medium of a type of culture different in many respects from the culture of the plantations. This culture with which urbanites identify in some respect is crystallized through Pijin. In Honiara, the strong position of Pijin as a medium of communication has been reinforced by the fact that most of the 64 vernaculars spoken in the country are represented in town. Given this high linguistic diversity, Pijin became naturally the lingua franca "par excellence" of the town. People migrating to town had to learn the language quickly if they wanted to create a social life for themselves outside of the limits of the *wantok* system.[7] The result was that Pijin progressively found its way within the family circle (due to an increasing number of inter-ethnic marriages), whereas it used to be used almost exclusively with non family members, and particularly, with non-*wantok* people.

The culture of Honiara is still in the making: the town is only 40 years old, and it is even more recently that Solomon Islanders have started to have an impact on it. These emergent urban cultural forms still embody many aspects of the village's ways of life and expectations; but they are quickly maturing. Young urbanites whose lives revolve around the town and no longer around the village display social and cultural expectations that contrast sharply with those usually found in the village. In a new social setting such as Honiara, identity is coined not only with reference to a common past on which one has no impact, but more and more with reference to the possibility of a common future on which one can act. Hence the thrilling experience shared by urbanites of having expectations regarding a new way of life one is helping to establish on an everyday basis. Pijin plays a central role in this new cultural formation. By virtue of being the privileged medium of an emerging and "natural" society, Pijin is in the process of acquiring cultural depth: urbanites use it in their everyday life; more and more children are brought up speaking Pijin as a mother tongue;[8] poems, popular songs, "kastom" stories, parliamentary speeches, radio programs, religious services, inscriptions on t-shirts and other collective uses of Pijin complement the individual (and more traditional) usages of the language. Without any doubt, this sociocultural expansion has had some impact on the language and on the way speakers make use of it (Jourdan 1985: 1987). At the same time, speakers' attitudes toward Pijin are changing.

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[7] It is interesting to note that the last bastion of monolingualism in town is not the family, but the wantok system. As more and more unmarried young people migrate to town, and as patterns of social relations and social networks develop accross ethnic boundaries, more and more inter-ethnic (hence bilingual) marriages ar taking place.

[8] Exact numbers are difficult to obtain. The 1976 census of population gave the amount of 1800 people who had claimed to speak Pijin as a mother tongue in the whole of the country. The 1986 census did not have any questions relating to mother tongue. However, in the intervening years between these two census, 9463 (32% of Honiara population) children were born in Honiara. Checking this figure against my own sample of 1984, we can assume ,conservatively, that 50% of these children have Pijin as a mother tongue.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LINGUISTIC NORM

Whereas Solomon Islanders used to look at Pijin as a fall-back position in case of breaches of communication, most of them now consider it as the "de facto" natural language of town. Many see Pijin as the language that urban children have to master, at least before getting to school, if they have not done so before. In their opinion it is important that their children know Pijin first rather than one of the family vernaculars. This is what M, a young Honiara woman then mother of two young children born in town has to say:

> *Mi laek hem* (her son) *save Pijin bikos bae hem had for hem, taem hem go lo skul. So mi laekem hem save Pijin fastaem; langgus*[9] *bae hem save bihaen.*[10]

With this new attitude toward the language, an interesting phenomenon is appearing: the development of a normative attitude toward Pijin, through the recognition of what should be said and what should not; of which linguistic occurrence belongs to Pijin and which one does not; of what is grammatical and what is not. The development of a normative ideology toward a language is deeply rooted in adhesion of speakers to that language, in its appropriation by speakers, and in recognition of its practical and symbolic strength. These new attitudes are spreading fast in town. When asked to comment on the linguistic situation of Honiara, Solomon Islanders verbalize very often this form of adhesion to the language and their recognition of the important role it plays in the life of the town:

> *Pijin hem barava langgus blong mifala long taon. Sapos no eni Pijin, bae mifala waswe?* (H.M. PS 57).[11]

Both the adhesion to the language and the normative attitude toward linguistic forms and usages were totally non-existent and irrelevant in the old days of Pijin usage. Their development under the new urban conditions of Pijin usage signifies that the lingua franca of the town is no longer someone else's language, but one's own language in which one has a vested interest: the key to urban socio-economic exchange, to the status of urbanite and to a possible future within a new socio-cultural formation. Along with the normative ideology, the sense of a linguistic norm is emerging. It is difficult to say exactly when the normative ideology and the linguistic norm began to appear. However it seems that it developed sequentially and progressively along three axes: rural-urban, old speakers-younger speakers, parents-children.

Rural speakers of Pijin do not have many opportunities to be confronted with urban Pijin. These occasions sporadically arise when villagers come to Honiara for a visit to their kin or on business. Then they notice the speed with which urban Pijin is spoken; some degree of anglicization in the speech of educated speakers (Jourdan 1989); the neologisms, particularly the very colourful stylistic expressions rendering some aspects of urban culture (*Honiara bone,*[12] *Jiru* (prostitute), *plastadens* (a slow dance where dancers hold one another tightly), some changes in the preferred syntactic usages such as relative markers (*hu* and *wea*), prepositional verbs (*apum* - to raise; *daonem* - to lower; *insaetim* - to bring inside; *ofum* - to switch off, etc). It is true that many rural speakers are annoyed by the speed with wich Pijin in changing: but, if and when they object to something, it is more to the lifestyle that generates such transformations in the language, than to the linguistic transformations per se. However they **do** object to Pijin being spoken in a way that is neither English nor Pijin, the epitome of this being the variety of Pijin heard on the radio, particularly during the news broadcasts. Rural Pijin speakers (and the majority of urban speakers as well) do not hesitate to call the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation register "bad" Pijin: "*Diskaen Pijin ia hemi rabis tumas*" (this kind of Pijin is bad). But they will marvel at the Pijin skills of a very gifted storyteller heard on the same radio later on in the program. Here we see the presence of a form of norm that does not aim at sanctioning speakers of the so-called bad variety. These normative but non-coercive assessments are illuminating in what they show that rural speakers have a very precise idea of the Pijin variety they consider genuine and legitimate Pijin: it is the variety that they themselves speak and appreciate, a variety that is in direct continuity with the earlier forms of the language. As Keesing (1988) has shown, they consider their variety, in some ways, as "the true Pijin" that they are proud to be speaking. This type of normative attitude toward Pijin aims at comforting rural speakers in the idea that their own variety of Pijin has its place in the linguistic repertoire of the country. They like their variety of Pijin because it sounds right to them. One element of this "rightness" is the close relationship between Pijin morphosyntactic patterns and those of Solomons vernacular languages.

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[9] Pijin word meaning "vernacular".

[10] Translation: "I want him to know Pijin otherwise it will be hard for him when he goes to school. So I want him to learn Pijin first, he will learn my language later".
Note that when I went back to Honiara in 1993, this child then 14, still had not learn more than 5 words of his mother's language. He was not any more fluent in his father's vernacular.

[11] Pijin is really the language of the town. If we did not have Pijin, what would we do?

In town the older Pijin speakers address a more precise linguistic criticism to the younger generation. This new discourse about the language is anchored in some feeling of alienation from a mode of life that is changing fast and in which older members of the urban center do not feel very confortable. Like their rural counterparts, older urban Pijin speakers object to new ways that are too far fetched for them: however they articulate their discontent by focusing on the way younger urbanites use Pijin. Very often, older people complain that young people in town stretch the language too far, inventing new grammatical forms, dropping others and creating neologisms and synonyms at much too fast a pace. A trend that they see as superfluous, spurious or exclusionary. For example, an old man was wondering why the new generation thought it necessary to coin the word *staka* (for English "many") when he felt that the early form of *plande* was quite appropriate and quite useful, and linguistically more correct.

Sophisticated young urban Pijin speakers will often make fun of the slower speed, indigenized phonologies, and grammatical conservatism of "bush Pijin" as spoken by old men in the remote areas of the archipelago. *Bush Kanaka* is the derisive term of address and reference used by urbanites to qualify people from the rural areas, unsophisticated in the ways and language of the town. In one famous murder case tried the High Court of Honiara in May of 1990, this derision towards bush varieties of Pijin became obvious. Young people in the audience laughed aloud at the Pijin spoken by key witness from the bush areas of the islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal. The young urbanites clearly were astounded to hear these men speak Pijin in a very slow fashion, using many of the phonological characteristic of the vernaculars in their speech.[13] One of them, "John", whose Pijin is very sophisticated and fluent by the standards of Malaita bush people was the laughing stock of the audience for the first five minutes of his testimony, until his proud demeanour and the conciseness and precision of his answers subdued the young urban crowd.

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[12] Literally, born in Honiara. Expression used to refers to culturally akward behaviours, particularly by young women who dress and speak in an non conventional and non subdued way. The underlying statement is that people in Honiara have no "culture" and as a result they behave wildly and uncontrollably.

Here we find a generation gap phenomenon not unfamiliar in western societies with the argots of youth culture as target of critique by the parental generation. For the first time in the history of Pijin, speakers (rural and urban older speakers) are identifying so much with the language, or trying to hang on to the privileges it once gave them, that they will consider their own variety of the language as the "authentic" one. Old forms become canonical forms against which other productions will be measured. Concepts such as "good knowledge" of Pijin and proper usage of canonical forms are emerging in the overall linguistic ideology. Not a small feat on the part of a language that is only some one hundred years old; a language that was used only as a second and peripheral language by Solomon Islanders until recently; and that many British colonial administrators called a "bastardized jargon" holding no hope for the future of the country and its citizens. With the development of a qualitative linguistic norm, appears the exclusion of speakers on the basis of their linguistic performance. History, once again, becomes the justification of authenticity as well as its alibi; a history that privileges the immanence of the earlier forms in the order of things, and thus their legitimacy. It is through the reference to history that cultural traditions are, if not created, at least reinforced (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1982), in a way that will serve as the legitimation agent of their own continued existence.[14] Linguistic traditions, and linguistic legitimacy, are developed just in the same way: by looking back to the past for justification of the present forms. Hence, not surprisingly, the older generations are seminal in the development and control of cultural or linguistic traditions. Of course, old Pijin speakers are the ones who voice their position regarding linguistic authenticity the loudest. They often speak of a time when they were the only ones knowing this language in the country, as if this "exclusive" knowledge of days past gave them the authority to decide on what was linguistically right and what was wrong today. Old people realize only too well that their linguistic prerogatives have escaped them precisely because their social prerogatives have escaped them as well.

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[13] The phonology of bush Pijin is highly variable and is strongly influenced by the phonology of the speaker's vernacular. This influence takes 3 different forms. 1) Phonological substitution: speakers will characteristically replace some Pijin consonants with the closest possible equivalent available in their vernaculars, contrasting, where possible, with the c.aononical ones in a single distinctive feature (e.g., voicing, bilabial vs. labiodental, nasal vs. non-nasal). For example, if one's mother tongue includes *p* and not *f* as in Tolo (Guadalcanal), the Pijin spoken by Tolo speakers will likely include *f* whenever Pijin has *p*. Pijin words such as *bifoa, finis, fis, foldaon* etc. will thus be pronounced *bipoa, pinis, pis, poldaon.* 2) Insertion of epenthetic vowels: in most languages of the Solomon Islands, consonant clusters do not occur. Most speakers therefore will insert epenthetic vowels in Pijin words in order to avoid consonant clusters. The choice of the vowel is directed by a rule of vowel harmony. Thus Pijin words pronounced in an urban way as *skul, olketa, spun, trae, bisnis, klaem* will be pronounced by rural speakers as *sukul, oloketa, supun, tarae, bisinis, kalaem.* 3) Addition of final vowels: just as vernaculars do not have consonant clusters, they very seldom have words ending with a consonant. Older rural speakers will add a final vowel to the Pijin words: *sukulu, supuni, bisinisi, kabisi, talemu, sikarapu.* Among most rural speakers and many older urban speakers all these phonetic interferences from the vernaculars are obvious. In the urban Pijin of the younger generation and of the children particularly, these variations tend to be neutralized: the phonetic system is regularized; the epenthetic vowels are disappearing and thus consonant clusters are more common than they are in rural Pijin; apocope is taking its toll and final vowels are disappearing.

[14] In some respect, our own dictionaries are nothing more but exercises of this type.

In that light, claims of linguistic authenticity resound very much as a last effort made to retain power locally and cross generationally. However, the authenticity of pidgin and hence, the concomitant aspects of its legitimacy, should not be perceived only as the product of a conflict of generations. Rather they are best understood in the light of the increasing differences between rural and urban modes of life, with the urban way acquiring progressively more social prestige.

Reportedly, pidgins and creoles, because of the traditional context of use to which they were put, are languages with which adults have rarely identified. Traugott (1977:87) noted that:

> They (the creoles) develop in situations where there is relatively little identification by adults with the pidgin because it is not their native language.

That has certainly been the case for most pidgins and creoles, although in the light of the new historical material that is now available for the Caribbean creoles, one needs to be cautious. However the Solomons case seems to show that given the appropriate sociolinguistic context (in permanent, stable and natural linguistic communities) identification with the language can be manifested even by speakers for whom this language is not a mother tongue (see above). In this particular case, what triggers identification of the speaker with Pijin is a positive attitudes toward living in town. Data collected in 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1989 show that where speakers are still very much attracted by the village life and values, and by a possible return to the village, identification with Pijin is not as high as it is in the case of speakers who have decided to make their life in town. If speakers are not identifying with Pijin, they are not likely to control the way their children use the language or to sanction their performance, according to their own performance of the language. Until recently most urbanites belonged to the former group: those for whom living in town represent a platform to a more satisfactory economic life, but not necessarily an ideal way of life. Their children have thus been left free to exploit the system of Pijin without incurring any social or linguistic sanctions, with the result that the overgeneralization and regularization processes appearing in the Pijin spoken by children in Honiara have not been controlled and channelled or even noted by the adult population, as is often the case in linguistic communities. This gives enormous linguistic freedom to the children, as they are not competing with an established and socially sanctioned norm. As Sankoff (1983:244) stresses:

> The genesis of both pidgins and creoles has taken place under conditions where the innovative strategies do get more of a chance to survive because they are not competing in the same way with existing rules.

In the absence of a norm, the children experiment, in relation with what they perceive the system of the language to be, and are free to do so. But of course the changes they introduce or systematize are not as spectacular as we might expect from a first generation of native speakers; these changes are limited by the linguistic input the children receive from the adult community, and by the demands and constraints of communication. Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere (Jourdan 1985; see also Keesing 1988), the Pijin of the parental generation which provided the input to the first "nativizing" generation had already expanded syntactically to a degree approximating that of developed creoles or even natural languages. There was little radical expansion left to these children (in contrast to the classical scenario portrayed for the Caribbean or the "true creolization" described by Bickerton for Hawaii).

The development of a linguistic norm in Pijin is a very recent phenomenon, that seems to have had, as yet, only a minor impact on the language. However, recently more and more young urbanites, most of whom have grown up in town, are seen coaching their children in their apprenticeship of the language, "correcting mistakes", reinforcing "good" linguistic performance, according to a linguistic norm that they have contributed to shape and of which they are the urban repositories. Traditionally "good Pijin" and "bad Pijin" were concepts that were correlated with good knowledge and proper usage of Pijin canonical forms. We are witnessing now that "good" and "bad" Pijin increasingly becomes phrased as "right" or "wrong". Value judgements applied to Pijin are finding their way into the unfolding sociolinguistic history of the language.

CONCLUSION

I have suggested in this paper that Solomon Pijin is acquiring some degree of legitimacy. This legitimacy is anchored in the development of an urban culture of which the language is the privileged medium; this is what I referred to as cultural legitimacy. We have seen as well, that across generations, a normative attitude toward Pijin, and a sense of a linguistic norm are developing. I am suggesting that the development of a linguistic norm in Pijin has been made possible by the development of Pijin's cultural rooting in the town of Honiara, a phenomenon that brought about speakers' positive ideological adhesion to the language. This adhesion in turn reinforced the practical position of Pijin in town and allowed for the elite of the country to co-opt the cultural rooting for their own political agenda: the building of nationhood and national unity. Urbanization brought even more cultural rooting for Pijin in the form of young native speakers of the language. All these aspects of cultural rooting provide the ideal frame for the development of a linguistic norm in Pijin. In their relationship to Pijin, speakers have gone beyond the "de facto" legitimacy stage mentioned above: the norm can be seen as the result and the warranty of Pijin's sociocultural legitimacy. Ironically, these normative, hence restrictive, values are coming into existence now, when the language has, at last, socially "made it".

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PLAYING THE MOMENT:

THE CONDITIONAL PRESENT IN HONG KONG

ROZANNA LILLEY*

DEVOURING TRADITION

Much current writing on Hong Kong requires confrontational enemies, holy wars between two evil empires, one run by greedy old men, the other by besuited imperialists, with Hongkongese depicted as the powerless victims of both. In this article, I am trying to establish a problematic that, without being shy of the colonial context, opens perspectives on to issues beyond the purview of any political morality tale. In order to do this, I present the reader with some performance fragments from local theatre group, Zuni Icosahedron. But first I should roughly foreshadow some of the issues involved in the historic juncture, known as the "late-transitional" phase (Chan 1994: 444), in which Hong Kong is currently caught.

The "transition" referred to here is the brief period of time left prior to sovereignty transferral in 1997. The political act of handing Hong Kong over from British control to the control of the People's Republic of China has, unsurprisingly, generated a great deal of uncertainty and promoted much discussion around the issue of "Hong Kong identity". This uncertainty remains despite China's formulaic undertakings that the territory will be allowed to maintain its capitalist system and lifestyle for fifty years following the transition and that "Hong Kong people will rule Hong Kong".

Aside from these broad assurances, China's policies towards the territory remain, at least publicly, relatively vague. The recovery of sovereignty, and the attendant expunging of the "shame" and subordination derived from China's defeat in the Opium Wars and the Sino-British "unequal treaties" which ceded Hong Kong Island and other territories from 1842 onwards, is the principal political objective (Scott 1989: 332; Sum 1995: 75). As Deng Xiaoping's daughter and biographer-cum-eulogist Deng Rong recently expressed it in a newspaper interview: "In 1997 the Chinese flag will fly over Hong Kong. That will also mark the end of a period of the colonial humiliation of China" (*South China Morning Post International Weekly* (*SCMPIW*) 25-26/2/1995: 7).

In the midst of all this, both 1997 and Hong Kong identity are getting somewhat overdone. Clubs in trendy Lan Kwai Fong all seem to have names now like "1996" or "1998". Businesses are taking out full page advertisements in newspapers. We"re here to stay; Hong Kong is our past and will be our future; respond positively to the winds of change. The exhortations to optimism or despair continue. There is a kind of designer packaging and jingoistic innocence to the whole affair that is, well, banal. By referring to the performance work of Zuni Icosahedron I hope to move against this banality and to unleash a few of the complexities and ambiguities which are continually being marshalled under the twin rubrics of local identity and sovereignty transferral. While this theatre group are frequently seen to both provide representations of Hong Kong identity and to encourage debate about the potential consequences of 1997, their performances also mock such generalities and playfully laugh at solemn enunciations about the assumed essence of a people and its links to their assumed fate.

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In other words, both their performances and my writing are inevitably about that banality previously referred to, about the politics of recognition and the political necessity of constantly and tediously referring everything forwards to that moment of changeover. But our work is also about painful balancing acts, the pressure of being squeezed between West and East, people's deeply felt relationship to China and their fear of, as one retired schoolteacher put it to me, "that bunch of bastards" in Beijing. My subheading makes use of a Cantonese expression, *hek yan ge laigau* or "the customs and traditions that devour people". I first heard this expression during a performance of *Scenes From A Man's Changing Room* which was staged by Zuni Icosahedron in August 1991 at City Hall.

Scenes From A Man's Changing Room was a very personal exploration from director Edward Lam, a homoerotic piece staged just after the decriminilisation of homosexuality in the territory. The timing of the piece and the efforts to scandalously flout convention were self-consciously conceived. In an interview in *Sing Pao Daily* (1/8/1991), Lam stated:

> I feel I am a marginal man. I find that I do not identify with men under the traditional standard. Those type of men represent ignorance and power worship. However, I can feel the feeling of safety when I am with them. I feel confused. I intend to express my understanding of my sexuality from the perspective of being contradictory in my feeling and thinking.

This attempt to remake, replay, cultural narratives by constructing a form of coherence founded on contradiction is typical of the work of this performance company. Lam's "choreographic theatre", as he likes to call it, proceeded through a number of discrete narrative vignettes to probe the issues of suppressed sexuality, sadism and hostility, rivalry, voyeurism, exhibitionism and death. During rehearsals male performers were told to look like Audrey Hepburn, to recall *Breakfast at Tiffany's*, to be more like a James Bond girl. They lounged around talking about what sections of the newspaper they masturbated on.

During the show, a man sat in a barbers chair making small talk about the latest fashions in haircuts and suits whilst being fellated; a male couple simulated intercourse for ten minutes, exhausting themselves to the strains of Mozart's *Clarinet Concerto*. Of course, it wasn't all so deliberately provocative. Much of the action turned on pastiches of movies, jokes about Hitchcock in overdone spy sequences, the use of Cantonese cinema cliches - "Please marry me", "Even now you don't believe I really love you", "You are jealous of me".

In seductively camp scenes, Hong Kong identity and sexuality constantly rubbed against each other, providing more areas of friction than regions of easy equivalence. The relations of difference here were not those of female to male, minority to majority, Hong Kong to China, but rather of male homosexuality to patriarchal capitalism and compulsory heterosexuality. In a homophobic and relatively sexually conservative environment such as

Hong Kong (Lee 1994: 21), the constant figure of the homosexual man displaced any general relation between nationality, sexuality and local identity.[1]

For his part, Lam constantly stressed how **un**Chinese he is. He contrasted his own desire to "spill his guts" and his belief that "democracy" comes from knowledge of the self with the value he asserts that Chinese people place on reticence, secrecy and self-delusion. In the *TV & Entertainment Times* (12-18/8/1991: 16) he commented: "Why am I interested in physicality? Because many Chinese don't give a damn or just don't pay any attention to other men's bodies. To mention bodies is always taboo".

And taboos are there, for Zuni Icosahedron, to be challenged. Certainly, part of my attraction to this group hinged on the ways in which they "devour" traditions, negating what they perceive to be canonically Chinese in their search for innovation and novelty, ripping apart the tissues of remembrance as they purposefully turn themselves towards the future. This is, in many ways, a classic revolutionary tactic - constructing a view of a static, ossified society, ascribing it to the previous and current regimes, and committing oneself to changing it (Young 1992: 16). Puritanical morality, Mao Zedong's rule, Qing society, the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping's leadership, the constraints of party historiography and British colonialists all become fodder for critique in their theatrical practice as they attempt to search out the boundaries of a radical beginning.

Yet the notion of "devouring tradition" should also be understood in another way. Memory as well as forgetting is implicated in this project. Zuni members also feed off their relations with China and Britain, deriving sustenance from the recognition that they are irrevocably the product of interlocking histories and cultures, drawing nourishment from the effort to explicate this complicated cross-over. There is no illusion of a return to the past, just a clear sense that searching for a beginning is unthinkable without the efforts of recollection. Images of "Chineseness" are not simply rejected but also conveyed and sustained in performance.

Zuni Icosahedron are not alone in this quest to catch the physical sense of various conjunctures, to provide a tangible jumbling-up of numerous reference points that might constitute and simultaneously unravel what is known as Hong Kong identity. Rey Chow, for instance, provides readers with a sense of these complex intersections and uses such configurations as a theoretical point of departure. She states:

> Growing up in the 1960s and 1970s in Hong Kong, that "classic immigrant city" and "junction between diaspora and homeland" ... What I retain from these memories is not a history of personal or collective victimisation but the sense of immediacy of a particular diasporic reality - of Hong Kong caught, as it always has been since the end of the Second World War, between two dominant cultures, British colonial and Chinese communist ... it is the tactics of dealing with and dealing in dominant cultures that are so characteristic of living in Hong Kong. These are the tactics of those who do not have claims to territorial propriety or cultural centrality. Perhaps more than anyone else, those who live in Hong Kong realise the opportunistic role they need to play in order, not to "preserve", but to negotiate their "cultural identity" (Chow 1993: 20,21,25).

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[1] I am partly indebted here to Elspeth Probyn's (1993) writing on related issues in Canada and Quebec.

Part of what this negotiation of cultural identity in contemporary Hong Kong involves is a contest among various social groupings for the right to define the territory both internally and abroad. These definitions are unstable and contingent, constructed on ever shifting ground and structured by larger systems of signification, such as international capitalism, Chinese communism, patriarchy and racism. They are inevitably moulded by these constraints but manage to assert the capability of local peoples to speak themselves rather than to simply be spoken about. Zuni Icosahedron, the theatre group whom I have chosen to speak about, are involved in precisely this project. What I find of most interest about them, and also most difficult to capture in words, is that their performances are neither "about" enforced identity or counter-identities nor "about" accommodation versus resistance but constituted, self-consciously, in their intersection and in the articulation of past and future in the present.

SHEDDING TEARS

All beginnings contain an element of recollection. My own is no exception. I first became interested in Hong Kong during the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. At that time I was studying Mandarin at the Australian National University and planning to do fieldwork in China's Yunnan Province. My own office within Anthropology was across the corridor from a visiting scholar normally resident in Yunnan. The sense of deep shock and bereavement which engulfed the Chinese intellectual community in Canberra was profoundly affecting. The gentleman across the corridor replaced, within a few days, his own public tears with public denials that anything of much significance had occurred. He took the Chinese government line. At the time I found this *volte face* enormously disturbing. In hindsight my perturbation seems rather naive but, at that moment, my own research plans on ethnicity seemed hopelessly irrelevant to the main plot. It was in this state of agitation that I attended a seminar about responses in Hong Kong to the events in China and learned of the dramatic reactions in the territory to this tragedy.

Protests and rallies shook Hong Kong during the spring of 1989. Declaring their sympathies with the student-initiated protest movement in Beijing, Hong Kong residents took part in rallies unprecedented in size and duration. On May 17, 6000 people gathered in Victoria Park and a hunger strike by seventeen Hong Kong students entered its third day (*South China Morning Post* (*SCMP*) 18/5/1989: 1). These "patriotic protests" continued on May 20 as 50,000 people, undaunted by Typhoon Brenda, thronged through the streets of Wanchai demanding the resignation of Chinese Premier, Li Peng (*South China Sunday Morning Post* (*SCSMP*) 21/5/1989: 1). Support was also expressed in other ways. Hong Kong news reports were sent to China via telex and facsimile, posted daily in Tiananmen Square and ardently read by Beijing citizens. Even before the military crackdown, Communist Party hardliners were branding Hong Kong as an anti-revolutionary base (*Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*) 29/6/1989: 32). Later, Hong Kong people were publicly accused of taking part in illegal activities aimed at subverting the Chinese government (*Hong Kong Standard* (*HKS*) 14/6/1989: 1).

An outpouring of emotion followed in the wake of the declaration of martial law in the Mainland (Rafferty 1989: 7). One million people marched through the heart of the territory; in other words, one out of every sixth person was moved to express their disquiet (Buruma 1990:45).[2] For most, it was their first attendance at a political rally. Builders climbed down from their scaffolding to join the march which wound snake-like from Chater Gardens to the Happy Valley Racecourse, clerks left their offices, shoppers exited department stores to swell the numbers (*HKS* 22/5/1989: 1).

The army massacre of unarmed civilian demonstrators in Beijing at the beginning of June and the subsequent arrests of student leaders and others across China was watched with horror on Hong Kong television screens (Rafferty 1989: 7). Rioting broke out in the territory, with police teargassing crowds; people wept in the streets; the whole colony went into mourning. A general strike was called on June 7. Share prices went into free fall (*SCMP* 20/5/1989: 1). The staff at China's representative office in the territory, the New China News Agency (NCNA), hung a banner outside their windows stating: "Resolutely support the patriotic democratic movement of Beijing students" (*SCMP* 19/5/1989: 1). Even pro-Communist newspapers denounced China's action. People demanded the right of abode in Britain and guarantees of human rights. And as the colony was swathed in black, the coffers of the Bank of China sunk steadily lower while customers withdrew their savings in protest (*FEER* 15/6/1989: 13 & 22/6/1989: 14).

These events have been widely interpreted within a Durkheimian framework, stressing the integrative force of the protests. The mountains of wreaths and banners, the lamentations and the grief are perceived as a concrete demonstration of the links which bind the inhabitants of the territory into a "united, unified Hong Kong" (Rafferty 1989: 7). We are told that this "astonishing outburst of old-fashioned patriotism" (Wang 1989: 2) established the conditions for affiliation, loyalty, identity. Commentators agree that : "It was in many ways Hong Kong's finest hour" (Buruma 1990:45).

The conditions that have enabled such a transformation are reputed to be grounded in the presence of a new generation born and bred in Hong Kong who, unlike their refugee parents, have a sense of belonging. The 1981 census established, for the first time, that more than half the inhabitants of the territory had been born there, and many of these are identified as belonging to a well-educated middle class (*FEER* 5/1/1984: 29 & 25/7/1985: 36; Morris 1988: 295). The twist in the tale was that as Hong Kong people's sense of disaffection with the Chinese Communist Party intensified, this disaffection became the catalyst for the vivification of their participation in a Chinese identity which simultaneously stressed love of country **and** hatred of the Beijing government (Kim & Dittmer 1993: 274; White & Cheng 1993: 190).

Obviously this invocation of unanimity and shared, corporate experiences glosses over divisions and contradictions amongst Hongkongese. Affiliations to place and province, loyalties to language and ethnic identities vary enormously. Many came from China's Guangdong Province, bound together by a common usage of Cantonese but divided by the circumstances compelling them to leave, by their aspirations and by more local networks of association. Regional prejudices amongst Chinese run deep. In the area where I was living, Discovery Bay on Lantau Island, arguments in the local Park "n Shop supermarket would frequently reduce to the hurling of the Cantonese derogatory epithet "you Mainlander!" at some dissatisfied customer. Hokkien speakers and Hakkas, Tankas and Vietnamese, Filipina amahs, American businessmen and other *gwailos* (foreigners, literally "ghost people") further fragment the community. These categories are crosscut by others - socioeco-

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2 The 1991 Population Census returned a total figure of 5,674,114 (Ng 1992: 213).

nomic situations, lifestyle variations and so on. Yet I think we have to take seriously the fact that these demonstrations keep being referred to subsequently as a kind of marker, a before and after Event, if we are to remain sensitive to the whole question of identity and to the cultural construction of such perceptions as moments within a specific historical imaginary.

Returning briefly to Tiananmen Square, it is evident that a complex series of potent meanings were mobilised in the demonstrations of June. Indeed, students and others exploited such occasions with liturgical sophistication and zeal and a conscious manipulation of symbols. As Calhoun (1989: 55) convincingly argues, the protest movement "wove symbols from a common international culture together with its own specifically Chinese concerns and conscience".

On the one hand, a subversion of Chinese communist culture is noted by Barmé (*FEER* 22/6/1989: 37,38) in the reinterpretation of martyrdom to serve a cause defying party orthodoxy. Thus, when Wu'er Kaixi, the infamous "pyjama boy" who berated Chinese Premier Li Peng in a televised meeting at the height of the Beijing spring demonstrations, spoke later that year in Australia he played upon an image of the blood of the students congealing all Chinese together, thereby recalling republican revolutionary Sun Yat-sen's celebrated remark that the Chinese people were like a "plate of loose sand".[3] Banners announcing a determination to die for the cause, hunger strikers, the formation of suicide squads, and, in a scene that has passed into romantic iconography, a lone student playing matador to a line of tanks (Rafferty 1989: 14), all attest to the centrality of martyrdom. The seizing of Tiananmen Square, a space rich with historical allusion that spoke at once of the Party, which used it to display its authority, and of the people who gathered there to acclaim leaders (Calhoun 1989: 57), was itself an act of semiotic guerrilla warfare. And how else could we interpret the appropriation of the Party's own hymn, The Internationale, by protesters (Rafferty 1989: 2)?

On the other hand, protesters also adopted symbols directed at a Western audience. From the erection of the enormous styrofoam and papier mache Goddess of Democracy, modelled on the Statue of Liberty, which outfaced the portrait of Chairman Mao across the Avenue of Eternal Peace (Jose 1989: 296), to proclamations of "Vive la liberte" and the two-fingered "V" for victory held aloft by marchers playing on nostalgia for Churchill's triumphant World War II gesture and the 1960s (Calhoun 1989: 55,58), the volatile and multivocal character of these enactments of dissent clearly emerges.

At one level, this multivocality simply indicates how internationalised models for dissent have become and how astute students were at directing their pleas to an international audience in a situation where, for a number of weeks, they were dominating world news (Wasserstrom 1992: 245). But more than cynical calculation was at stake here. If we take the example of the Goddess of Democracy, the highly self-reflexive character of these protest actions becomes evident. While her creators began with a notion of copying the Statue of Liberty, they decided to adapt it to their own situation. A preexisting figure of a male Chinese peasant grasping a wooden pole was feminised in a style consciously imitating the work of Russian revolutionary realist sculptor Vera Mukhina (Lee 1992: 172,173). The result was a pastiche, part-ironic, part-serious, that reminded people of the giant white statues of Mao that were carried through Tiananmen Square during National Day parades in the 1960s (Esherick and Wasserstrom 1992: 34). The mutual implication of the "global" and the "local" was literally on display.

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[3] He was speaking at a public lecture at The Australian National University (20/12/1989) to promote the cause of the Paris-based Federation for a Democratic China.

This mutual implication was also characteristic of Hong Kong protests. Not all activities can be elided into these binary categorisations, but it remains the case that interpretations have focused on a British/Chinese dichotomy manifest in forms of political resistance. Usually the notion of British identity is notably ill-defined, while the practices symbolising it are virtually a compulsory cliche. This is well illustrated by the text of a full-page newspaper advertisement, pressing for the right of abode in England, replete with a photo of a Chinese boy in a British school uniform:

> The coins in his pocket bear the impression of the Queen. On Saturdays he plays football. His school flies the British flag. He doesn't think about freedom because he takes it for granted (cited in Buruma 1990: 45).

Emotionally charged signs of "Britishness", such as protesters making speeches in English or broadcasting a cassette of Vera Lynn triumphantly carolling "Land of Hope and Glory", were the crucial elements of such pleas.

More commonly, however, appeals have been cast in terms of adherence to an equally stereotypical Greater Chinese ideal. Even the most virulent of critics, legislator Martin Lee Chu-ming, suggests that the Mainland should act as: "a considerate and loving parent ... For we are all proud to be Chinese, and we fully support the return of sovereignty..." (Drafting of the Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (DBLHKSAR) 1989: 66). As protesters marched ten abreast they repeatedly sang the patriotic song *Heirs of the Dragon*. Fund raising activities were conducted under the slogan "Blood is thicker than water" (Chow 1993: 24). During the May 21st rally film director John Shum, speaking on behalf of "showbusiness personalities", stated: "We might not be well versed in politics but the blood flowing inside our bodies is the blood of Chinese" (*SCMP* 22/5/1989: 1). Cheng Kai-nam, leader of the Federation of Education Workers, joined the patriotic chorus: "The Government crackdown has not only irritated the people but the heavens. While our brothers and sisters are shedding their blood in Beijing, we are shedding our tears" (*SCSMP* 21/5/1989: 1).

In fact, one of the striking features of the Beijing spring movement was the active role played by an international audience of overseas Chinese mobilized by media coverage of the events (Calhoun 1989: 59).[4] World-wide protests were held in response to the call for support from Mainland students. In Macau, which reverts to Chinese sovereignty in 1999, thousands marched; in Washington, New York, Vancouver, Toronto and Sydney large demonstrations were held (*HKS* 29/5/1989: 1); in Taiwan one million students formed a four hundred kilometre human chain, referred to as "Hand in hand, heart to heart", symbolising a great wall of the flesh and blood of Chinese youth (*HKS* 1/6/1989: 1). And amongst these communities, Hong Kong was undoubtedly the most significant actor. The euphoric support, the millions of dollars raised, the massive demonstrations and activists' participation in the underground railway, "Operation Yellowbird", that with the assistance of triads, spirited dissidents away from the Mainland, are all concrete evidence of this (*FEER* 1/2/1990: 29). For most, the Han Chinese "country" rather than the People's Republic of China state/nation had clearly become the primary locus of loyalty (Kim & Dittmer 1993: 263,278).

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[4] Donations, remittances and investments from Overseas Chinese account for a considerable percentage of China's foreign currency. Conservative estimates suggest that investments, for example, currently stand at about US$1 billion. These figures include funds coming from Chinese in Hong Kong and Macau, who are referred to in the Mainland as "compatriots" (*FEER* 22/11/1984: 47,50).

As part of her desire to forge a "diasporic consciousness" which rejects this focus of loyalty, Rey Chow (1993: 24) has negatively described these heartfelt claims to ethnic oneness as "illusory" and "manipulative". Further, she suggests that the social differences separating Hong Kong and China are being bypassed through submission to a "myth of consanguinity" that is "empty". Here, it is necessary to make a number of comments. Firstly, Chow relies on a somewhat canned vision of what Hong Kong actually "is" that sits uncomfortably closely to Cold War rhetoric. For her, Hong Kong is a civil society marked out by its fair legal system, freedom of speech and emerging direct elections. The odd qualifier doesn't detract from the contrast. Of course, this is one view of society which Mainland activists were pursuing in 1989. In this sense, "difference" in no way detracts from consanguinity because Hong Kong is, for some, a utopian model of what China might become. More disturbingly, Chow's negative comments betray an idealist positing of an "outside" to the systems which structure subjectivity and an unwillingness to sanction the tremendously strong political strategy that calls to "blood" entail.

Nowadays, Tiananmen Square has been resurfaced, the Chinese propaganda machine has transformed the protesting "martyrs" of 1989 into "thugs" and "gangsters" and "bourgeois elements" participating in the so-called peaceful evolution (*heping yanbian*) strategy of the capitalist West, the foreign media's attention has been diverted by radical changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and international realpolitik and business interests have prevailed over concerns for human rights violations as the terror of arrests, executions and purges continues (Jaivin 1989: 22; Jose 1989: 297; Kim & Dittmer 1993: 258; Rafferty 1989: 5). Politics in Hong Kong remains volatile. Premier Li Peng accused locals of stirring up "rain and wind" by chanting "down with China's Ceaucescus" at a New Year's day march in support of the Romanian revolution (*FEER* 25/1/1990: 17); in April, 1990 thousands of demonstrators alluded to Tiananmen and to the inefficacy of officially mandated amnesia when they observed the annual Qing Ming festival to honour dead ancestors (*Sydney Morning Herald* (*SMH*) 7/4/1990); in July of that year China's National People's Congress adopted the Basic Law, the mini-constitution for Hong Kong after 1997, in the face of forceful objections that it undercuts guarantees about the protection of civil and political rights (*SMH* 7/4/1990: 30).[5] New political factions are also proliferating, including a coalition of emerging groups who form a substantial bargaining force in legislative politics called the Democratic Party, the core members of which are drawn from the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China (*FEER* 23/8/1990:22; Sum 1995: 88,90). Widespread support for this coalition is expressed each year when the territory hosts elaborate and well-attended commemorations of the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre (Chan 1994: 445).

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[5] Objections centre on Beijing's power to declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong in times of war or internal turmoil and on the limited role given to Hong Kong courts to interpret the Basic Law. Insufficient reform of the legislature is also at issue. The Basic Law provides for the qualified democratic election of 20 of the 60 members of Legco by 1997, with the possibility of half the seats being directly elected by 2003 (*SMH* 7/4/1990: 30).

In response to these activities, repressive measures are also becoming more commonplace. For instance, in 1990 a Hong Kong magistrate invoked powers that have lain dormant for seventeen years to convict five pro-democracy activists of using loudhailers at a public gathering and collecting public donations without official approval (*FEER* 9/8/1990: 11). In 1994 Hong Kong's Education Department attempted to remove references to the Tiananmen Square massacre from two textbooks on the grounds that events which happened less than twenty years ago could not be judged objectively (*SCMPIW* 16-17/7/1994: 3). In that same year the National People's Congress, which is China's highest law-making body, passed a resolution to abolish all three tiers of Hong Kong's partially elected political structure. The district boards, the urban and regional councils and the legislature will all be dissolved on July 1 1997. Thus the first act of the incoming sovereign will be to liquidate the existing political structure in the territory. All of this fuels the prevalent conviction that the future government will be tightly controlled by Beijing and that this will be a repressive regime. Local legislator Christine Loh sums this up when she writes: "The political reality for Hong Kong is that on July 1, 1997, it will become part of China, supposedly to enjoy 'a high degree of autonomy' from Beijing. The change of sovereignty is causing the people of Hong Kong anxiety because the history of Communist China is one of repression" (*SCMPIW* 26-27/11/1994: 10).

An increasing resort to extra-institutional modes of demand making, including dramatic actions such as the public burning of the Chinese constitution, has now irreversibly altered the political landscape of Hong Kong. During the year of my fieldwork in the territory, marches and hunger strikes were frequent occurrences. In fact, hunger strikers positioned on mats outside the Star Ferry entrance were on almost permanent display during 1991 and were obviously a focus of romantic idealisation. Young women would remove their shoes before approaching these debonair young men who, surrounded by lavish bouquets of flowers, were propped in front of guitars as nearby video players constantly replayed footage of the Tiananmen Square massacre to passers by. I think it is important to state here that my sympathies were entirely with these young people and that I, too, marched a number of times to the New China News Agency, pushing against police cordons.

I have included this material on the protests in Tiananmen and subsequent reactions to these in Hong Kong partly because it provides a vivid example of the use of social categories in context-dependent ways but mainly because my whole approach to thinking about Hong Kong identity is predicated on these events and the sense they conveyed that the present is a time of disjuncture, a time when, to borrow one of the earliest slogans of Tiananmen demonstrators, "we are writing history". This research is a part of that history, constantly doing battle between a desire for concrete political action and the intensely fragmented and elusive quality of practices and representations forced, by commentators, to submit to the seemingly cohesive demands of a phrase such as "Hong Kong identity".

From the start I took my lead from Calhoun's (1989: 67) point that the monological and authoritative rhetoric of the Beijing spring movement should not divert our attention from "the sense of cultural crisis which went along with it". The pursuit of civil liberties and calls for the government to listen to the demands of the people were part of a history of trying to find a national identity which can serve effectively in current times. Chinese publications of the 1980s were full of discussions about a specifically modern "identity crisis" (*rentong weiji*) and debates about the appropriate foundations for modernisation reform which went under the rubric of "culture fever" (*wenhua re*).[6] This concern, I suggest, is also at the heart of cultural production in Hong Kong where the whole question of whether there is one China to which all Chinese belong takes on particular urgency in view of 1997. The productions of Zuni Icosahedron are part of this protracted and agonizing process being undertaken by Chinese intellectuals to renegotiate "Chineseness" as they search for a viable position in the world. But that far from exhausts the sum total of their possibilities.

IN-BETWEEN: NATIONALISM, LOCALISM, IDENTITY

Given current circumstances, however, it is hardly surprising that the question of Hong Kong identity should emerge urgently and irrevocably in the throes of political alteration. A 1985 survey, for example, showed that when a sample of people in the colony had to choose between identifying as "Chinese" or "Hongkongese", three-fifths chose to call themselves by their city (White & Cheng 1993: 181). Leaving aside criticisms of the implied starkness of such a choice, it remains the case that most of those approached decided to express a clear concern with what it means to be a *Heung Gong yan* or Hong Kong person.

But there are factors other than 1997 promoting this concern. Hong Kong had been born in the early Victorian era as a military, commercial and administrative centre of expanding British trade with China. For more than one hundred and fifty years it has developed apart from the Mainland as an increasingly distinctive social formation. By the 1950s, the territory had become a politically detached metropolis, immersed in modernization and cosmopolitanism, which rendered it quite different from the "embedded" cities across the border (Lau & Kuan 1988: 1,33,189; Wong 1988: 323). Nevertheless, we can still fairly say that social and political changes in the 1970s ushered in a process of introversion which has been intensified by the 1997 issue (Kuan & Lau 1988: 12). The Tiananmen Square massacre had an essential role to play in galvanising this process but well before the carnage in Beijing a cautionary literature on Hong Kong's future, asserting that legal measures would prove entirely inadequate to preserve a liberal administration, had flourished (White & Cheng 1993: 184).

In one sense we can say that this introversion and consequent assertion of Hong Kong identity is a counterhegemonic discourse that pits itself against both British and Mainland Chinese refusals of local specificity. On closer inspection, though, one begins to feel uncomfortable with the extent to which this discourse of identity derives from and reproduces colonial structures of thought. Indeed one of the strongest and least noticed English influences on Hong Kong claims to a unique identity is exactly this type of cultural nationalism in which the inner essence of a people is discovered in a selective version of local cultural production (see Williams 1989: 67,68). Of course, China is also nationalist in orientation and a great deal of debate centres on searching out the roots of this orientation.

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[6] This sense of cultural crisis is beautifully captured by Nicolas Jose's 1989 novel *The Avenue of Eternal Peace*. He writes:

> On Saturday afternoons throughout the city, salons for democracy were held. Items on the agenda included: modern management techniques; cybernetics and systems theory; artistic individualism; an independent press; the separation of Party and government. People talked their heads off ... argued against Marx and for Nietzsche, asserting the power of individual will to recast the world (Jose 1989: 271).

Watson (1992: 71), for example, argues that the idea of a unified culture predated, and made possible, the invention of a modern Chinese state following the collapse of the imperial order in 1911. Scalapino (1993: 217) places much emphasis on the role of the "traditional" belief that China is destined by virtue of its superior culture to tutor others in forging modern nationalism. Fitzgerald (1991), by way of contrast, opines that Sun Yatsen's concept of *min zu* (translating the Western terms "race" and "nation"), popularised during the 1920s and 1930s, can itself be traced back to essentialist, racist European writings about "Johnny Chinaman". Leys (1988: 65,66), too, documents the use by local intellectuals of Reverend Arthur Smith's notoriously unflattering nineteenth century book *Chinese Characteristics*. This catalogue of collective vices neatly shored up the indigenous presentation of a barbaric traditional society desperately in need of transformation. Whatever the case, the thin line which separates an indigenous Hong Kong counterhegemonic discourse about "local identity" and hegemonic British and Chinese nationalist discourses remains intact.

One of the difficulties in writing about Hong Kong is that, in any case, "nationalism" is not a particularly useful word insofar as some notion of patriotic loyalty to either the Chinese or the British state is not at issue and even movements for autonomy are severely curtailed. A proclivity to be demoralized by the logic of circumstances, to feel ground down by the present and its agonising choices is manifest in the muting of both anti-colonial and anti-Mainland discourse. Self-determination is simply not an issue. In some ways this is surprising. The history of subordination is, in its most general outlines, clear. Hong Kong has remained what it was at its inception - an archaic colony presided over by a Governor commanding an executive-centred system of power.

The current controversy over Governor Chris Patten's efforts to increase the pace of democratisation in the territory by lowering the voting age to 18 from 21 and broadening the voting base of the functional constituencies still leaves Hong Kong, post-1997, with an unrepresentative government with an executive chain of command that runs directly from Beijing down through the territory's chief executive and her or his top officials to the 190,000 strong civil service. Interviewed for the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (1/4/1993: 12), Patten described his proposals thus:

> I freely confess that my proposals are not a great step forward towards democracy for Hong Kong. They aren't even a small step ... What they are is an attempt to secure a legislative council which is broadly based, which is credible ... I hope that in a rather wider context they will reckon that I helped close the last chapter in Britain's colonial history honourably.

His "exit in glory" conservatism parades as radical reflection against China's reactions to these plans. Premier Li Peng accused Britain of trying to "create disorder and impede the smooth transfer of power".[7] This mild outburst later gave way to personal insults - Patten became known as a thoroughly dishonourable "prostitute", "serpent" and "tango dancer".

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[7] According to the Basic Law, in the first years of the Special Administrative Region, the proportion of directly elected seats on the legislature will remain small. Provisions exist for 20 directly elected seats during 1997-1999, increasing to 24 by 1999 and reaching thirty to fifty per cent of legislature seats by 2003. Any departure from this model is seen by China as a betrayal of the "through train" concept by which legislators elected in 1995 would stay on after sovereignty transferral in the interests of ensuring political stability (Lo 1992: 12).

Where nationalist sentiments do occur in Hong Kong they tend to take a somewhat unorthodox form. Rather than being generated by local inhabitants, nationalist rhetoric is constantly promoted by the representatives of the People's Republic. This rhetoric involves a grand vision of the unification of the Chinese nation and maps the Hong Kong Chinese, like their Taiwanese compatriots, as part of the Chinese in China. As Sum (1995: 75,76) points out, while this form of nationalism is constantly linked to an anti-colonial stance, it is, necessarily, also completely severed from any notion of self-determination or genuine autonomy.

To avoid the ambiguities and over-determinations carried by nationalism, some writers opt for the term "localism"; others, arguing for a broader "southern Chinese" orientation, prefer "provincialism". This latter term receives impetus from the increasing dovetailing of the economies of Guangdong and Hong Kong. Hong Kong's involvement with manufacturing industries in the Shenzhen economic zone is a good illustration of what is sometimes referred to as the "vanishing border" (Donnithorne 1979: 621). In fact, Martin Lee Chu-ming speculated that Hong Kong and areas of south China could ally against the north after 1997: "We speak the same dialect ... It's the sort of thing that can happen because Hong Kong's prosperity has rubbed off on Guangdong and Shenzhen" (White & Cheng 1993: 183). The issue of language is not incidental here; Cantonese separatism is an integral component of the centrifugal tendencies of south China which analysts within the People's Republic describe as a "Pearl River culture area". The question of this potential merging takes on greater salience with recent accounts of the continued devolution of economic and political power to local authorities in China, with wealthy Guangdong being cited as the most prominent example of this regionalism. Some commentators refer to Guangdong's capital, Guangzhou, as having an "alloy culture" (*hejin wenhua*) mixing East and West, or a "window culture" (*chuangkou wenhua*) of cosmopolitan trading connections. Further, a convergence between the roles of Hong Kong and Guangzhou in serving the Chinese state as places for dealing relatively safely with international interfaces is posited (White & Cheng 1993: 163,164,167,173,182).

In the midst of these mercurial discursive categories, that shuttle back and forth between north and south and coast and inland, most writers opt for the much vaguer term "identity". This neatly bypasses most of the problems even if it does little to clarify the situation. As White and Cheng (1993: 156) put it, "the notion of identity has been put to so many social purposes, it seems to be a word in search of a definition". The Chinese equivalent *rentong* did not even come into usage until the 1980s and is confined largely to technical/academic discourse (Kim & Dittmer 1993: 246). I think that the best we can do is to recognise that whether we use one label or another we are dealing with the same "epistemology of entivity" (see Foster 1991: 253) involving an awareness of difference, the attribution of that difference to "culture", and the objectification and substantivization of culture as a unitary essence (see Jolly 1992: 54). This observation in no way implies that such strategies are politically impotent.

The politics of recognition demands that the fate of groups, however they may be defined, is bound up with the words that designate them, the capacity to mobilise around a name (Bourdieu 1984: 481) - "Hongkongese", "Chinese", "feminist", "proletariat", "gay" or whatever. So, even if we are not sure about what "identity" is we can, at least, say that it acts as an essential and essentially contested concept. The term may be intellectually messy but it has the advantage of reminding us of the positional and conjunctural character (their formation in and for specific times and places) of these designations, opening up identification as a form of political action rather than as an inheritance. Certainly the major protagonists of my writing have no access to anything as stable and fixed as a monolithic, singular "Hong Kong identity" as a position that they can unproblematically occupy. Instead, they speak and perform various identities both within and against the weight of cultural traditions that place them in positions of marginality (Hall 1992: 309; Robinson 1991: 135).

This marginality is acknowledged as a type of "distinctiveness". In fact, the main purpose of both the Sino-British Joint Declaration, signed in 1984, and the Basic Law, promulgated in 1990, is to design the necessary measures so that the distinctiveness of Hong Kong can be maintained (Lau & Kuan 1988: xi). This distinctiveness is, however, conceived in largely economic terms. Hong Kong is permitted to retain, for fifty years following the transition of sovereignty, its "capitalist system and lifestyle" (Draft Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong (DAFHK) 1984: 30). This is based on the concept of "one country, two systems" in which Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region[8] with a high degree of autonomy (*FEER* 21/3/1985: 100).[9]

These bare formulations find a disturbing echo in a number of academic texts. In a particularly influential study, prominent sociologists Lau and Kuan (1988) have argued that "utilitarian familism" and "egotistic individualism", form the core values of the "ethos" of Hongkongese. This description emphasises a kind of emptily pragmatic ideology of capitalist performativity. Thus we are told that "Hong Kong Chinese were found to regard their society instrumentally as a place to make a living or prosper" (Lau and Kuan 1988: 179).

These academic accounts simply participate in a far more general process of negative stereotyping engaged in by both Western and indigenous pundits. These range from the relatively ludicrous -

> Why do Chinese people behave so badly ... People spit, litter, queue-jump and push, smoke in non-smoking areas, shout instead of talk, eat with their mouths full; the list is long and disgraceful. Hong Kong must be the worst disciplined society in Asia ... No one can accuse me of being racist as I am genuinely 100 per cent Chinese and I am ashamed of it (H. Leung, *Letters to the Editor*, *SCMP* 10/1/1991: 18) -

to the rather more benign "Hong Kong is above all a practical place. It gets on with the job and lets theory look after itself" (Sung n.d.: 112).

Indeed, in the writing of some authors, Hong Kong is mobilised as the paradigm of the traditionless, the land of the material not the cultural. Thus Hutcheon (1989: 7) remarks:

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[8] The 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) stipulates in Article 31 that: "The state may establish Special Administrative Regions where necessary". These regions are part of a policy of opening coastal and riparian cities, particularly former treaty ports, to trade and investment cooperation with foreign firms (DAFHK 1984: 14; *FEER* 21/3/1985: 29).

[9] While there has been much criticism of the relationship between the notion of "one country, two systems" and China's four cardinal principles (adherence to the socialist road, to the democratic dictatorship of the people, to the leadership of the party, and to Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought), Communist party propaganda presents this situation as a concrete manifestation of building socialism with Chinese characteristics (*FEER* 5/12/1985: 14). What emerges is a very flexible concept of socialism, largely uncoupled from any specific doctrines or texts, which allows China to argue that there will be no repetition in Hong Kong of the outflow of capital and entrepreneurs which occurred in post-"liberation" Shanghai (Scott 1989: 69), and to benefit from Hong Kong's experience as an international trading centre as an extension of a pattern of irregular state centralisation (*FEER* 1/8/1985: 29: White & Cheng 1993: 169).

> If Hong Kong looks back on a long history of cultural neglect, that is because the administrators of the Qing dynasty saw no use for the arts; its small trade and sea-oriented population were people of simple tastes, with a little piracy thrown in to provide the spice of life. Looking back through the historical record, we see there was little to distinguish our early inhabitants from other coastal dwellers of southern China. The archaeological artifacts that survive from these earliest years show the barest concession to artistic design - functional pots and bowls, unglazed and with incised simple geometric patterns, simple tools ...

Of course, this kind of intellectual swoon before the very notion of a leavening of cultivation suggests that there are, on the one hand, heavily circumscribed menial cultures, carried as a foil to the grandeur of the West and, on the other, that there is Culture, marked out in the terrain of pan-European arts, as the unitary, identity-producing machinery of civilization which forms a final stage in the narrative of Hong Kong's progress (see Cubitt 1989: 2,3). Such examples could be multiplied *ad nauseum*, but the larger point is that Hong Kong is popularly perceived as having a civic culture which emphasises social mobility and consumption and which deemphasises political participation. The language that shapes and lends legitimacy to this view is the discourse of commerce and commodification, of utility and disutility, of self-interestedness and instrumental rationality.

Thankfully, a number of very recent accounts which grapple with the question of Hong Kong identity have departed, to varying extents, from these negative stereotypes. Sum (1995), whose work on nationalism I briefly referred to, provides one instance of such an account. Writing in *Economy and Society*, he argues that in the struggle for hegemony during the late-transitional phase official discourses have crystallized into two opposing formations - Britain's democratisation rhetoric and China's advocacy of pragmatic nationalism. Inserted between these two warring discursive blocs are the various groups and individuals involved in an indigenous democracy movement which strategically utilises an imaginative identity based on the notions of universal rights, global trends and decolonisation to pursue a vision of a genuinely autonomous Hong Kong.

Certainly, "democracy" has proved to be both a contagious and a slippery category in contemporary Hong Kong. Starkly contrasting views of what Hong Kong society is and ought to be have involved many different and incommensurable understandings of this term. As Sum points out, the demands made for democracy and self-government in the territory do not come from a single, united movement but from a broad and heterogeneous group of activists who, contra Scott (1989), cut across class lines. Unfortunately, though, such a conception of Hong Kong identity as necessarily involving either a pro-British or pro-Chinese or indigenous liberal-democratic stamp fails, because it is pitched purely at the level of an analysis of public discourse as revealed in newspaper articles, to take into account the practices and views of those who are not, in any conventional sense, politically active. In other words, those who do not feel an alignment to any of these particular camps are hardly likely to be represented in this form of discourse analysis and are therefore conspicuous in their absence.

More importantly, though, I find that Sum's account is lacking in any appreciation of the fluidity and complexities of people's sentiments. Despite his disclaimers of a comprehensive picture in his suggestions that these emerging social bases of support are not static, the reader is left with the impression that individuals are either part of one camp or another. This may, on occasion, be true of the very politically active. Many, however, cannot be slotted into this tripartite schema. What is so intriguing about contemporary Hong Kong, and so difficult to analytically capture, is the ambiguity and flux of forms of identification, the ways in which local people can simultaneously be faithful to the notion of being Chinese, locate the centre of that "Chineseness" in the Mainland, distrust the current government of China, be proud that colonial rule is ending, feel deeply attached to Hong Kong and be cynical about the future possibilities of their lives under Chinese rule. In other words, the question that Sum does not ask is one posed by Lee (1994: 17) in *Third Text*: "What is the relationship between the localised identity (Hong Kong people) and the imagined national identity (Chinese) ?"

Chan Hoi-man (1994), writing in *The Other Hong Kong Report* (a yearly publication of articles designed to provide some critique of the government's inevitably bland annual report), gives us a far more nuanced view of Hong Kong identity. Rather than following Sum's tack of providing the reader with a series of discrete and exclusive discursive blocs, he argues that cultural identity in the territory can be most productively conceived of as "sets of intertwining and contradistinctive constellations of cultural discourses" (Chan 1994: 449). These constellations are three discursive formations to be found in the arena of popular culture. The first, termed "culture of affluence" refers to "consumerism", "materialism" and a "general climate of individualistic hedonism" (Chan 1994: 450). This, we are told, is demonstrated in the extraordinary growth of mass cultural choices and of indigenous cultural production from the mid-1970s. The second discursive formation, "culture of survival", is a kind of "hard-boiled realism" based on the fragility of social life in the late-transitional phase, the sense of chaos, of broken promises and of unrealised aspirations. These themes find particular expression in Hong Kong cinema's New Wave movies of the early 1980s (Chan 1994: 453-455). The final formation, "culture of deliverance", is characterised by escapism and enchantment and finds its expression in the absurdist narratives and dialogues of comic films (Chan 1994: 455-457). All of these discursive strands are in a relationship of tension - they "stem from contrasting demands and pull in different directions" (Chan 1994: 458).

For Chan (1994: 447,448), there is thus no "master ideal" which drives Hong Kong culture, no "unifying foundation" upon which social life is built. Popular culture, and the various discursive formations expressed within it, provides a framework, which skims over but cannot resolve fragmentation. These cultural products may mould political action but they cannot alter the cultural imperatives upon which they draw. Though I do not subscribe to this cultural idealist position, in many ways Chan's work complements my own efforts to investigate the critical responses encouraged by inter-cultural imaging and genre mixing in Hong Kong cinema (Lilley 1993). The assumption, though, of deep cultural dynamics remains problematic in that, whether we wish to accept or reject such a model, we are never told either what these deep dynamics might be or precisely where they are located. Where Chan and I primarily differ is in his constant sliding towards a view, commonly expressed in Hong Kong, that "mass culture" necessarily leads to political impotence and narcissistic insensitivity and his evident concern at the lack of what he rather quaintly calls "primary cultural values and ideals" (Chan 1994: 460). To state that comic films reveal "aimless discontent", "resignation and submissiveness", that Hong Kong society can fairly be characterised by its "nihilistic materialism and cynicism" and its "vacuous centre" (Chan 1994: 456,457,460,463) is to fall back into the pattern of negative stereotyping that so frequently and so tediously attaches itself to Hong Kong.

Lee (1994), drawing on a heady mix of Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and Rey Chow, paints a similar picture to Chan but, instead of reviling Hong Kong for its vacuous centre, he applauds its "hybridized cultural register" and berates those who fail to put their hands together for their fetishistic desire for cultural purity and authenticity. Initially suggesting a return to the trope of Hong Kong as the land of material plenty and spiritual lack, Lee (1994: 15) muses "Sometimes, Hong Kong seems no more than a giant shopping mall to me". We mercifully realise an ironic intent as he moves on to argue that the conscious hybridity promoted by local intelligentsia is a politically strategic identity which counters idealistic demarcations between East and West, which undermines the "illusory Chinese nationalism and Occidentalism" of Hong Kong people (Lee 1994: 17,19 21).

This intellectual stance is generated from a strong sense of "in-betweenness", of being interstitially placed between China and Britain, and is partially a response to state and quasi-state cultural apparati through which both of these powers propagate Oriental and Occidental cultural forms. It is also driven by cosmopolitanism, by the double vision and aesthetic stance of openness to divergent cultural perspectives which this "in-betweeness" fosters. This cosmopolitanism is not fortuitous. Hong Kong owes its existence to its positioning at an economic and political crossroad and, nowadays, is an important channel between centres and peripheries within wider international and regional systems (see Hannerz 1992: 201). It is, quite literally, Hong Kong's business to be open. Furthermore, thousands of Hong Kong's families have strong links abroad, not only with mainland China but with diasporic China, made up of about thirty six million people scattered throughout the world (Kim & Dittmer 1993: 277). The heightened awareness of cosmopolitanism, and the metacultural position that this encourages, is derived from the above factors and from the internationalisation of art and culture generally. It is also intensified by the biographical histories of many Hong Kong people who have, at times, sojourned in various parts of diasporic China and returned home to find that the easy sense of the taken-for-grantedness of one's own milieu is no longer available to them, that encounters with contrasting perspectives have rendered them permanently sceptical.

Lee's article is written from a position that is basically sympathetic to the claim that modern identities are being dislocated, fragmented and decentred. He also quite clearly points out that in Hong Kong this is a profoundly political process. This inevitably brings up the spectre of postmodernism and I would like to briefly engage with this spectre by returning to the work of Zuni Icosahedron who would undoubtedly place themselves amongst the Hong Kong intelligentsia about whom Lee writes.

If we look at the performances of Zuni Icosahedron, it would be simple to describe them as postmodern. The omnipresence of pastiche in which the past becomes a vast collection of images open to the play of random allusion; the transgression of boundaries between what is inside and what is outside of a cultural "text", between high culture and popular culture, between reality and representation; the denial of the possibility of master narratives; the presence of hyper-reflexivity and artifice; the production of irony and scepticism are all present. On the other hand, one could equally label their work modernist. The quintessentially modernist figure of the isolated, estranged individual framed against the anonymous crowd looms large in Zuni productions. More convincingly, the whole notion of art as a separate oppositional sphere within society which informed the modernist movement in so far as it marked a crisis of nineteenth century bourgeois culture, is upheld by members of Zuni Icosahedron and by the larger performing arts scene in Hong Kong. The idea that there is a split between an artistic establishment which relies on traditional forms and an experimental, subversive avant-garde, with Zuni in the latter camp, permeates the discourse of members and the media's appreciation of the company. Heterogeneity, deconstruction and difference have made absolutely no impact on this enduring framework.

My own view is that the polarised thinking encouraged by a modernism-postmodernism problematic is not particularly helpful in understanding cultural production in contemporary Hong Kong. The preconditions for the uses of theatrical imagery and techniques which could be attributed to either "moment" are quite different from those in the late capitalist West. There is certainly a lack of faith in the metanarratives of historical materialism or British liberalism but this is felt as a painful not a playful reality. In a place where there is no "post" to colonialism, the past is not raided for commoditizable nostalgias so much as ransacked for possible meanings and future directions. The past may be criticised, even devoured, but it is still respected.

FROM THE HEART

I hope I have said enough in these somewhat random remarks to indicate that currently in Hong Kong there is disorientation and a feeling of vulnerability in relation to impending sovereignty transferral and that this uncertain fragility was magnified by the Tiananmen Square massacre. Zuni Icosahedron members are not immune to these feelings. Speaking to me in the Wanchai office of the company about the immediate responses in the territory to the 1989 protests on the Mainland, Danny Yung, artistic director of Zuni Icosahedron, described the enormous sense of shock and the desire to positively respond which these events generated:

> There was a lot of creative energy and the reason why it was creative is because it came from the heart. When it's out there it's out there and you can just sense it and people will do it spontaneously with no contriving. Because I remember when we were laying out the bedsheets over here and we just found whatever paint we could, we found whatever sticks or bamboo poles we could to hold those sheets up and we made do with everything because we all just wanted to participate in the demonstration and there's a lot of creative energy in it and it's there - you can sense it. Not only here but everywhere and during the march.
>
> I remember this one big character we did which was rather interesting and also kind of sad because it was in "89 in May. At one point the news we heard was that the government finally decided to have a dialogue with the students. So the whole demonstration we had organised almost became a celebration and then on the 24th everything suddenly turned around. We were writing, we were trying to pick out words that could reflect how we felt. So I remember I put down one character which meant "mourning". It was one character and the reason I chose one character is, as I kept saying,: "Hey, let's do one bedsheet and the most visible way, the most powerful way is to do only one character on one bedsheet and the bedsheet looks like a mourning screen at a Chinese funeral". And then somebody else suggested we should say that this is mourning for the death of democracy. And the person who we dedicated this to was Li Peng. So it became an ironic thing.

> I remember we did that and it was captured by all the television crews, that particular character, and then during the next three days I saw on the news that Shenzhen was doing the same thing. It was very visible. That's why the television picked it up and from then on everybody else. You know how TV can spread the news.

I include this lengthy quotation because it underlines that palpable shock and rage, the dynamic of hope abridged which Hong Kong citizens registered in that year. I also include it because it illustrates the sense of stillness which Zuni Icosahedron tried to recover in the midst of all that loud, noisy history. Later, Danny Yung attempted to restore that still rage, to remind people of the necessity for keeping an engaged distance, in a production titled *The Square: Deep Structure of Chinese (Hong Kong) Culture*; a production that was as much stern unappeased vigil as it was performance.

Initially, Yung was reluctant to undertake a performance on this subject: "I felt it didn't make sense to do anything on stage because the entire street was like a stage at that time, with demonstrations of one and a half million people in Hong Kong; the scale seemed completely wrong; the creative energy was out there" (*The Independent* 17/5/1990). But driven by the knowledge that "1997 is something that's definitely on people's mind, dealing with the Chinese government is definitely on people's mind and if they have to deal with the government they have to deal with June 4; it's in their mind and it's part of their culture - there's no way to take that away", Yung persisted. He arrived at an austere piece which paradoxically embodied, in carefully inscribed images of chaos and disarray, the tyranny of Hong Kong's political positioning, a tyranny less than subtly alluded to in the choice of two songs which were repeatedly broadcast through the theatre: the ironic contrast between *Land of Hope and Glory* and kindergarten children singing "China is a big garden, the warm sun shines brightly, everybody is happy and gay" was not lost on anybody.

Yet it wasn't all so obvious. Indeed, the bracketing of "Hong Kong" in the title of the piece clearly indicated the exploration of the proximity between mainland Chinese and their Hong Kong compatriots and the cultural distance separating them. The performance began with four figures wearing the uniforms of the People's Liberation Army guarding the stage, their backs to the audience. Pacing figures crossed and recrossed the floor, scrims delineated several increasingly opaque playing spaces, the simple steps of the Maoist "loyalty dance" and the "peasants" dance" repeatedly reminded the audience of bodily propaganda.[10]

A black curtain finally lifts to reveal the horizon, a huge blank back wall, the wings, the stage machinery. The revelation of artificiality was carefully positioned between a kind of austere optimism and the desolation of exposure. The centre of energy remained the spaces between. For me, this stark image of what is behind and between is a necessary complement to the more widely publicised images of demonstrating masses. It restored a sense of what is possible and a sense of the crushing weight of current historical circumstances and left me wondering whether the politicizing of art is the specular image of the aestheticizing of politics. The emptiness Yung opened up was the abyss where our identities and images run the risk of being engulfed. Walking a tightrope, he wondered whether he should allow himself to be walled in or make a play out of it.

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[10] *Yang ko* communist drama was derived from this peasants' dance originating in Shensi Province. Its easy steps and clear dramatisation were considered ideal vehicles for Maoist propaganda (Hsu 1985: 14,15).

In his Programme Notes to this performance, Yung (1991) was at pains to disconcert the audience by insisting that in *The Square* there is no conclusion, that Zuni Icosahedron are continuously searching, trying to say something that they can't even understand. He went on to comment:

> ... deep inside the stage there's a wall. And my heart sinks again. The stage is sort of like a book. You flip through page after page and there are a lot of high points - the pleasure of reading. And when you finish reading a book, when you flip the last page, all this pleasure is hanging up there. Maybe it's not important. Maybe the important thing is what's between one book and reading another book, between one performance and another performance and between one piece of work and between another piece of work.

This article too is about what is at stake between: between performances, between China and Britain, between conjuring with the false unity of "Hong Kong identity" and imaginatively mapping out the unknown. The images that I have been replaying for you - the homosexual couples, the PLA soldiers, the angry crowds, the lilting verses of children - cannot be seen as contributing to any general model of Hong Kong identity. The keywords and phrases that signify the things that really matter - democracy, identity, Hong Kong people - are not fixed in static definitions but constantly subject to contestation as different subjects, at different moments, seek to hegemonize discourses which support their vision of the future. But that is not all. If you hold in your mind that image of the long, receding distance to the back wall and the vast see-through wings, this need to play the moment, to make a scene, will guide you through the following two years.

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NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AN OLD ENCLAVE:

BEING BRITISH IN PORTO

JEAN LAVE*

I have four points to make, and will make them as baldly and simply as possible.[1] First, I would like to add my voice to those that find it helpful, in trying to understand the port trade as such, to go beyond its narrowest definitions as a production process or economic enterprise, to consider the complexities of the social communities in which the trade is, and has been, embedded. My focus is on the British enclave in Porto, Portugal. Second, it should be possible to analyze changing longterm struggles in the communities and social lives of participants in the trade in terms of the political economic structures that shape trade and community-life alike. In the port trade these relations have moved over a long period from mercantile capitalism to multinational global forms of trade, and from informal colonial to post colonial political relations between British port firms and families and Portuguese farmers, exporters, and families which participate in the social life of the British enclave. The third and fourth points concern how to go about realizing the first two: I argue that struggles over community identity are struggles to establish advantaged positions for stakeholders, (for themselves, for their children, and thus for their own longterm reputation as "ancestors") in the future of the community. Thus participants in the British enclave in Porto are variously fighting to sustain and reproduce informal colonial relations with themselves as the central figures of a "venerable old port trade community," or to transform the community into a multinational management group which also happens to have a small, anachronistic pocket of longterm British expatriates. A useful site at which to encounter concrete social struggling over the future is in battles over the education of children. Both curent battles over the Oporto British School and the relations of the OBS with a new international school play out these struggles.

"Being British in the port trade" is a centuries old, lifelong, changing **and** sustained struggle. It takes place in the context of political-economic and social relations that have kept the British port families in Porto and which give urgency to their efforts to stay (both British and in Porto). Political-economic relations are changing. Put crudely, the transformation involves a shift from the production of little but port by foreign nationals in Portugal organized into family firms, to the opening after the Portuguese Revolution in 1974 of the country to an influx of multinational capital which, among other things, bought many of the port firms. With this transformation there have been changes in the specifics of old conflicts in which national and class identities are embedded. British acting in the name of conflict-

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[1] An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the conference: "Historia da Vinha e do Vinho no Vale do Douro" sponsored by the Grupo de Estudos de Historia da Viticultura Duriense e do Vinho do Porto, March, 1996.

ing identities struggle with each other over the trajectories of enclave identity that each needs in order to produce, confirm and sustain their own. I will try to sketch the heterogeneous stakes that characterize different ways of mustering versions of British community identity by differently positioned people in the enclave. It will then be possible to address their struggles in terms of conflicting stakes in future trajectories for persons and enclave alike. Schooling is perhaps the most intense arena for such conflicts and the one examined here.

BACKGROUND

The first British seeking wine in Portugal were traveling buyers who ventured over from England to trade in whatever was available. Later, they were merchants who "came out" to live in Portugal the better to acquire sufficient quantities of sufficiently good port from wealthy proprietors and/or small farmers in the Douro year after year, but who also bought and sold other things (including credit - see Duguid 1993). Still later (1790-1880) they established, in a dizzying and prolonged spate of shifting partnerships, the port houses that still later (about 1950, see Robertson 1987) took control of the fermentation and blending of the wine from the farmers and with this (and the imprimatur of its high class consumers in Britain) extended and consolidated their position as elite purveyors of an elite commodity made, sold and drunk by gentlemen. The changing British involvement in the trade has provided the British port families in Porto, in short, with increasingly solid grounds for constructing backwards a noble and harmonious history, that of a community dedicated to a single elite enterprise. This has enhanced in the British community in Porto the "old port families'" legitimacy to define traditions, a soul or spirit to the enclave (a port family-head's term) and the privileges accreting thereto.[2]

Another very significant change, in the Port trade since the mid-60s but accelerating after the revolution of 1974, has been the sale of the family firms (both Portuguese and British) to multinational corporations, British (e.g. Harvey's, IDV), French, Canadian American (Seagrams), and Portuguese (SOGRAP). Not all of the old firms have fallen into multinational corporate hands. There are exceptions, of course, including Churchill Graham (new), Wiese & Krohn and the Symington group which is now a unique multigeneration family holding company.

Today, port wine, and its central place in present histories, gives the British enclave in Porto a unique flavor that distinguishes it from other British enclaves around the world, and from equally old but less homogeneously focused collections of British, as in Lisboa. The economic and political power of the British port family participants in the port firms in Gaia has diminished. (The port trade, though higher in volume and profits over the last few years than ever before, has fallen from 50% of Portugal's foreign trade to 2% since the revolution, as barriers to foreign investment were removed and a variety of industries have moved into Portugal and become heavy contributors to Portuguese foreign trade balances.) Yet, across the river from Vila Nova de Gaia, in the St. James Anglican Church, the Oporto

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[2] The firms in Porto are also acting fairly successfully (and increasingly) as a cartel. They speak with one voice in the newspapers, they conceal their differences, and distance themselves in talking with visitors, from their competitive relations.

Cricket & Lawn Tennis Club and the Oporto British School, this is less obvious, less plain than it might be. There is considerable ignorance within the enclave about who owns and runs what in the port trade (e.g. a debate at a Church Ladies Guild meeting as to whether one of the major firms was in British or Portuguese hands, for example). The past looms important for the pillars of the community, and their putative uniqueness matters to them, perhaps more than in the past, as a resource for legitimizing their privileges. In a number of ways the elite core, still port-focused, still the core, of the British "colony," lives out its claims to founders' privileges with conviction but without the resources that underwrote their position seventy-five years ago.

Under the circumstances, it would be easy to imagine the form of struggle between British upper middle class national class-culture and Portuguese that would end, and shortly, with the demise of the British enclave in Porto, with either the repatriation of British subjects "home," as they persist in referring to England, or through deanglo-saxonisation, awkwardly put by Australiain sociologist J. P. Bailey, writing about the British in Argentina (1976).[3] Indeed the decreasing significance of the port trade in the larger scheme of things and of an economic base for port families, has in part led to an opening of British colony institutions, especially the Oporto British School (OBS) and the Club once closed to Portuguese membership. At present they could not survive without their preponderance of Portuguese (paying) members. There are struggles in progress, however, to keep control of these institutions in British hands.

But not just any British hands. Rather than seeing a quick demise of the British presence in Oporto since April, 1974, the British community has changed in composition. The community is differentiated into several, hierarchically-arranged groups, in which clashes center around the different interests and stakes in the community of the old port families, (their long term residence in Oporto, and their claims as founders of club, school, hospital, consulate, factory house and church as well as the port firms), and the new corporate managers and their families, who come to supervise British and other multinational companies with branches in northern Portugal. In fact, the major question concerning the British community in Porto may well not have to do with whether the community will disappear, but rather will it, for the forseeable future, continue to be a unique old community of port shippers who graciously extend an egalitarian welcome (Tanner 1966)[4] to three year contract managers during their "short stay" as visitors passing through - gracious so long as the visitors don't try to disrupt or change the order of things while they are there. Or is the community to become a transient flow of managers in a variety of industries, in which to fail is to fail to move on quickly to a more prestigious office in an economically more powerful country; a community with a curiously vivid but no longer active root in the port trade of past centuries.[5]

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[3] Curtin (1984) argues that cross-cultural trade will eventually be assimilated as the traders either return or enculturate.

[4] Tanner (1964) notes that "The writer lived in small European communities in Burma and Tanganyika from 1945 to 1960 and was struck not only by the similarity of behavioural patterns in these two widely separated countries but by an historical similarity between such modern communities and European communities in India and Burma described in autobiographical and fictional works from 1860 onwards," citing Kincaid (1939). There are huge differences among the communities, their purposes, activities, sources of legitimation, and trajectories in relation with the history of global imperialism. At the same time, many of the aspects of social life described by Tanner are strikingly similar. Trying to understand what is going on here is a problem deserving further work.

[5] "[I]dentity is always a question of producing in the future an account of the past," Stuart Hall remarks, going on immediately, "that is to say it is always about narrative, the stories which cultures tell themselves about who they are and where they came from."

There is not space to lay out the considerations that lead me to characterize the political economic struggle as one between an informal colonial and postcolonial modes of production and social life. But very briefly, the work of S. Sideri (1970) makes a detailed case for Portugal's informal colonial relation with Britain during the 18th and 19th centuries. This account makes the port trade crucial to British government interests in informal and indirect exploitation of Portugal and its colonies. By contrast, relations of nationality between Portuguese and British participants in the trade and beyond are at present enacted in what with some justification might be called the "postcolonial enclave" in which colonial relations are undergoing transformation, as the mode of living in Porto seems more and more to involve three year stints by managers engaged in transnational migration for multinational corporations.[6]

BEING BRITISH IN PORTO

How has this enclave continued to be an enclave? Exclusions and concessions with respect to those who do not "get to be British in Porto" are central to the process. How do people get to be British in Porto? Where do they get the resources of Britishness implicated in the first question? Do they in fact "get to be British?" They say about themselves, and their doings invoke as predictable reactions from British visitors, that they are "more British than the British".[7] It is clearly not the same thing as being British. I have considered these questions at greater length elsewhere (Lave in press). The focus here is on the implications of community struggles over future community and personal identities as British and Portuguese participants in British enclave social institutions locate themselves with respect to colonial and postcolonial stakes and conflicts.

The contemporary descendents of the historic Port trade diaspora from England are but a small part of the British community in Porto today, yet that trade diaspora is in many

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(Hall 1995:5). The main point is what is important here. But in qualifying it it seems to me he narrows to "narrative" what in Porto I see as relations between social and political economic organization and control of the enclave, and the kinds of identities in-whose-name people are (going to be) able to act. He is talking specifically about identity as cultural identity, also about the Caribbean - definitely an imagined community; both of these are different from the project at hand and each may contribute to the differences.

[6] Breckenridge and van der Veer (1993:1): "We can therefore speak of the postcolonial period as a framing device to characterize the second half of the 20th century. The term 'postcolonial' displaces the focus on 'postwar' as a historical marker for the last fifty years... To call this postcolonial is to... bring to our attention the relation between colonialism and nationalism in the politics of culture in both the societies of the excolonizers and those of the ex-colonized." In the present context I have in mind what seems a common response of colonizers hanging on, that stripped of their colonizing positions they move into corporations that increasingly replace the exploitative political economics of colonialism with the exploitative political economics of multinational corporatism.

[7] Stuart Hall (in *Negotiating Caribbean Identities*) insists that, "... let us not forget that retention characterized the colonizing cultures as well as the colonized. For if you look at the Little Englands, the Little Spains and the Little Frances that were created by the colonizers, if you consider this kind of fossilized replica, with the usual colonial cultural lag - people are always more Victorian when they're taking tea in the Himalayas than when they're taking tea in Leamington - they were keeping alive the memory of their own homes and homelands and traditions and customs" (1995:7). In Porto, further, the port families feel themselves to have (had) an important part in the production of British culture - all that surrounds the drinking of port wines. They have suffered no violent rupture as Hall points out as constitutive of historical relations for the colonized; they "stayed on" - but stayed on after **what**, is not defined...The British in Porto are unlike "Caribbean people of all kinds, of all classes and positions, [who] experience the question of positioning themselves in a cultural identity as an enigma, as a problem, as an open question" (1995:7). For the British national/class identity is not in question. It is signed, sealed and delivered. Getting it ratified all the time is a constant problem of enclave existence.

ways responsible for the fact that the British community in Porto has a collective identity, more vivid, romantic and distinctive than the antecedents that many other British communities in the antipodes claim as their own. Oporto is the oldest British factory in Europe and it is the last still in existence today. This enclave has been responsible for centuries, to hear them tell it, or others tell it on their behalf, for the production of a notably elite commodity.

Claims to community distinction are a potent argument for the distinctiveness of identities. In this case they have something to do with mirages of empire, privileged social classes, vintage port (**with** cigars and **without** "ladies"). Claims to distinction emerge in the life trajectory requirements for a certain kind of "organization gentleman" and gentlewoman. There is concrete evidence for such claims, in the port trade buildings erected between 1790 and 1840. The Factory House, the port houses, the Church, the graveyard, and the consulate now have a certain concretely persuasive impact on arguments about the value of the past and its relations with future economic/cultural transformation. The buildings, the billboards, the concentration of port houses in Gaia, are all evidence for claims to distinctiveness, as are, ironically, the advertising efforts of the multinational corporations that fly banners along the river's edge in Gaia proclaiming the venerable age of old (often British) family port firms. In sum, the British community is an enclave that would be organized quite differently if it variously were not British, or were not deeply connected with the port trade.

STRUGGLES OVER COMMUNITY IDENTITY, AND FUTURES

The port families have grown up British very much in the dispersed colonial mode of the empire. They are struggling to sustain their lives, and the significance of the enclave for themselves. Other participants have a variety of other stakes. Changes matter deeply to members of the enclave because everyone has stakes in their children's futures. Schools must often be key places, then, in which struggles that inform all aspects of social existence, surface as active debates over the imperatives of children's life trajectories (identities in the making). Some of these may be glimpsed in two events in the Spring of 1994, and in excerpts from the brochure of a new school that styles itself as a rival to the OBS.

(1) There had been a painful, unexpected fight, according to the new headmaster, at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Oporto British School (held at the Club) in which parents of students in the School, and the School Governing Committee had argued over, then voted down, the headmaster's appeal to change the name of the School from the Oporto British School to the Oporto British International School. He was surprised at the heat generated by a small, obviously appropriate change that would reflect the changing student composition and new school priorities, as the School had finally initiated something called the International Baccalaureate degree (recommended a decade previously but not implemented at that time).

(2) At the AGM of the St. James Anglican Church (held at the Club) shortly thereafter there was tense debate between elderly members of old port families and the newly arrived manager of a British factory in Portugal, (he and his wife both sang in the choir, their children attended church with them, and they were obviously active, responsible and eager to take part in community activities) over moving the altar and changing the church service to make it more informal and to make the church more welcoming to children. The most vociferous opponent, widow of the head of an influential family port firm, finally said, "I don't want it to change; I remember how church services have been all my life and I want them to stay that way." At the Club for Sunday dinner, a couple of weeks later, I joined the elderly woman for lunch. In between greeting other church goers who were also dining at the Club after church, this woman described wrathfully a disagreement she had had with this same man during the hospitality hour that morning (the only Anglican church in the world that serves port every Sunday after the service, the members like to tell visitors). The discussion was about whether children should or should not be sent to boarding schools in England for their education. The man had said he wouldn't dream of sending his children. The woman exclaimed with indignation, "I asked him if he knew of [name of Public] School and he hadn't even heard of it. I'm not a snob! But anyone who hasn't heard of the school is simply not on my list!"

(3) A glossy brochure, with bright, elaborate graphics, and many color photographs of children at the school, is entitled CLIP:. Colegio Luso-Internacional do Porto - that is reading from front to back in one direction, in Portuguese. Turn the brochure upside down and backwards, and the English version is called CLIP: Oporto International School. A number of its claims seem to challenge the OBS:

- The governance of CLIP is based on a democratic model for decision making, as articulated in its Charter. CLIP recognizes the preeminent role of parents, teachers, and students in the educational process.
- Teaching methods and subject syllabuses are drawn from English speaking educational systems with careful note and consideration given to the programmes of work existent in the present Portuguese system.
- CLIP's pupils share the love of learning and intellectual ability so necessary to the attainment of academic excellence. They differ, however, in most other aspects. Coming from different national and ethnic backgrounds, and speaking a motley of languages, CLIP's pupils give to the Colegio the right mix for its success as an international school.
- Criteria for Admission include:
  1. All applicants to CLIP will be considered regardless of their race, religion, sex, or national origin. 4. A lottery system will be used when the number of candidates who have met the Standard of Admission exceeds the number of slots available. 6. Prior knowledge of English, even though preferable, is not a condition for admission.

The heat in the first example is generated in intersecting, deeply related conflicts reflected more specifically in the other examples. The second fieldnote excerpt indicates how the school is caught up in the ongoing struggles over getting to be British in Porto. The third is concerned with relations between British and Portuguese families in Porto. CLIP is a Portuguese-sponsored English-language international school in Porto that opened three years ago with an Portuguese-American head, formerly from Cambridge High & Latin in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It was started in opposition to the Portuguese-excluding practices of the OBS. These conflicts - within the OBS and between the two schools - would both fuel instant reactions to the suggestion that the OBS should include the word "international" in its name. Conflicts within and about the school reflect (perhaps more clearly than in its other institutional arrangements) the cross-currents of political economic - and cultural - globalization in which the British enclave in Porto is embedded in all aspects of its daily existence. The OBS, at its founding in 1894, was embedded in relations of empire just as much as the mercantile practices of the port traders.[8] On the whole, the content of school instruction seems not noticeably anachronistic; it is the intentions of parents and the effects on children of removal from their families to the total institutions that have traditionally replaced personal roots in family with old school loyalties of a more abstractly nationalistic sort[9] boarding schools in England that principally express the peculiar concerns over life trajectories of old port family members.

The "old port" families view the school as a prep school for children who will attend public schools in England from the age of 13. Male heads of the newer families are often managers in multinational firms with branches in Portugal who come for three years to Porto on contract and who anticipate a peripatetic existence. These families favor a full international school with an International Bacalaureate curriculum available all over the world. The Portuguese families who eagerly send their children to the school (and without whose financial support the school would cease to exist), want a British education for their children, but they must decide for themselves whose version of it fits their needs best.

The International Bacalaureate, in effect, is a curriculum for a high school diploma, and a program of international supervision to guarantee the certification of the program in specific schools, has its origins not in England, but in that center of capitalist neutrality, Switzerland. It is intended to make possible a continuous curriculum, at a coordinated pace, across international secondary schools all over the world, thus making it possible for transnational migration by managerial families for multinational corporations to secure a single standard educational trajectory for their children, without sending them to a metropolitan boarding school. It is an English language program, and to a great extent built on British educational traditions. But it is in English because the global language of business is language, not because of attenuated connection with pre WW2 relations of empire.

This description of the International Bacalaureate program is my own Thnot precisely how it figures in debates at the OBS: The Headmaster, whose charge in 1993-94 was to build a high quality school, and whose loyalties lay first with this professional project rather than with the insertion of the degree in local political struggles, argued that the IB offered a high standard educational plan from which students at the OBS could benefit greatly, a way to expand the school to a full high school degree without having to start from scratch and invent it themselves, and the only way to cultivate a professionally esteemed reputation for the school.

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[8] Mangan points out that historians of empire on the whole don't touch on education, nor historians of education on imperialism, and introduces the book with the proposition that: "One fact emerges with great force from these essays O the close and continuing association between British imperialism and the public schoool system" (1988:6). The network of private preparatory schools, of which the OBS would be an example, are according to Mangan (1988:13) "a mid-to-late Victorian manifestation. Its raison d'etre was to be found largely in the expanded public school system of the second half of the 19th century. As it grew, so the 'preparatory schools' grew, serving the public schools as 'feeders'"... they taught "the housemaster's credo of king and country." The prep schols were a form of socialization into public schools and the latter socialization for upper middle class boys into the civil and military branches of imperial expansion, via harsh discipline, a focus on the classics, religious training (in which cricket metaphors abounded, e.g., the trinity explained to the boys as 3 stumps, 1 wicket, and god, Queen, empire and duty). They were taught the red world map and glowing history of empire, organized into a prefect system (12 and 13 year olds responsible rather like district commisioners in farflung outposts), and from the 1860s through organized games. They were inculcated with chavinism, racism and bigotry (Mangan 1986:26). "Their ethnocentricity applied to the Continent as well as Kaffirs" (1986:27). By the turn of the century the boys were expected to become "exemplars of Muscular Christianity" (1986:68) - a headmaster's poem called the Feminine Boy (who doesn't want to play Cricket and should be beaten) underlining the gendered character of all this. The trade colony in Porto was not a arm or project of British government policy directly. In many respects the port family sons must have felt at home in the public schools they were sent to in Great Britain; in others, being in no obvious way part of the great project of empire they may have felt uninteresting; and they may well have experienced the "anti-commerce elitism" of the public schools as well (1986:30). They seem to this day to have imbibed their "pro-athleticism/anti Gallic intellectualism" (Mangan 1986:48).

[9] I am grateful to Peter Gow, anthropologist, Manchester University, for this speculation.

It takes resources to build such a program. The fights are over whether putting resources into this project will take them away from the junior school, which prepares primary school aged children to take the Common Entrance Exam for British public schools. The old port families are still intent on this mission for the School, and opposed to the IB program. The program was instituted three years ago, but its continued existence is still a matter of conflict, not yet resolved.

The IB program is in the interests of various constituencies of the School besides the manager families on contract. It would meet the needs of British families who haven't the means or desire to send their children to England (e.g. several families of missionaries and teachers). And for Portuguese families who have sent their children to the OBS for primary school, it would escape the incommensurate curricula and organizational differences their children face when switching to the Portuguese school system. The OBS, as a feeder prep school, has published a clear vision of the proper trajectories of education for boys, but there are no comparably clear purposes stated for the education of girls. Thus, discussions about the admission of girls and other nationalities, especially Portuguese, have been couched in terms of favors to these constituencies and in turn, they can only fight to get themselves included and their wishes upgraded to equally important and legitimate concerns. The conflicts described above are not played out in the name of gender issues.[10] They engage people in arguments about whether the OBS is to support trajectories of character and class positioning of those boys (and without obvious public concern, girls) who would spend from adolescence to young adulthood principally in the UK.

At the opposite end of the ocean front community of Foz is CLIP, the other English language school in Porto, located in the restored former Porto trolley line power station. It seems designed in many respects in opposition to the OBS. The project commenced as the effort of a former OBS headmaster in collaboration with a group of Dutch and Scandinavian parents. Command of the project was soon taken over by a wealthy and influential Portuguese businessman in Porto. The oppositional character of the CLIP school surely had its roots in part in the Portuguese businessman's experience sending his children to the OBS. The exclusion of Portuguese parents from voting about school issues, parent meetings conducted exclusively in English, the visible hierarchy among teachers by nationality, etc. eventually led him to withdraw his children from the OBS and concentrate his efforts on the international school which undercuts OBS fees, promises an auxiliary language school and shortly a college associated with the secondary school. CLIP pays its teachers higher salaries, and has succeeded in hiring teachers away-from the OBS. The head teacher was formerly head of the junior form at the OBS, and is the wife of a young manager in a port firm. The school emphasizes nationality-blind admissions, the equality of pay and standing among all teachers, equal opportunity for all parents to participate, and above all the equitably international (rather than British) character of the school.

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[10] The marathon performance of highlights of 100 years of the OBS (and the port community in Porto) presented by children and adults from the enclave at the school centenary celebration in June, 1994, was notable for its port- and British-centricity, perfunctory nods to Portuguese history, its principally American popular music (very lukewarm applause for the Beatles, a standing ovation for a Frank Sinatra imitation) and the uniquely derisive commentary by two port-family fathers, the Masters of Ceremony for the occasion, on the senior girls' skit about Sylvia Pankhurst and the suffrage movement.

This complex conflict illustrates broader implications for relations between the old port firm families, contract managers, and Portuguese families who have stakes in the British enclave. In a different register it illustrates the interconnected implications of shifts toward multinational corporate political-economic relations, and clashes between old and new political-economic relations. British expatriates are caught up in them in different ways, and are engaged in different and changing relations with the Portuguese families who involve themselves in School and Club, themselves caught in relations between pre- and post-revolution political-economic differences similar to those experienced by the British (and that have common origins in changing global economics).

It is possible to reiterate this in another way in summing up the struggles over educational trajectories. With the IB degree, which the CLIP does not have, and perhaps could not get a license for given the OBS program so close by, the OBS has the possibility of serving the British contract-managers families, and not deterring from the continued presence of a large group of Portuguese children at the OBS. But this must be at the expense of the agenda of the old port families. However: so long as the hierarchy of the OBS offers some assurance of the value of a specifically British education to some Portuguese families, their presence is assured, and it gives an important affirmation to the value of British class culture. This could subtly strengthen the hand of the old port families with respect to the managers on contract.[11] Mass desertion from the OBS to CLIP by either contract managers or Portuguese families would destroy the OBS. Affirmation of the more equitably international character of the school challenges the rightfulness of the claims of the old port families to "their" school and its mission to only incidentally educate other children than their own. The IB is necessary to keep a high quality headmaster, and a headmaster in favor of the IB is going to push for the increasing international and egalitarian control of the school.

It seems that the port families must capitulate, and the British enclave shed its identity as the old port wine merchants' colony. And yet, resistance (which may be the weapon of the weak) is the weapon *par excellence* of the wealthy and the conservative: port families continue to struggle to maintain the School in its old form. Their coordinated action so far carries the day. A port family head recently offered a desperately needed loan to the School, but on condition that he controls appointments to the School Governing Committee for some years to come. There is strong resistance among the members to a more professional relation between Committee and the headmaster who ordinarily would assume the day to day management of the School. And so on. I recently received a letter from a friend in Porto who says that the IB is again in jeopardy and a fight is in progress over whether it will continue.

The issue here is not who will win and who will lose. With all the partially discontinuous layers or arenas in which transformations of changing relations play out, the notion of a clear outcome probably doesn't make good sense. These are after all life-long, life-shaping endemic struggles that in part are who their participants are. These struggles must affect who participates in the future in the port trade, and how, and with what kinds of views of their role in the trade, of national identities and relations between Portuguese and British farmers, firms, and multinational companies, and of the importance of continuity and tradition however contrived. It affects intergenerational relations. It raises questions about whether and on what terms old British port families will continue to participate in the trade, and about what changes will emerge in the trade because of changing community struggles and their outcomes.

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[11] I am grateful to Susan Shepler, Graduate School of Education, University of California, Berkeley, for this insight.

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REPRODUCTION INTERDITE: LA DIMENSION SYMBOLIQUE DE LA DOMINATION ÉCONOMIQUE

PIERRE BOURDIEU*

> Le paysan ne devient "stupide" que là où il est pris dans les rouages d'un grand empire dont le mécanisme bureaucratique ou liturgique lui demeure étranger.
>
> Max Weber, *Le judaïsme antique.*

La proposition qui m'est faite de revenir, si longtemps après, sur le problème du célibat me ravit et me trouble à la fois.[1] J'ai en effet une affection particulière pour ce travail ancien (Bourdieu 1962) qui, bien qu'il présente toutes les incertitudes des premiers pas, me paraît enfermer le principe de plusieurs des développements majeurs de ma recherche ultérieure: je pense par exemple à des notions comme habitus, stratégie ou domination symbolique qui, sans parvenir toujours à l'explicitation complète, orientent tout le texte ou à l'effort de réflexivité qui l'inspire de bout en bout et qui s'exprime, non sans quelque naïveté, dans sa conclusion. Et si je n'étais pas retenu par la crainte de paraître sacrifier à la complaisance, je pourrais montrer comment la réappropriation d'une expérience sociale plus ou moins refoulée qu'il a favorisée a sans doute rendu possible, au titre de socio-analyse préalable, l'instauration d'un rapport à la culture, savante ou "populaire", à la fois moins tortueux et torturé que celui que les intellectuels de toute origine entretiennent d'ordinaire avec tout ce qui touche au peuple et à la culture. Mais je ne puis pas me défendre d'un certain malaise au moment de réouvrir, sans avoir le goût ni le loisir de m'y replonger complètement, les dossiers où ont dormi si longtemps les pièces et les morceaux que j'avais écrits au début des années 1970 en vue de la publication en anglais (due à l'initiative amicale de Julian Pitt-Rivers) d'une version révisée et augmentée de l'article d'*Études Rurales* : comment déterminer, dans le fatras de ce chantier abandonné, ce qui est encore valide, après tant de travaux importants, au premier rang desquels ceux qui sont rassemblés ici? Comment sans refaire de font en comble l'article initial, comme j'en avais eu l'intention, transmettre les principes fondamentaux des corrections et des additions que j'aurais souhaité apporter?

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[1] This article was first published in *Études Rurales* No. 113-114, 1989. I thank Pierre Bourdieu for suggestion and permition to reprint it here, with minor editorial changes, and to the editors of *Études Rurales* for providing me with the original text (editor's note).

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

Je ne reviendrai pas sur la première partie, où je m'efforçais de décrire la logique des échanges matrimoniaux dans la société d'autrefois, l'article intitulé "Les stratégies matrimoniales dans le système des stratégies de reproduction" (*Annales* 4-5, juil.-oct. 1972 : 1105-1127) avait été conçu pour prendre la place de l'ancienne description de la logique des échanges matrimoniaux telle qu'elle se présentait avant la crise dont le célibat des héritiers est la manifestation la plus visible: bien qu'elle ait été pensée contre la manière, alors dominante, de concevoir les rapports entre les structures de la parenté et les structures économiques, cette analyse laissait en effet échapper la logique pratique des **stratégies** par lesquelles les agents visaient à tirer le meilleur parti possible de leurs "atouts" spécifiques (taille de la propriété, rang de naissance, etc.). La comparaison entre la tentative initiale pour enfermer dans une formule d'allure formelle la relation, matérialisée par l'**adot**, entre les **structures** économiques (saisies au travers de la distribution des propriétés selon la taille) et les structures matrimoniales, et la reconstruction finale de l'ensemble des contraintes (ou des facteurs déterminants) qui orientent les **stratégies** matrimoniales offre une bonne occasion d'observer, dans le détail concret de la recherche, la rupture avec la vision structuraliste qu'il a fallu opérer, notamment dans les procédures d'interrogation et d'observation et dans le langage employé, pour être en mesure de produire une théorie adéquate de la pratique et de comprendre les "choix" matrimoniaux des agents comme étant le produit des stratégies raisonnables mais non voulues d'un habitus objectivement ajusté aux structures.[2] Le progrès théorique et méthodologique est lui-même inséparable d'une **conversion** du rapport subjectif du chercheur à son objet, l'extériorité un peu hautaine de l'observateur objectiviste cédant la place à la proximité (théorique et pratique) que favorise la réappropriation théorique du rapport indigène à la pratique. Ce n'est pas par hasard en effet si l'introduction d'un point de vue qui place les agents, et leur stratégies, en position centrale, en lieu et place des structures hypostasiées par la vision structuraliste, s'est imposée à propos de sociétés qui, comme les communautés paysannes de l'aire européenne, longtemps exclues en fait de la grande tradition ethnologique, sont assez proches pour rendre possible, une fois surmontée la distance sociale, une relation de proximité théorique à la pratique qui s'oppose aussi bien à la participation fusionnelle à l'expérience vécue des agents que poursuit certaine mystique populiste qu'à l'objectivation distante que certaine tradition anthropologique, faisant de nécessité vertu, constitue en parti méthodologique.

Quant à l'analyse statistique des chances différentielles de mariage ou de célibat, on a dû, pour plus de rigueur, refaire les calculs en prenant pour population mère non plus (comme dans l'article de 1962) l'ensemble des personnes résidant à Lesquire au moment de l'enquête, mais l'ensemble des **cohortes** concernées (cf. tableau en annexe). C'était se donner le moyen d'établir les taux d'émigration différentiels selon différentes variables (sexe,

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2 Les découvertes scientifiques ont souvent le privilège ambigu, en anthropologie, de devenir évidentes dès qu'elles sont acquises, et, sauf à évoquer l'expérience, après tout purement subjective, de la peine qu'elles ont demandée, on ne peut trouver meilleure attestation, au moins à des fins pédagogiques, du chemin parcouru, que les états successifs du travail qui a été nécessaire pour les obtenir ou les corrections et les additions apparemment minimes qui, mieux que les autocritiques fracassantes, font voir le lent cheminement de la conversion intellectuelle. On peut aussi donner une idée du mouvement de la recherche en évoquant l'état historique de la problématique par rapport à laquelle elle s'est instituée (cf. Bourdieu 1987). Il est remarquable que, dans une mise au point à propos d'un article qui décrivait l'émergence et la diffusion récente du concept de stratégie en se limitant, **as usual**, à la production anglo-saxonne (Crow1989), David H. Morgan, qui travaille lui-même dans ce domaine, rappelle que les premiers usages de ce concept et le nouveau "paradigme" qu'ils introduisent en ethnologie et en sociologie sont apparus dans la sphère de la sociologie et de l'histoire de la famille et de la maisonnée (cf. Morgan 1989).

année de naissance, catégorie socioprofessionnelle du père, rang dans la famille et localisation - au bourg ou au hameau - du domicile) en même temps que les chances de mariage des migrants et des restants selon ces même variables. En fait, ces statistiques, fort difficiles et longues à établir (les informations sur les émigrés devant être recueillies oralement aupres de toute une série d'informateurs), confirment, en les précisant, les conclusions déjà acquises: on peut en effet avancer (avec la prudence qu'impose l'exiguïté des effectifs) que les chances de départ sont beaucoup plus fortes chez les femmes que chez les hommes, surtout dans les hameaux, où l'excédent des hommes atteint des proportions impressionnantes; que, chez les hommes, les chances de rester à la terre s'accroissent avec la taille du patrimoine; et que si, dans l'ensemble, la probabilité d'émigrer est nettement plus faible chez les aînés que chez les cadets (61% contre 42%), les effets du droit d'aînesse ne sont plus perceptibles chez les petits propriétaires. Chez les filles, on n'observe aucune relation significative entre l'émigration et la taille de la propriété ou le rang de naissance, les filles de bonne famille quittant même la terre dans une proportion légèrement plus élevée que les autres. Quant aux chances de mariage elles sont, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, nettement plus fortes chez les partants que chez les restants[3] et, parmi ces derniers, plus élevées chez les habitants du bourg que chez les habitants des hameaux.[4] Mais le fait le plus important, et qui frappe les intéressés comme un scandale, est que, parmi les restants, les probabilités de mariage ne varient pratiquement pas, dans les hameaux, en fonction de la taille de la propriété, ou du rang de naissance, de "grands aînés" ou, en tout cas, des héritiers de patrimoines importants, pouvant se trouver ainsi condamnés au célibat.[5]

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[3] Il n'en va pas de même chez les filles - celles qui sont restées au pays ayant un taux de célibat légèrment inférieur (18% globalement, soit 22% au bourg et 17,5% dans les hameaux) à celui des partantes (24%): ce qui se comprend puisqu'elles sont affrontées à un marché moins difficile.

[4] D'une série de tableaux statistiques établis à partir des listes nominatives pour les années 1954, 1962 et 1968 pour les différentes communes du canton de Lesquire, il ressort que partout s'observent les régularités déjà observées à Lesquire, l'intensité du célibat masculin atteignant des taux très élevés, analogues à ceux des hameaux de Lesquire, dans les petites communes reculées et isolées, et très semblables aux hameaux, par leur éloignement de tout centre urbain, leur habitat dispersé et leur structure socioprofessionnelle, tandis qu'elle diminue dans celle des communes qui se trouve être proche d'une ville ouvrière, Oloron, et comporter une fraction relativement importante d'ouvriers.

[5] La notion d'aîné ou d'héritier doit être prise au sens social et non au sens biologique. Dans la situation traditionnelle, l'arbitraire de la définition sociale pouvait se trouver masqué: c'était presque inévitablement l'aîné biologique qui était traité et agissait en aîné social, c'est-à-dire en héritier. Aujourd'hui, avec le depart de l'aîné, un cadet par la naissance peut se trouver investi du statut d'héritier. L'héritier n'est plus seulement celui qui reste.parce qu'il est l'aîné mais aussi celui qui est l' aîné parce qu'il est resté.

		BOURG		HAMEAU	
		Restants	Restants célibataires	Restants	Restants célibataires
Petits propriétaires (+ domestiques)	H	28,5*	*	43,0	57,0
	F	50,0*	*	33,5	15,2
Moyens	H	75,0*	*	70,5	61,5
	F	100,0*	*	50,0	22,0
Gros	H	100,0*	*	82,0	55,5
	F	40,0*	*	43,0	33,5
Autres professions	H	58,5	14,0	33,5	*
	F	23,5	50,0	36,5	*
Ensemble	H	54,0	15,0	49,5	56,5
	F	33,5	22,0	37,0	17,5

Tableau 1

La part des restants et, parmi ceux-ci, des célibataires, selon le domicile, le sexe et la taille de la propriété parmi les personnes nées à Lesquire avant 1935[6]

En fait, l'émigration et le célibat sont étroitement liés entre eux (dans la mesure notamment où les chances de rester célibataire sont considérablement renforcées par le fait de rester, surtout dans les hameaux) et étroitement liés au même système de facteurs (le sexe, la catégorie socioprofessionnelle d'origine et, pour les agriculteurs, la taille de la propriété, le rang de naissance, et, enfin, le domicile, au bourg ou dans les hameaux). Ce que la statistique des relations entre ce système de facteurs plus ou moins étroitement connectés entre eux et les chances d'émigrer et l'accéder (plus ou moins jeune) au mariage appréhende, c'est l'effet des transformations globales de l'espace social et, plus précisément, de **l'unification du marché des biens symboliques** tel qu'il s'est exercé différentiellement sur les différents agents selon leur **attachement objectif** (maximum chez les aînés de grandes familles) **et subjectif** (c'est-à-dire inscrit dans les habitus et les hexis corporelles) au mode d'existence paysan d'autrefois. Dans les deux cas, on mesure en quelque sorte la résultante tangible de la **force d'attraction** exercée par le champ social désormais unifié autour des réalités urbaines dominantes, avec l'ouverture des isolats, et de la **force d'inertie** que les différents agents lui opposent en fonction des catégories de perception, d'appréciation et d'action constitutives de leur habitus. L'unification du champ social, dont l'unification du marché des biens symboliques, donc du marché matrimonial, est un aspect, s'accomplit à la fois dans l'objectivité - sous l'effet de tout un ensemble de facteurs aussi différents que l'amplification des déplacements favorisée par l'amélioration des moyens de transports, la généralisation de l'accès à une forme d'enseignement secondaire, etc. - et dans les représentations. On serait tenté de dire qu'elle ne s'acccomplit dans l'objectivité - entraînant des phénomènes d'élimination différentielle dont le célibat des héritiers est l'exemple le plus significatif - que parce qu'elle s'accomplit dans et par la subjectivité des agents qui accordent une reconnaissance à la fois extorquée et acceptée à des processus orientés vers leur propre soumission.

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* Chiffres nuls ou trop petits (et donnés à titre indicatif).

[6] En adoptant (en 1970) 1935 comme limite supérieure des cohortes retenues, on se situait au-dessus de l'âge moyen de mariage des hommes (29 ans) et des femmes (24 ans) et près de la limite supérieure de la "mariabilité" (on ne compte que 4 ou 5 cas de mariage après 35 ans).

"DU MONDE CLOS À L'UNIVERS INFINI"

En reprenant le titre de l'ouvrage célèbre d'Alexandre Koyré, on voudrait seulement évoquer l'ensemble des processus qui, dans l'ordre économique, mais aussi et surtout symbolique, ont accompagné l'ouverture objective et subjective du monde paysan (et, plus généralement, rural), neutralisant progressivement l'efficacité des facteurs qui tendaient à assurer l'autonomie relative de ce monde et à rendre possible une forme particulière de **résistance** aux valeurs centrales: soit, pour ne nommer que les plus importants, la faible dépendance à l'égard du marché, surtout en matière de consommation, grâce au privilège donné à l'ascèse de l'autoconsommation (dont l'homogamie est un aspect) et l'isolement géographique, renforcé par la précarité des moyens de transport (chemins et véhicules) qui tendait à réduire l'aire des déplacements et à favoriser l'enfermement dans un monde social **à base locale**, imposant à la fois l'interdépendance et l'interconnaissance par-delà les différences économiques ou culturelles. Cette fermeture objective et subjective rendait possible une forme de **particularisme culturel**, fondé sur la résistance, plus ou moins assurée, aux normes citadines, en matière de langue notamment, et une sorte de **localocentrisme**, en matière de religion et de politique: par exemple, les choix politiques ordinaires étaient en grande partie opérés par référence au contexte immédiat, c'est-à-dire en fonction de la position occupée dans la hiérarchie au sein du microcosme clos qui tendait à faire **écran** au macrocosme social et à la position relative que le microcosme, globalement, y occupait (ainsi, à partir d'un certain niveau de la hiérarchie locale, on se devait en quelque sorte d'être pratiquant et conservateur et pour un "gros" paysan, fréquenter régulièrement l'église, porter au curé le vin de messe, était une question de **pourtalè**, de portail, de rang social). Autrement dit, la position occupée dans l'espace social par ce microcosme doté de ses hiérarchies sociales propres, de ses dominants et de ses dominés et de ses conflits de "classes", n'avait pas d'effet pratique sur la représentation que les paysan avaient de leur monde et de la position qu'ils y occupaient.[7]

L'unification du marché des biens économiques et symboliques a pour effet premier de faire disparaître les conditions d'existence de valeurs paysannes capables de se poser en face des valeurs dominantes comme **antagonistes**, au moins subjectivement, et pas seulement comme **autres** (pour évoquer la vielle opposition platonicienne de l'**enantion** et de l'**heteron** qui suffirait à éclaircir bien des discussions confuses sur la "culture populaire"). La dépendance limitée et masquée cède progressivement la place à une dépendance profonde et aperçue, voire reconnue. On a souvent décrit la logique et les effets du renforcement de la domination de l'économie de marché sur la petite agriculture (dans laquelle se rangent les plus "gros" des paysans de Lesquire). Pour la production, l'exploitation agricole dépend toujours davantage du marché des marchandises industrielles (machines, engrais, etc.) et elle ne peut faire face aux investissements nécessaires pour moderniser l'équipement productif et améliorer les rendements que par le recours à des emprunts propres à compromettre l'équilibre financier de l'entreprise agricole et à l'enfermer dans un type déterminé de produits et de débouchés. Pour la commercialisation, elle dépend aussi de plus en plus étroitement du marché des produits agricoles et, plus précisément, de l'industrie alimentaire (dans le cas particulier, celle qui assure le ramassage du lait). Du fait que leurs dépenses d'exploitation dépendent de l'évolution générale des prix, industriels notamment, sur lesquels ils n'ont pas de prise, et surtout que leurs revenues dépendent de plus en plus de prix garantis (comme celui du lait ou du tabac), les aléas de la conjoncture des prix tendent à tenir, dans la réalité et dans leur vision du monde, la place qui revenait autrefois aux aléas de la nature: à travers l'intervention économique des pouvoirs publics - et en particulier l'indexation des prix -, c'est une action politique, propre à susciter des réactions politiques qui a fait son apparition dans le monde quasi naturel de l'économie paysanne.[8] Ce qui a pour effet d'incliner à une vision plus politisée du monde social, mais dont la coloration anti-étatique doit encore beaucoup à l'illusion de l'autonomie qui est le fondement de l'auto-exploitation. La représentation dédoublée, voire contradictoire, que ces petits propriétaires convertis en quasi-salariés se font de leur condition et qui s'exprime souvent dans des prises de position politiques à la fois révoltées et conservatrices, trouve son fondement dans les ambiguïtés objectives d'une condition profondément contradictoire. Restés, au moins en apparence, les maîtres de l'organisation de leur activité (à la différence de l'ouvrier qui apporte sur le marché sa force de travail, ce sont des **produits** qu'ils vendent), propriétaires de moyens de production (bâtiments et équipements) qui peuvent représenter un capital investi très important (mais impossible à réaliser en fait en argent liquide), ils ne tirent souvent d'un travail dur, contraignant et peu gratifiant symboliquement, quoique de plus en plus qualifié, que des revenus inférieurs à ceux d'un ouvrier qualifié. Par un effet non voulu de la politique technocratique, notamment en matière d'aides et de crédit, ils ont été conduits à contribuer, par leurs investissements de tous ordres, à l'instauration d'une production aussi fortement socialisée en fait que celle des économies dites socialistes, à travers notamment les contraintes qui pèsent sur les prix et sur le procès de production lui-même, tout en conservant la propriété nominale et aussi la responsabilité de l'appareil de production, avec toutes les incitations à l'auto-exploitation qui en découlent.

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[7] Les catégories de droite et de gauche, propres au champ politique central, n'ont pas du tout le même sens dans le macrocosme et dans le microcosme local (si tant est qu'elles en aient un dans ce contexte). C'est à l'allodoxia structurale, qui résulte de l'autonomie relative, au moins subjective, des unités à base locale, et non à la dispersion spatiale, comme le suggère Marx, avec la métaphore du sac de pommes de terre, qu'est imputable la singularité constante des prises de position politiques des paysans et, plus généralement, des ruraux. Pour rendre compte complètement de cette allodoxia, dont les effets sont loin d'avoir disparu, il faut prendre en considération tout un ensemble de traits caractéristiques de la condition paysanne et rurale, qu'on ne peut ici qu'évoquer: le fait que les contraintes inhérentes à la production se présentent sous la forme de rapports naturels plutôt qu'au travers de rapports sociaux (les horaires et les rythmes de la production semblant déterminés exclusivement par les rythmes de la nature, et indépendamment de toute volonté humaine; la réussite de l'entreprise semblant dépendre des conditions climatiques plus que des structures de la propriété ou du marché, etc.); le fait que la dépendance universelle à l'égard du jugement des autres prend une forme très particulière dans ces mondes à huis clos où chacun se sent sans cesse sous le regard des autres et condamné à coexister avec eux pour la vie (c'est l'argument "il faut bien y vivre!" invoqué pour justifier la soumission prudente aux verdicts collectifs et la résignation au conformisme), etc.

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[8] Bien qu'elle se masque toujours, aux jeux mêmes de ceux qui en sont responsables, sous des justifications techniques, la politique des prix dépend fondamentalement du poids de la paysannerie dans le rapport des forces politiques et de l'intérêt que représente pour les dominants le maintien à l'existence d'une agriculture précapitaliste coûteuse, mais politiquement **sûre**, donc **rentable** en un autre sens (et nécessaire, comme on l'a découvert dans les années 1980, pour conserver à la compagne ses charmes esthétiques). La volonté technocratique d'intensifier l'exode rural pour réduire les gaspillages et pour jeter sur le marché de l'emploi industriel les travailleurs et les capitaux actuellement "détournés" par la petite agriculture s'affirmerait-elle aussi brutalement si la petite bourgeoisie citadine avide d'ascension et soucieuse de respectabilité n'était venue relayer, dans le système des alliances politiques, une paysannerie qui se trouve ainsi renvoyée vers des formes de manifestation à la fois violentes et localisées (du fait, notamment, de son isolement par rapport aux autres forces sociales) où s'expriment toutes ses contradictions?

La subordination croissante de l'économie paysanne à la logique du marché n'aurait pas suffi, par soi seule, à déterminer les transformations profondes dont le monde rural a été le lieu, à commencer par l'émigration massive, si ce processus n'avait été lui-même lié, par une relation de causalité circulaire, à une unification du marché des biens symboliques propre à déterminer le déclin de l'autonomie éthique des paysans et, par là, le dépérissement de leurs capacités de résistance et de refus. On admet que, de manière très générale, l'émigration hors du secteur agricole est fonction du rapport entre les salaires dans l'agriculture et dans les secteurs non agricoles et de l'offre d'emploi dans ces secteurs (mesurée au taux de non-emploi industriel). On pourrait ainsi proposer un modèle mécanique simple des flux migratoires en posant d'une part qu'il existe un **champ d'attraction** avec des différences de potentiel d'autant plus grandes que l'écart des situations économiques (niveau de revenu, taux d'emploi) est plus grand et d'autre part que les agents opposent aux forces du champ une **inertie** ou une résistance qui varie selon différents facteurs.

Mais on ne peut se satisfaire complètement de ce modèle que si l'on oublie les conditions préalables de son fonctionnement, qui n'ont rien de mécanique: ainsi, par exemple, l'effet de l'écart entre les revenus dans l'agriculture et hors de líagriculture ne peut s'exercer que dans la mesure où la **comparaison**, comme acte conscient ou inconscient de **mise en relation**, devient possible et socialement acceptable et où elle tourne à l'avantage du mode de vie citadin dont le salaire n'est qu'une dimension parmi d'autres; c'est-à-dire dans la mesure où le monde clos et fini s'ouvre et où viennent progressivement à tomber les écrans subjectifs qui rendaient impensable toute espèce de rapprochement entre les deux univers. En d'autres termes, les avantages associés à l'existence urbaine n'existent et n'agissent que s'ils deviennent des avantages perçus et appréciés, si par conséquent, ils sont appréhendés en fonction de catégories de perception et d'appréciation qui font que, cessant de passer inaperçus, d'être ignorés (passivement ou activement), ils deviennent perceptibles et appréciables, visibles et désirables. Et de fait, l'attraction du mode de vie urbain ne peut s'exercer que sur des esprits convertis à ses séductions: c'est la **conversion collective** de la vision du monde qui confère au champ social entraîné dans un processus objectif d'unification un pouvoir symbolique fondé dans la reconnaissance unanimement accordée aux valeurs dominantes.

La révolution symbolique est le produit cumulé d'innombrables conversions individuelles, qui, à partir d'un certain seuil, s'entraînent mutuellement dans une course de plus en plus précipitée. La banalisation que crée l'accoutumance porte en effet à oublier l'extraordinaire travail psychologique que suppose, tout spécialement dans la phase initiale du processus, chacun des départs loin de la terre et de la maison; et il faudrait évoquer l'effort de préparation, les occasions propres à favoriser ou à déclencher la décision, les étapes d'un éloignement psychique toujours difficile à accomplir (l'occupation d'une profession de facteur ou de chauffeur à mi-temps au bourg fournissant par exemple le tremplin pour un départ vers la ville) et, parfois jamais achevé (comme en témoignent les efforts, qui durent toute une vie, des émigrés forcés, pour "se rapprocher" du pays).

Chacun des agents concernés passe, simultanément ou successivement, par des phases de certitude de soi, d'anxiété plus ou moins agressive et de crise de l'estime de soi (qui s'exprime dans la déploration rituelle de la fin des paysans et de la "terre": "la terre est foutue"). La propension à parcourir plus ou moins vite la trajectoire psychologique qui mène au renversement de la table des valeurs paysannes dépend de la position occupée dans l'ancienne hiérarchie, à travers les intérêts et les dispositions associées à cette position. Les agents qui opposent la plus faible résistance aux forces d'attraction externes, qui perçoivent plus tôt et mieux que les autres les avantages associés à l'émigration, sont ceux qui sont les moins attachés objectivement et subjectivement à la terre et à la maison, parce que femmes, cadets ou pauvres. C'est encore l'ordre ancien qui définit l'ordre dans lequel on s'éloigne de lui. Les femmes qui, en tant qu'objets symboliques d'échange circulaient de bas en haut, et se trouvaient de ce fait spontanément inclinées à se montrer empressées et dociles à l'égard des injonctions ou des séductions citadines, sont, avec les cadets, le cheval de Troie du monde urbain. Moins attachées que les hommes (et les cadets eux-mêmes) à la condition paysanne et moins engagées dans le travail et dans les responsabilités de pouvoir, donc moins tenues par le souci du patrimoine à "maintenir", mieux disposées à l'égard de l'éducation et des promesses de mobilité qu'elle enferme, elles importent au coeur du monde paysan le regard citadin qui dévalue et disqualifie les "qualités paysannes".

Ainsi, la restructuration de la perception du monde social qui est au coeur de la conversion individuelle et collective ne fait qu'un avec la fin de l'autarcie psychologique, collectivement entretenue, qui faisait du monde clos et fermé de l'existence familière une référence absolue. Référence si totalement indiscutée que l'éloignement sélectif de ceux qui, cadets ou cadettes pauvres, devaient abandonner la terre, pour et par le travail ou le mariage, était encore un hommage rendu aux valeurs centrales et reconnu comme tel.[9] La conversion collective qui conduit à des départs de plus en plus nombreux et qui finira par affecter les survivants eux-mêmes est inséparable de ce qu'il faut bien appeler une révolution copernicienne: le lieu central, immuable, siège d'une hiérarchie elle aussi immuable et unique, n'est plus qu'un point quelconque dans un espace plus vaste, pire, un point bas, inférieur, dominé. La commune, avec ses hiérarchies (l'opposition par exemple entre les "gros" et les "petits" paysans), se trouve resituée dans un espace social plus large au sein duquel les paysans dans leur ensemble occupent une position dominée. Et ceux-là même qui tenaient les positions les plus élevées dans ce monde soudain relégué finiront, faut d'opérer à temps les conversions et les reconversions nécessaires, par faire tous les frais de la révolution symbolique qui touche l'ordre ancien et un point stratégique, le marché matrimonial; du fait que l'exploitation agricole est située dans un environnement économique et un marché du travail qui la condamne à n'avoir de main-d'oeuvre que domestique, ce marché commande en effet, très directement, la reproduction de la main-d'oeuvre agricole et, par là, de l'entreprise paysanne.

L'UNIFICATION DU MARCHÉ MATRIMONIAL

En tant que marché tout à fait particulier, où ce sont les personnes, avec toutes leurs propriétés sociales, qui sont concrètement mises à prix, le marché matrimonial constitue pour les paysans une occasion particulièrement dramatique de découvrir la transformation de la table des valeurs et l'effondrement du prix social qui leur est attribué. C'est ce qui révélait, de manière particulièrement dramatique, le petit bal de la Noël, point de départ de toute la recherche, qui apparaît, au terme d'un long travail de construction théorique, étendu en cours de route à des objets empiriques **phénoménalement** tout différents, comme la réalisation paradigmatique de tout le processus conduisant à la crise de l'ordre paysan du passé.[10]

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[9] La déroute symbolique des valeurs paysannes est aujourd'hui si totale qu'il faut rappeler quelques exemples typiques de leur affirmation triomphante. Par exemple, cette dénonciation de la dérogeance prononcée juste avant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale par la femme d'un "grand héritier" de Denguin à propos d'un autre "grand héritier"; "X. marie sa fille avec un ouvrier!" (en réalité un petit propriétaire de Saint-Faust travaillant comme employé à la Maison du Paysan). Ou cet autre cri du coeur à propos d'une grande famille d'Arbus dont la fille unique avait été mariée à un fonctionnaire: "Dap u emplegat!" (Avec un employé!).

Le bal est en effet la forme visible de la nouvelle logique du marché matrimonial. Aboutissement d'un processus à travers lequel les mécanismes autonomes et autorégulés d'un marché matrimonial dont les limites s'étendent bien au-delà du monde paysan tendent à se substituer aux échanges réglés du petit marché local, subordonné aux normes et aux intérêts du groupe, il donne *à voir*, concrètement, l'effet le plus spécifique - et le plus dramatique - de l'unification, du marché des échanges symboliques et la transformation qui, dans ce domaine comme ailleurs, accompagne le passage du marché local à l'économie de marché.[11] Selon le mot de Engels, les agents "ont perdu le contrôle de leurs propres interrelations sociales"; les lois de la concurrence s'imposent à eux "en dépit de l'anarchie, dans et par l'anarchie".[12] Les grands héritiers condamnés au célibat sont les victimes de la concurrence qui domine dorénavant un marché matrimonial jusque-là protégé par les contraintes et les contrôles, souvent mal tolérés, de la tradition. En déterminant une dévaluation brutale de tous les produits du mode de production et de reproduction paysan, de tout ce que les familles paysannes ont à offrir, que ce soit la terre et la vie à la campagne ou l'être même du paysan, son langage, son vêtement, ses manières, son maintien et jusqu'à son "physique", l'unification du marché neutralise les mécanismes sociaux qui lui assuraient, dans les limites d'un marché restreint, un monopole de fait, propre à lui fournir toutes les femmes nécessaires à la reproduction sociale de groupe, et celles-là seulement.

En matière de mariage comme en toute autre espèce d'échange, l'existence d'un marché n'implique nullement que les transactions n'obéissent qu'aux lois mécaniques de la concurrence. Nombre de mécanismes institutionnels tendent en effet à assurer au groupe la maîtrise des échanges et à le protéger contre les effets de l'"anarchie" que rappelait Engels, et que l'on a coutume d'oublier, du fait de la sympathie spontanément accordée au modèle "libéral" qui, comme dans la comédie classique, libère les amoureux des impératifs de la Raison d'État domestiques. C'est ainsi que, dans l'ancien régime matrimonial, du fait que l'initiative du mariage revenait non aux intéressés mais aux familles, les valeurs et les intérêts de la "maison" et de son patrimoine avaient plus de chances de triompher contre les fantaisies ou les hasards du sentiment.[13] Cela d'autant plus que toute l'éducation familiale prédisposait les jeunes gens à se soumettre aux injonctions parentales et à appréhender les prétendants selon des catégories de perception proprement paysannes: le "bon paysan" se reconnaissant au rang de sa maison, lié, inséparablement, à la taille de sa propriété et à la dignité de sa famille, et aussi à des qualités personnelles comme l'autorité, la compétence et l'ardeur au travail, tandis que la bonne épouse était avant tout la "bonne paysanne", dure à la peine et préparée à accepter la condition qui lui était offerte. N'ayant jamais connu "autre chose", les filles des hameaux voisins et de toute la zone des collines étaient plus disposées à s'accommoder de l'existence qui leur était promise par le mariage; nées et élevées dans une aire relativement fermée aux influences extérieures, elles avaient moins de chances aussi de juger leurs partenaires éventuels selon des critères hétérodoxes. Ainsi, avant 1914, le marché matrimonial des paysans des hameaux de Lesquire s'étendait à la région comprise entre les Gaves de Pau et d'Oloron, ensemble économiquement et socialement très homogène de communes composées, comme Lesquire, d'un petit bourg encore fortement paysan et de fermes dispersées sur les coteaux et les basses montagnes.[14] La maîtrise du groupe sur les échanges s'affirmait dans la restriction de la taille du marché matrimonial mesurée s'affirmait dans la restriction de la taille du marché matrimonial mesurée en distance géographique et surtout en distance sociale. Si, pas plus en ce domaine qu'ailleurs, le monde paysan n'a jamais connu l'autonomie et l'autarcie totales dont les ethnologues le créditent souvent, ne serait-ce qu'en prenant pour objet le village, il avait su conserver le contrôle de sa reproduction en assurant la quasi-totalité de ses échanges matrimoniaux à l'intérieur d'un "marché pertinent" extrêmement réduit et socialement homogène: l'homogénéité des conditions matérielles d'existence et, par conséquent, des habitus, est en effet le meilleur garant de la perpétuation des valeurs fondamentales du groupe.

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[10] Il faudrait, à propos de cet exemple, essayer d'éclaircir ce que l'on appelle d'ordinaire **intuition**. La scène concrète à travers laquelle se désigne le problème est un véritable **paradigme comportemental** qui condense, sous une forme sensible, toute la logique d'un processus complexe. Et il n'est pas indifférent que le caractère hautement significatif de la scène ne se livre d'abord qu'à une perception intéressée, voire profondément "**biaisée**", comme disent les traités de "méthodologie", parce que chargée de toutes les résonances affectives et de toutes les colorations émotionnelles qu'implique la participation sympathique à la situation et au point de vue, douloureux, des victimes.

[11] Les informateurs opposent explicitement les deux modes d'instauration des relations conduisant au mariage: la négociation entre les familles, sur la base souvent de liens antérieurs, et le contact direct, dont l'occasion est à peu près toujours le bal. La liberté que donne l'interaction directe entre les intéressés, ainsi affranchis des pressions familiales et de toutes les considérations économiques ou éthiques (e.g. "réputation" de la jeune fille), a pour rançon la soumission aux lois du marché des individus abandonnés à eux-mêmes.

[12] La distinction que fait K. Polanyi entre "les marchés isolés *(isolated markets)* et "l'économie de marché" *(market economy)*, c'est-à-dire plus précisément, entre les "marchés régulés" *(regulated markets)* et le "marché autorégulé *(self-regulating market)* (cf. Polanyi 1974:56-76), apporte une précision importante à l'analyse marxiste de "l'anarchie" de la "production socialisée" *(socialized production)* dans laquelle "le produit gouverne les producteurs" *(the product governs the producers)*: l'existence d'un marché ne suffit pas à faire l'économie de marché aussi longtemps que le groupe conserve la maîtrise des mécanismes de l'échange.

[13] L'institution la plus typique de l'ancien régime matrimonial était évidemment le marieur - ou la marieuse - (appelé **trachur** ou

Ce monde clos où l'on se sentait entre soi et chez soi s'est peu à peu ouvert. Dans les hameaux de l'aire principale des mariages, comme dans les hameaux de Lesquire, les femmes regardent de plus en plus vers la ville plutôt que vers leur hameau ou vers les hameaux voisins. Plus promptes que les hommes à adopter les modèles et les idéaux urbains, elles répugnent à épouser un paysan qui leur promet cela même qu'elles veulent fuir (entre autre choses, l'autorité des beaux-parents qui "ne veulent pas se démettre" et tout spécialement la tyrannie traditionnelle de la vielle **daune** qui entend conserver la haute main dans la maison, particulièrement lorsque le père manque d'autorité parce qu'il a fait un mariage de bas en haut). Enfin et surtout, elles ont plus de chances de trouver un parti hors du monde paysan, tout d'abord parce que, selon la logique même du système, ce sont elles qui circulent, et de bas en haut. Il s'ensuit que les échanges matrimoniaux entre les hameaux paysans et les bourgs ou les villes ne peuvent être qu'à sens unique. Comme l'atteste la présence, dans les petits bals de campagne, de jeunes citadines auxquels leur aisance et leur allure donnent un avantage inestimable sur les paysans, le marché matrimonial autrefois contrôlé et quasiment réservé est désormais ouvert à la concurrence la plus brutale et la plus inégale. Tandis que le citadin peut choisir entre différents marchés matrimoniaux hiérar-

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talamè), quasi institutionnalisé ou spontané. Dans un univers où la séparation entre les sexes, toujours très marquée, n'a sans doute fait que croître du fait du relâchement des liens sociaux traditionnels, particulièrement dans les hameaux, et de l'espacement des occasions traditionnelles de rencontre - comme tous les travaux collectifs - le **laissez-faire** du nouveau régime matrimonial ne peut que renforcer l'avantage des citadins.

[14] Les différents quartiers de Lesquire avaient, à l'intérieur de l'aire commune, des secteurs propres, définis par la fréquentation privilégiée des mêmes marchés et des mêmes fêtes ou, plus précisément, par l'utilisation des mêmes autobus (qui drainaient la population des différents quartiers dans des directions différentes et donnaient occasion à des contacts entre les utilisateurs).

chisés (villes, bourgs, hameaux), le paysan des hameaux est cantonné dans son aire et concurrencé, jusqu'à l'intérieur de celle-ci, par des rivaux mieux nantis, au moins symboliquement. Loin que l'extension récente de l'aire matrimoniale des paysans des hameaux marque l'accès à un degré de liberté supérieur et conduise, avec l'accroissement de l'espace des mariages possibles, à un accroissement des chances de mariage, elle exprime tout simplement la nécessité où sont les plus démunis d'étendre l'aire géographique de prospection, mais dans les limites de l'homogénéité sociale (ou, mieux, pour maintenir cette homogénéité) et de diriger leurs attentes, à l'inverse de leurs soeurs, vers les hameaux les plus reculés du Pays basque ou de Gascogne.[15]

Comme il arrive régulièrement lorsqu'un ordre social bascule, surtout de manière insensible, les anciens dominants contribuent à leur propre déclin. Soit qu'ils obéissent au sens de la hauteur statutaire qui leur interdit de déroger et d'opérer à temps les révisions nécessaires, voire de recourir aux stratégies du désespoir que la dureté des temps impose aux plus démunis. C'est le cas de ces héritiers de bonne famille qui s'enferment dans le célibat après plusieurs tentatives infructueuses auprès des filles de leur rang ou de ceux qui, entourés et courtisés, laissent passer leur moment, le tournant des années 1950 où le mariage est encore chose facile pour les "gros" paysans ("Beaucoup de filles pour lesquelles il a fait la fine bouche feraient bien aujourd'hui son affaire", dit-on de l'un d'eux). Soit qu'ils appliquent à la situation nouvelle des principes anciens qui les portent à agir à contretemps. Telles ces mères qui s'occupent de chercher un parti pour leur fille alors qu'il faudrait songer au garçon ou de celles, encore plus nombreuses, qui repoussent comme des mésalliances des mariages qu'elles auraient dû accueillir comme des miracles. Les réponses de l'habitus qui, lorsqu'il est en phase avec le monde, sont souvent si miraculeusement ajustées qu'elles peuvent faire croire au calcul rationnel peuvent au contraire venir à contresens lorsque, affronté à un monde différent de celui qui l'a produit, l'habitus tourne en quelque sorte à vide, projetant sur un monde d'où elles ont disparu l'attente des structures objectives dont il est le produit.

Sans doute le décalage entre les habitus et les structures, et les ratés du comportement qui en résultent, sont-ils l'occasion de retours critiques et de conversions. Mais la crise n'engendre pas automatiquement la prise de conscience; et le temps nécessaire pour comprendre le nouveau cours des choses est sans doute d'autant plus grand que l'attachement objectif et subjectif à l'ancien monde, les intérêts et les investissements dans les enjeux qu'il propose, sont plus importants. C'est ce qui fait que, si souvent, le privilège s'inverse. En fait, les différents agents parcourent, à des vitesses différentes selon les intérêts qu'ils ont investis dans l'ancien et le nouveau système, avec des avancées et des reculs, la trajectoire qui conduit de l'ancien au nouveau régime matrimonial, au prix d'une révision des valeurs et des représentations associées à l'un et à l'autre. Et l'effet le plus caractéristique de la crise révolutionnaire, qui s'exprime dans des prophéties prophylactiques, des prévisions à fonction d'exorcisme - de la forme "la terre est foutue" - , est cette sorte de dédoublement de la conscience et de la conduite qui porte à agir successivement ou simultanément selon les principes contradictoires de deux systèmes antagonistes.

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[15] Sans prétendre proposer ici une théorie générale des échanges matrimoniaux dans les sociétés socialement différenciées, on voudrait indiquer seulement que la description des processus d'**unification** du marché matrimonial n'implique aucunement l'adhésion ou modèle du marché matrimonial unifié qui est à l'oeuvre, à l'état implicite, dans les théories communes du "choix de conjoint" et qui, postulant l'homogénéité des fonctions de l'homogamie (sans voir qu'elle peut avoir des sens opposés selon qu'elle est le fait des privilégiés ou des dépossédés), fait de l'attraction du semblable sur le semblable, selon l'intuition du sens commun ("qui se ressemble s'assemble"), c'est-à-dire de la recherche de l'homogamie, le principe universel mais vide de l'homogamie. Mais il ne s'agit pas pour autant de succomber à l'illusion opposée qui consisterait à traiter les différents marchés matrimoniaux (par exemple le marché "paysan" qui continue à fonctionner, tant bien que mal) comme autant d'univers séparés, francs de toute dépendance. De même qu'on ne peut rendre raison des variations de salaires selon les régions, les branches ou les professions, qu'à condition d'abandonner l'hypothèse d'un marché du travail unique et unifié et de renoncer à agréger artificiellement des données hétéroclites pour rechercher les lois structurales de fonctionnement propres aux différents marchés, on ne peut comprendre les variations que l'on observe dans les chances au mariage des différentes catégories sociales, c'est-à-dire du prix que reçoivent les produits de leur éducation, qu'à condition d'apercevoir qu'il existe différents marchés hiérarchisés et que les prix que les différentes catégories des "mariables" peuvent recevoir dépendent des chances qu'ils ont d'accéder aux différents marchés et de la rareté, donc la valeur, qui est la leur sur ces marchés (et qui peut être mesurée à la valeur matérielle ou symbolique du bien matrimonial contre lequel ils ont été échangés). Tandis que les plus favorisés peuvent étendre l'aire géographique et l'aire sociale des mariages (dans les limites de la mésalliance), les plus défavorisés peuvent être condamnés à étendre l'aire géographique pour compenser la restriction sociale de l'aire sociale dans laquelle ils peuvent trouver des partenaires. C'est dans cette logique, celle des stratégies du désespoir, que l'on peut comprendre les "foires aux célibataires" dont la première fut organisée à Esparros, dans les Baronnies, en 1966.

La statistique établit ainsi que les fils de paysans, lorsqu'ils parviennent à se marier, épousent des filles de paysans, tandis que les filles de paysans s'unissent souvent à des non-paysans. Ces stratégies matrimoniales manifestent, dans leur antagonisme même, que le groupe ne veut pas pour ses filles ce qu'il veut pour ses garçons ou, pire, qu'il ne veut pas, au fond, de ses garçons pour ses filles, même s'il veut de ses filles pour ses garçons. En recourant à des stratégies strictement opposées selon qu'elles ont à donner ou à prendre des femmes, les familles paysannes trahissent que, sous l'effet de la violence symbolique, cette violence dont on est à la fois l'objet et le sujet, chacune d'elles est divisée contre elle-même: alors que l'endogamie attestait l'unicité des critères d'évaluation, donc l'accord du groupe avec lui-même, la dualité des stratégies matrimoniales porte au jour la dualité des critères que le groupe emploie pour estimer la valeur d'un individu, donc sa propre valeur en tant que classe d'individus. Selon une logique analogue à celle qui commande les processus d'inflation (ou, à un degré d'intensité supérieur, les phénomènes de **panique**), chaque famille ou chaque agent contribue à la dépréciation du groupe dans son ensemble, qui est elle-même au principe de ses stratégies matrimoniales. Tout se passe bien comme si le groupe symboliquement dominé conspirait contre lui-même. En agissant comme si sa main droite ignorait ce que fait sa main gauche, il contribue à instaurer les conditions du célibat des héritiers, et de l'exode rural, qu'il déplore par ailleurs comme une calamité sociale. En donnant ses filles , qu'il avait coutume de marier de bas en haut, à des citadins, il manifeste qu'il reprend à son compte, consciemment ou inconsciemment, la représentation citadine de la valeur actuelle et escomptée du paysan. Toujours présente, mais refoulée, l'image citadine du paysan s'impose jusque dans la conscience du paysan. L'effondrement de la **certitudo sui** que les paysans étaient parvenus à défendre envers et contre toutes les agressions symboliques, dont celles de l'école intégratrice, redouble les effets de la mise en question qui le provoque: la crise des "valeurs paysannes" qui trouve dans l'**anarchie** des échanges du marché matrimonial l'occasion de s'exprimer redouble la crise de la valeur du paysan, de ses biens, de ses produits, et de tout son être, sur le marché des biens matériels et symboliques. La défaite intérieure, ressentie à l'échelle individuelle, qui est au principe de ces trahisons isolées, accomplies à la faveur de la solitude anonyme du marché, aboutit à ce résultat collectif et non voulu, la fuite des femmes et le célibat des hommes.

C'est le même mécanisme qui est au principe de la conversion de l'attitude des paysans à l'égard du système d'enseignement, instrument principal de la domination symbolique du monde citadin. Parce que l'École apparaît comme seule capable d'enseigner les aptitudes que le marché économique et le marché symbolique exigent avec une urgence sans cesse accrue, comme la manipulation de la langue française ou la maîtrise du calcul économique, la résistance jusque-là opposée à la scolarisation et aux valeurs scolaires d'évanouit.[16] La soumission aux valeurs de l'école renforce et accélère le reniement des valeurs traditionnelles qu'elle suppose. Par là, l'école remplit sa fonction d'instrument de domination symbolique, contribuant à la conquête d'un nouveau marché pour les produits symboliques citadins: lors même en effet, qu'elle ne parvient pas à donner les moyens de s'approprier la culture dominante, elle peut au moins inculquer la reconnaissance de la légitimité de cette culture et de ceux détiennent les moyens de se l'approprier.

La corrélation qui unit les taux de scolarisation et les taux de célibat des agriculteurs (agrégés au niveau de la région) ne doit pas être lue comme une relation causale. Ce serait oublier que les deux termes de la relation sont le produit du même principe, même si l'éducation peut contribuer à son tour à renforcer l'efficacité des mécanismes qui produisent le célibat des hommes.[17] L'unification des marchés économique et symbolique (dont la généralisation du recours au système d'enseignement est un aspect) tend, on l'a vu, à transformer le système de référence par rapport auquel les paysans situent leur position dans la structure sociale; un des facteurs de la démoralisation paysanne, qui s'exprime aussi bien dans la scolarisation des enfants que dans l'émigration ou dans l'abandon des langues locales, réside dans l'effondrement de l'écran des relations sociales à base locale qui contribuait à leur masquer la vérité de leur position dans l'espace social: le paysan appréhende sa condition par comparaison avec celle du petit fonctionnaire ou de l'ouvrier. La comparaison n'est plus abstraite et imaginaire, comme autrefois. Elle s'opère dans les confrontations concrètes au sein même de la famille, avec les émigrés et surtout, peut-être, dans les relations de concurrence réelle dans lesquelles les paysans se trouvent mesurés aux non-paysans, à l'occasion du mariage. En accordant pratiquement la préférence aux citadins, les femmes rappellent les critères dominants de la hiérarchisation sociale. A cette aune, les produits de l'éducation paysanne, et en particulier les manières paysannes de se tenir avec les femmes, n'ont que peu de prix: le paysan devient "paysan", au sens que l'injure citadine donne à cet adjectif. Selon la logique du racisme qui s'observe aussi entre les classes, le paysan est sans cesse obligé de compter dans sa pratique avec la représentation de lui-même que les citadins lui renvoient; et il reconnaît encore dans les **démentis** qu'il lui oppose la dévaluation que le citadin lui fait subir.

On voit immédiatement l'accélération que le système d'enseignement peut apporter au processus circulaire de dévaluation. En premier lieu, il ne fait pas de doute qu'il détient par soi un pouvoir de détournement qui peut suffire à triompher des stratégies de renforcement par lesquelles les familles visent à faire porter les investissements des enfants sur la terre plutôt que sur l'école - lorsque l'école elle-même n'a pas suffi à les décourager par ses sanctions négatives. Cet effet de déculturation s'exerce moins par la vertu du message pédagogique lui-même que par l'intermédiaire de l'expérience des études et de la condition de quasi-étudiant. La prolongation de la scolarité obligatoire et l'allongement de la durée des études placent en effet les enfants d'agriculteurs en situation de "collégiens", voire d'"étudiants", coupés de la société paysanne par tout leur style de vie et, en particulier, par leurs rythmes temporels.[18] Cette nouvelle expérience tend à déréaliser pratiquement les valeurs transmises par la famille et à tourner les investissements affectifs et économiques non plus vers la reproduction de la lignée mais vers la reproduction par l'individu singulier de la position occupée par la lignée dans la structure sociale. Ici encore, c'est surtout par l'intermédiaire de l'action qu'elle exerce sur les filles que l'école atteint les fils d'agriculteurs destinés à reproduire la famille et la propriété paysanne: l'action de déculturation trouve un terrain particulièrement favorable chez les filles dont les aspirations tendent toujours à s'organiser en fonction du mariage et qui sont de ce fait plus attentives et plus sensibles aux modes et aux manières urbaines et à l'ensemble des marqueurs sociaux définissant la valeur des partenaires potentiels sur le marché des biens symboliques, donc plus portées à retenir au moins de l'enseignement scolaire les signes extérieurs de la civilité citadine. Et il est significatif que, comme si, une fois encore, ils se faisaient les complices de leur destin objectif, les paysans scolarisent plus et plus longtemps leurs filles.[19]

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[16] La baisse progressive du cours des langues vernaculaires sur le marché des échanges symboliques n'est qu'un cas particulier de la dévaluation qui affecte tous les produits de l'éducation paysanne: l'unification de ce marché a été fatale à tous ces produits, manières, objets, vêtements, rejetés dans l'ordre du vieillot et du vulgaire ou artificiellement conservés par les érudits locaux, à l'état fossilisé de folklore. Les paysans entrent dans les musées des arts et traditions populaires, ou dans ces sortes de réserves de culs-terreux empaillés que sont les écomusées, au moment où ils sortent de la réalité de l'action historique.

[17] Il n'est guère possible de ressaisir à l'échelle de la région, le système des facteurs explicatifs qui déterminent les stratégies matrimoniales des agriculteurs. Etant donné l'hétérogénéité des exploitations agricoles, au sein même de la région, il faudrait pouvoir prendre en compte à la fois la taille de l'exploitation, le cycle de vie de la famille, le nombre d'enfants, leur distribution par sexe. leur réussite scolaire respective, etc. Ainsi, un exploitant agricole ayant un fils de 25 ans et possédant 20 hectares ne pourra pas se mettre à la retraite à 50 ans pour laisser sa ferme à son fils, qui l'aurait bien reprise. S'il avait une exploitation plus grande, il pourrait la couper provisoirement en deux; s'il avait un écart d'âge plus grand avec son fils, il pourrait la lui laisser à 60 ans.

Outre qu'ils ont pour effet de couper les agriculteurs de leurs moyens de reproduction biologique et sociale, ces mécanismes tendent à favoriser l'apparition, dans la conscience des paysans, d'une image catastrophique de leur avenir collectif. Et la prophétie technocratique qui annonce la disparition des paysans ne peut que renforcer cette représentation en conférant sens et cohérence aux multiples indices parcellaires que leur livre l'expérience quotidienne. L'effet de démoralisation qu'exerce une représentation pessimiste de l'avenir de la classe contribue au déclin de la classe qui le détermine. Il s'ensuit que la concurrence économique et politique entre les classes s'opère aussi par l'intermédiaire de la **manipulation symbolique de l'avenir**: la prévision, cette forme rationnelle de la **prophétie**, est propre à favoriser l'avènement de l'avenir qu'elle prophétise. Il ne fait pas de doute que l'information économique, lorsqu'elle se contente de porter au jour et de divulguer largement, jusqu'aux "intéressés" eux-mêmes, les lois de l'économie de marché qui condamnent les petits agriculteurs, les petits artisans et les petits commerçants, contribue, par l'effet de la dialectique de l'objectif et du subjectif, à l'accomplissement des phénomènes qu'elle décrit. La démoralisation n'est jamais autre chose qu'une forme particulière de *self-fulfilling prophecy*. La paysannerie représente un cas-limite et, à ce titre, particulièrement significatif, de la relation entre les déterminismes objectifs et l'anticipation de leurs effets. C'est parce qu'ils ont intériorisé leur avenir objectif, et la représentation que s'en font les dominants, qui ont le pouvoir de contribuer à le faire par leurs décisions, que les paysans ont des actions qui tendent à menacer leur reproduction.

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[18] Plus les enfants d'agriculteurs sont restés dans le système d'enseignement, plus ils ont de chances de quitter l'exploitation agricole. Parmi les enfants d'agriculteurs, ceux qui ont suivi l'enseignement technique ou général, secondaire ou supérieur, sont les plus enclins à se détourner de l'agriculture par opposition à ceux qui n'ont reçu qu'une formation primaire ou un enseignement agricole. Outre qu'ils ont été préparés explicitement ou implicitement à exercer un métier non agricole ou à vivre dans le milieu urbain, ils subissent un manque à gagner d'autant plus important en entrant dans l'agriculture que certains seuils de surface d'exploitation et de capital ne sont pas atteints. Enfin, ils sont les plus aptes à avoir une bonne connaissance de l'offre d'emplois non agricoles et à se déplacer vers les zones où les perspectives de revenus sont les plus fortes (cf. Daucé et al. 1971).

[19] En 1962, 41,1% des filles d'exploitants agricoles âgées de 15 à 19 ans étaient scolarisées contre 32% seulement des garçons (cf. Praderie1966). Si les taux scolarisation des garçons et des filles sont assez proches pour les 10-14 ans et pour les 20-24 ans, on remarque que les filles de 15 à 19 ans et notamment celles dont le père dirige une exploitation de plus de 10 hectares sont beaucoup plus fortement scolarisées que les garçons. (cf. "Environnement économique des exploitations agricoles françaises", *Statistiques agricoles* 86, oct. 1971: 155-166 (Supplément, sér. Etudes)).

L'enjeu du conflit sur les représentations de l'avenir n'est autre que l'attitude des classes en déclin face à ce déclin: soit la démoralisation, qui conduit à la **débandade**, comme sommation de fuites individuelles, soit la **mobilisation**, qui conduit à la recherche collective d'une solution collective de la crise. Ce qui peut faire la différence, c'est fondamentalement la possession des instruments symboliques permettant au groupe de se donner la maîtrise de la crise et de s'organiser en vue de lui opposer une riposte collective, au lieu de fuir la dégradation, réelle ou redoutée, dans le ressentiment réactionnaire et la représentation de l'histoire comme complot.[20]

"OPINIONS DU PEUPLE SAINES"

Ayant assez dit en quelle suspicion il faut tenir la sociologie spontanée et étant plus que jamais porté à récuser toutes les formes de "bavardage quotidien" sur le quotidien qui ont de nouveau cours aujourd'hui, au terme d'un cycle de la mode intellectuelle, je me sens en droit de rappeler que les désespoirs ou les indignations des **premiers intéressés** désignent souvent des problèmes que la recherche, bien souvent, ignore ou esquive. C'est le cas du célibat des héritiers qui, autour des années 1960, à un moment où certain discours populiste chantait l'émergence d'une nouvelle élite paysanne, semblait concentrer toute l'angoisse des familles rurales. De fait, si l'on accepte la théorie selon laquelle la reproduction biologique de la famille agricole fait partie des conditions du fonctionnement de l'entreprise agricole en sa forme traditionnelle (Thorner et al. 1966, et en particulier l'introduction de Kerblay parue aussi in *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* V(4), oct.-déc. 1964:411-460; Thorner 1966), on comprend que la crise qui affecte l'institution matrimoniale, clé de voûte de tout le système des stratégies de reproduction, menace l'existence même de la "maison" paysanne, cette unité indissociable d'un patrimoine et d'une maisonnée: nombre des moyens propriétaires qui, selon les statistiques nationales, ont été les grands bénéficiaires de la légère concentration des terres rendue possible par le dépérissement des petites propriétés et qui se sont montrés les plus modernistes, tant sur le plan technique que sur le terrain des associations ou des syndicats, ont été touchés par le célibat: en laissant tant de terres sans héritiers, le célibat des aînés a réalisé ce que les seuls effets de la domination économique et de la dégradation, au moins relative, des revenus agricoles, n'auraient pu réussir.[21]

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[20] De manière générale, l'aliénation économique qui conduit à la violence réactionnaire de la révolte conservatrice est en même temps une aliénation logico-politique: les agents en déclin se tournent vers le racisme ou, plus généralement, vers la fausse concrétisation qui place dans une groupe traité en bouc émissaire (juifs, jésuites, francs-maçons, communistes, etc.) le principe de leurs difficultés actuelles et potentielles, parce qu'ils ne disposent pas des schèmes d'explication qui leur permettraient de comprendre la situation et de se **mobiliser collectivement** pour la modifier, au lieu de se réfugier dans la panique des subterfuges individuels. Dans le cas particulier, il est certain que la revendication régionaliste ou nationaliste constitue une riposte spécifique et sensée à la domination symbolique résultant de l'unification du marché: ceci contre les différentes formes d'économisme qui, au nom d'une définition restreinte de l'économie et de la rationalité et faute de comprendre comme telle **l'économie des biens symboliques**, réduisent les revendications proprement symboliques, qui sont toujours plus ou moins confusément engagées dans les mouvements linguistiques, régionalistes, ou nationalistes, à l'absurdité de la passion ou du sentiment (cf. par exemple cette déclaration typique de Raymond Cartier dans *Paris-Match* du 21 août 1971 à propos des revendications des catholiques irlandais: "Rien n'est plus absurde, le départ des uns ou des autres signifiera un désastre économique. Mais ce n'est pas l'intérêt, hélas! qui mène le monde, le monde est mené par la passion."). En fait, ce qui est absurde, et qui jette les trois quarts des conduites humaines dans l'absurdité, c'est la distinction classique entre les passions et les intérêts, qui fait oublier l'existence d'intérêts symboliques tout à fait tangibles et propres à **fonder en raison** (symbolique) des conduites en apparence aussi parfaitement "passionnelles" que les luttes linguistiques, certaines revendications féministes (comme le jeu avec *he or she* du nouveau discours universitaire anglo-saxon) ou certaines formes de revendications régionalistes.

Si, après lu ces analyses, on est convaincu que la domination symbolique qui s'exerce à la faveur de l'unification du marché matrimonial a joué un rôle déterminant dans la crise spécifique de la reproduction de la famille paysanne, on doit reconnaître que l'attention portée à la dimension symbolique des pratiques, loin de représenter une fuite idéaliste vers les sphères éthérées de la superstructure, constitue la condition sine qua non, et pas seulement en ce cas, d'une véritable compréhension (que l'on peut dire, si l'on veut, matérialiste) des phénomènes de domination. Mais l'opposition entre l'infrastructure et la superstructure ou entre l'économique et le symbolique n'est que la plus grossière des oppositions qui, en enfermant la pensée des pouvoirs dans des alternatives fictives, contrainte ou soumission volontaire, manipulation centraliste ou automystification spontanéiste, empêchent de comprendre complètement la logique infiniment subtile de la violence symbolique qui s'instaure dans la relation obscure à elle-même entre les corps socialisés et les jeux sociaux dans lesquels ils sont engagés.[22]

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[21] Au terme d'une étude sur les facteurs de disparition des exploitations agricoles, André Brun conclut que les "'sorties' d'agriculteurs exploitants sont essentiellement le résultat de la mortalité et des retraites" (Brun 1967). En 1968, à Lesquire, 50% des agriculteurs avaient plus de 45 ans, plus de la moitié d'entre eux étaient célibataires et la population paysanne marquait un net déclin du fait du déficit des naissances résultant du célibat et du retard au mariage. En 1989, la génération directement touchée par la crise des années 1960 arrive à son terme et une part très importante des propriétés vont disparaître avec leur propriétaire.

[22] Bien que je n'aime guère l'exercice, typiquement scolaire, qui consiste à passer en revue, pour s'en distinguer, toutes les théories concurrentes de l'analyse proposé - entre autres raisons, parce qu'elle peut faire croire que celle-ci peut n'avoir eu d'autre principe que la recherche de la différence - , je voudrais faire remarquer toute la différence qui sépare la théorie de la violence symbolique comme méconnaissance fondée sur l'ajustement inconscient des structures subjectives aux structures objectives de la théorie foucaldienne de la domination comme discipline et dressage - ou encore, dans un autre ordre, les métaphores du réseau ouvert et capillaire d'un concept comme celui de champ.

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ANNEXE

Distribution des personnes nées dans les hameaux de Lesquire avant 1935 selon leur résidence en 1970 (à Lesquire ou ailleurs), leur sexe, la profession de leur père (et pour les agriculteurs, la taille de leur propriété), leur rang de naissance et leur statut matrimonial

PROF. DU PERE			**AGRICULTEURS**												**AUTRES***	
			Petit (<15 ha)				Moyen (15-30 ha)				Gros (>30 ha)					**TOTAL**
			NR	Ainé	Cadet	Ens.	NR	Ainé	Cadet	Ens.	NR	Ainé	Cadet	Ens.		
R	**H**	Célib.	3	14	18	35		5	11	16		3	2	5	2	58
E		Mariés	1	12	14	27		6	4	10		3	1	4	5	46
S		Ens	4	26	32	62		11	15	26		6	3	9	7	104
T	**F**	Célib.		1	6	7			4	4			2	2		13
É		Mariés	3	7	26	36		2	12	14		1	3	4	8	62
S		Ens.	3	8	32	43		2	16	18		1	5	6	8	75
	Ensemble		7	34	64	105		13	31	44		7	8	15	15	179
P	**H**	Célib.	2	4	8	14			1	1					3	18
A		Mariés	5	12	51	68		1	9	10		1	1	2	10	90
R		Ens.	7	16	59	82		1	10	11		1	1	2	13	108
T	**F**	Célib.	4	1	11	16									2	18
I		Mariés	12	9	51	72		8	10	18		2	6	8	10	108
S		Ens.	16	10	62	88		8	10	18		2	6	8	12	126
	Ensemble		23	26	121	170		9	20	29		3	7	10	25	234
	R+P		30	60	185	275		22	51	73		10	15	25	40	413
DÉ	**H**		14	1	12	27	1	1	2	4		1	1	2	8	41
CÉ	**F**		8	3	10	21			2	2			2	2	10	35
DÉS	Ensemble		22	4	22	48	1	1	4	6		1	3	4	18	76

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* Les données concernant les domestiques et ouvriers agricoles, les artisans et commerçants et les employés (facteurs, gendarmes, etc.) n'ont pu être détaillées ici.

THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS IN KALAUNA

MICHAEL W. YOUNG*

INTRODUCTION

His expectations raised by having read *The Interpretation of Dreams* by Sigmund Freud, it was probably with some disappointment that Bronislaw Malinowski discovered that Trobriand Islanders did not pay much attention to their dreams.

> Spontaneous dreams are not of any great importance in the life of the Trobrianders. On the whole the natives appear to dream but seldom, have little interest in their dreams, and do not often tell their experiences on waking or refer to dreams in order to explain a belief or justify a line of conduct. No prophetic meaning is ascribed to ordinary dreams, nor is there any system or code for their symbolic interpretation (1932: 326).

With some minor qualifications, this statement could have been written about the people of Kalauna, a village-based society in eastern Goodenough Island or Nidula (which is about 100 kilometres to the southwest of the Trobriands) located in the D'Entrecasteaux Archipelago of southeast Papua New Guinea. Kalauna folk are also inclined to be reticent about their dreams, and unless I had come to know a person particularly well it was difficult to elicit dream accounts. Even when I succeeded I sensed that my enquiries were thought to be tactless. Of course, there were some occasions when men alluded to their dreams spontaneously, as justification for a course of action, or to explain a point to do with sickness, sorcery or ancestral ghosts, but volunteered accounts of dream experiences were few and far between. I say "men" deliberately, for I have no firsthand data on women's dreams; after four fieldtrips and some 30 months spent in Kalauna I never befriended any woman well enough to learn about her dream life.

These facts say something about Kalauna theories of dream (as well, perhaps, about my own lack of persistence), for I have no reason to doubt that Kalauna people dream any less frequently than others. Yet compared to the extravagant fantasy and symbolic richness of their myths, Kalauna people's reported dreams were disappointingly prosaic: the difference between a sumptuously appointed art gallery and a barely furnished hall. In this essay I sketch the principles of Kalauna dream interpretation. These partly explain, I think, why people in this society are less forthcoming than others who invest symbolically in their dreams.

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To situate readers unfamiliar with Melanesia, it will be helpful to know that Kalauna people, who speak an Austronesian language, numbered about 500 in 1980; that they are subsistence gardeners who cultivate yams, taro, bananas, coconuts, and numerous lesser crops; that they rear pigs for consumption and exchange, and that although hunting and fishing were important traditionally, nowadays it is much easier to purchase tinned meat or fish from the store, though cash earnings (mostly from the sale of copra and labour abroad) are low. Structurally, the community is composed of seven exogamous, patrilineal clans subdivided into localized, hamlet-based patrilineages (see Young 1971). The largest clan, Lulauvile, claims higher status than other clans owing to its possession of crop magic and weather sorcery. Its leaders are respected and feared as "guardians" or "fathers of the village" (Young 1983a).

I have described the dominant ethos of this community as heavily inflected by the symbolic idiom of food, expressed in people's daily concern with food-getting, food-withholding, and food-giving. At the level of the unconscious foundations of the culture:

> food provides simply one expression (albeit the most symbolically weighted) of the culture's concern with orality: ingestion as the center of experience. Other modes, less well developed by comparison, but thematically obstrusive nonetheless, are betel-chewing and cannibalism. The former is in fact a euphemism for courtship, and is thus heavily loaded with sexual connotations of marriage and procreation; the latter, although now suppressed in practice, lives on in the ideology of traditional *nibai* [enemy] enmities and its idiom of oral vengeance. One might say that if betel-chewing is redolent of eros in Kalauna culture, then cannibalism was redolent of thanatos. Both are rooted in orality, but as mythology testifies this is profoundly ambivalent. For at the level of culture it seems that as much ingenuity has gone into obviating and denying orality (yet without giving compensatory rein to sexuality) as into its celebration and gratification (Young 1983a:48).[1]

Kalauna abandoned warfare and revenge cannibalism about the turn of the century under pressure from the encroaching Methodist mission and the British colonial government. Since then, elaborate competitive food exchanges that mimic warfare ("fighting with food") have effectively redirected oral aggression. Such exchanges function through the coercive shaming potential of massive food gifts (see Young 1971).

DREAMING AND DREAMERS

Some three generations after their nominal conversion to Christianity, Kalauna people continue to subscribe to the almost universal belief that dreams represent the experiences of the dreamer's soul or spirit (*maiyau* in Kalauna) during sleep. They recognize that dreams are to do with the mind (*nua*), but they deny that they have anything to do with desires or wishes (*nuanua*); for them this is a subtle but important distinction. They have no compensatory theory of dreams and do not speak of their dreams as expressing wish-fulfilments or buried emotions. This is not so surprising in view of their animistic concept of *maiyau*, a notion that attributes volition to the souls or spirits of many other beings (including a few crops) in addition to humans. As Meggitt reported for the Mae Enga of highlands New Guinea, "the individual (or more accurately his spirit) is thought to be 'inside' the dream, behaving in a situation just as he does in waking life" (1962: 218).

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[1] See Roheim 1950 for a similar ethos on neighbouring Normanby Island (Duau).

For the sake of exposition I shall follow an implicit classification of dreams that also has its uses for understanding the principles of Kalauna dream interpretation. While this classification is an externally imposed or "etic" product, it is based on "emic" Kalauna terms and discriminations, though it must be appreciated that the four "types" of dreams I discuss are by no means fixed or discrete categories. If there is any realm in nature that defies tidy taxonomic treatment it is surely the human imagination.

Avaita is the generic term for dream. *Enoita* (literally "sleep-seeing") is the term for dream image, something seen during sleep. More concretely, one may speak of *avaita yana maiyau*, the image or spirit in a dream. Nightmares are *enonafenafekwaia*, or more colloquially *avaita koyokoyo*, literally "bad dreams". This is the most radical distinction, perhaps, and one that we make ourselves between ordinary benign dreaming (though there may be undertones of menace) and malign nightmares in which there is an overwhelming sense of threat, dread or terror.

But Kalauna people also cut the cake of dreaming another way. They distinguish between inconsequential dreams (*avaita kawowo*), which have—so they say—no meaning, and portentous dreams (*avaita towava*), which signify events that have just happened or are about to happen. Only the latter have any importance for Kalauna people, and only these are thought to be worth reporting (or concealing). Within this broad class of portentous dreams, people distinguish between those that occur gratuitously or unexpectedly, and those that occur during sickness or states of possession. A sick person's dreams are significant by definition. Since sickness preoccupies the whole person, anything he or she dreams must have some bearing on that sickness. Typically, this means that a sick person is expected to dream about the cause of his or her affliction. Such dreams are diagnostic, therefore, and their interpretation is heavily influenced by cultural conventions of appropriate symbolism. As we shall see, whether a person is sick or not is a vital clue to the mode of interpretation adopted. A fundamental principle is involved: sick people dream only about themselves, whereas healthy people normally dream only about others.

There is yet another implicit classification of dreams in the Kalauna notion that certain men, *toenomadu* (literally, "man-sleep-run"), are believed to be able to induce and direct their dreams, whereas most people dream quite involuntarily. The *maiyau* of an ordinary person leads a relatively independent and somewhat vulnerable existence during sleep and is under only the most tenuous control of its sleeping owner. But the *toenomadu*—who is typically also a sorcerer—can direct his *maiyau* to obey his conscious commands. It can wander far abroad, visit the dead, assume a variety of forms, and invisibly cause things to happen. At this stretch even Kalauna's permissive epistemology seems ready to snap.

INCONSEQUENTIAL DREAMS

Included under this rubric are waking or hypnogogic dreams, which Kalauna people say are "straight" because they follow mundane reality so closely. Thus, when dozing while sitting amid conversing, active company, one's dreams are likely to follow the imaginative contours created by the social occasion. People dismiss such dreams, however vivid, as meaningless. They correctly identify their stimulus in the immediate surroundings of the sleeper. But when one is sleeping in the privacy of one's own house in the quiet of night there is no such obvious stimulus, and one's own *maiyau*—whether active or passive—is thought to be in some way responsible for one's dreams.

> **D1.** K. dreamed about drinking whisky in a house at the government patrol post. Several whitemen gave him a cupful. He swigged it and "sparked" (felt drunk). Then he leapt out of the window. He tricked the whitemen inside by telling them that his leg was injured, so they came out and carried him back inside. Mr M. (a patrol officer on the island many years before) gave K. milk and water in a tin cup and made him drink it. K. sobered up immediately and vomited. Then he awoke.

K. commented that he did not think this dream had any meaning: it was *kawowo*, "for no reason". I reminded him that we had shared a small cupful of whisky the night before. He agreed then that the dream might have been about himself, but was more inclined to think it was about a kinsman who was currently working for the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and was probably being given whisky by some soldiers. What might strike us as curious is K.'s unwillingness to read the dream as a product or representation of his personal experience the previous evening. He refused to see me (as a whiteman) in the guise of the patrol officer or any of the other whites present in his dream. He also refused to acknowledge (though I suggested it to him) that he was anxious about confronting Europeans in authority; though he admitted, "Yes, if I was in their house, I might be scared—for what would I be doing there?" He suspected the milky water was his "punishment" for getting drunk on whisky but then, as if still to deny that I had anything whatever to do with his dream, he said: "You put only a **little** milk in my coffee." This was to remind me that I was aware he couldn't drink more than a few spoonfuls of milk without discomfort (like most Melanesians he is unable to absorb lactose), and therefore I was unlikely to force it upon him, even in a dream.

> **D2.** A. dreamed that M., a village friend working in Port Moresby, was boarding a plane while clutching a packet of cigarettes. Some days later A. received a letter from M. to tell him he was returning home.

A. mentioned this dream to me during a discussion about M.'s return, and it was clear that he would have disregarded it but for the letter that "verified" it. He now saw it as a portentous dream since it invited a post hoc interpretation that demonstrated its veracity. In this manner do inconsequential dreams become meaningful — if one can be bothered to remember them. (Kalauna people say that if they want to remember a dream they bite the end of a finger sharply as soon as they wake up.)

> **D3.** K. dreamed he was walking to the patrol post with money in his basket to buy goods from the store. He passed through the village of Belebele where a young married woman lived whom he had secretly fancied for some time. She suddenly appeared on the path before him and snatched a twenty kina ($US20) note out of his basket. She ran off into the bush and he gave chase. He called out to her, "Alright you can keep it, I've got more in my basket!" Then he caught up with her and said, "Alright, you took my twenty kina so I'm going to fuck you twenty times." He threw her down on the ground, lifted her leaf skirts, and began copulating with her. After "three or four times" he became aware that his wife, who had been following him on the road, was drawing closer. Suddenly she appeared and saw him on top of the girl. "Oh, you enjoy doing that!" she said. "Maybe you want to divorce me." And she reached over K.'s shoulder and slashed the girl's face with her bushknife. K. watched it split open from forehead to chin, carved almost in two. He tried to turn around to look at his wife, but he awoke.

Of all the dreams I collected in the teeth of Kalauna men's usual reticence, this was the longest and most detailed. Yet it would seem to be the one most deserving of coy dissimulation, not least in view of Kalauna's somewhat prudish sexual attitudes. But K. told it to me without the trace of a blush or the suggestion of a snigger. He was so convinced that the dream had nothing to do with himself that he even told it to his wife. With similar disinterested equanimity she said, "Oh, that's someone [else]." K's interpretation went as follows: "Someone's wife is committing adultery for payment. Twenty kina is a lot of money, so the man who is paying that much is wasting it. Copulating twenty times means he wants to have a child, so perhaps he's thinking he will have paid for it. The man's wife is very angry because he wants to have a child with some other woman."

This interpretation nicely illustrates the general Kalauna principle that, unless one is sick, one's inconsequential dreams refer to the lives of others, perhaps strangers, and not to one's own or those of one's kinsmen. "We don't dream about our family or our own hamlet," as one man put it, "only if they are far away or if they are sick and about to die." What he meant was that although the dream experience appears to involve oneself and one's close ones, it is "really" about others: the manifest personae of an inconsequential dream are others disguised as oneself and one's kin. As I shall suggest later, this is one of the main reason dreams are neither a popular nor safe conversational topic in Kalauna. One's own casual dreams may be someone else's living nightmares.

K.'s apparently libidinous dream is especially interesting, however, in that the conventional principle of Kalauna dream interpretation utterly obscured any personal meaning it might have had for him. According to our own canons of interpretation (whether Folk or Freudian) the dream is incontestably a product of the dreamer's mind and therefore communicates something about the dreamer, whatever else it might say about the world outside. One may not be responsible for one's dreams but one cannot disown them.

K. appeared to deny this, even though he was prepared to admit that he rather fancied the young woman from Belebele. He would not even concede that the dream was "about" her. It was about a certain man who fancied a certain girl in a certain village and whose wife was jealous of the fact. Until gossip provided him with some clue as to whom they might be, K. would not speculate further, and he would keep his dream to himself. But he was convinced—such was the vividness of the dream—that a doomed triangle existed in his own or another village, and that events similar to the ones he had dreamed would come to pass, if indeed they had not already done so. (The events, incidentally, need not follow the dream exactly for it to be confirmed, and there is a wide latitude of approximation for adjusting dream event and image to reality.) According to this principle then, such dreams reveal "truths" about others, but not about oneself. It is eminently a social rather than a psychological theory of dreaming.

Let us scrutinize more closely the events of K.'s dream to determine what his own interpretation — his "culturally constituted defence mechanism" in Melford Spiro's phrase [1965]) — prevented him from actively considering. As there are only three persons, two objects of transaction, and four or five basic acts in the drama of the dream, it readily lends itself to structural analysis. The main transformations are as follows:

(1) K. makes the girl "pay for" her theft by sexual appropriation to the value of the money she had stolen;
(2) K's wife intervenes by making the girl "pay for" the theft of her husband.

Bearing in mind the dreamer's own significations, K. was "stealing" the sexual rights of another by an illegitimate payment for what would be an illegitimate child. This motivates the wife's response, for she "cuts" (in Kalauna idiom) the sexual transaction before it can be completed, thereby confirming the dreamer's view that "it isn't worth it".

Let us now give a Freudian gloss to this interpretation by presuming the dream to have been motivated by K's unconscious wishes. K. desires the young Belebele woman, but she is married, too, and he will not risk compromising himself by approaching her. (While not uncommon, adultery in Kalauna entails fairly severe penalties; it is also very difficult to keep secret.) K's dream has the woman take the initiative by stealing his money, so that he can with justice pursue her and exact his due by orgiastic and aggressive sexual intercourse. The dream censor then intervenes in the form a jealous wife who "kills" the object of his desire even while he is in process of possessing her. So far this is a conventional psychoanalytical instance of wish-fulfilment in which K. exculpates himself for his own guilty desires. But there is another, deeper, interpretation if we allow the dream phenomenon of "splitting" and the likely identity of girl and wife. The former then represents the desirable aspects of the dreamer's own wife, whom he nonetheless suspects of adultery and resents for "wasting money" (or causing him to waste it), and whom he would like to punish by aggressive intercourse—perhaps to the extent of "splitting her apart"!

I cannot, of course, substantiate this interpretation other than to say that K. did in fact resent his somewhat spirited wife, that in the past he had physically beaten her for "wasting money", and that he was probably sexually insecure. But in these respects he was perhaps no different to the majority of Kalauna men, who are almost pathologically anxious about their wives' fidelity (see Young 1987b;1988a). The important point remains, however, that both K. and his wife were so easily able to dismiss this dream as utterly irrelevant to their own relationship. And they could do so thanks to the convention by which a dream's manifest contest is projected onto unknown others. One is reminded of Sophocles' Oedipus (thoughtfully cited in another context by Donald Tuzin [1975: 563]):

> How oft it chances that in dreams a man
> Has wed his mother! He who least regards
> Such brainsick phantasies lives most at ease.

PORTENTOUS DREAMS

Inconsequential dreams are, as I indicated, likely to be regarded as portentous when circumstances invite *post hoc* interpretations. I have many examples of these from Kalauna, simply because after the events that "verified" them had occurred people were no longer reticent about recounting such dreams.

> **D4.** A. dreamed of a tug-of-war between the men of two hamlets, his own Heloava, and Anuana I. The rope broke and the Anuana men fell down the mountainside, breaking their heads. Heloava men, including the dreamer, fell into the river and drowned.

A. commented, "The rest of Kalauna are always blaming us." Hence they wished ill of the men of Heloava and Anuana who, as garden magicians and sorcerers of the weather, are indeed frequent scapegoats for poor harvests. K., who is also a Heloava man, offered another interpretation to the effect that the dream was about the leader of Anuaua I who was lying sick in hospital at the time. He suggested it was an omen of his impending death.

Listening to these two interpretations I ventured my own, which seemed perfectly obvious to me, knowing as I did something of the current political tension between the two hamlets. They are exchange partners (*fofofo*) to one another, and they are supposed to reach ready agreement concerning plans for ceremonial exchanges and mortuary feasts (see Young 1971:70). The men of the two hamlets had recently been discussing the possibility of staging a mortuary feast for a young Heloava woman (A.'s sister in fact), who had died a few months before. But the Anuana leader's sickness—among other contingencies—had prevented any decision from being made. Heloava men suspected that this man's affliction was "his own fault", due to some mismanaged garden magic, and they were consequently less sympathetic than they might otherwise have been. I said that I thought A.'s dream about a tug-of-war was an expression, "a picture", of the conflict between the two sets of exchange partners about "which way to pull" to work for the mortuary feast.

But the two Heloava men responded to my interpretation without enthusiasm; it somehow failed to strike the right note. A month later, however, another death (in Anuana this time) brought the men of the two hamlets together to discuss what course to follow. Heloava and Anuana were evidently in disagreement, though they carefully veiled their differences. K. said to me at the time, "You were right about A.'s dream. We are pulling against Anuana, and perhaps we shall all die if we cannot agree."

> **D5.** While A. was in Port Moresby he dreamed about moving his Kalauna house and making a widow's coconut leaf shelter beneath it. Then he dreamed he was back in Moresby and a kinsman came and told him that A's father had scolded his wife and banished her to another hamlet, whence several men had carried her house. But the wall of the house was broken and only a coconut leaf was tied over the hole to cover it.

When he awoke, A's immediate thought was that someone back home in the village, probably a woman, was going to die. (It did not occur to him that it might be his own wife, and he scoffed when I suggested that he had been anxious about his wife's fidelity during his long absence in Moresby.) A few days after the dream he received a letter from the village saying that his brother's wife had died. "So I knew the meaning of my dream, and it was true. The widow's coconut leaf shelter meant my sister-in-law had died."

The logic of his interpretation is not straightforward. Like many Kalauna interpretations it appears to depend upon substitution and inversion: sister-in-law for wife; brother for self; widower for widow; death for adultery. Far more appears to have been encoded in this dream than was evident to A. himself, for on another occasion he told me that his father might have been responsible for "helping" his daughter-in-law to die, since she was sexually promiscuous and was "spoiling" her husband with *doke*, the cuckold's disease (see Young 1987b). No one was in any doubt that the woman had died "because of adultery", for when she was sick she had been observed enacting her lust by compulsively stroking her own thighs.

Here the principle of dreaming about others when one seems to be dreaming about oneself is abrogated by distance. A. said to me that if he had been living in Kalauna at the time he could not have had this dream. On the other hand, some portentous dreams **are** taken seriously by the dreamer as referring to themselves. This is particularly the case with "bad dreams" or nightmares, which portend sickness, accident or sorcery attack (insofar as these can be distinguished). Men who dream of sorcery being done to them do not take the risk of assuming that the dream is "really" about someone else. They play safe and stay at home next day.

> **D6.** A young man dreamed he climbed a mango tree. He began to cut off a branch, but his axe slipped and he cut off his own head.

The young man told his wife about the dream when he awoke. She advised him to stay at home that day, but he ignored her and went to the gardens where he was killed by a falling boulder. This reported dream was offered to me as a cautionary tale, of what happens to people who do disregard their dreams or assume too readily that they refer to the doings of others.

DIAGNOSTIC DREAMS

Kalauna people believe that when they are seriously ill (that is, an illness lasting longer than a week or two) they dream inadvertently about the cause of their own sickness. By "cause" they generally mean the personal delict or offence that has provoked the attack of a sorcerer or a spirit. The majority of serious illnesses in Kalauna are attributed to the nefarious magic of sorcerers; less commonly illness is thought to be the result of ancestral ghosts, and even less frequently to be caused by the malicious attack of demons or devils called *balauma*. Diagnosis—or interpretation—is usually a matter for the concerned kinsmen or spouse of the sick person, though they depend upon clues or signs (literally "pictures") given by the patient. At some point, perhaps, a local curer is called in and asked to make his diagnosis, but he always begins by asking people around the sickbed what they have "seen"

> **D7.** S. fell sick and became delirious after harvesting some extra large yams. He dreamed he was digging them up and (so his wife confirmed) he spoke in his sleep: "My wife, get those big yams, dig them up!"

S. explained his dream thus. People heard the "news" of his big yams and began to gossip about them. The yam spirits were angry. They homed in and invaded the bearer of the name the people were broadcasting. Two curers who came to see S. asked his wife if he had said anything during his sleep. She told them. "Ah, it's yams," they said, and rubbed S. with dried yam sprouts to "draw out" the inimical yams spirits. He quickly recovered.

It is worth observing that while every Kalauna man keenly desires to uncover large yams in his garden, when he does so his excitement, gratification and pride are tempered by anxiety. On the one hand such yams attract admiration and confer prestige; but on the other they compel the envious attention of sorcerers. Given such ambivalence it's scarcely surprising that men admit to dreaming quite frequently about big yams.

Simply talking about the products of someone's gardens implies envy and is mystically dangerous to the owner. Malicious gossip (*talafo'u*) is done with the deliberate intention of causing sickness in this way, though it is not always clear what the particular agency is believed to be. Ancestral spirits (*inainala*) are usually assumed to be involved, though perhaps not in every case of sickness induced by *talafo'u*.

It is standard curer's practice to ask the spouse and kin of a sick person whether they have been dreaming about anyone. Those named are immediately suspected of malicious gossip, *talafo'u*, and may be called to the sickbed to declare their good will. Any who refuse to do so, of course, simply confirm others' suspicions that they are responsible.

The principle that one dreams about oneself during sickness is quite simple; the delirium of sickness is taken to be evidence that the *maiyau* or spirit is only tenuously attached to its body. It is restless, uneasy, and roves about seeking the cause of its malaise. There is a notion that the *maiyau* has access to invisible truths about social relationships, truths that are hidden from those in normal health. Hence, special credence is placed not only upon the sick person's dreams, but also upon any unusual behaviour the patient manifests. During sleep, delirium or serious illness the body cannot speak (*awana hi vita*, "the mouth is heavy"), so it communicates by gestures. This is thought of as a representation or "picture" (*ya'iyana*, also sign, mark, symbol). It is a kind of shorthand embodiment of the dream image that cannot be communicated in the usual way by speech.

There is an extensive code for such signed gestures or "pictures", and it is of great importance in conventional diagnosis. A few examples follow. When a patient repeatedly scratches his or her nose people say it signifies the scraping of a yam; the sickness has been indentified by the patient's *maiyau* as "due to yams". Scratching the mouth signifies taro (because the juice of raw taro irritates or burns). A bent head or curled fingers denote a drooping bunch of cooking bananas; tears denote banana juice, hence sweet bananas; a nodding or swaying head, coconuts; beating the head on the floor, pig or pork. Picking with the fingers or crossing the hands over the chest signifies fish. These gestures describe, respectively, picking fishbones and the shape of a fishtail. Obviously, food imagery dominates the diagnostic system, and it is symptomatic of Kalauna people's perception that therein lies the principal focus of competition and threat to personal wellbeing.

Food is not quite the only item in the diagnostic code, however:

> **D8.** During a long sickness J. obsessively made flicking or "dealing" motions with her fingers. Her family at first took this to signify playing cards, and wondered when and with whom she might have played. A curer solved the problem by declaring that her gesture was that of counting money, and a recent quarrel came to light between her husband and his brother over the proceeds of a copra sale. This diag-

> nosis was "confirmed" when J. told of a dream she had of whitemen counting out money.

I should mention that at least one Kalauna man believed that conversion to Christianity made dreaming redundant. He told me, "God lives in your heart, and if you pray every night your *maiyau* does not wander but stays in your body. If other [i.e. hostile] *maiyau* come to you Yaubada [God] chases them away." This kind of salvation protects the body but presumably diminishes the soul by restricting its experience.

POSSESSION DREAMS

The diagnostic "signs" referred to above are almost invariably supposed by Kalauna people to attest to sorcery attack or to malicious gossip. Sudden illness, mental derangement or hysteria, however, are often attributed to attacks by ancestor spirits. This is particularly the case when a man (women seem to be less often afflicted) falls down in a faint and then acts strangely and sometimes violently (hysterically or even psychotically according to our judgement). *Hi beu* ("he falls") and *hi kwava* ("he is mad, demented"), implies that the victim has been "hit" (*mununa*) by a ghost or ancestor spirit. The symptoms are similar to classical possession states, though the Kalauna notion is not so much that the spirit of an ancestor "possesses" as that it disorients the victim with a blow from which he reels groggily for a time. The source of the attack is usually revealed in a dream after the victim has recovered, or at least regained enough of his senses to be able to offer a coherent account of his dreams.

> **D9.** Y. took betel nuts from his dead mother's brother's tree. That evening he stumbled around in a daze and would not answer to his name. He became violent when his brothers tried to restrain him. A curer came and quietened him by placing a piece of bespelled ginger between his teeth. Y. then slept. Next day he told me he had dreamed of his mother's brother's ghost who warned him not to take betel nut again without announcing himself. Y. took this to mean that his mother's brother had not recognized him and punished him for theft as if he had been a stranger. (Although not heirs to their property, sisters' sons do have the customary right to take fruit from their mothers' brothers' trees.)

One of my best friends and helpers in Kalauna, Y. was uncommonly prone to this kind of affliction. Within the space of several months he was "hit" several times by various ancestor spirits. For hours and sometimes days afterwards his behaviour was uncoordinated, his speech disconnected, and his normally gentle mannerisms went utterly awry. On most occasions when this occurred he slept for long periods and dreamed vividly. His dreams at such times always (so he said later) referred to his predicament, and confirmed his belief that he had been "hit", for he invariably dreamed of some ancestor (even his dead mother) whose displeasure he had incurred. The hysterical (or psychotic) attacks that I observed most closely occurred when he was a member of my own household, and I could not discount the possibility that they were in some way connected with his role as my assistant and companion. He was, for instance, known in the village to be eating at my table occasionally, having easy access to supplies of tobacco and other luxuries, and to be accumulating a wage that he did not have to earn by hard physical labour (one of the only resources the great majority of Kalauna men could sell, and then only far from home).

All things considered, Y. was a young man with uncommon privileges and unusual prerogatives—and a direct exposure to envy. It was entirely possible if not extremely likely, therefore, that he suffered acute attacks of "conscience" in the form of vengeful ancestor spirits. His social conscience was responding to a deeply implanted respect for egalitarianism, for however he (and I) might rationalize his position, there was little doubt that he appeared in the eyes of most villagers as inordinately "lucky" and privileged beyond his years. In coping with this moral contradiction he occasionally opted out by having hysterical or psychotic episodes, in which state he could (and did) lay bare his troubled soul to me and say the most forthright and even insulting things. He could indulge his suppressed oral aggression with impunity. Under the influence of his ancestral ghosts he could criticize me without incurring any responsibility for doing so; his agency was in abeyance. So his ghosts were a kind of protection after all: both from my demands and from the censure of his peers and elders.

Possession dreams also occur during more prolonged attacks by spirits, though these are more properly regarded in Kalauna as nightmares and are far more terrifying than the dreams of ghosts that follow the "blows" of ancestor spirits. *Balauma* is the generic name for demonic spirits. They are nominally associated with the forest or the wild, and although they may be conjured by sorcerers they are also believed capable of attacking quite independently and capriciously. People conceive of them as formed like men, only larger and uglier with long teeth, shaggy hair, pointed ears and fearsomely glowing eyes. They stink of excrement and haunt certain places in the deep forest or on the rocky coast, whence they accost unwary travellers. *Balauma* are protean and may present themselves as desirable women or handsome men, as crocodiles, dogs, wild pigs, or even as trees.

> **D10.** W. dreamed he was lying on his sleeping mat when a *balauma* climbed into the house and offered him a leg of pork. A second *balauma*, a female, entered and tugged his arm, urging him to follow them into the bush. W. awoke screaming and the next day he suffered a high fever. That night he dreamed of the *balauma* again. This time they offered him a child. The next night he showed signs of distress again, though a couple of curers managed to sooth him.

Of particular interest in this case is the way one of the curers, Kimaola, retrospectively manipulated the imagery of the young man's nightmares (see Young 1983a: 215-17). There had been much discussion on the first and second nights about the nature of his possession, and a consensus emerged that it was due to an attack by *balauma* rather than by a sorcerer. The victim himself seemed to confirm this interpretation during his lucid moments. On the third night Kimaola declared that he had seen two *balauma* fleeing the house when the other curer had performed his exorcism.

Some time later, when W. had fully recovered, Kimaola put his own interpretation on the nightmares. The pig's leg offered by the *balauma* stood for the pigs that W. and his hamlet should have been growing to support Kimaola's impending festival. The child (*kwamana*) offered by the *balauma* stood for the exchange partners (colloquially *kwamana*) who should have been supporting Kimaola. These hints left no doubt in the minds of W. and his kinsmen that Kimaola himself was responsible for conjuring the *balauma* to remind them of their feasting obligations to him.

It is thus entirely plausible to Kalauna people that sorcerers are able to intervene in others' dreams—indeed, are able to instigate them—by means of the demonic agents they control. Not only *balauma*, but also *kwahala* (a kind of flying witch or were-bird) and *yafuna* (any animal familiar) may be directed to attack a particular victim. The first indication he or she has of such attacks is a nightmare: either of being enticed away (as in the case of W.) or of being eaten from the inside. Again, the sorcerer is thought to be typically one who can control his own dreams, or rather the activity of his *maiyau* during sleep.

Kimaola, Kalauna's most notable curer and notorious sorcerer during the late 'sixties and early 'seventies, was reputed to dream in such a way that little that happened in the village escaped his attention. He played up this rather sinister vigilante role when he wanted to appear in a good light as one who protected the village from alien and invasive evil spirits (see Young 1971: 136-37). The source of this power of knowledge-through-dream was purportedly his dead father's coconut shell cup that Kimaola filled with fresh water every night and set by his pillow. His father's spirit visited him and told him whatever he wanted to know, or took him on fantastic journeys to see for himself.

The wilder shores of fantasy are reached in such beliefs, especially as they concern the *toenomadu*, one who is expert in the peregrinations of the soul. There were two or three other *toenomadu* in Kalauna in addition to Kimaola, one of whom was said also to be able to make himself invisible (a refinement of *maiyau* control). One of these men was reputed to be able to fly to Port Moresby ("in two hours"), assisted by *balauma* who held him by the hands. The sister's son of another *toenomadu* told me that he had once been "visited" on a neighbouring island by his uncle who was checking to see that he was well during his long absence. The uncle appeared in the form of a mouse, and his nephew recognised him by the characteristic way the mouse scratched its head!

In order to practise *enomadu* (literally "sleep-run") one must sleep alone. This is for self-protection, since it is dangerous for a *toenomadu* to be awakened suddenly when his *maiyau* is far abroad. If it cannot return to the body quickly the man will die. Distant journeys sometimes involve "bringing together" islands or mountain peaks so that the occult traveller may step from one to the next, thereby accomplishing his journey. "Not the real islands," I was assured, "just their *maiyau*."

In this realm of fantasy almost anything is possible. One man hinted to me that he could visit any woman he fancied and copulate with her while she slept. Another offered to teach me (for a consideration) his secret of invisibility and *enomadu*, so that I could steal goods from department stores without detection, and visit Australia without having to pay the airfare (though he warned me that it would be somewhat risky since I would need to be back in the village before dawn).

THE ANTHROPOLOGIST'S MAIYAU?

It might be of interest to tell how some Kalauna men interpreted a dream of my own, though their readings add little to the principles I have already adduced. By Kalauna standards I must be virtually a *toenomadu*, for although I cannot claim to be able to control my dreams and discover truths hidden to waking eyes, my *maiyau* wanders far abroad when I am sleeping in Kalauna. Indeed, it seems I never dream of Kalauna while I am actually living there; though of course this means the converse to Kalauna people: that I dream **only** about them.

In my own self-understanding, my dreams in Kalauna reflect some form of anxiety or deprivation. They are the precipitations of a questing, homeless mind. I dream vividly each night about the other lives I might be leading, dreams that take me to Melbourne or Manchester, Canberra or Cambridge, dreams that have me wandering the labyrinths of hotel corridors, college cloisters and city streets, somehow always missing lectures, buses, planes or boats, failing to find the cafe or bar where I'm to meet someone, seeing lovers across crowded avenues or stairways, unable to reach them before they disappear. Dreaming tumultuously, in short, but never about Kalauna. My other life, it seems, goes on elsewhere...

> **D11.** I dreamed I was on a large refugee ship. There was a handsome but sinister Indonesian spy aboard. I was wary of him but also felt some sympathy. There was a safe in a strongroom with my chequebook inside it and a disposable cigarette lighter that was leaking. I felt I should hurry to rescue my chequebook. There were also numerous women aboard whom I was vaguely trying to help. They seemed to be Asian, and their faces were perfectly made-up.

On recounting this dream to K. next morning, he immediately seized upon the "boat" and gave it a conventional signification: "Maybe someone is going to die." (The Kalauna phrase for "sinking" into death is *waka hi ota*, "the boat has fled".) K. surmised that that person was Anuana's leader, who was in hospital at the time. He also suggested the boat was a ghost ship (*balauma yana waka*) because all the people aboard were strangers to me. "But that means it is also about us," he said. My concern to retrieve the endangered chequebook, K. supposed, was an acknowledgement of his own financial problems. He had been hinting the previous day that I should give him money to repay his debt on a bank loan, for which the government was threatening to sue him.

Later that morning we learned that the patrol post "landrover" (actually a Japanese Toyota) had come to the bottom of the hill to take a man to hospital. On hearing this, K. smiled, "You see! That is your dream. Not a ship but a landrover, taking away a sick man." Later still, I listened while K. retold my dream to G. (after he had politely asked my permission). He distorted it by saying I was the captain of the boat, and he failed to mention the leaking cigarette lighter and the pretty oriental women. (When I corrected him I found myself revising the dream, too, by identifying myself with the Indonesian spy!) Such refinements made little difference to G.'s interpretation, however. He suggested that the boat was "like a hospital" and perhaps all the officers (captain, spy, including myself) were medical orderlies. He agreed with K. that it could only portend a death. K. elaborated this interpretation. "You are like the M.O. at the hospital, searching for Kalauna people there and trying to get them out." I had indeed been interviewing patients and staff and examining hospital records during this fieldtrip, but it was putting a charitable gloss on my activities to say that I was trying to cure Kalauna people.

Four days later a man died in a neighbouring village and K. came to me and said, "You see! That was your dream. You didn't know anyone on the boat, so that means it was really another village." When I pointed out that this contradicted his previous assumption he was not abashed. "We don't know much about *dimdim* (whiteman's) dreaming."

Three weeks later tragedy struck Anuana when the leader's son was killed in a car smash in Wewak, on the distant north coast of Papua New Guinea (see Young 1988b:126-7). This was the event that sharpened the meaning of A's dream (see D4 above), and it now seemed to give a definitive meaning to my own. K. claimed, and A. concurred, that the meaning of my dream about the refugee ship was now perfectly clear. The boat was both the death vehicle in which the young man was killed and the Toyota in which his body was delivered to Kalauna for burial. The strangers were people of distant places, "Indonesia side", like Wewak.

The chequebook in the unsafe strongroom? "That represents the money you will give us when you leave Kalauna after the burial." And A. percipiently recalled how, on a previous fieldtrip, he had inadvertently rolled tobacco in a cheque I had given him and literally smoked it ("I smoked your money, remember!"). And the decorative Asian women? K. had forgotten about them, but then he brightened. "The widow is coming from Wewak too. She is a Sepik woman with tattoo marks on her cheeks." My Kalauna friends are nothing if not imaginative interpreters.

INTERPRETATION AND DUPLICITY

Kalauna dream experience, dream interpretation, and the *post hoc* manipulations of dream imagery are not so very different from those described for many other small-scale, preliterate societies. Dreams tap culturally-induced anxieties, and there is a pragmatic, "social" cast to conventional dream interpretation, a preoccupation with food and death, and a minimal interest in dreams as self-referential unless it is to identify the cause of sickness. Interpretation, in short, is heavily oriented towards external (social) circumstances, rather than towards inner (psychological) states.

Kalauna people, perhaps, are more reticent and guarded than most about their dreams, and I believe that this is a corollary of their insistence that inconsequential dreams (unless subsequently proved otherwise) refer to others and not to the dreamer or to his family and kin. It is not only in bad taste to tell one's casual dreams, it is potentially dangerous. To inform others that you have dreamed about them is to evoke a suspicion that you wish them ill. Telling a dream may thus be construed as malevolence. If some misfortune does befall a person whom you have dreamed about and to whom you have told your dream, he or she is likely to blame you for causing their misfortune. There is also the general unease left by vivid dreams, whether or not they feature oneself or others, and it is an unease that lurks at the heart of Kalauna's ethos of duplicity.

The notion of double identity is commonplace in the mythology and in the social and political ideologies of Kalauna. Exchange institutions and the modes of political leadership in an egalitarian milieu depend to a considerable extent upon dissimulation and duplicity (see Young 1983b;1983c;1987a). Sorcery, too, depends for its efficacy on things and persons being other than they seem. Such truths are brought to consciousness through dreams, dreams haunted by the invisible, secret selves of others. Doubling occurs in dreams no less than it does in myths and in life. Dreams offer nightly proof to Kalauna people that their society has hidden depths. But it is the lesson of the mythological heroes that what is hidden is better left concealed; exposure provokes resentful destruction (see Young 1983a). Dreams too are better left untold.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference organized by Dr Michele Stephen on "Dreams and Altered States: Aspects of Other Realities in Melanesia" held at La Trobe University, Melbourne, 21-23 May 1983. I am grateful to Bill Epstein and Bryce Boyer for their helpful comments on a subsequent draft.

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NO CULTURE, NO HISTORY

MARILYN STRATHERN*

Interest in others can sometimes be rather uneventful in character. Indeed the "others" as exotic anthropologists may be startled by certain forms of lack of interest - people do not play them with questions, enquire into their background, use them as a source of information on their own society. We are of course free to treat such non-events as in themselves events, and it is a non-event of this kind which I wish to account for here.

It would not be possible to specify non-events as "events" requiring explanation but for that feature of our own classificatory scheme which simultaneously defines entities by way of negation (interest contrasts with lack of interest) and incorporates the negative form as an instance of the positive (thus lack of interest can also be rendered as an interest of a particular type - as a non-event is itself a type of "event", or the "personality" of someone is rendered as a matter of that person having "no personality"). Typological possibilities of this kind underlie Augé's complaint (1982:14) that anthropology itself "has neither resolved nor excluded the problem of the status of the other, for it is both its torment and justification": the other, he suggests, may be the "same", though at a different evolutionary stage, or irreducibly or relatively "different" (cf. M. Strathern 1981:684). The "other" here refers to other societies, other cultures. The inference is that the differences we perceive between societies and cultures can enjoy a definitive, boundary marking status, or be seen as points along a continuum implicitly encompassed by some higher order class. He suggests indeed that this distinction is itself collapsible into the "intellectual necessity to think of the other as **both** different and identical" (Augé 1982:15, my emphasis).

Societies and cultures are often characterised by the presence or absence of certain traits or institutions. This analytical interest in the presence or absence of features - societies with or without centralised polities, cultures with or without literacy - is a digital device for drawing attention to what we also know as analogic difference. The digital metaphor is ultimately based perhaps on the oppositional discrimination between self/other to which we sometimes reduce our experience of "otherness" (Cf. Murphy 1972; Wilden 1972). The "other" can be defined both as not-self and as a type of (another) self.

Because the entity "self" enjoys an ontological status, we suppose there is an experiential, behavioural base here for scholarly interest in "the other". It may be taken as an axiomatic human condition in which anthropology happens to specialise. "All peoples are curious about strangers", writes Burridge (1973:7), "investigate, explore, discuss, and lampoon them." In fact, however, Burridge goes on to account for the specialisation in terms of its particular European "signature".

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I would argue, first, that not all peoples are indeed "curious" about strangers, and second, that the digitalised self / other dichotomy that we take so much for granted has certain distinctive symbolic features. Burridge continues:

> Westerners are by no means alone in having traveled and told of their experiences in foreign lands among strange peoples... But using these accounts to build up a taxonomy of social institutions and their inter-relations, and deliberately quitting the home environment specifically in order to do these things - these activities are exclusively a part of the European heritage (1973:7).

An "European civilization seems to have found, and still finds, authenticity in successive reaches into otherness... At the core... lies the choice of alternative basic assumptions about man and the nature of society" (1973:38-9, transposed). Still finds because, I think, of the way we construct our representations with their emphasis on observation, reflection and self-reflection, optical metaphors (cf. Salmond 1982) which specify certain "models of registration" (Ardener 1978:103):

> Everybody now knows and acknowledges that the "events" that are registrated are inseparably related to the mode of registration. Yet, as commonsense beings, we are used to identifying an event determined by one mode with an event determined by another, as by sight and by sound; or (at another level) by radio, press and television, or by a document and by an oral communication; or (at another level still) by a theory of economics and a theory of psychology. Still, we come at once to an intractability about events; they have to be "recognised", "detected" or "picked up", by modes of registration. We must know as much as possible about these modes.

When the registration of events takes the form of **self**-scrutiny, it participates in certain conceptualisations of the self/other divide which also assimilates the self to other. The cognitive dissonance to which this can give rise is interesting.

By self-scrutiny I mean those academic and reflective activities by which accounts of otherness are spun from self-experience or self-knowledge. In effect this is the anthropological project, which, where it is honest, locates its categories of analysis within its own society but through them seeks an interpretation of others.[1] The ultimate aim my be rendered either as understanding oneself better or understanding others better. But the paradox - akin to learning one language through another - affords endless ruminations on the methodology and intentions of the enterprise.

The paradox takes the form of dissonance in the effort of "interpretation": this becomes an impossible ideal, impossible because of the absurdity of being self and other simultaneously. Absurdity is reduced if we shift from trying to encompass both self and other in their own disparate terms, and concentrate instead on defining the other as a version of the self. Anthropology forever swings between these two devices - coming to grips with other cultures in their own terms, and utilising frames drawn frankly from its own.

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[1] By no means confined to those individuals who are consciously self-reflective (cf. Lindstrom on Leenhardt, 1982), I take this as a characteristic of anthropology as a social product.

Dissonance is only barely camouflaged as choice. But is arises acutely in the context of academic practice. That is, it arises from the attempt to construct representations out of sheer thought. By thinking hard enough we can juxtapose elements, concepts, constructs and "explain" relations between events. Ultimately the thinker draws on his or her own resources - a personal collection of ideas or ideas gleaned from like others (fellow academics). The academic as self, as the single producer of accounts and representations of things outside her or himself, is a phenomenon of a particular social order.

The social order I would briefly characterise as providing self-descriptions through both an encompassing and a contrastive relation with what lies beyond it. By no means confined to the capitalist west, its products are there commoditised in such a way as to accumulate in addition "an object-world" (Yeatman 1983). Burridge refers to the tension between "rational objectivity" and "participation in oneness" so produced,[2] as Sahlins reminds us that the endless production of things rests simultaneously on the individual differences between them and their reduction to a common (market) value (1976; 1983).[3] The tension arises in part from our notions of singular authorship.[4] If you will forgive a simple-minded comparison. A manufacturer gears all his or her resources to flood an anonymous market with products which bear a name: the academic marshalls her or his thoughts - thoughts derived from herself, his own social situation, her own society - to make a representation of otherness that will also bear the mark of authorship. The manufacturer's authorship is evident in the extent to which raw materials are transformed under his or her hand; the academic deals in description only, and must show the results of her or his analysis **on** the raw material, which thereby retains its own authenticity in being of different origin.

The discrete origins of the raw data may be authenticated by reference to different modes of registration. The anthropologist is only too aware that he or she constructs an "anthropological" account. But its anthropological nature is legitimated if it can be seen to be an informed version of data also susceptible to alternative description - "a psychologist would say thus or a geographer so: but only an anthropologist could think of this". History holds a special place here.

The antinomy between "anthropology" and "history" is tenacious.[5] They are competitive of course precisely because of the common ground between them. Disciplines compete in their authorship of representations, as individual practitioners do among themselves. This is why we stay in business. But that business we represent as better ways of understanding the cultures of others who are not in the competition. Whereas the manufacturer competes with fellow-manufacturers through forcing an anonymous public to consume, the academic competes directly with fellow academics by forcing **them** to consume her or his ideas, the difference, perhaps, between a generalised and restricted circulation of products. Those involved in restricted exchange then become aware of interdependence, and this qualifies their sense or singular authorship.

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[2] Though he regards this as ultimately produced out of the Graeco-Christian synthesis, "the theology born of comparing the messages of the Old and New Testaments in the light of Roman law and Greek philosophy" (Burridge 1973:38). (See note 13.)

[3] The market is also seen as a "result" of these differences, and, by analogy, social outcomes in the populist model are seen as the cumulative expressions of individual interactions: structure as the summation of event (1983:525).

[4] A characterisation I have attempted to describe elsewhere (n.d.).

[5] Though fifteen years ago Lewis (1968:xiii) argued that the opposition was polemically contrived, citing several explicitly historical anthropological studies. The synchrony/diachrony dichotomy obviously plays a part in the self-description of disciplines, but is not a complete guide to practice.

ANTHROPOLOGY AND HISTORY

Possibly as the less well established partner, it is anthropology which more recurrently than history seeks this sister discipline out in terms of sameness and difference. They may be said to have the same ends, different data (Evans-Pritchard 1961), or the same data, different ends (Silverman 1979). I assume that the function of such assumptions is the separation of data from ends: thus if the difference can be shown, then what is also shown is that data are more than the analysis of them. Only this premise justifies the continuation of analysis.

That data comprise more than analysis of, i.e., that they "exist" independently, is demonstrated by intractibility (Ardener 1978:103-104). Although analysis seeks to subsume everything - our definition of a good analysis is that it provides an encompassing context for all the facts to hand - it has to display itself (as analysis) as being different form from what is being subsumed. That is, the organisation of data is differentiated from the data themselves. (For a sociological commentary on such display, see Anderson and Sharrock 1982). Although anthropological enterprise seeks to subsume various accounts and features of other cultures and societies, including encompassing historical events within its structures, it is also important I would argue to its own self-estimation to be able to recognise phenomena implacably resistant to its formulations. Hence the significance of history for anthropologists.

When anthropologists consciously write "history", they replace generalities with particulars, exemplars with happenings, case studies with biographies, and above all scrupulously supply names for people, places and times. Changing contexts (see below) are thus registered in changing events. This kind of individuation of action is held to present a problem for orthodox anthropological analysis, even as the larger concerns of history with processes over time are held to present problems. In Morton-William's words: "One of the most difficult problems is that of how individual freedom of action within the social structure results in social change" (1968:4). "History" is interventionist. It disrupts our view of a functioning whole (cf. Lindenbaum 1983).[6] It is to be found in the working out of internal contradictions which confronts ideal order with the "realities" of incompatibility between the "constituent parts" of society (Lloyd 1968:28-31). And history is held to inhere in named episodes (Southwold 1968), chance (Sacks 1979), instances (Augé 1982), a factuality in short which competes with myth (Southwold),[7] internal logic (Sacks)[8] and symbolic efficacy (Augé).[9] "Facts", whose establishing is so seminal for the historian (Marcus 1982:598; Hopkins 1968:71; cf. Murphy 1972:105), become self-evident in context where the problems are seen to lie in their marshalling and organisation, and thus in their conceptual status (Augé 1982, 113). (Facts become problematic, when they are used to criticise this organisation.)

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[6] Specifically, it is held to upset the apple cart of symbolic analysis, holding a place vis-à-vis symbolism analogous to that of "social reality" vis-à-vis ideology (Lindenbaum 1983:97). Thus Lindenbaum argues apropos Gillison's (1983) account of Gimi cannibalism, that the symbolic equation of cannibalism with female substance-cycling is compromised by the "information" that men and children also ate human flesh. Events, it is posited, thus play havoc with cultural categories, self-evident sources of reality in opposition to the symbolic figments of anthropological imagination. In truth, the "event" of men and children eating flesh as much masks or denies the "reality" of the cultural construction (women are the substance-cyclers) as "myth" or "ritual" masks or denies "social relationships" (Lindenbaum 1983:99).

[7] Southwold (1968:128) uses the term in the sense of "fiction". **The** important thing is to establish "what did occur".

[8] Sacks treats the prior social organisation of the societies she considers as contributing to a determinism of events that in fact also constitutes "history" in a second sense (see below). **Both** kinds of history are necessary to the explication of cause and effect.

[9] Augé (1982:111) argues for the **desirability** of replacing "a language of instances and a functionalist language ... with an anthropological analysis of the effects of domination and symbolic efficacy". (This does not mean a denial of specificity - see 1982:8.)

"As a discipline, history is a methodological device for organizing events according to a chronological scale" (Hastrup 1978:126, emphasis removed). But events conceived as such are intractible even before the issue of chronology arises. For the anthropologist the immediate problem becomes that of contextualising particular events within the social and cultural structures with which he is concerned. In other words, he turns events into relations (to fatal effect, according to Sahlins 1981:4). This contextualisation provides explanation of a sorts. But to the historian chronology itself provides explanatory possibilities, drawing on the temporal dimension between cause and effect.

For the sake of argument, then, let me suppose there is a radical difference between the two. Anthropology takes as its subject matter "relations". If it can turn events into relations, i.e., contextualise them as contingent upon values, principles, relationships, etc., belonging to the society under study, then they can be subsumed under the general description of society and culture. Events are intractible only when resistant to contextualisation and thus characterisable as unique, individual, non-reducible (named) elements. Unique events are crucial to a historian's frame, however, for he or she has the means of relating such events to one another, through temporal sequence. It is non-unique events which are intractible to such a sequencing. This is a caricature, of course, but it indicates history's traditional interest in great happenings (events and people which can be named even as points in time are scrupulously named).[10] It also indicates why the history of the non-unique - popular or "social history" - takes on anthropological dress. Contextualising events in terms of social circumstances and cultural conditions seems to infuse a new order of "reality" into the arbitrary nature of temporal sequence. We thus have the phenomenon of (some) historians turning to anthropology for inspiration, a compliment anthropology periodically returns.[11] For anthropology gains a similar sensation of "reality" when it considers relations within historical context. Identifying people and happenings and then putting them in chronological order rebuts the arbitrariness of particular cultural configurations (cf. Silverman 1979:431).[12] Names, and above all dates, seem like a great breath of fresh air. If one knows what took place when, it is "cultural fit", not linear time, which begins to look curiously single-stranded.

My argument is a simple one, and I recapitulate the reciprocal relation between anthropology and history from an anthropological perspective. The historical sequencing of events which sustains uniqueness, individuation, is seen as non-susceptible to anthropological analysis, which is interested in a different kind of organisation of what happens. Events are both vaguely threatening (a "problem") and revealing of the particular task that anthropology sets itself, which is **not** the analysis of events for their own sake. Having pushed the question of unique events to the corner of the mind, as it were, the anthropological account also endows them with a different-order reality. This "reality" can become transferred to the style of explanation which links events - temporal sequencing - which may suddenly appear to throw great light on the constructed model. Indeed, there is a sense in which anthropology draws on history as evidence of "natural" relations. Wagner (1977) locates events within the schematisation of which western society sees itself as founded.

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[10] Given our linear view of time, pinpointing a precise date is the ultimate specificity.

[11] It must be noted, however, that it is quite possible to reverse these terms - "history" being regarded as concerned with broad contextualising sweeps and "anthropology" with the minutiae of cultural specificity (Gewertz 1983:1).

[12] Silverman also criticises reduction to the "individual strategist", which ignores "the structural framework" (1979:432) (cf. the "history of institutions" approach, see below). She thus feels the need to broach the question of transactional analysis, but criticises it for being non-historical. (However it is not the individual competitor but the individual "commune" which in fact emerges from her account as a political games-player.)

> The ethic and institutions of what we call Western society correspond to an ideological régime of deliberate and morally sanctioned literal construction. "Civilization", with its cities, technologies, literatures, bodies of knowledge and educated classes, is conceived and constituted as a cumulative aggregate of collective human artifice, and hence of deliberately articulated convention. We take collective responsibility for the preservation, regulation, alteration and implementation of the "culture" and social organization that gives us our orientation ... Natural phenomena have the spontaneous and self-contained character of standing for themselves. They merge object and event, but depend for their relational capabilities upon an assimilation of their literal context. Nature, in other words, is a flow of seemingly innate, differentiating transformation that is precipitated by our systematic and literal efforts at harnessing or understanding it...
>
> The literally conceived descriptions of science are thus necessary "synchronic", and they effectively separate themselves off (as human artifice, "mere theory") from the allegedly innate world of precipitated differentiation that we speak of as natural phenomenon and event. The necessity of doing so, "artificializing" our theoretical formulations and hence "naturalizing" their literal complement, is the necessity of maintaining the semantic world view of our larger, rationalist civilization (1977:394-395).

In other words, as much as a self-conceptualised "culture" needs a nature, a self-conceptualised "system" needs events.[13]

METAPHORS AND REALITIES

Antinomy is captured above all then in the opposition between "system" and "event". Sahlins (1981) makes considerable play with this; insofar as "structure" can be placed as a higher order class of analytical organisation, the dialectic between the two can be typified as "structural" (cf. "the interaction of system and event is itself susceptible of structural

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[13] Burridge (1979:11-12):

> "Long evoked by some of the prophets of the Old Testament and the events and teachings of the gospels, the lineaments of the individual began to emerge from the Graeco-Christian synthesis. We can, too, trace to the same sources the intellectual and moral roots of what was to become social or cultural anthropology. For going together with the Platonic and Augustinian heritage was the injunction to go and teach all nations - the missionary purpose and endeavor exemplified by St. Paul. Shouldering that obligation implied that the teachers should learn from others: a necessary corollary to extending one's love and making oneself understood. ...
> The Old and New Testaments were, indeed, the centerpiece of a triptych which included on either hand a knowledge of, and familiarity with, the history, customs, languages, and experience of the ancient Greeks and Romans. The measure of intellectual worth lay in the penetration of other social spaces, in exploring and making intelligible the cate-

account" (1981:33)). Given the infusion of "reality" which chronology affords anthropological accounts, Sahlins doubles his sources of creativity by considering at one and the same time a set of historically validated events, Cook's advent and death in Hawaii, and their materialisation through the categories of Hawaiian culture and, through practice, their unprecedented objectification in the effect they had on that culture. Sahlins makes it clear that event does not simply enter culture "as an instance of a received category" (1981:7), but also reorders it. Deliberate paradox is thus presented in the title of the essay: *Historical metaphors and mythical realities*. Culture is historically grounded, its constructs (metaphors) embodied in events and occasions, but practice has its own dynamics, and what really takes place generates novel myths.

On the one hand, Sahlins is tilting at the manner in which we privilege certain "realities" over others. Metaphor and myth are "real" in one sense (sc. reality is opposed to myth; myth is also an instance of reality). On the other hand, however, he sets up certain equations which give his account interest in the present context.

Marcus (1982:601) makes a telling comment apropos one set of incidents. Sahlins' essay, he says, contains "an interesting example of how a structuralist's problem is posed as an Hawaiian problem", although "we cannot expect Hawaiian perceptions to be stimulated by the same cognitive dissonance that spurs Euro-American structuralism". As in the original appellation of "hot" and "cold" societies, there is a constant tendency on the investigator's part to attribute his or her theoretical premises or methodological procedures to the culture under study. (To find "nature" and "culture" in people's own categories, cf. MacCormack & Strathern 1980; to read off culture as a map or code, Bourdieu 1977; and above all of course to be interested in people's self-descriptions.) Where the attribute is cognitive dissonance, internal contradiction or logical inconsistency, then one would be tempted to elide "our" history and reality against "their" metaphor and myth, and in doing so expose the latter in terms of the former.

But Sahlins' account is more complex that this. Far from privileging history/reality as an exposure of metaphor/myth, he deliberately argues that each is the context for the other, and thus mutually encompassing. There **is** an "us"/"them" opposition in his account (analytically speaking, apart from the historical confrontation), but I think it is coded through that between event and system itself. This emerges from one reading of the work, namely the movement which yields a "structural" analysis encompassing history, in spite of his opening disclaimer (1981:3). There is a sense in which the title's "metaphor" stands for "structure", and the metaphoric act (setting up relations between elements in the process of representation) for the anthropologist's art. Here is a source of Marcus's criticism. Thus one way to split the terms is:

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gories of other cultures in terms of one's own. The study of other cultures, the individual, and individuality are intimately entwined. Each in an aspect, phase, or transformation of the other."

At the same time,

"In part, this tradition of reaching into otherness, this venture into other social forms and experience to discover a general human ontology tied to moral universals, stems from the Greeks who brought other worlds into the native cognizance, marrying other cultural and intellectual traditions to their own. They gave us the logos, a means by which, through an intellectual construct, we could, ideally, look at ourselves and others objectively and not from a merely subjective or ethnocentric standpoint" (1979:10).



1 (across) refers to our discernment of discrete historical events in the context of Hawaiian mythologising which gives signification to practice; they systematise what we see as a series of incidents. 2 (across) refers to the Hawaiian experience of reality as against our capacity to read its metaphorical status; their experience of events we systematise as manifestations of culture. 3 (down) represents history simply as the temporal sequencing of real events, history from our point of view, reality from theirs. 4 (down) suggests that what they systematise in myth we systematise through laying bare the relations between elements, viz. structural anthropology, which is our system interpreting their system. Finally (diagonals 3-4), "they" systematise (system over event) reality through myth, while "we" systematise (system over event) history through metaphor. This masks history as systemic. It does so by locating Hawaiian systemics in terms of their mythologising, leaving "history" and "reality" high as dry as mere events. I suggest that the movement of these particular juxtapositions is to yield the strong proposition that anthropology (viz. structuralism) is the supreme systematist.

The juxtapositions are of course only implicit in Sahlins' essay, and come from only one aspect of it. But the point is that the us/them distinction is being employed to comment upon categories of analysis unilaterally derived from "our" tradition. "Their" events and "their" system are seen from "our" point of view: it is not Sahlins' purpose here to offer ethno-history or ethno-anthropology.[14]

From another reading, history certainly emerges as a locus of systemics. When "structure" and "practice" are dialectically paired, "historical process" (= change) becomes their product/context (1981:72). "Structural theory" has "historical use" (1981:33). What I wish to underline is that in scrutinising the problematic western opposition between system and event, the essay glosses over the extent to which it is "our" systems and "our" events which are its ultimate subject matter. The problem, that is, the manner in which we conceptualise these entities, as Sahlins would be the first to admit, is ours. Our construction of "systems" requires events, as units of disparate order. System versus event, "structure" versus "praxis", do not marshall comparable entities. But one mixes them in opposing system (manifestation of whole structure) to event (part of history), or elements (part of structure) to social change (whole historical process). And one mixes them in order to reveal the higher order, encompassing nature of the systematising term. Events and elements are (in our descriptions) **organised by** our notions of history and structure. In so far as there is an implicit "history" in the rendering of events, we are dealing with data already systematised. Here the construct "history" competes directly with that of "structure" as like with like:

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[14] This is done elsewhere, as in the comparison of different forms of symbolic production. Thus in his generalised typification of the "primitive" world Sahlins notes (1976:211) that the locus of symbolic differentiation is not the production of goods (events) but of social relations (society's "preconception" of itself).

summations of our organisational capacity to describe interrelated wholes, they share significant common ground.

Conversely, "structure" no less than "history" is a matter of "our" intellectual organisation.[15] The elucidation of a symbolic structure belongs to "us" quite as much as the reconstruction of historical process. In this sense Hawaiians in fact have no more - or as much - access to a "structural" account of themselves than they do to a "historical" one. The interesting question to my mind becomes: under what conditions do people set out to organise elements and information into wholes?

To utilise an obvious product of that very type of thinking, it seems that the notion of "system" (whether of structural interrelations or historical process) arises among certain classes of people in societies concerned with encompassment. That is, societies which see themselves as defined by those others who do not belong but whom they might include. I am not sure that all predatory formations would be eligible, but conquest states and centralised polities are characterised by "histories" (see the essays in Lewis 1968), the scholars of world religions write "sociologies" (Gellner 1981) and capitalism produces academic "anthropology" (Sahlins 1983). People see themselves as constituted by, as inspired by or as producing events which mould them in such a way that others may be moulded too. This view may be characterised by an ethnic sense of self-identity (they are the sole authors of their history etc.). "Special identity" accrues to this kind of society which "thinks itself", and engages in self-description, in terms of a distinctive life form (cf. Yeatman 1983). Indeed control, conversion and the determination of consumption are all varieties of a colonisation that turns on the idea of a system with some internal structure of its own which is known by its capacity to impose itself (and thus transform) those who lack it.[16]

These remarks are not intended to discriminate between societies which "have" or "do not have" history/structure (from our point of view all societies have) but whether they, especially those who make an art of it, "do" (viz. represent themselves as having) history or structure (viz. carry out historical or structural analysis).

Thus the first essay in *History and anthropology* (edited by Lewis 1968) is prefaced with a quotation from "the greatest sociologist of Islam" (Gellner 1981:16), Ibn Khaldun (1375):

> This science, then, like all other sciences, whether based on authority or reasoning, appears to be independent and has its own subject, viz. human society, and its own problems, viz. the social phenomena and the transformations that succeed each other in the nature of society.

In turn,

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[15] "The cases of the historians and anthropologists ... are similar in that both involve the Subject-Object quandary - the alienation of reality from image of reality and the variable interpretations of social life that result from this estrangement" (Murphy 1972:106).

[16] A less charitable version perhaps of Burridge's claim (1973:232) that "the problems and endeavors of the set of disciplines contained within anthropology are ... integral and authentic to European civilization", in terms of the moral construction of observer and participator. "That same imaginative impulse which, leaping from the prison of its own social experience, attempted to describe another social order also searched for and found extant empirical examples on which it could build and embellish" (1973:8). See Gellner 1981:89.

> Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society. This model is available in writing; it is equally and symmetrically available to all literate men, and to all those willing to heed literate men. These rules are to be implemented throughout social life (Gellner 1981:1).

Yet Gellner goes on to add

> The society brilliantly sketched out by Ibn Khaldun could also be summarised in other terms, which would highlight the contrast between it and other social forms. Ibn Khaldun's own perceptiveness is all the more remarkable in so far as he evidently though he was describing the only kind of human society, society *as such*, anywhere. His analysis is evidently meant to follow from basic human or social traits, and not to be dependent on any cultural idiosyncrasies. In this he was mistaken: it is all the more noteworthy that he should have seen that which, within his own horizon, lacked any contrast. His perceptiveness refutes the view that to exist is to differ, and that only what is differentiated from other objects within one's horizon can ever be perceived (1981:29, original emphasis).[17]

By contrast, state formation, evangelical religion and capitalism combine in the west where practitioners in self-descriptions draw on a powerful nature-culture paradigm to construct society **as built out of elements exogenous to it** (the environment, individuals etc.). This gives, arguably, a particular movement to the self/other distinction (cf. earlier in this paper) - the not-self is also a potential (another) self (i.e., encompassable) / or the self may become alienated from its context, becoming an "other" (i.e., encompassed). I suggested, however, the cognitive discomfort of these juxtapositions arose partly from the experience of cogitation - particulary the experiences of academics whose activity is thought, and who strive to make representations. Lived paradoxes are not reducible to these logical ones with which they tussle (cf. Evens 1983). The problem of self reflection that Augé sees (1982) is one which arises from contemplation; it need be no paradox in interactional terms. Indeed I wish to turn briefly to a situation where the contradiction of self = not-self, not-self = other, other = another self, is not presented with quite the same urgency. The situation is definable as one where relations are mediated through exchange which institutionalise interdependency between self and other, where there are no assumptions about the single authorship of products or events, and no notion of a conversion process from nature to culture or culture's contextualisation by nature.

NO CULTURE, NO HISTORY

A desire to systematise also promotes certain forms of curiosity. The inhabitants of the Hagen area in Highlands Papua New Guinea strike me in some respects as quite uncurious.

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[17] Also Gellner (1981:89-90); however we may note internal antinomies, for example, the city is both the model and the antithesis of a community; townsmen confront tribesmen; and he refers to the "permanent, if sometimes latent, tension and opposition between two styles of religious life", (1981:159).

This needs of course instant qualification. Anyone presented with the opportunity to travel is enthusiastic - the exotic is constituted as a source of attraction. Moreover, too intent on my own concerns I certainly did not seek out forms of curiosity. And Ongka ends his self-account with the hope that his words will be broadcast (A. Strathern 1979). Nevertheless, on the whole, for all the reciprocities that there were between "us" and "them", exchange of information about our own societies was not among them. People did not enquire much into our circumstances: talking about our own society did not materialise as an event.

Further qualification is necessary. Friends were interested in personal details - they asked questions about our kinsfolk, which situated our familial status, maturity and so on. They were intrigued by the night/day reversal between Papua New Guinea and England, on which their myths had a comment, and which exemplified certain assumptions about our spiritual origins (cf. A. Strathern 1979:134, 137). Women wanted to know whether I was "really" a woman. The most extended discussion I recall were about bridgewealth arrangements - western patterns of marriage being a topic of interest and bemusement, coupled with observations on the childbirth spacing of nearby missionaries and the division of labour between European husbands and wives. There were also of course critical deductions about the behaviour and intentions of European employers (cf. M. Strathern 1975). But the marriage issue particularly concerned them, since it was through adjusting marriage "custom" that Hageners had their most immediate contact with Highlands neighbours whose customs were palpably different in this area but with whom they had to interact.

In one sense we were just irrelevant to the local situation, political nonentities lacking power. We were not seen as an information resource on our "own" society, because it was of no possible relevance to what was going on or to what mattered. On the other hand, of course, **we** came with encompassing theories about what "other societies" would look like, and had a subject of study. But this is just the point. Among the various asymmetries in our mutual situation was the fact that whereas we could also define it as contemplation, Hageners defined the encounter as interaction.

This meant that as "others" we were framed in a particular way. What was relevant was the quality of our ongoing interactions - the exchanges we became involved in, what we could give and what we were ready to receive. We were exemplars of a type of person ("Europeans") not potential windows onto European society. In the face of dramatic social change people sometimes thought of themselves as "becoming European" or else as "remaining Hagen", but as though these were choices between domains of personal efficacy. In the early days at least I would surmise that they did not feel "colonised" any more than they felt a usurpation of authorship (and see Brown 1972). There is no "ethnicity" to be compromised nor "orthodoxy" to be supplanted. Not representing themselves as having constructed a society or culture of a particular (ethnic) type with its special (orthodox) canons, Hageners discard certain traditional practices and adopt others without, as we would put it, touching the sense of self. The self simply takes on before and after appearance, a phenomenon reported widely from Melanesia (e.g., Errington 1974).

Hagen social units are certainly bounded. Its constituent polities (clans, tribes) are defined by explicit perimeters. In the past they fought, defeated and scattered one another; fragments of groups joined others, even as individuals can transform their clan identity. These relations are ultimately symmetrical: like units against like units, ceremonial exchange an alternative to warfare. Asymmetrical relations, as with neighbours, spirits or other foreigners are dealt with through trade or ritual, which essentially keeps relations at a distance. Asymmetries between the sexes rest on boundaries established by rules, the division of labour, domains of participation.

All these acts of social differentiation work to establish appropriate frames for action. Yet these kinds of construction of difference do not in themselves produce the visions of "otherness" which compel Europeans to do anthropology or history. Persons socially differentiated from oneself have to be dealt with, set apart, engaged: but the context for encounter which Hageners construct is I think that of the interaction itself-the degree to which the other is open to influence, persuasion or force. How will the relationship be conducted; who will get what from the interchange? This includes the estimation of motives conventionally held to be hidden, and which thus may have exotic origins. Political knowledge will shape judgement of an exchange partner"s motives. But when interaction is with a stranger, there is little interest in creating a context that rests on understanding the kind of society from which she or he comes.

Curiosity in "other" societies is not simply a "natural" extension of curiosity in others. The vision of otherness which produces anthropology and history alike is grounded in the perception that "the other" (another culture, another period) is a self-contained entity. It has a life and form of its own, even as one can conceive of one's own society as having its distinctive life and form. When we "do" history, we investigate the past through an observer frame. That is, we look in and wish to see what it was like then. This framing is possible only in the presence of a concept of "society" or "culture". Such a concept not only provides a vehicle for the notion of systemic interrelation, it also suggests bodily images of evolution, development, growth, decay - the unfolding of the life processes of an organism. Organic metaphors may be out of date; but the point is, one, that they embody the intellectual construct of diachronic process which supposes an entity in which process is manifest; and two, that Hageners never had them in the first place.

The notion of an entity in which process is manifest has many exemplars, but a powerful one for the investigation of events and human cause-effect relations in the underpinning view of "society" as a set of interlocking institutions and relationships, and of "culture" as attributes and values and codes decipherable as an observable whole. A "part" exhibits a life comparable to the "whole". Individual biographies can be taken as exemplars of social processes; and anthropologists wondering how to do history without named individuals turned to the history of institutions - that is, miniature societies within societies (e.g., Morton-Williams 1968:5; also Hopkins 1968). History as heroics (cf. Sahlins 1983) is now also out of date, but embodied a classical metonym: the life of a part evinces the life of the whole, above all when those lives control cosmic "events".[18] Biography models self containment, closure, single authorship:[19] passive or active the subject acts as a coherent entity. Chance events (the history of encounters) can thus be integrated with the unfolding development of the organism (the history of growth and decline) (cf. Sacks 1979:438).

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[18] In the same way as the citizen embodies government, cf. the Greek *polis* was "an organization constituted by its self-awareness as a human community" (Sahlins 1983:518). And in "heroic polities the king is the condition of the possibility of community" (1983:519).

[19] The post-structuralist subject may transcend structure (Hastrup 1978:143; cf. Marcus 1982:602), but is sill an accredited author of actions. Hagen notions of personal efficacy, like "prestige", always require interaction to be registered by another subject. Young's (1983) rendering of Kwahihi's autobiographical narrative on Goodenough Island is interesting in this regard.

Such "life" is unimaginable in Hagen (and cf. Keesing n.d.). People are remembered, by name and exploit; encounters are commemorated; there is a strong sense of individual agency; and actors are located within wider social categories which give them identity. But they do not "do" being socially constructed role-players. They do not, in short, espouse a theory of role which detaches the constructs of culture from the natural individual (Murphy 1972:69). Hence they can not act as exemplars of society or history.[20] They are exemplars only of themselves (Wagner 1975:87-8). When Ongka searches for the sources of his efficacy, it is in his own mind: "I thought it out for myself" (A. Strathern 1979:100).

If in a place such as Hagen there is no basis for a self-conceptualisation of culture as "culture", then people's reactions to intrusions from other worlds cannot take the form of (academic) reflection and speculation on the internal structures of those intrusive worlds. Coping with "otherness" does not yield a recognisable "history" or "anthropology" - or "theology" even (Keesing 1982:4). This kind of society does not produce historians any more than it produces anthropologists. On these grounds, I would add, we intensify rather redress colonial pressure in pushing for indigenous "histories". It is mere moral validation of our own enterprise to encourage "others" to write "their" histories (or anthropologies for that matter).[21]

Nonetheless, while writing our own histories and anthropologies of other societies, we may yet wonder whether this activity has indigenous analogues.

> If "culture" becomes paradoxical and challenging when applied to the meanings of tribal societies, we might speculate as to whether a "reverse anthropology" is possible, literalizing the metaphors of modern industrial civilization from the standpoint of tribal society. Surely we have no right to expect a parallel theoretical effort, for the ideological concern of these people puts them under no obligation to specialize in this way, or to propound philosophies for the lecture room. In other words, our "reverse anthropology" will have nothing to do with "culture", with production for its own sake, though it might have a great deal to do with the quality of life. And if human beings are as generally inventive as we have assumed, it would be very surprising if such a "reverse anthropology" did not already exist (Wagner 1975:31).

Leaving aside the question of social "structure" how do people represent the sequencing of events and relations of cause-effect? In Hagen particular events are rhetorically stamped: they become metaphors of future political intention (A. Strathern 1975). Intention is read off from behaviour of all kinds, including daily domestic interaction. Cause and effect lie in the estimation of debts, liabilities and responsibilities between persons, and thus in the evaluation of ongoing relations. Their definitions of the state of affairs is always private - no one knows what another thinks - but the subject of reflection is less the self as single actor than the state of the self's relations with others. To find out what actions in the past have current significance, people resort to omen-taking and divination: effects are traced back to their cause in past interactions. Invariably the revelation of such a chain of events compels further social action. Thus sacrifice is a supreme moment of re-alignment, an "enactment" that brings the past and the future together. In Melanesian contexts where political oratory is less developed, the public significance of past events (effect → cause) may be established through seances of the kind Schieffelin describes (1977). Thus a "coherent historical entity", namely the "history" of a "relationship" between a community and a spirit, is established through the questioning of spirit mediums. Mediums give knowledgeable insight into the unseen (Schieffelin 1976:107). In so far as ritual in general is concerned with realignment and the constitution (enactment) of events, then it is "history" par excellence.[22] And in so far as all ongoing relations of difference depend on enactment, Gewertz (1983:2) observes that they can never be described ahistorically.

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[20] Cf. Burghart (1983) on the Brahman ascetic whose bodily condition encompasses the social world, a life-stage model of the "universe".

[21] Likely to happen of course when "otherness" is already much reduced, and western educated indigenes seek to encapsulate a dual identity. I would not question the motives of such scholars - only what outsiders might seek from them in terms of their own legitimacy.

Prior to realignment is the initial step of ascertainment which takes a past event as already enacted. Acts of interpretation are directed towards the elucidation of another"s motives. People have plans already in their minds or emotions in their hearts that others try to find out. This applies to the incursion of aliens, as in the white penetration of Papua New Guinea. In many contexts people acted out their interpretations in terms of cargo cults (Wagner 1975), setting up specific structures to capture cause-effect relations. Contained within these acts was a construction of otherness. Indeed Wagner argues that "cargo" metaphorizes the same inter-cultural relation that "culture" does.

> "Culture" extends the significance of technique, mode, and artifact to human thought and relationship; "cargo" extends that of human relation and mutual production to manufactured artifacts: each concept uses the extensive bias of the other as its symbol. Thus it is easy for Westerners to "literalize" the significance of "cargo", and assume that it means simply manufactured goods, or Western modes of production (1975:32).
>
> ... The words are to some extent "mirror images" of each other, in the sense that we look at the natives" cargo, their techniques and artifacts, and call it "culture", whereas they look at our culture and call it "cargo" (1975:31).

"Cargo" was, then, derived for what it stood for, and what it stood for especially in terms of the relative efficacy of personnel involved. Hageners themselves did not make enduring cults out of this reading of "culture"(though see A. Strathern 1979:134), but were intensely interested in European wealth and power, as Brown (1972) reports for Chimbu. They assumed such attributes were transferable to themselves. The question was the appropriate interaction, how to make these new relations work, not of their qualifications in the matter.

I almost subtitled this essay "The Omaha connection". Two quite distinct authors with disparate ends in view - Southwold wishing to locate factuality and Sahlins wishing to explode the concept of history by the anthropological experience of culture - characterise aspects of the relationship between history and anthropology through the image of kin classification. Arguing that "the different cultural orders studied by anthropology have their own historicities", Sahlins recalls how Crow/Omaha kin classification "turns contingent events of marriage into perpetual relationships by freezing whole lineages into the familial positions assumed at an initial alliance"(1983:525). Southwold singled out rather the timelessness of this formulation in its imagery of social anthropology's concern with other cultures: "in Omaha systems of kinship terminology members of the mother's lineage are not distinguished by generation: as we all know, this is because it is the distinction of that lineage from our lineage which the terminology is stressing ... when otherness becomes the focus of concern, distinctions of time are naturally excluded" (1968:136; sentences transposed).

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[22] And a certain "anthropology" too: "Cargo cult can be thought of as a pragmatic sort of anthropology that invents in anticipation of the future, in a manner reminiscent of Melanesian magic, rather than reconstructing the past or present out of shards of evidence" (Wagner 1975:34).

Temporality has not been a dimension to my discussion, although it is customary to specify types of history by reference to distinctive notions of time (and cf. Fortes 1949). One may thus differentially account for duration, continuity and discontinuity, the cause-effect sequencing of events, passages and stages, and so on. "Time" presents itself here as an organisational phenomenon, that is, a manner of perceiving relationships. I have suggested that anthropology and history both ascribe, with differing emphases, to the notion that time's effects can be demonstrated in the shaping of society. My interest is in the fact that this notion requires a prior systemic supposition: "society" and "culture" have to exist as coherent reference points before they can register the effects of - and conversely, create and produce - event and individuation. Before society can have a view of "its past", it has to have a view of "itself".

AFTERWORD

Comparing history and anthropology leads one into the systemics of whole societies and coherent cultures, of processes with lives of their own and the unfolding of design as against chance and event. However one might also consider other contemplative arts such as literature, or science as "investigation". Wagner sets forth a provocative comparison between western literature and Daribi myth. His comments (1978:58-61, passim) are worth quoting.

> Literature is the characteristic expression of a conventional, or collectivizing ideology: a cumulative effort of deliberate style, founded on the assumption of an innate world of phenomenal differentiation. The literary genre of "fiction", that which is "made up" of fabricated by deliberate human intention, involves the introduction and eventual obviation [exposure and dissolution] of convention so as to yield an expression of individual or historical uniqueness. This is the medium of our great novels of adventure, character development, satire, or social commentary. Nonfiction, which deals with "fact", actually talks about fact with the intention of obviating its idiosyncratic aspects so as to arrive at generalizing conclusions. Scientific investigations, experiments, and accounts obviate the situational and the particular in order to integrate their results within a conventional body of "literature" and theory; historical, biographical, and documentary discussions reduce the uniquely situational to a conventional judgement, but all nonfiction is implicitly moralizing in tone.

Myth, as the expression or a figurative of differentiating ideology, is based on the premise of the innate nature of human convention, hence its conventional character is largely unspoken...

Readers will perhaps recognize the Western genre of nonfiction as the modality in which the science of culture is transformed into the culture of science. We observe and analyze the unique peculiarities of strange and exotic lifeways only to obviate them and collapse them into our familiar forms of "society", "culture", or "system". Thus the scientific or "explaining" aspect of anthropological writing, like that of nonfiction in general, is didactic in nature...

Realm of human artifice	DARIBI MYTH **NAMU PO** (TALES)	WESTERN LITERATURE FICTION
	obviation of peculiarity to yield moral demonstration	obviation of conventions to yield (amoral) expression of individual historical uniqueness
Realm of the innate	**PO PAGE** (ORIGINS "MYTH")	NONFICTION
	obviation of conventional circumstance to yield (amoral) origin account	obviation of "factual" particulars to yield general theory of (moral) judgment

... The insertion of a (facilitating) level of factuality between man and man, constitutes the interpretative schema of Western science and nonfiction. It is expressed in the notion of "objectivity", the ecological "man and environment", and ultimately in the Cartesian duality of mind and body. However brilliant and helpful its applications have been, however impressive its conclusions, the obviation of fact to produce theory through scientific methodology is but one kind of symbolic orientation, subject to the constraints of a particular ideological regime. Because the theoretical motivation of science works against our ideological commitment to the "innateness" of fact, the self-disqualifying of scientific effort - through real or feigned humility, through humor or irony if need be - is absolutely essential. Theory must remain "mere theory" if it is to retain credibility in a world of "innate" fact...

Science and nonfiction happen to be the means by which we construct descriptions and explanations with a legitimated "reality" value. It should not surprise the reader, then, that it is the opposite creative modality, which we identify with fiction, that embraces the transformation of the culture of science into the science of culture. Like Daribi *po page*, fiction involves the obviation of the collective and conventional to produce an expression of the unique and the particular. In anthropology the amoral character of such an expression has often been linked to the danger of rendering the resultant phenomenal description so unique as to elude any sort of meaningful comparison, though some writers have championed this modality for precisely that reason. That which cannot be easily integrated into the orders of our collective understanding acquires the kind of celebrated uniqueness that we accord the individual in literary expression, and it is this culturally "fictive" yet provocative "external" character that carries the study of cultures beyond the moral confines of our own conventional understanding.

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A GENIE IN THE FLY-BOTTLE: REFLECTIONS ON ERNEST GELLNER

ANDRÉ CZEGLÉDY-NAGY*

Ernest André Gellner was born in Paris in 1925, the son of a Jewish, Czech lawyer, Rudolf Gellner, and his wife Anna (*née* Fantl). The family left Czechoslovakia for England in 1939. After studies at St. Alban's County Grammar School, the young Gellner earned himself an Oxford scholarship. Like many young men of his generation, he would be immensely affected by the rising tide of totalitarianism in Europe of that time and much of his subsequent academic work would directly follow from an intense aversion to intellectual rigidity. If anything, he was against ideologies of every kind, believing them to be the strait-jackets of contemporary life.

I first met Ernest quite late in his life. It was the Autumn of 1989, and I had arrived at Cambridge's Department of Social Anthropology in order to study for my doctorate under him. I had no inkling then that I would become the last student to submit a dissertation under his name. Although my research on culture and identity in international business was not one of Ernest's traditional interests, he consented to act as my principal supervisor because of our common concern with the contemporary transformation of East European society. Unknown to me at the time, it also helped that my (Hungarian) ethnic background coincided with his fascination for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the six years that followed, he would often query me on my sense of national identity and the way in which it interplayed with the conduct of my anthropological fieldwork in Hungary.

I recall first asking Ernest about his own sense of national identity in 1992. This was a theme which his friend John Davis had skirted a year earlier in a 1991 interview for *Anthropology Today* (32/I). With perhaps less tact than Davis might have employed, I simply blurted out the questions: "So **what** do you think you are, Ernest? Do you see yourself as Czech? Or something else - another nationality?" He stopped in mid-stride across a King's College path and took some time to answer. Close to saying something possibly too spurious for his liking, he caught himself ever so slightly and planted his walking stick on the stone-flagged pavement. Turning to face me directly, he cocked his head to one side and responded "English", quite emphatically.

I was surprised with this answer, in part because of my own experience of Ernest and in part because of what I knew of his familial background - indeed, the personal value attached to *émigré* histories was a subject which would arise in a lengthier conversation with him the next day. After Ernest had given me his reply - characteristically in as succinct language as possible - I sought to draw him out a little bit more. That, or the surprise on my face may have taken him aback enough to give him cause for reflection. I continued: "Really, are you certain?" He again paused, frowning slightly - as if about to decline my invitation, and then said with complete conviction "International." I was satisfied with this answer at the time - and it seemed to be the one he was looking for judging by the tone of his voice, the relaxed expression on his face and the way he returned his body to a position

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

Professor Ernest Gellner. (Photograph by Ashley Ashwood from *Financial Times*; special thanks to Susan Gellner who provided the photograph to be published in this issue) in alignment with the walking path before us. Without further reference to the finality of his reply, we returned to speaking on the original theme of our conversation (his most recent cross-Atlantic lecture tour).

International. In so many ways Ernest Gellner was just such a man, between nations and beyond them: born in France, an early childhood spent in Czechoslovakia, coming of age in England and then a flourishing academic career focusing as much on human universals as cultural particularities; he refused to be pigeon-holed into the confines of any sort of tight labelling. Intellectually, he was - as one internationally eminent Cambridge archaeologist referred to him - a "polymath". He moved with remarkable facility through the fields of philosophy, sociology and social anthropology, exploring with consummate ease the elements of social change, kinship, religion, psychoanalysis, post-modernism and nationalism. These diverse interests were aided by an intellectual trajectory which firmly placed him in a classical tradition of inclusive, wide-ranging scholarship. The depth and breadth of his learning - and his fluid, unencumbered writing style - was such that he always seemed to belong more to another time then that of today. His manner on the page and in person reflected more the decisive, 19th century sense of debate than the politically correct, intellectual timorousness of the present generation of scholars. This direct manner was reinforced by an acute sense of satirical humour which overwhelmed friendly audiences and incensed detractors alike.

If there was one quality for which he could be justly criticised, it was the annoying tendency to simply ignore that with which he disagreed. Not everything mind you, just those ideas which he felt were sufficiently inconclusive - or morally bankrupt. Marxism was one such flawed notion, and so too were the more rabid forms of cultural relativism which he steered well clear of. Stuck in a post-war age where the latter academic ideology had grown triumphant, he was often dubbed an arch-rationalist and then surprised (though secretly pleased) at the reactions of colleagues who were led to anger by his desire to remain unmoved by the dictates of fashionable scholarship. Although Edward Said would take him to task for his approach to cultural relativism, the public debate in the pages of the *Times Literary Supplement* only served to confirm Gellner's standing as a primary representative of reasoned argument.

The predisposition to overlook the disagreeable spilled over into Gellner's abhorrence of academic administration. He never liked it and - to some extent, naively - hoped that the move to Cambridge in his later life would free him of such responsibilities. This trait nonetheless served him well: it gave him the time to think about the ideas which interested him most. In this sense, he was very much of an intellectual, always thinking and always interested in taking the time to think rather than being bothered with the details and the politics of contemporary academic life. Thankfully for him (and everyone around him), a line of secretaries in addition to his family kept him from falling off the conveyor belt of meetings and international appearances which increasingly filled his relentless work schedule.

In the face of the onslaught of people, places and events which clamoured for his attention he was, nonetheless, a modest, unassuming man who immensely enjoyed the company of family, friends and all manner of acquaintances. Throughout his career, he was known to give time and attention to the most junior student and the most senior academician in equal measure. This was his way of recognising the commonality of humanity and of rejecting the hierarchical pretensions which he had seen in place elsewhere, particularly in the trails of autocratic power. These imprints he knew too well. He had witnessed firsthand the growth of fascism as a child. He had been at the siege of Dunkirk, had served in the Czech Armoured Brigade during the war, watched the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Czech lands after it and, later in life, made numerous visits to the Soviet Union (including a year as distinguished guest of its Academy of Sciences in 1988-89). This longer visit was in recognition of his critical role in bridging the gap between hitherto separated anthropological traditions, a contribution marked by his editing *Soviet and Western Anthropology* (1980).

Gellner's own intellectual footsteps are themselves remarkable for both their shifts of disciplinary territory and for the consistency of his influence in one academic field after the next. He finished his undergraduate studies (Politics, Philosophy and Economics) with first class honours at Balliol College, Oxford in 1949 and left to make an early impression in philosophy. After a two year stint at Edinburgh University, he found a much treasured home at the London School of Economics. It was while at the LSE that he wrote *Words and Things* (1959), a brilliant *début* which damned (and dammed) the flow of Wittgensteinian thinking so dominant at Oxford in his day. This would be but the first step on a long road of sometimes controversial, but always illuminating, publication.

In 1962, Gellner was made Professor of Sociology (with Special Reference to Philosophy) at the LSE . This post fully reflected his growing influence in the many academic disciplines which bordered his particular brand of social philosophy. *Thought and Change* (1964), *The Devil in Modern Philosophy* (1974) and *Legitimation of Belief* (1975) were but three of the more important publications which soon followed. His dissatisfaction with the abstract nature of philosophy eventually led him across the buildings of Houghton Street to the Department of Social Anthropology. It was here, guided by Paul Stirling and Raymond Firth, that he received a doctorate after fieldwork in Morocco (which was originally inspired by a hiking expedition to the Atlas mountains in 1954). Gellner's Moroccan ethnography would later feature in his *Saints of the Atlas* (1969). This most ethnographic volume of his career emphasised an interest in the study of Middle Eastern society in general and Islam, in particular. It would be followed up by a number of related publications, including among them: *Arabs and Berbers* (1973; co-edited with C.Micaud), *Muslim Society* (1981) and *Islamic Dilemmas: reformers, nationalists and nationalisation* (1985; edited).

Gellner's stay in the anthropology camp culminated in 1984 with his appointment to the William Wyse Chair of Social Anthropology at Cambridge. Cambridge surprised him. He told me that after coming to the department with the specific intent to escape the chains - and he did view them as chains - of bureaucratic administration, he was saddled with more such onerous responsibilities than ever before. Yet, at the same time, Cambridge also gave him new opportunities, especially the chance to fine-tune his interest in the issues of nationalism. This interest had already been superbly expressed in perhaps his most influential book, *Nations and Nationalism* (1983). The slim volume was written at the summer cottage in Fontanili, nestled among the Italian mountains of the Mediterranean shore behind San Remo.

In this quintessential treatise, Gellner underscored the artificiality of the notion of nation and aligned nationalism with industrialisation and the period of modernity. These connections were indispensable to our understanding of the development of both nation and state. Similarly, his distinction between the "low" and "high" cultures of agro-literate societies established a way of looking at the dynamics between and within rural and urban communities which has proved invaluable to subsequent theorists. This is not to advocate that

Gellner's explanation of nationalism remains pristine and unassailable. His fondness for tight, social models - which reflected a quest for human universals in the grand manner of early anthropologists - was at times undercut by the niggling pest of cultural diversity. The eurocentric bias manifest in his marshalling of historical evidence and the more general conceptual antecedents of his thinking frequently exposed his roots in the "Western" currents of scholarship. Yet, to his credit, he was always open and honest about this heritage, and resolutely refused to make allowances for the sake of academic populism. The sense of compromise, it might be said, was never an integral part of his intellectual creed; its lack remained both a strength and a weakness throughout his career.

In the last years of his life, Gellner became increasingly interested in socio-economic change in Eastern Europe. After summing up his understanding of the march of history with *Sword, Plough and Book* (1988), the tumultuous changes in the late 1980s provided him with the chance to commit himself to intellectual freedom in this region, in practical as well as theoretical terms. He accomplished this *via* several avenues: lending the weight of his name and his writing to a number of learned journals in Eastern Europe and - despite the increasingly debilitating effects of the *osteoporosis* with which he battled daily - repeatedly supporting local conferences in person. In 1992, he retired from his Cambridge post and re-situated himself in Prague on a temporary, but increasing basis. There, in the city of his childhood, he headed the Centre for the Study of Nationalism at the Central European University. This new institution fulfilled many of his private aspirations with regards to championing a community of scholarship set in the middle of contemporary debate. Like the general CEU profile, his institute brought together local scholars and senior western academics on sabbatical leave with a diversity of enthusiastic students from all over Eastern Europe. It acted as the focus of both research and communication for the many interested in the issues of nationalism and social transformation in and outside of the region as a whole. In these terms, the Centre was a marvellous success and one which he was distinctly proud of. In a sad and subsequent parallel to his death on 5 November 1995, the very life-span of the institute was called into question and it was disbanded in the following year.

At the December 1995 conference in Prague which was originally meant to celebrate his 70th year, at his funeral in Chichester near the family home, and later at the March 1996 memorial service held for him in his Cambridge college, King's, he was publicly remembered with intense affection and enormous respect. The testimony of family and a wealth of friends and professional colleagues attested to the profound influence which this man had on the daily lives of the people who knew him. Some came to pay their respects from nearby, others travelled across continents and over oceans. In his passing, his wife Susan and his children, David, Sarah, Deborah and Ben lost a dear husband and father. And the community of scholarship lost one of its most devoted men, one of its great thinkers.

EUROPEAN IDENTITIES: NATIONALISM, VIOLENCE, KINSHIP AND POPULAR CULTURE

PETER WADE*

GODDARD, Victoria, **LLOBERA**, Josep and **SHORE**, Chris (eds). 1994. *The Anthropology of Europe: Identities and Boundaries in Conflict.* Oxford: Berg. x + 310 pp. **ISBN 0-85496-901-2.**

Reading this book in the context of the Euro 96 football competition reveals a number of things. The endlessly reiterated internationalism of the competition alongside the sometimes repellently jingoistic nationalism that was also insistently present is reflected in some of the contributions to this collection of essays that point to the preliminary and unstable nature of a "European" identity, and the persistence of national and regional identities, despite the forces of globalization. The presence of many black players in several national European teams also touches on the issue of "Fortress Europe" raised by a number of the contributors - the fear that the consolidation of a European identity will depend on exclusion as well as inclusion, on the creation of a "constitutive outside", the boundaries of which are, of course, far from evident. The fervent passion of the supporters - with the underlying fear, realized to some extent after England's defeat at the hands of Germany in the semi-finals, that such obsessive emotion could too easily erupt into xenophobic violence - is also mirrored in a chapter by Bowman that asks why ethnic and national identities sometimes generate terrifying atrocities. He finds the answer in Lacanian psychoanalysis and this broaches the issue of kinship, personhood and gender which are clearly central to understanding identity and which are examined in some detail by other contributors (Goddard, Comas d'Argemir). Discussion of kinship and gender could also be detected in the Euro 96 competition, or at least in British football, with recent explicit attempts to make the game less exclusively male and macho, in the hope that a female, or more generally a family presence will defuse violence and turn the game into "something for everyone" - with all the connotations of (national) unification that such an endeavour can have. Finally, the football competition raised quite sharply well-known problems of bureaucratic control (from refereeing, through ticket allocations to crowd control) and the commoditization of popular culture. This book had some comments to make on bureaucracy, but the question of popular culture was - in traditional anthropological fashion - not high on the agenda.

This collection - which like many such edited volumes grew out of a conference (in this case, one held at Goldsmiths's College, University of London, in the context of Maastricht Treaty debates) - is an interesting set of essays in its own right, but ultimately I felt that it deals in a patchy way with the issues raised above. These issues may have been prompted by my own immersion in Euro 96, but they are also problems that the book sets out to address in one way or another. In the end, the book tells us quite a lot about the anthropology of

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Europe, but less about identities and boundaries in general.

On the first question of internationalism and nationalism - a version of the global/local debate - there are many clues as to what generates these different identities: competition over resources, opportunities for social mobility, the explicit projects of elites in the cultural, economic and political realms. Chapman, in a good chapter that discusses changing patterns of production and trade and their impact on nation-states and the EU, points out that, although the globalizing forces of capitalism seem to undermine national boundaries, even the biggest multinational corporations usually have a national identity that is materialized in the physical location of top-level decision-making and high valued-added research and development. Using Polish-German relations as an example, he argues that the EU as a regional trading bloc impacts on Poland in terms, for example, of restrictions on migration and agricultural exports, but that this is perceived by Poles mainly in terms of relations with Germany, rather than the EU as a whole. This is partly because of historical precedents for seeing pre-war German capital as a malign influence on the national economy. In a more predictable piece, O'Brien argues that, in French Catalonia, a shift from Catalan to French identity is often structured by upward mobility into the French bureaucracy; women, however, often revert to a Catalan identity after motherhood when they are re-integrated into a village network of older women that offers other opportunities. Shore and Black, in a suggestive chapter, look at attempts by EU bureaucrats to create a "People's Europe" and the emergence of a more or less European Eurocrat culture in Brussels and Strasbourg, although the latter is only very lightly sketched in ethnographic terms. The failure to consolidate a European identity occurs because, among other things, the Eurocrats are so distant from "ordinary citizens" and because the *raison d'être* of the EU is economic, rather than primarily political or social. The last argument would seem to ignore the well-established, although not unscathed, resource-competition model of ethnicity which holds that it is often economic factors which create the basis for a powerful identification; but Shore and Black do acknowledge the possibility that a popular political European consciousness might flow from economic unity (p. 296). Also, I was surprised to see no reference to the factors that Maryon MacDonald - in research still in progress - has observed among Eurocrats who publicly and to some extent privately purvey the notion of a European identity: the strength of national stereotyping in Eurocratic culture and the importance of bureaucratic patron-client relations that follow national (or in EU jargon, "geographical") lines.

All this, however, does not get us much further than the fairly obvious point - that Euro 96 made abundantly evident - that national and regional identities are not disappearing under the impact of European supra-nationalization. It is noticeable that the existing literature on global-local relations is barely cited in these articles and, for example, Stuart Hall's argument that it is precisely the forces of globalization that can provoke a defensive retrenchment into national or regional identities is hardly evident (Hall 1991). It is also important to see that the diversity in a globalizing world is often structured into certain **types** of difference - something that Wilk (1995) calls "structures of common difference". This is partly related to what Robertson (1990) terms the universalization of particularism - the universal idea that each nation should be unique - and partly to the way that capitalism commodifies difference (in this case national heritages), working with not against diversity. In his review of recent processes of change in Europe, Boissevain touches on this briefly when he mentions the popularity of nostalgia, but although he recognizes the commoditization of the past, he does not relate this to questions of diversity and homogenization.

The question of Fortress Europe is raised by several contributors. Shore and Black are worried by a racist, exclusive Europe and Mandel examines in some detail the position of Turks in Germany who now tend to be identified there as *Auslander* (foreigner) rather than *Gastarbeiter* (guestworker), or as *Mitburger* (co-citizen), rather than plain citizen. This is, of course, part and parcel of an increasing xenophobia and racism that is evident in much of Europe. But there is a certain over-simplicity to these questions which finds it hard to deal with the ambivalences and ambiguities that are part of a post-colonial world (or indeed a colonial one) and that, for example, Homi Bhabha has been very alive to in his writings (see Bhabha 1994). The ambivalence between desire and hate, between incorporation and exclusion of the other is a very evident part of, say, British popular culture in the post-war period - most manifest perhaps in music and fashion, the kinds of cultural realms that are left unconsidered in this book.

Bowman's chapter on violence in what was Yugoslavia is good and attempts to come to terms with the powerful, even rabid, emotions that national and ethnic identifications can evoke. His idea is that nationalism can work because, by creating enemies and scapegoats, it parallels the early psychological processes of infantile identity formation. This is how people identify so strongly with social discourses which "hail" them or call to them as social subjects. The parallel does not, of course, always lead to violence: the presence of economic competition and threat, of political instability and ensuing opportunism by leaders, and of pre-existing loyalties all channel and raise the emotional pitch. There are certain dangers here. The first is the threat of psychoanalytic reductionism which, I think, Bowman avoids in his emphasis on the social context and his insistence that both a social logic and a logic of identification are operating (p. 168). As Hall says: "if ideology is effective, it is because it works at **both** the rudimentary levels of psychic identity and drives **and** at the level of the discursive formation and practices which constitute the social field" (1996:7). It may be that Bowman falls into the trap of implying a ready-constituted subject who can be hailed and slotted into a social position by a discourse that supposedly constitutes the subject in the first place, but this is probably not that important for his argument. As Hall (1996) argues, it may be that this critique of the Althusserian argument on ideology and interpellation is over-zealous and leaves us at an impasse in terms of explaining how subjects are constituted. He contends that there have to be varied processes of self-recognition as a subject, some of them embryonic, some Oedipal, and some that occur later; subjects are not constituted all in one go, so to speak.

The second danger is a tendency to reify the social discourses which sketch out the positions with which people identify: where do these discourses come from? Here Bowman is less convincing and there is a tendency to separate "nationalist rhetoric" from "people" (e.g., p. 165) which threatens to lose sight of the fact that "people" are the purveyors of the rhetoric - even though Bowman sees the relationship between the two as dynamic and processual.

The fourth issue that I outlined above is that of kinship, gender and identity. Goddard gives an excellent review of studies of kinship, gender and personhood in the anthropology of Europe, attempting to move away from a reifying and distracting concern with "the Mediterranean" towards a broader concern with Europe in a comparative framework, and attempting to bring the insights of gender theory into the rather parochial concerns with male and female "roles" evident in much work on the honour/shame complex and on the family. There is not much in all this, however, that relates to themes of European identities. There is the idea that the so-called uniqueness of European kinship - its supposed closeness to simple "biology" and restriction to the "private" family realm - is not so simple, but these claims to uniqueness were, I think, more academic claims to analytic uniqueness than elements of popular European identities. More relevant is her discussion of kinship and civil society (by which she means, after Gramsci, the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private" [p. 78]). Her point is that the varied relationships found in European countries between the state and civil society in the realm of kinship and marriage may converge, but also remain diverse - and even diversify - with the process of European integration. But this remains undeveloped. The general theme that ethnic and national identities may be based in important respects on ideas about kinship and family - and of course gender - is suggested throughout, but not tackled head on. This is, perhaps, not what Goddard was setting out to do, but it is a pity because it would have brought together nicely the title (Anthropology of Europe) and the subtitle (Identities and Boundaries in Conflict).

Comas d'Argemir also tackles kinship and gender, this time from the innovative angle of care and support. This is an interesting chapter too, in its own right, but again it relates to identities only in a tangential way. She locates care as a critical element in the construction of gender difference, but the only hint of its role in other kinds of difference is the idea, again rather undeveloped, that northern European countries generally have welfare states, while southern European states have more family-based support systems - which some northern countries are now trying to emulate with "care in the community" policy initiatives. This could be an interesting area in which to develop a comparative approach to how ontological ideas about the individual and his/her relation to an entity called society underlie notions of national, ethnic or regional difference. The supposed existence of a "Western" ideal of the individual as a sovereign, autonomous being opposed to society (which, as Goddard points out, has been contrasted to Melanesian concepts of the dividual person by Marilyn Strathern) could be deconstructed in interesting ways within Europe and related to national and ethnic differences in the ways people think about persons and sociality through the concepts of kinship.

Popular culture, as I mentioned, is not discussed much in this volume. Some might object that, if this term is understood to mean the culture of (ordinary) people, then it is indeed discussed at length. I am, however, referring to the term as used, for example, by the British school of Cultural Studies - that is popular, urban, commercial culture: pop music, T.V. and other media, sport, fashion and so on. I hold no brief for limiting the term popular culture to these sorts of activities, but as long as anthropologists neglect these central aspects of people's lives, there will need to be a separate term with which to refer to them. This, in my view, is a shame.

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Martin **STOKES** (ed). 1994. *Ethnicity, Identity and Music: The Musical Construction of Place.* Oxford: Berg. Pp. 211. **ISBN 0 85496 877 6** (cloth) **ISBN 1 85973 041 8** (paper).

REVIEWED BY JOHN HUTNYK*

TONE-DEAF ANTHROPOLOGIES.

It is impossible today, I think, to not feel a little uncomfortable when Anthropologists talk about ethnicity. There is always a discordant tone in writings about what people are doing out in the world when these doings are written up by people safely ensconced in elite institutions. That these people are fieldworkers who do get out of their offices on occasion, and in the case of this volume - on musical ethnicities - include amongst their number some seriously proficient musicians, does not make the thing less problematic. Martin Stokes confronts this dilemma right from the beginning - noting that the Western "use of the Orient" as a basis for its various fantasies and political exploitations has traded in musical forms (the images and sounds of Turkish Delight) in the past and today (p. 4-5), and that music is intensely implicated in political demarcations and struggles - noting specifically the role of institutions like universities, conservatories and archives in state control over dissemination and definition of national (musical) identities (p. 10-11). Stokes challenges the previous "tone-deafness" of Anthropology in a way that takes seriously the cultural politics of music as a "place" of struggle over identity. Although I would question the attributes of this aural disability and its "cure" in location studies (see later), Stokes provides a cogent critique of folklore romanticism in deployment of the term "ethnic" and calls for more closer understandings of the local conditions, languages and contexts of musical cultures. Somewhat incongruously, this comes with a fairly staid rendition of the project of understanding ethnicity as one of analysing the "construction, maintenance and negotiation of boundaries" (p. 6) and thus an exploration of the "central anthropological concern with classification" (p. 6) insofar as music is used to negotiate "identities". Such "classification" perspectives hark back to an old-style anthropology interested in boundaries that I find quite repetitive, and which I think neglects the dynamic flows and transgressions of cultural practice, especially music, which in the essays of this volume make for the most interesting passages.

This in a volume that early on cites Lévi-Strauss's excellent section on music in *From Honey to Ashes* (while ignoring his essays in *The View from Afar*) seems to be contrapuntally arranged against calls to rethink our own (our = the West's) distinctions between music and speech, between ritual and the technical, etc., etc (p. 2). Certainly Martin Chapman's proposal that we listen to music for ways in which it tells us the politics of identity is a useful reminder - and his discussion of his decision, along with like-minded colleagues coming through Oxford Anthropology in the mid-seventies, to do "anthropology-at-home" echoes resoundingly with his other useful critical points in his chapter on Celtic music - where he notes that "Romanticism is not primarily a creative process, but a re-evaluative process ... in the centre, of peripheral features. The motivation to the re-evaluation is that those in the centre who carry it out, benefit from it" (p. 41). This adds much to our understanding of the actual processes of romantic ethnicity-mongering, in this case in music, and how things from the periphery may be appropriated and turned into fashion by the powerful in the centre (with appropriate distinctions and complexities within these broad categories acknowledged also).

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In certain ways I enjoyed the contradictions of this book more than the individual essays - however all of these have important contributions to make, and are jammed full of engaging refrains, dynamic and resonant points, arranged with skill and attention to harmony in the composition and orchestration of a sustained debate. There is no question that the book is an accomplished result from a series of seminars in Oxford and Belfast (initiated by Edwin Ardener, convened by Shirley Ardener, Tamara Dragadze and Jonothan Webber) and suggests that the exchanges of those seminars will now reverberate further through anthropology and ethnomusicology in Britain. John Baily's narrates a history of the synthesis that is the contemporary Afghan national musical style and how this relates to Afghan national identity. Along the way offering a report of musical innovation amongst refugee musicians in Peshawar which entailed the imitation on *tabla* of artillery and firearms in the increasingly pyrotechnic Pashtun style (p. 59). Zdzislaw Mach's discussion of Chopin and Polish national identity is framed neatly between two images of another important national symbol, the flag - firstly the image of the flag of the USA placed on the floor of the Institute of Art in Chicago in 1989 by an unnamed "black communist" in such a way that gallery visitors had to step upon it (signifying contempt of the system), and secondly, the avoidance of the red worker's flag by contemporary Polish trade unions and worker's parties because of its association with the Stalinist administration - a taint that did not extend to Chopin, despite having also been deployed by that administration as signifier of patriotic Poland (p. 69).

Suzel Ana Reily takes up the theme which holds these otherwise disparate papers together to explore the role of Brazilian ethnomusicology in the formation of national identity (p. 76), noting along the way that Dina Lévi-Strauss had once been asked to organise a course in ethnography and folklore at a Brazilian music institute (p. 90). Reily's discussion of the "place of music in the revolution", the "national cultural project of democratisation" and the failure of art in the service of national ideology is perhaps the most resoundingly spirited of these essays. Martin Stokes takes up the travelling performer in a paper that suggests many further potential improvisations on the theme of the "out-of-place" musician, the role of "world music" as commodification and the recreation of authentic localities (p. 98), and musical tourism (p. 99) and this discussion has obvious connections to the contribution by Sara Cohen who follows the Liverpool sound (those mop-top ethnics) down the train-track to London and the - can't get it out of my head, "Ferry down the Mersey" refrain. The focus of industry executives on certain localities and local identities contrasts with her discussion of the transnationalism and transnational ownership of the recording industry (p. 130) in ways that go beyond naive discussions of classification and difference in the construction of identity (p. 132), despite hesitations. This attention to locality and music raises interesting questions for this book overall: in the context of Chapman's points about the "tone-deafness" of much earlier anthropological study it is curious that the reassertion of the aural "dimension" of culture comes, throughout this volume, alongside a greater attention to geographic metaphors and interests - even in the title of the book - as focus upon "place" so often attends to a visual code. In Cohen's chapter the necessary overlaps and imbrications of these themes cannot be avoided. Cohen also briefly mentions Hip Hop, Soul and Techno in a refreshingly contemporary way that escapes the more ethnomusically traditional contributors to this volume. (The Hip Hop/ethnicity connection would certainly repay discussion given debates within the global Hip Hop community of its sources and meanings, its links to African storytelling traditions, its appropriation by post-Bhangra Asian rappers, its success in South Africa with the Prophets of Da City crew at Mandela's inauguration, and its French, Canadian, Australian manifestations - all travelling well beyond the "original" Bronx and Sth Central media-gangsta "ethnicities" of inner-urban USA).

Fiona Magowan's detailed presentation of the complexity of Yolngu *yothu-yindi* concepts of land and relatedness operates within a frame that might have offered more if its traditional focus on the ethnography of kinship in Arnhem Land was mediated by a similarly considered approach to the place of the band Yothu-Yindi in the wider commercial music industry and political scene in Australia. While it is useful to point out the connections between *yothu-yindi*, *Yirritja-Dhuwa* moiety clan membership and other staples of the anthropology of Arnhem Land, this story does not capture the extent of debates about what is "traditional", what is important in music and politics, how these matters relate to not only Northern Land Councils and the like, but also inner-urban Kooris and other political formations, and how all this is related to questions of the "consumption" of culture by audiences, anthropologists and other Europeans. These are also significant parts of the story of contemporary Aboriginal popular music. To applaud the ways empathy for the "Aboriginal cause" might be achieved amongst non-Aboriginal audiences via presentation of "semi-stereotypical images of traditional Aboriginal culture", painted bodies and chap sticks, and allowing feelings of being "part of the tribal situation" (p. 152) would not be considered viable nor a "model for a parallel discourse between all Aboriginal communities and the world music industry" (p. 154), by more militant Aboriginal bands like, for example, Warumpi Band or Mixed Relations. Certainly the recognition that "the world music phenomenon has constructed global musical 'difference' in ways which suit the strategies of multinational corporate industry" (p. 153) would serve to undermine any overly optimistic assessment of the ways Yothu-Yindi as a band can escape the co-options of corporate and political institutions and present an effective demand for justice. (Having the band's leader nominated Australian of the Year during the International Year of Indigenous Peoples and shaking hands with Prime Minister Keating overlooking the Opera House on Australia Day probably did more for record company sales units than it did to redress the socio-economic disenfranchisement of Australia's Aboriginal peoples).

Peter Parkes' discussion of the enclave of Kalasha communities in Northern Pakistan owes much to recent work by Mary Douglas on "enclave culture" and operates very much within the anthropological interest in classification of the other chapters of this collection. Assessing the viability of a rather anarchic orchestration of personal and collective identities through performance and song, Parkes finds an "aesthetically coherent experience of segmentary integration" under the "benign symbolic dominance of senior 'ceremonial' elders" (p. 171-2). In other words, festivals organise the community by enacting social processes and rivalries in an egalitarian way that assures the authority of the organising elders (p. 182) - anarcho-hierarchy! Helene La Rue provides the final chapter and gives the book a conclusion somehow out-of-place but wholly appropriate to the collection. She attends to the time spent learning to play instruments and how this is related to status (p. 191) but takes as her ethnographic community the characters of novels like *Pride and Prejudice*. This investigation is not out of place because it is the only one that deals with gender, nor because it is literary and historical rather than anthropological, and also not because it deals with the previously unmentioned ethnicity of middle-England, but because, I'd suggest, in its concern with how people learn their instruments its level of musicological focus is much closer and detailed than any of the more general and contexted discussions that come before. As such it appeals to me as a creative coda to a collection that promises to inspire further volumes of musical elaboration and cadenced ethnomusicological themes.

Tariq **MODOOD**, Sharon **BEISHON** and Satnam **VIRDEE**. 1994. *Changing Ethnic Identities*. London: Policy Studies Institute. **ISBN 0 85374 646 x.**

REVIEWED BY BOBBY SAYYID*

This book sets out to discover the significance of ethnicity for Britain's **ethnicised** minorities. It seeks to explore how these minorities project their ethnic affiliations in different contexts (family, community, religion, marriage partners and language...). Using qualitative survey techniques the authors interviewed 74 respondents from two-generations of **ethnicised** minorities. Given the small sample of their field work the authors are careful to note that their conclusions should be treated as being illustrative rather than representative. Their aim is to show the complex configurations of identity that make up, what was once described unproblematically as, Britain's black population. The hope is that this study will act as a pilot for a larger exercise to be conducted jointly by PSI and Social and Community Planning Research.

Tariq Modood's recent work has been directed at aiming to demonstrate the inadequacies of the conventional descriptions of Britain's post-War settlers. It is, therefore, not surprising that the research design of this project reflects these concerns. The authors are keen to show that there is no monolithic "black" subject position into which one can dragoon the complex diversities of ethnic identification in Britain. Such attempts, they feel, are products of a U.S based social science approach which fails to take into account the different circumstances in the United States and United Kingdom.

Some of the research findings are interesting and on the whole the exercise is informative. But, there are number of theoretical difficulties which the book raises but fails to address. Most of these issues arise from the lack of theorization around one of the central categories used in the book: ethnicity. We are told at various points how ethnicity relates to other forms of identification: "The family is an important component of ethnicity" (p.16); or "Marriage is one of the principal ways in which ethnic boundaries are drawn and maintained..." (p.64), but, we are never told what, exactly, the authors mean by ethnicity. Because the work is actually concerned with exploring the means by which settler groups and certain cultural practices are marked out as ethnic (in other words, the constitution of ethnic identity seems to be the central concern of the book), we cannot rely on common-sense notions of ethnicity since these notions are precisely the ones which the work purports to be testing. Therefore, it would have been necessary for the authors to make theoritically explicit the notion of ethnicity they are using.

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The lack of any sustained discussion of what ethnicity is and how it differs from other forms of human identification becomes even more problematic since the authors insist on making a distinction between cultural and colour racism. While one can be broadly sympathetic with the underlying aim of the authors to demonstrate that racism comes in many shapes and that it does not affect the **ethnicised** minorities in the same way; this aim is not well served by making such a sharp distinction between cultural racism and colour racism. The authors suggest that the former type of racism is what "South Asians" suffer while the latter is what "Caribbeans" experience. While the authors' intention is clearly to try specify a range of racist experiences this division between colour and culture has a number of unfortunate and perhaps unintentional consequences. To argue that there is a cultural racism implies that "colour racism" does not have a significant cultural dimension. Which tends to suggest those who suffer from "colour racism" lack a culture, or at least a distinctive culture. The distinction between culture and colour is too close to the 19th century discourse on "race and place". It seems to reproduce the idea that Asia because it had monuments and writing therefore it had civilization, while Africa lacking both (sic) was in a state of savage nature. It is a pity that the authors do not engage more clearly with writings which would see the re-description of the human population into "races" not as a transparent reading of reality, but rather as a highly political and rather problematical operation. Such an engagement would help fill out their ambition of trying to chart the changes in ethnic identities by providing a more rigorous theorization of their framework. I think the book would have benefited by having a more clearly theorized approach to its categories, by demonstrating a greater awareness of "Caribbean" cultural practices, and also including an index. Clearly, there is a need to understand how **ethnicised** minorities narrate themselves outside the context of hegemonic discourse of "whiteness". The achievement of this book is to focus attention on the limited ability of dominant discourses of racism/anti-racism to constitute the subjectivities of Britain's post-war settlers.

Michael **KEITH** and Steve **PILE** (eds). 1993. *Place and the Politics of Identity*. London: Routledge. Pp. 235 + viii. **ISBN 0 415 09008 3** (cloth) **ISBN 0 415 09009 1** (paper).

REVIEWED BY BORUT TELBAN

What was once called the inter- or multidisciplinary approach is now, in the age of fully developed "post...isms", realized in the broad field of cultural studies in which people from different academic backgrounds raise similar questions and advance common interests. This book, in which the majority of the contributors are geographers, addresses the relationship between geography, cultural politics and sociology, and within these subjects the relationship between place, politics and identity in particular.

As the switch of attention from mind to body in poststructualist thought is a distortion of a life-world (as was an exclusive stress on the former), so is the switch of focus from temporality to spatiality in many postmodern writings. The contributors to this volume (Harvey, Massey, Soja and Hooper in particular) do not simply dismiss temporality in favour of spatiality (they are somewhat against intellectually hegemonic historiography), but call for deconstruction of outmoded binary oppositions and dichotomies of any sort (white/black, male/female, heterosexual/homosexual) the better to explore the political practice of everyday life.

The book is composed of two introductions, nine chapters and a short conclusion. "The Politics of Place" and "The Place of Politics" are the titles of the two editors' introductions. One of their primary objectives is to show that abstract social relations can be represented in concrete, geographical and historical form. In Part 1, drawing on the writings of Fredric Jameson, Ed Soja, bell hooks, Walter Benjamin and others, the editors argue that space is an active, constitutive and not merely abstract arena, in which things happen. For them the term "spatiality" captures "the ways in which the social and spatial are inextricably realized one in the other" (p.6) and where there is a "complex relationship between the so-called real and the so-called metaphorical" (p.9) spaces. Two examples discussed in this first part are drawn from the politics of urban regeneration in London's Docklands and from the politics of diaspora. In Part Two the editors look at the spatial debates of political theorists. Their "two ways" spatialized reading of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* is inspired by theoretical discussions of Henri Lefebvre and Ernesto Laclau. They suggest that "spatialities have always produced landscapes that are loaded with ethical, epistemological and aestheticized meanings" (p.26). Keith and Pile reject the notions of pure knowledge and of pure difference and argue that identity is always an incomplete process and that all spatialities are political.

While some of the contributors discuss the politics of identity and spatiality in abstract terms, others, like David Harvey, situate their discussions in the context of particular events. Harvey centres his study around an incident in September 1991 when the Imperial Foods plant, in a small town of Hamlet, North Carolina, caught fire. Twenty five of the 200 workers died and 56 were seriously injured. The incident revealed harsh truths about employment conditions and workplace safety, about "raw class politics of an exploitative sort" (p.44). These events, however, received no media or political attention, not even from Women's or African-American organizations despite the fact that the majority of victims were African-American women. After examining the problem of social justice from different theoretical perspectives, Harvey concludes by emphasizing the necessity of construing the "universality condition" in dialectical relation with particularities of difference. Conceptions of social justice cannot be imposed hierarchically but have to be continually negotiated. He goes on to say that progressive analytical, theoretical and political entities should take into their account those processes which gave rise to the problems instead of merely looking at differentiated identities once they have arisen.

Sarah Radcliffe examines the meanings of social and geographical spaces in the construction of new identities of women in Latin America. She focuses her study around the military dictatorship in Argentina (1976 - 1983) when the army entered private homes and arrested civilians, one third of whom were women. Metaphors of "public" and "private" spaces serve the author in her analysis of how women in Argentina formed a new community of resistance (called *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*) and in this way initiated a return to democracy.

By focusing on Carol Lake's book of short stories *Rosehill: Portraits from a Midlands City* and the morally-charged concept of community, George Revill examines the relationship between place (seen as fluid, permeable and conflictual), personal identity and story-telling. Doreen Massey analyses the use of the term "space" and its multiple definitions. She (like Hesse in the following chapter) takes a critical view of the opposition between time and space proposed by Ernesto Laclau in *New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time*, in which he takes a static view of space (as opposed to time) without temporality and without any possibility of politics. Massey summarizes discussions of social/spatial relations: not only is space socially constructed (the theoretical view of the 1970s), but society is spatially constructed too (the view of the 1980s). For her current Western culture relates time to history, progress, civilization, science, politics, reason, order and control - all seen as "male"; and relates space to stasis, reproduction, body, aesthetics, emotion, and disorder - all seen as "female". She, acknowledging Einstein's theory, argues for the interrelation between the two (i.e. a four-dimensional space-time) where space produces history and politics as much as time produces geography.

We could say that the emphasis on space in the past studies took different directions: some looked at it from phenomenological perspective of lived experience (the lived space); others addressed space from social, symbolic and structuralist perspective (the social space); yet others, i.e. postmodernists, see space as an artifact of political control (the space politic). It is the last one which is predominantly addressed in this book, not least under the influence of thinkers such as Foucault, for example, who wrote extensively about regulation and control of individuals and social groups in industrial societies. Regardless of their emphasis on the interrelation between the different perspectives from which the space may be viewed, the index at the end of the book contains no reference to "movements" or "paths", which are characteristic of a lived space, while "space" itself represents the longest entry. There is, however, emphasis on travel in Smith's and Katz's contribution in which they explore the interconnectedness of metaphorical and material space. And again, there is an emphasis on journeying in Hesse's discussion of Black politics in Britain. It would be a commonsence to think that people who are on the move remember and evaluate space in terms of movements and paths. However, it springs to mind (as a speculation, of course) that the opposite is the case: people on the move emphasize, remember and evaluate space through sites and places, while settled people emphasize, remember and evaluate it through paths and movements. Something, I believe, worth exploration in the future.

There are a few places where a reader might feel uneasy. For example, in "Locating Identity Politics", Liz Bondi casts a critical eye on both Marx and Freud. She does not refer to their own works, however, but takes her inspiration from secondary sources. In the contribution by Hesse there is an embarrassing mistake (surely not a typo, considering no fewer then seven readers were acknowledged to have read this article before publication): references to Dreyfus and Rabinow persistently nominate the latter as Rainbow.

Today the realm of abstract ideas and concepts is also lived (as myth is lived in Melanesian societies, for example) and not just thought about. Considering how much the Western World is preoccupied with the present, there is almost no "time" to take one's time and reflect thoroughly on the past or the future. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why space has received such attention in recent postmodern thought. Because it matters, for us, here and now. As an anthropologist, I think immediately of those peoples around the world who do not have these kind of concepts of space and time and even perhaps do not have words for them. One has to remember, therefore, that the discourse on spatiality deploying a richly spatialized vocabulary represents a fairly recent Euro-American development in the history of ideas. For an ethnographer who works among non-industrial societies this book is not refreshingly argumentative. The social construction of space and the spatial construction of society, for instance, were analysed already by Evans-Pritchard in *The Nuer* (1940) while the concept of spacetime was elaborated by Nancy Munn in her study of value transformation in a Massim society in Papua New Guinea. What is new, however, is the jargon, the prose: hard to follow, with too many big words and too many references to big names.

Anthony **COHEN**. 1994. *Self Consciousness: An Alternative Anthropology of Identity*.
London: Routledge. Pp. 217 + viii.
ISBN 0 415 08323 0 (cloth)
ISBN 0 415 08324 9 (paper).

REVIEWED BY MARK HARRIS*

This important book argues for locating the self conscious person at the centre of anthropological analyses - someone who is aware of herself enacting culture in common with other selves, and who is forever critically reflecting on that culture: the authorial self (p.42). This self conscious person is not just the writer of texts, but with equal importance it should be those who get written about. Why if we have given so much importance to our own reflexivity do we deny this same self consciousness in others? In questioning this gross oversight, Cohen is attempting to capture what has been traditionally deemed either inaccessible or irrelevant to the project of the social sciences. As such Cohen convincingly demonstrates how such a perspective helps us to understand the nature of society better, and to revise many of methodological and theoretical problems in the social sciences.

Whilst Cohen's argument is sophisticated and extremely well developed, it is also attractively mundane. The idea of self consciousness captures the common sensical notion that we are all simultaneously alike and yet different, anthropologically and personally. If I say I am English, I am expressing a vague sense of a shared identity with other English people. I am clearly not stating I am like all English people and that I accept all things English, to the point of sublimating myself to some anonymising higher order (p.120). I will always be an unique individual, thinking about people and things in the world, and I experience things no-one else ever has and ever will. As Cohen says, this does not mean that society does not "continuously intrude upon the individual's capacity for self-direction. But that we should not assume that individuals are complicit to the extent of abandoning their will to self-direction" (p.23). And so for Cohen society is to the individual as form is to meaning. Thus the self and society are mutually implicated: we cannot properly study the latter without the former (p.x).

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The implication is that anthropologists cannot assume a uniform consciousness across people in a so called society and each self conscious person may have a number of shared identities of differing ranges, scales and significance. As such the book is a plea against "the facile generalisation of individuals into cultures" (p.118) and the Durkheimian based notion of society. This is where the book works best, as an acute critique of some of the main premises of British social anthropology: "The societies we have constructed have been overordered, implausibly systematised, bloodlessly regimented by organisational principles; and we therefore have good reason to doubt their veracity" (p.109).

The main starting point for Cohen is his claim concerning the problematic nature of self-hood. With the arguable exception of Mauss, the author maintains that the self has either been taken as a naturally given category in the construction of society or that it is made by society, and as such is socialised as a blank slate self in order to become competent in that society. Cohen claims that here anthropologists have confused the self with the person (the social construct), making each individual a miniature version of society. Society and its workings were always the analytical problems here. What Cohen refreshingly demonstrates is a renewed perspective and how the society/individual interface is revived it. By focusing on self consciousness we can think anew about old questions: how can groups cohere when their members perceive significant internal differences? (p.22). He suggests we move inductively from self to society, rather than deductively from society to individual (p.29), reasoning that the self is essential dynamo of social process (p.50).

It is clear then that Cohen wants to present an argument to undermine much of modern anthropology (as also indicated in the subtitle). Even Goffman and Giddens, who locate the agency of the self at the centre of their analyses, do not escape criticism, on the basis that they do not go far enough and their latent Durkheimianism.

The book is exceptionally well presented in mostly non-technical language, making it easily accessible to undergraduates as well as to those outside anthropology, but the sophistication and importance of the arguments makes it pertinent to graduates and professors alike.

The structure of the argument is about as systematic as could be possible, drawing on a formidable range of ethnographies from all geographical areas. The argument while easily summarised requires extended demonstration, which means the book becomes repetitive and perhaps predictable. After the introduction the reader is introduced to successive re-analyses of ethnographies, from political oratory, to rituals of initiation, to other markers of social status, which affect self consciousness, such as marriage and old age. After these first four chapters, the book then moves onto looking at world-views, individuality and identities. These last three chapters are about as polemically and passionately argued as can be found anywhere in anthropology. Given the current political climate in Britain, dominated by reactionary notions of individualism, Cohen is bound to enter into a polemic with these views. He does so conscientiously; the result is to give the book a far reaching appeal above a textbook in academic anthropology, almost becoming a political manifesto. By way of ending, Cohen considers the importance of the self in three novels. In doing so, he highlights rather well the fallacy upon which so many ethnographies are based: that writers cannot seriously include other people's self consciousness in their writings. Novelists obviously can and must, since without such consideration social life and its negotiations by selves could not be accessed, "institutions cannot be understood without the selves which create and populate them" (p.188).

Since this review is to be included in a special issue dealing with nationalism, I shall focus in more detail on what Cohen has to say about these topics. The attention to the self in Western societies works best because of the multiplicity of domains in which it is embedded. The argument from the beginning has ambiguity and flexibility built in. Whereas, the tendency is for anthropologists to describe all people of one ethnic identity as being basically the same and to claim the assertion of ethnicity as a tactical posture of boundary marking. Cohen's point is that this perspective reduces internal heterogeneity and cannot account for multilocality-vocality. Further, it ignores autobiography; the self's capacity to make itself. So he suggests we need to break down our collective representations of identity and use the concept of boundary, deeply embedded in our discipline, between selves as well as between ethnicities and cultures. Cohen argues that it is the concept of boundary which is so crucial here, because it addresses the essence of the task, to extend our limited consciousness in order to comprehend another's (p.125). By travelling across the boundaries between the self and the other, on personal and anthropological levels, we can fulfil this task and begin to understand how difference and identity is created.

Since the book attempts an interdisciplinary perspective, it is surprising that there is virtually no attention paid to any of the philosophical and psychological literature on the nature of consciousness and the self. Freud or Lacan are not even mentioned, but perhaps more damingly neither is there any integration of work in the cognitive sciences. However, these omissions only act to purify Cohen's dogmatic attention to practice of culture by selves. Nevertheless, I came away with the sense I actually knew little about the nature of self consciousness, in what sense do we make meaning for ourselves, do we have to be aware of our creativity, decision making and problem solving for them to be part of Cohen's critical anthropology of the self? While the gendered implications of consciousness are considered, they are not as developed as should be expected: Cohen's self conscious person is basically ungendered and without sexual interests.

However, this book and its argument provides a new and important perspective on how to think about and present our ethnographic data. The breadth of examples and clarity of argument will appeal to all those in the social sciences and humanities, and it should become a key text in the development of social and cultural anthropology.



ERNEST ANDRÉ

1925•1995

GELLNER

Ernest André Gellner was born in Paris, the son of a Jewish Czech lawyer. He spent his early childhood in Czechoslovakia and moved to England in 1939. After finishing his undergraduate studies at Oxford, he obtained his PhD from the London School of Economics. Following his early fieldwork in Morocco he developed a profound interest in the study of Middle Eastern society and Islam. After becoming the William Wyse Chair of Social Anthropology at Cambridge, Gellner took the chance to fine-tune his interest in the issues of nation, state and nationalism, and later in his life, in socioeconomic change in Eastern Europe. In 1992 he retired from Cambridge to become the Head of the Centre for the Study of Nationalism at the Central European University in Prague. He published many important articles and books, among which **Nations and Nationalism** (1983) is perhaps the most influental.

Photograph by Ashley Ashwood, © The Financial Times

II. REFERENCES

All contributions must be edited according to the bellow standard. Please do not, unless specifically otherwise agreed, include references you did not use in the text. The bibliographic list must be titled REFERENCES.

References are listed in alphabetic order. Several volumes/papers of one author must be listed chronologically. Multiple references of one author, published in the same year, must be referred to as a, b, c, ... (e.g. 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). References to sources in the text must be in parenthesis, with name, year of publication, and page number(s) (e.g. Smith 1995:55-57). Do not use footnotes for references, except for unpublished archive sources or personal correspondence notes.

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ISBN 961-90451-0-6