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

DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
Roy A. Rappaport

TIME-OUT
Thomas Hylland Eriksen

STUDY THEME
Borut Telban

INTERVIEW
Anne Knudsen

LJUBLJANA 1995

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Editors' preface

When the Slovene Anthropological Society (Društvo antropologov Slovenije, DAS/SAS) *was founded in 1992, it was established as the successor of two major previous societies: the Slovene remnants of the dissolved anthropological association of the late Yugoslavia, which was predominantly a union of physical (biological) anthropologists, and the* Section for Social anthropology at the Slovene Sociological Association, *which was founded by a handful of junior teachers and researchers in social anthropology back in 1989. The newly established* Slovene Anthropological Society *began immediately to concern itself with many pressing issues of anthropological teaching and research in Slovenia, and to actively, and at times decisively, support the building of professional institutions and activities. Thus among other, the Society lent undivided support to the growth of the postgraduate and graduate programmes in anthropology at the* Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, *the institution where social anthropology was first taught in Slovenia (beginning in 1969) and survived the unfavourable times of the old regime largely due to Professor Stane Južnič's, the Society's President, inestimable single-handed efforts. We also initiated a series of actions in order to bring together several scattered University chairs' teachers and individuals who in one way or another sought to shift, or else develop, their professional work to enter the anthropological discipline. This latter process, inevitably erratic and complex, and sometimes perhaps unduly prone to conflict of all kinds of interests, is still underway and will hopefully turn out to have been productive. All the more so since anthropology in Slovenia still lacks the most basic of all structures, a stable financial support scheme in both teaching and research that would allow not only the keeping up with the work, but to adequately provide the coming generations with opportunities for professional careers.*

It was largely with these coming generations in mind that the Society outlined the programme of one of its central activities, the publishing. Space had to be provided for our own members, especially those more junior, to publish their research results. And, recognised was the need for a forum where colleagues from abroad could contribute to the shaping of anthropological debates in Slovenia. The Society's Committee on Publications *had determined that what was called for is a periodical publication in English that would closely follow with its policy of publication the ongoing research and teaching in Slovenia, in order to supply students, teachers and researchers with immediately relevant information and discussions. Finally, it was acknowledged quite simply that every association of people with a shared interest must establish ways of reflecting in some permanent way the thinking and concerns that bring them together.*

The decision to go for an all-English periodical after four volumes in Slovene that went under the same name as this new review, Anthropological Notebooks (Antropološki zvezki)[1], *and a monograph (the first in the series of* Antropološka knjiga, Anthropological

1 The first two volumes, one a compilation of papers mainly from ex-attendants of anthropology courses at the *Faculty of Social*

Books)[2] *was not brought about easily. Several implications were carefully considered. Of a most practical concern was the smallness of Slovene market in social science and humanities press; the continuation of all-Slovene publishing would mean an inevitable commercial loss and consequently, total dependence on external financial resources - which are notoriously scarce in our line of work, and such dependency likely to cause substantial delays in publishing, as was the case even with this issue. An all-English publication, on the other hand, is not only in accord with the widespread policy of scientific press in comparable small native language communities, but also stands some chance on international market. Publishing anthropological texts in Slovene, however, in the interest of helping the development of anthropological terminology in Slovene language, was also recognised as the goal of prime importance. Beginning with the 1996 issues then, the AN will start publishing appendices containing important texts in the discipline in Slovene translation.*

Another important impulse towards, and support for, such a decision came from our foreign colleagues with whom many of our members conferred, formally and informally, at several occasions. As a result, not only does the Society have an international programme board; several renown professionals from various countries were willing to act as members of the Editorial Board *of the* Anthropological Notebooks, *a body that is currently under formation, contribute as authors, and become our regular members. Our first and foremost special thanks is due Professor Roy A. Rappaport, our* Distinguished Lecturer *in this first issue and our Society's* Programme Board *member, for the contribution, for the very kind prologue to his lecture, and for invaluable advises, enormous patience and unwavering friendship that go years back and without which so much of our work, past and present, would lack the decisive encouragement.*

The present experimental issue, logged as the first in the first year of publication and supervised by the Society's Committee on Publications *serving as the provisional Editorial Board, endeavoured to set standard rubrics for the review. As our kind reader can see, these are presently six: the* ***Distinguished Lecture*** *is followed by a lengthier discussion on the problems of anthropological groping with its subject by Thomas Eriksen - a theme we thought more than appropriate to be the first in the series of* ***Time-Out for Disciplinary Self-Reflection*** *contributions. These we planned to be dedicated to the discipline's history, theoretical and methodological problems. The single most exhaustive section of the review is reserved for what we call our* ***Study Theme****; contributions under this name will present reviews of specialised bodies of knowledge in anthropology. We hope that our future Study Themes will prove as worthy an information and interpretation source as Borut Telban's on anthropologies of emotion and sickness is in this issue. Our next rubric, the* ***Interview****, will seek to present colleagues from various fields in anthropology on a more personal basis - and we could hardly have chosen a personality more compelling and professionally versatile than Anne Knudsen to initiate the series. The remaining sections of the review are reserved for* ***Reports****, whereby the present issue's selection is but skeletal; we hope to expand from research, study and conferences reports to include other standard rubrics such*

Sciences (edited by Vesna V. Godina), and the second, Vesna V. Godina's monograph on socialisation theory in Talcott Parsons, were published by the Society's predecessor, the *Section for Social Anthropology*. The third volume (ed. by Irena Šumi) was published by the SAS and brought various contributions from Slovene and foreign authors centered around the concept of culture in anthropology.

2 Monograph by Janez Kolenc on Slovene political culture.

as book reviews, and in due course, the bibliographies of our members, the review's own bibliography, substantial reactions to published contributions, information on the Society's activities structure, membership and the like, as well as the aforementioned ***Appendices*** *with translations to Slovene.*

There is, however, a contribution in the present issue that we hope will not be all that regular: the fond memories of Roger Martin Keesing as written by his former student, Borut Telban, speak about the loss of an outstanding professional in the world anthropological community, who was also an enthusiastic friend of Slovene anthropology, and was our contributor to the previous, Slovene book-issue of Anthropological Notebooks *(No. 3).*

With a final word of thanks to all authors in this issue, let us invite all our readers to contribute to the Notebooks *that we hope will merit a favourable reception with colleagues at home and abroad.*

Irena Šumi
Duška Knežević-Hočevar

LAW, MEANING AND HOLISM

ROY A. RAPPAPORT*

The inauguration of a new journal can be likened to the opening of a new road, one that may be able to lead us from "Here" (wherever that may be) to some "There" to which we aspire. As such it is an occasion for both celebration and reflection, a time to recall where we have been, to understand where we are and to imagine, if not our destination, the general direction toward which we would like to move. The plural pronoun "we" may be misleading, for the present is hardly a time of widespread agreement about anything in anthropology, and it would be unreasonable to expect any greater consensus about anthropology's future. Each of us must, therefore, conceive of that future for himself or herself, but each of us probably does entertain some sort of vision for the discipline as a whole. My vision (which comes out of a past concerned with ecology and religion and a present increasingly concerned with contemporary social and ecological problems) remains vague (as visions probably should), but in most general terms it is for anthropology to become a science, a discipline, an inclusive way of understanding, the characteristics of which reflect those of the complex species it studies, a species that lives by meanings it itself must construct in a world without intrinsic meaning but subject to natural law.

I.

Two traditions, each corresponding in a rough sort of way to one or the other of these two aspects of humanity - its subordination to law on the one hand, and its need to construct meanings on the other - have proceeded in anthropology since its earliest days. One objective in its aspirations, and inspired by the biological sciences, seeks explanation and is concerned to discover, at the least, causes, and even, in the thought of some, general laws of social and cultural life. The other, influenced by philosophy, linguistics, comparative religion and literary studies, and open to more subjectively derived knowledge, attempts interpretation, seeks to elucidate meanings, and is staunchly relativist. We are as much descendants of Vico as of Descartes.[1] Our ancestry lies in both the enlightenment and in what Berlin (1981) calls the "counter-enlightenment". Because the idea of the counter-enlightenment is much less familiar than that of the enlightenment, it will be useful to recall the opposition as Isaiah Berlin formulated it. As for the Enlightenment, Berlin tells us:

* **ROY ABRAM RAPPAPORT**, b. 1926, is Valgreen Professor for the Study of Human Understanding at the University of Michigan. His fields of interest are ecology, religion, socioeconomic grounds of environmental degradation, contemporary social problems, the structure of maladaptive systems. Fieldwork: Papua New Guinea. Books: *Pigs as Ancestors* (1967, 1984); *Ecology, Meaning and Religion* (1979).

1 Much attention has been paid Giambattista Vico's work in past decades. See for instance Giorgio Tagliacozzo's edited volume *Giambattista Vico. An International Symposium*, Baltimore 1969, Johns Hopkins Press, which includes forty-one contributions from authors representing a wide range of disciplines; another edited by Tagliacozzo in 1981: *Vico: Past and Present*, Humanities Press, of about the same dimension but rather more heavily weighted towards philosophers; and more recently, Marcel Danesi (ed.), *Giambattista Vico and Anglo-American Science*, Berlin and New York 1995, Mouton de Gruyter, with ten contributors. - I would also further cite the works of Sir Isaiah Berlin: *Vico and Herder*, New York 1976, Hogarth Press; and *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, New York, 1991, Knopf (see also *References*).

> The central doctrines of the progressive French thinkers, whatever their disagreements among themselves, rested on the belief, rooted in the ancient doctrine of natural law, that human nature was fundamentally the same in all times and places; that local and historical variations were unimportant compared with the constant central core in terms of which human beings could be defined as a species, like animals, or plants, or minerals; that there were universal human goals; that a logically connected structure of laws and generalizations susceptible of demonstration could be constructed and replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance, laziness, guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy, and, above all, the "interested error" maintained by the rulers of mankind and largely responsible for the blunders, vices, and misfortunes of humanity.
>
> It was further believed that methods similar to those of Newtonian physics... could be applied with ... success to the fields of ethics, politics and human relationships in general... (1981:1)

As for the counter-enlightenment, Berlin continues:

> Against this there persisted the doctrine that went back to the Greek sophists, Protagoras, Antiphon and Critius, that beliefs involving value-judgments and the institutions founded upon them, rested not on discoveries of objective and unalterable facts, but on human opinion, which was variable and differed between different societies and at different times; that moral and political values, and in particular justice and social arrangements in general, rested on fluctuating human convention... It seemed to follow that no universal truths, established by scientific methods, that is, truths that anyone could verify by the use of proper methods, anywhere at any time, could in principle be established in human affairs (1981:2).

Given such roots it is not surprising that the two traditions have not always lived easily or happily together. The two, indeed, relate to each other like the spouses in a marriage that wasn't exactly made in heaven, but wasn't contracted in hell either, a marriage in which there are some irreducible incompatibilities but in which the partners are in deep, although not always acknowledged, need of each other, a marriage which stumbles along, through continual bickering, occasional brawls, frequent compromises, passionate extra-marital affairs (for instance, with literary criticism on the one hand and biology on the other) and shaky reconciliations.

Despite the intrinsically troubled nature of their relationship, divorce of our two traditions would be worse than misguided, not only because causes can be meaningful or because meanings are always in some sense causal, but because, more fundamentally, their relationship reflects the condition of our species. Their divorce would dissolve, by rendering invisible, the class of contradictions underlying humanity's deepest problems, those between meaning and law.

II.

Law and meaning: they are differently and differentially known and they are not fully compatible. The relationship between law (much of which remains, and may always remain, un-

known or, in its workings, complex to the point of incomprehensibility) and meaning (which seems unconstrained from constructing self-destructive follies) and their inevitable conflicts underline, define or even constitute what is portentously called "The Human Condition". Humanity is not, as Geertz would have it, simply "suspended in webs of meaning". We are, rather, racked between law and meaning. Each advance in what I continue to call "sociocultural evolution", driven by ever-elaborating technology and ever-increasing social scale, stretches us yet further, as the dangers intrinsic to disparities between law and meaning are promoted from merely self-destructive to potentially world-destroying as humanity's capacity to alter the world's ground and air increases and as, correspondingly, there are increases in the ability of ever-smaller groups of men to devise, for their own parochial purposes, reality-defining meanings and to promulgate them ever more effectively through mass media, the control of which becomes ever more concentrated. We have not only become a self-endangered species but one whose endangerment endangers all others. That this observation is a commonplace only confirms its truth.

The relationship between power and what qualifies as knowledge (be it brutally dominant or insidiously hegemonic) has been much discussed in the last decade or two, but the problem is even deeper than power. It is, I think, grounded in differences in the very nature of the truths of meaning on the one hand and of physical law on the other, differences toward which Giambattista Vico pointed in his radical critique of Descartes (1988 [1710]: Ch. I., Sec. III, *passim*).[2]

Vico disagreed most profoundly with the Cartesian claim that only objective knowledge, derived through precise observation of objects by dispassionate observers radically separated from those objects, could claim truth about the extended world. Mathematics, according to Descartes, is the ultimate and purest form of objective knowledge, and numerical representation provides the best guarantee of certainty. All other claims are trivial or false. Although Vico agreed with Descartes' claim for mathematics, he asserted that he had misunderstood the ground on which its certainty stands. In doing mathematics we are not **discovering** the most immutable features of an objective world but **inventing** logical systems (1965 [1709]: 23; 1988 [1710]: Ch. I, pp. 103-104, *passim*).

Vico elevated this understanding to the status of a general principle (1988 [1710]: Chap. III, *passim*). The only consciousness that can truly know a thing is that which made it. Thus, he argued, the only mind that can truly know the natural world in all its detail and complication is God's because God made it. Humans may be able to get a glimpse of nature's workings by imitating God through the conduct of experiment, but otherwise they are limited to the outside knowledge provided by mere observation. This **in itself** is not in disagreement with Descartes. Disagreement lies in their valorization of such knowledge. For Vico, knowledge so obtained could claim no more than an inferior form of truth, no more than the truth of that which can simply be ascertained, such truths as, for instance, that four moons orbit Jupiter (1984 [1744]: par. 331). Such knowledge can be extended by inference from the directly ascertainable, but the extent of such inference is limited; the further it is extended the more dubious it becomes.

2 Vico's critique of Descartes is most developed in *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, beginning with Chapter I, part III (pp. 53 - 56), but continuing throughout the work. There is also a slightly earlier work, originally published in 1709 (see *References*).

In contrast, Vico claimed, we can have full and true knowledge of, and only of, that which **we** have made: of machines, for instance, or more importantly, of images, thoughts, symbols, institutions and other products of the human mind. Because we have created them or because they were created by minds like ours, minds which, through various methods, are accessible to us (as God's is not), we stand in relation to them as God does to nature (1968 [1744]: par. 331ff., *passim*; 1988 [1710]: Chap. I, *passim*).

Vico distinguished terminologically between the forms of truth available through Cartesian method and through his own (Berlin 1981:111). All that Cartesian method can yield is *certum*, that which can be ascertained. The "inside knowledge" we can have of the products of human thought and practice can claim the deeper truth that he called *verum*. The very first sentence of *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* (1710) declares: "For the Latins, *verum* (the true) and *factum* (what is made or done) are interchangeable, or "convertible", that is, one and the same (Palmer 1988:45).

This has, I believe, generally been read as an epistemological dictum and as such social scientists generally should love it, for it inverts the order of science's "Great Chain of Being". In the conventional view, physics stands at God's right hand, while the social sciences are barely emerging onto dry land, all of them but anthropology, that is, which is still bottom feeding in stagnant ponds, in, to continue the conceit, the scientific equivalent of the Devonian period. At a deeper level, however, and hardly recognized, Vico's dictum is ultimately not epistemological but ontological (Palmer 1988:2). It isn't simply that we can know the truth (*verum*) of that which we, or minds like ours, have made. It is that in the world of symbols and institutions we don't discover such truth. We **fabricate** it. Having been made, it is a thing done, *factum*, no less a fact for being an artifact and as such fully known to its maker. It is as if two hundred fifty years before J. L. Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), Vico had a glimpse of Speech Act Theory.

III.

Humans not only do create such truths. They must. A brief look at humanity's evolution should make this clear.

I am concerned, please note, with **humanity's** evolution and not with human or hominid evolution. This may seem hairsplitting, but the implications of the distinction are fundamental. To speak of "hominid" or "human" evolution is to speak of what our species has in common with all others. We, like all of them, are products of natural selection, like all of them we are subject to all the requisites of metabolism and reproduction and, no less than any of them, we are dependent upon natural environments to fulfill our needs. To speak of **humanity's** evolution is, in contrast, to speak of the emergence of characteristics distinguishing us most fundamentally from all other species. It should not be necessary, but unfortunately it may be, to note that our differences from all other species do not nullify or make less binding or less cogent that which we share with all of them. The quality of humanity, for all that is distinctive of it, inheres in societies composed of organisms - individual humans - no less organic in nature than the earthworms who shall, in the end, reduce them to humus.

Having made it clear, first, that an emphasis upon humanity's distinguishing characteristics does not dismiss commonalities shared with other species but, on the contrary, assumes them and, second (and conversely), that recognition of our animal nature does not diminish the fact or scale of humanity's uniqueness, we may approach just what it is that di-

stinguishes us from all other animals. Our hominid forebears became what may be called "fully human" with the emergence of language. All animals and even plants communicate, that is, transmit and receive information. But only humans seem to be possessed of languages properly so-called, that is, sign-systems composed, first, of lexicons made up of symbols in Pierce's sense of the term, that is, of signs only conventionally related to that which they signify - and second, of grammars - rules for combining symbols into semantically unbounded discourse.

Language makes possible ways of life absolutely inconceivable to non-verbal creatures, and the ability to use it must have been selected for strongly. With language, communication not only can escape from the present to enter the actual and distant past or to approach the foreseeable future, all of which must have been of great practical advantage, but it can also search for such parallel worlds as those of the "might have been", the "should be", the "may always be", the realms, this is to say, of the desirable, the moral, the general, the possible and even the imaginary. To explore such realms is, obviously, not simply to **discover** what is there but to **create** it. Thus, language not only facilitates the communication of what is thought, but expands by magnitudes what can be thought. This expansion in conceptual power underlies the general human mode of adaptation. But even claims as grandiose as "language is the foundation of human ways of life" do not do language's momentousness justice, for its significance transcends the species in which it appeared. With language, an entirely new form of information appeared in the world. This new form brought new content, and the world as a whole has not been the same since. The worlds in which humans live are not fully constituted by tectonic, meteorological and organic processes, but are also symbolically conceived and, to use J. L. Austin's term, performatively established (Austin 1962), and they thus come to be filled with qualities like good and evil, abstractions like truth and right, values like honor and generosity, imagined beings like demons and gods, imagined places like heaven and hell. Such conceptions do not reflect or approximate elements of an independently existing world but **themselves participate in that world's construction**. All of these conceptions are reified, made into *res* by social actions contingent upon language, and it is in terms of their reality no less than the existence of trees or water that people operate in and transform the ecosystems which, in all but the cases of hunters and gatherers, they have dominated since the emergence of agriculture 10,000 or so years ago. So language, for better or worse, has ever more powerfully reached out from the species in which it emerged to reorder and subordinate the natural systems in which populations of that species participate.

There are certain objective grounds for concluding that such reorderings have increasingly been for worse rather than for better, and it is interesting to observe that in ecosystems other than those regulated by humans, dominant species are almost always plants, like oak trees or prairie grasses, or plant-like animals, like corals. Such organisms are, in their brainless natures, devoid of purposefulness, intention or motive and are, therefore, incapable of greed, improvidence, or error.

The account so far offered suggests that although humanity's worlds are incomparably richer than those of other creatures, they are also troubled by problems unknown to others. It is time to consider some of them. First, when a sign is only conventionally related to what it signifies, that is, a symbol in Pierce's sense, the sign can occur in the absence of the signified and events can occur without being signalled. The same conventional relationship which permits discourse to escape from the here and now also facilitates lying. If humans are not the world's first and only liars they are the world's foremost liars. Although

some proto-lying may occur among others species, falsehood and deceit become especially serious and even fundamental problems for a species whose social life is built on language. If a communication system accommodates falsehood, how do you assure recipients of messages that the information they receive is sufficiently reliable to act upon? Failing some minimum of trust, society fails.

If The False is a problem for a language-using species an even deeper problem is The True. Whereas the problem of falsehood is intrinsic to the symbolic relationship between sign and signified, the problem of the true may be intrinsic to grammar, for grammar makes the conception of alternatives virtually ineluctable. If you can imagine and say "kings are good and democracy is bad", you not only can imagine and say just the opposite. You can act on it.

The general problem of morality is obviously broached with the generation of alternatives. But there is a yet more fundamental problem, not simply the problem of what is moral, but what **is**, what exists as against that which is only imagined, what, among the range of conceived or conceivable alternative possibilities, is "real" or "is the case". The very capacity that enhances adaptive flexibility, a system's ability to transform itself in response to changed conditions, presents a continuing challenge to prevailing social and conceptual orders. The dark side of enhanced flexibility is increased possibility for disorder. It is of interest that Martin Buber (1952) took lie and alternative to be the grounds of all evil. Be this as it may, if there are to be any words at all it may be necessary to establish what may be called **The Word** - the "True Word" - to stand against the dissolving power of lying words and of many words, of falsehood and Babel. We are led to the question of how humanity grounds the Truth it must fabricate.

Elsewhere (Rappaport 1979a, 1979b, 1993) I have argued at length that, at least until recently, all societies have grounded their *logoi* (singular *logos*, a cosmological construction constituting the world's true and proper order, a construction in which the conventional is assimilated to the natural and both are represented as God-given) in religion. I have argued that religion is precisely as old as humanity, which is to say precisely as old as language. Language and conceptions of the Holy, I have suggested, must have emerged together in a mutual causal process as expressions from burgeoning proto-language were drawn into, and subordinated to, already existing non-verbal ritual forms (I take human ritual to be continuous with the stereotypical behaviors ethologists call "ritual", observed in animals as disparate as arthropods and primates).

Central to religion is the concept of the sacred, which I have defined as **the quality of unquestionableness imputed by congregations to certain expressions, in their nature absolutely unfalsifiable and objectively unverifiable**. These expressions, which I call "ultimate sacred postulates" are, typically, low in or even devoid of social specificity. ("The Lord our God the Lord is One," a well-known example, does not provide any directions for social governance). But, through ritual and religious discourse such expressions **sanctify** other expressions - concerning the legitimacy of authorities, the truth of testimony, the morality of commandments, the binding nature of obligations, etc. - that do.

Whereas the sacred would have been literally inconceivable in the absence of language, the vices intrinsic to language's virtues, lie and alternative, might have been sufficiently corrosive and subversive to have undermined the social life of any community dependent upon it, which is to say all human communities. Sanctity, however, which may have been generated in the assimilation of symbolic (in Pierce's sense) expressions into the ritu-

al form, may well have ameliorated (certainly not cured) these problems sufficiently for humanity, that is, language using societies, to endure.

The sacred's unquestionableness is, I have argued at length elsewhere, a product of ritual, that is, **of the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not encoded by the performers**. To perform an invariant sequence of acts and utterances encoded by others is *ipso facto* to **conform** to it, which is to say, to acquiesce to its authority. To put it more strongly, to participate in such an order of acts and utterances is to realize it by becoming part of it. To deny it while part of it is impossible, therefore to participate in its performance is to accept it. Such an acceptance entails an obligation (not always met) to abide by it. At the same time, the invariance of expression characteristic of ritual, in the light of information theory, asserts that whatever is so expressed is, following Anthony F.C. Wallace (1966), certain. (Information is, theoretically, that which reduces uncertainty between alternatives. To the extent that there are no alternatives - as in the performance of an **invariant** order of acts and utterances - ritual is devoid of information. Information and meaning are not synonymous, however, and the meaning of informationlessness is certainty). The acceptance of the participants and the certainty of the orders in which they participate are two of ritual's grounds for the unquestionableness of the sacred. The third is ritual's capacity to invoke, for at least some participants some of the time, deep emotions which, in the presence of sacred postulates or their representations, are experienced as belief.

The sacred is the primordial foundation upon which fabricated *verum* has stood. The subject matter of ultimate sacred postulates is generally, if not always, about the divine. Vico claimed that the gods were the first great invention of the gentiles (1984; orig. 1744, par. 9, 10, *passim*), more particularly of their theological poets (1984; par. 199, 200), and *verum* has its origin in poetic truth. This is very different from the empirical truth of Descartes, and is founded in historical mythology.

These fables are ideal truths... and such falseness to fact as they contain consists simply in failure to give their subjects their due. So that, if we consider the matter well, poetic truth is metaphysical truth, and physical truth which is not in conformity with it should be considered false. Thence springs this important consideration in poetic theory; the true war chief, for example, is that Godfrey of Torquato Tasso imagines; and all the chiefs who do not conform to Godfrey are not true chiefs of war (par. 205).

The truths of nature - nature's regularities - must be discovered if they are to be known, but are the case whether they are known or not. The fabricated truths particular to humanity are true only if they are known, for they must be known to be accepted and they are true only so long as they are accepted. We may call them "truths of sanctity" and recognize that they are, in essence, moral. They declare the truths of "should" against which actions and actual states of affairs are judged, and usually found wanting, immoral or wrong. They also declare the ultimate metaphysical ground upon which the moral stands: that, for instance, Yahweh is god, and Marduk is not, or vice versa. They are the truths upon which social systems have always been built.

IV.

It is easy to see that mythic truths and what we may call the truths of nature do not always coincide or compliment each other. They may, in fact, be inimical to each other and so may the means, epistemic and ontic, by which they are known.

First, the understandings that humans construct for themselves may be so much at variance with the world's nature that actions guided by them will be destructive. We are brought here to an inversion that must have occurred in the course of humanity's evolution, an inversion that may, in fact, have been the symbolic Rubicon which, once crossed, distinguished humanity from all other creatures.

It is implausible to imagine that language emerged as anything other than an element of our species' adaptive apparatus. As such it must have been strongly selected for, and could have developed fairly rapidly. But if humans act, and can only act, in terms of meanings they or their ancestors have imagined and enacted into truths, they are as much in the service of those conceptions as those conceptions are elements of their adaptations. **There was, this is to say, an inversion, in the course of evolution, of the relationship of the adoptive apparatus to the adapting species.** The capacity central to human adaptation gives birth to conceptions that come to possess those who have conceived them into being, conceptions like God, heaven, and hell.

The metaphor of inversion may well be an oversimplification but if it is anywhere near the mark it raises questions concerning the extent to which kin selection or inclusive fitness can account for aspects of culture or cultures. To argue that concepts of heaven and hell necessarily enhance the survival and reproduction of the individuals accepting them, or of their close kin, is simply not credible. This account further suggests that whatever may be the case among other species, group selection, the selection of traits, particularly behaviors, maladaptive for individuals in their possession but adaptive for the social groups of which they are members, is not only possible but important among humans. This is to claim that the nature of the evolutionary process itself may have changed for the species in which language emerged. All that is needed to make group selection possible is a way to lead their ultimate self-interest away from their own reproductive activity and even from their biological survival. Such concepts as heaven, hell, salvation and damnation do very nicely.

V.

The adaptive inversion that leads humans to subordinate their own survival and reproduction to the preservation of the truth value of postulates that it itself has fabricated and mystified seems to propose that the possible blessings bestowed upon humanity by the sacred are mixed. Religion may, as Bergson (1935:112) put it, be society's defense against "the dissolvant power of [self-serving] intelligence", but it nevertheless, or even thereby, has led millions either to sacrifice themselves or to slaughter others for the sake of God. The understandings for which people will willingly kill or die are not, however, limited to ultimate sacred postulates. We need hardly note that countless humans have laid down their lives to preserve the truth of such expressions as "Death before dishonor", *"Deutschland über Alles"*, or "Give me liberty or give me death", or have massacred others to perpetuate such fictions as racial purity.

Honor, liberty, fatherland, purity are notions that may frequently enjoy sanctification, and thus may be said to fall within religion's ambit, but contradictions between biological requisites and constructed meanings are not confined to religious discourse. We may consider here contradictions between certain understandings constructed in the domain of economics and certain characteristics of biological systems, knowledge of which has been

discovered through many generations of empirical experience and, in recent centuries, extended by formal scientific procedures.

Living systems - organisms, societies, ecosystems - are enormously complex, and so are their needs. Each requires a great range of particular things if it is to remain healthy, and the extent to which these things are interchangeable is limited. Adequate niacin in the diet will prevent Pellagra but is of no use in warding off Scurvy, which requires Vitamin C, a nutrient that has no effect upon Pellagra. Vitamin C and niacin are incommensurable. An analogous case can be made for the constituents of ecological systems. Each species occupies a more or less distinctive niche and makes a more or less distinctive contribution to the functioning of the ecosystem as a whole. In sum, biological systems, both organisms and ecosystems, operate on a logic of complementarily among distinct and incommensurable things.

The logic of commodity, in contrast, does not operate in terms of interactions among qualitatively distinctive things and creatures, but in terms of quantitative differences among things treated as fully commensurable. At its heart are monetary metrics, the invention of which in antiquity facilitated trade and the division of labor and made possible increasingly elaborate forms of social organization by rendering everything to which they were applied directly and simply comparable in value. Through money, distinct species which are ecologically incommensurable, and distinctive substances which are nutritionally infungible, become fully comparable as commodities. This is to say that the logics of biology on the one hand, and commodity on the other, are not merely in disagreement, but contradict each other. We note here a deep epistemological error that does much more than simply misconstrue. The application of a common monetary metric to things and species in their natures qualitatively dissimilar from each other reduces their qualitative distinctness to the status of mere quantitative difference. When either/or distinctions are dissolved into more/less differences, the metric itself becomes the highest, or at least the most decisive, value. Thus, appropriate answers to questions like "what is the difference between a forest and a residential subdivision" become something like $10,000 per hectare. Evaluation becomes what is called "The Bottom Line", an outcome of operations of addition and subtraction. Such evaluations are, in their simplified and simplifying nature, incapable of evaluating, or even recognizing, processes, beings, substances or relationships in which qualitative distinctiveness is of the essence. To the extent that monetary standards are dominant, their application forces the great range of qualitatively distinct organisms, materials, and processes that together are necessary to sustain or even to constitute life into specious equivalence. It follows that actions guided by such false equivalences are likely to simplify, which is to say degrade and disrupt, the ecological and social systems in which they operate. The application to such living systems of the increasing amounts of energy that technological development makes ever more available, under the tutelage of the simplifying, simple-minded and often selfish considerations that money privileges, is in its nature brutal and destructive.

This discussion implies, among other things, that the doctrine of cultural relativism is in need of overhaul. In its simpler version (see Spiro 1986 for a much more nuanced and penetrating discussion) it holds that practices and principles specific to a particular culture are properly assessed only in the terms of, or according to the values of, that culture itself. This principle has long constituted a liberal defense of colonized cultures against the likes of colonial administrators and missionaries. The problem of cultural relativism is, however, that it leaves little room to recognize for what they are the misconstructions and misunderstandings that sometimes possess entire cultures. I refer here, among other things, to con-

ceptions, no matter how produced, that so disconform to the world's physical structure (like commoditized understandings of ecosystems) that the actions they guide can hardly avoid being destructive. Such misunderstandings are not simply a matter of getting things empirically wrong, for which empirically recognizable failure is likely to induce timely correction. They are deeper and more comprehensive than most empirical errors. They are likely to be outcomes of power differentials, of what discourse is dominant, of who is in a position to make it dominant or, to put the matter into starker and more frightening terms, who is in a position to declare public reality in his own interest? It is likely that such interests will become ever narrower and that they will be promulgated ever more powerfully as technology advances and its control becomes ever more concentrated. All of this is to say that significant misconstructions of the nature of physical reality are more likely to be fabricated by colonizers than by the colonized.

But misconstruction is not one-sided. It is not only fabricated misunderstandings (of, for instance, ecosystems as congeries of potential commodities) that disrupt the world. The contradiction between law and meaning, discovery and construction, is double. The epistemologies of science are not only hostile to ignorance, to magic and to whatever is meant by "superstition". Whenever they are focused upon humanity's foundations they endanger them. In demystifying the social-ontic processes out of which Gods are generated and upon which institutions and their legitimacy are founded, they show them to be fabrications. In a world dominated by scientific epistemologies "fabricated truth" is an oxymoron. As such, humanity's grounds are taken to be false: at best illusory, but perhaps delusory or even fraudulent. This should be of deep concern to anthropologists.

VI.

That the species is caught between an absolute need to fabricate some truths and to discover others, that, further, it must forever combine and harmonize the truths of fabrication and discovery, and that, finally, it is ever in danger of fallaciously attempting to fabricate what must be discovered and to discover what must be fabricated, proposes that both of our traditions, one originating in the enlightenment, the other in the counter-enlightenment, must, at the least, be preserved. To banish either would so misconstrue the nature of our subject matter as to falsify it. Until two or three decades ago such a possibility was unimagined and perhaps even unimaginable. Anthropology, at least in the United States, was committed to a doctrine of holism, a holism not only substantively but epistemically defined. We assumed that those among whom we lived were both bearers of culture and organisms, and we further assumed that the anthropologist's task was both interpretive and explanatory. We expected, perhaps, in ways too simple-minded, to find interdependencies between the meaningful and the material. Our holism, this is to say, was naive when it needed to be understood to be deeply problematic, but if the characterization of humanity as stretched between law and meaning is at all apt, it was on the right track, which is to say reflective of our species' condition.

In recent decades, however, our traditional holism has not only become increasingly problematic. Concern with meaning - interpretive anthropology - and anthropologies concerned with explanation, Marxist and ecological formulations being prominent among them, have not only been practiced by different anthropologists but have been practiced in an atmosphere of such antagonism that there have been calls to dismantle the field. Thus, in his introduction to the 1986 volume *Writing Culture*, James Clifford wrote:

> The essays in this volume occupy a new space opened up by the disintegration of "Man" as *telos* for a whole discipline... In a trenchant essay Rodney Needham surveyed the theoretical incoherence, tangled roots, impossible bedfellows, and divergent specializations that seemed to be leading to academic anthropology's intellectual disintegration. He suggested with ironic equanimity that the field might soon be distributed among a variety of neighboring disciplines. Anthropology in its present form would undergo an iridescent metamorphosis. The present essays are part of the metamorphosis (pp. 4-5).

This passage explicitly pronounced dead the American four-field approach (which includes, of course, biological, linguistic and archeological as well as cultural anthropology). It is quite clear, however, that it favors, with equally ironic equanimity, the dismantling of cultural anthropology itself, with a redistribution of various of its constituents to, say, biology, ecology, sociology and so on, while literary, interpretive and postmodern approaches take possession of the traditional discipline, where they would metamorphize iridescently.

My own view is that the American four-field approach is not exactly well, but it is far from dead. The subject matter of each sub-discipline at the least provides necessary contextualization for the other three and is, reciprocally, contextualized by them. Furthermore, as long as the subdisciplines do remain siblings, "Man", or, as I would prefer to put it, "Humanity", will remain their unifying *telos*. If this is the case for four-field anthropology, it holds even more within a cultural anthropology concerned with both law and meaning.

It is one thing to say that the *telos* for a discipline, here taken to be "Man", has disintegrated, another thing to say that the object (Humanity) for which that *telos* is a representation has disintegrated. Humanity, the species, has not disintegrated... yet. What is proposed by Clifford, following Needham, and by a good many others following them, is that our approaches to understanding the species **should** disintegrate.

Clifford's comments do, of course, reflect centrifugal forces that become ever stronger as a consequence of, among other things, increasing numbers of anthropologists. Nowhere has this trend proceeded further than in the United States, where the American Anthropological Association now includes over 11,000 members. Increasing specialization follows from increasing numbers, and theoretical originality is, in the United States, the road to professional distinction. Such trends and considerations lead our colleagues further and further apart, and other related developments have also contributed to their alienation. This is not the place to trace the recent history of burgeoning divisiveness in any detail. It is possible that, whatever Geertz's intention might have been, his declaration (1973: Chapter I) that anthropology is essentially an interpretive enterprise, led to widespread dismissal of more explanatory and even empirical approaches, and it may be that his observation, certainly correct to the point of truism, that what ethnographers do is **write**, and that what they write are **fictions**, "things made", further contributed to the estrangement of the anthropology of meaning from the anthropology of law, or, if you prefer, interpretive from explanatory anthropology. He proposes that ethnographic fictions are empirically limited by thick description, highly detailed empirically grounded accounts, nevertheless, for him in later works (particularly *Works and Lives*, 1988) and for some of his followers (see, for example, Crapanzano 1986) the ethnographic text itself becomes centrally important. Ethnographic authority, this is to say, becomes grounded in the text, a function of prose rather than a product of the relationship between the text and observations recorded in the text. To put

it another way, ethnographic authority, for interpretive anthropologists, becomes a matter of persuasion rather than of argument grounded in empirical reference.

We come here to the deeper problem central to our entire discussion. To cut interpretation away from explanation is to attempt to separate meaning from law. It may well be, indeed the general argument I have been attempting insists, that meanings (for instance, economic understandings of ecological systems) are often, if not always, fabricated with, at best, imperfect knowledge of law and with little or no consideration of it. But this is not to say that law and meaning are irrelevant to each other. Meanings may be grasped without reference to law, but **the full human significance, which is to say the full natural entailments**, of those meanings and actions informed by them cannot be grasped in the absence of considerations of law.

This leads to another matter. Many, perhaps most, anthropologists would propose that it is our business to understand the world as best we can and not to fix it. The matter is not so simple, however, for to understand the world we must understand its disorders, which are largely human in origin and which, in the main, derive from actions guided by meanings fabricated by humans. In the absence of considerations of law it becomes impossible to evaluate meanings. Many, perhaps most, anthropologists might propose that we should not attempt to evaluate meanings, but in a world as threatened by holocausts, by environmental disaster, and by increasing inequity as is ours, we can claim no such privileges of neutrality. All interpretations, this is to say, are not created equal. As the philosopher Frithjof Bergmann puts it (personal communication), interpretations can be likened to maps. Some will guide you to wherever it is you want to go. Others will lead you into swamps.

If certain trends in interpretive anthropology threaten to break the anthropological *telos* of Humanity into fragments mistakenly assumed to be unrelated to each other, more recent developments in the general movement called "Postmodernism" have dissolved it entirely. Lyotard (1984), for one, takes the defining characteristic of the postmodern to be an "incredulity toward metanarratives". The metanarratives toward which he says incredulity is directed seem to include general principles of understanding, both explanatory and interpretive, as well as those by which humans live and communicate with each other. They include, this is to say, the explanatory and interpretive paradigms of social science as well as the general understandings by which the subjects of social science studies live. Nothing is left.

It is easy to point out that postmodernism is itself a metadiscourse or metanarrative and that, therefore, the formulation undermines itself, and that he who claims to have no meta-narrative is in the possession of one of which he is unaware. Be this as it may, some anthropologists (see, for example, Tylor 1986) evidently taken by such dicta (as well as by others concerning the opacity of language), have proposed that neither interpretation nor explanation is possible.

It is one thing to say that a radical crisis of credulity with respect to all metanarratives afflicts the contemporary world, another to say that none of those metanarratives are illuminating or useful, and yet another to assimilate such radical and paralyzing doubt into one's own analytic assumptions. The last succumbs to the disorder that the first takes to be part of the world's afflictions. As such, it contributes to the world's problems, not to their amelioration. The second, that no meta-narratives are useful, is both self-delusory and itself useless. If no meta-narrative is trusted because each is asked for more than it can deliver, questions are raised concerning the reasonableness of our demands rather than the adequacy of the meta-narratives. No meta-narrative could possibly constitute more than a partial

truth; the cure for the limitations of all meta-narratives is not to dispense with them, but to multiply them and to attempt, if at all possible, to integrate them or, at least, to recognize their possible complimentarities.

I have, in effect, been arguing for the preservation of a holistic anthropology during a time when the centrifugal forces within the field are more powerful than they have ever been. I have proposed that neither of our two traditions would be fully viable in the absence of the other. More fundamentally, it takes both in some degree of concert to represent and take as a problematic in its own right the tensions and wholeness of the human condition, defined as it is by contradiction between law and meaning.

VII.

I have done little more than imply in passing that the consequences of these contradictions became ever more grave as a concomitant of certain aspects of social, cultural and technical evolution: increasing economic scale, increasing ability to harness and apply energy, increasing capacity to process information. These trends, usually taken to be manifestations of progress, set new and terrible problems even as they ameliorate older ones, and it is not alarmist to propose that the world as a whole, and not only our species, is increasingly imperiled by them.

It is neither too naively idealistic nor too crassly practical to suggest that social science can, or should, or perhaps even must, justify its existence by contributing to the enhancement of the human condition or even the condition of the world. If it is the case that the most profound problems facing humanity and the world that humanity ever more comprehensively dominates are consequences of contradictions between law and meaning, then anthropology has special contributions to make because it, virtually alone among the social sciences, is concerned with both law and meaning, and may be the only one of them that recognizes the deep and central importance of their incompatibilities. If their continuing reconciliation is the most pressing business of contemporary science, it may be that the very characteristics that made anthropology the most laggard of modern sciences, make it the most precocious of what Stephen Toulmin (1982) calls the "Postmodern sciences". These include its qualitive concerns, its commitment to holism, its respect for subjectively as well as objectively based knowledge, its consequent recognition of participation as well as observation as grounds for knowledge, its pursuit of *verum* as well as *certum*, its willingness to quantify tempered by a highly developed awareness of quanification's limited capacities, its awareness of problems of ethnographic representation, and its humanistic concern with the problematic nature of what it is to be human.

Toulmin had the work of an anthropologist, Gregory Bateson, in mind when he advanced his conception of postmodern science, a conception that has little in common with the postmodernism that seems to have originated in architecture and entered anthropology by way of literary studies. It differs from modern science, which he takes to have commenced with Descartes and the new astronomers, in several ways. First, it returns scientists to the systems from which the Cartesian program exiled them, reducing them to the status of alienated observers. Such detachment, he claims, is no longer supportable if, indeed, it ever was. A concomitant is that unlike modern science which confined itself to the development of theory, a postmodern science must concern itself with praxis as well. A third difference is implicit. To the extent that such a science concerns itself with praxis it is not, nor can it be, value-free. It has a moral dimension. We are led to a fourth difference. If postmodern

science is to be a science of thinking and acting subjects as well as of inanimate nature, or of thinking and acting subjects treated as inanimate objects, then it must recognize the validity of constructed as well as discovered knowledge. Finally, the holism of postmodern science will contrast with the fragmentation of modern science. The program of modern science, demanding, as it has, ever more refined and detailed observations, has required an ever more ramifying division of labor. Disciplines have, therefore, multiplied, and as a consequence, knowledge has become fragmented and theory specialized. The organization of the world as a whole has not been any serious scholar's business for several centuries. Toulmin proposes that a postmodern science will revive the conception of *Cosmos*, a conception that has been at best moribund since ancient and medieval formulations, grounded in the stars, and was done in by the new astronomy at the turn of the seventeenth century. He claims that although it is no longer possible to found a cosmos on astronomy, one can be grounded in ecology. An ecological conception of cosmos, unlike the earlier astronomical conceptions, makes ineluctable a concern with human participation in it as well as observation of it. As such, it makes concern with praxis as central as concern with theory. And ecology is, in its nature, systemic and holistic.

I prefer the conception of *Logos* to *Cosmos* because, as I have already suggested, the order of the world since the emergence of humanity has not been lawfully constituted by tectonic, meteorological and organic processes alone. It has also been in increasing degree constructed socially and symbolicly, and it can be, quite literally, physically deconstructed through social and symbolic processes as well. The world is too full of obvious instances of ecological degradation for economic reasons to require further discussion of the matter here.

For anthropology to accept a conception of *Logos* that is ultimately ecological is not to propose that all the problems facing humanity are environmental in nature. It is, simply, to recognize that humanity is a part of the natural world, and, since the emergence of agriculture and with the burgeoning of technology, and with the increasing comprehensiveness of human domination, an ever more special part. With our ever increasing ability to nurture the world, to shape the world or to destroy the world, we have an ever increasing responsibility **for** the world. Humanity seems to be the only species that can conceive the world as a whole; to put it conversely, humanity is that part of the world through which the world as a whole can conceive of, and reflect upon itself, its beauties and its deformities. Such a conception of humanity - as the world's means for thinking about itself - seems to me to be ultimately and eminently anthropological. If anthropology remains whole, that is, if it can maintain its concern for law, meaning and their contradictions, it can continue to present such a vision of humanity to humanity in an age when the debased conception of *Homo economicus* is regnant, and so I urge all new journals in our discipline to devote themselves to the preservation of our traditional holism. More may depend upon it than the future of anthropology.

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WALLS: VANISHING BOUNDARIES OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

THOMAS HYLLAND ERIKSEN*

The term "globalisation" has become a central, if contested, term in contemporary social anthropology. This essay traces the preconditions for its emergence, discusses some widespread misreading of the concept, and argues that the study of global/local relationships may save anthropology as a comparative discipline from the important, but ultimately irresponsible criticisms of postmodernist deconstruction. The neo-diffusionist stance developed in this essay stresses the need to rephrase some of the central conceptualisations of the discipline while retaining the classic preoccupation of social anthropology; to understand and account for social and cultural variation, and to relate the symbolic realm to social organisation.

A main controversy in the social anthropology of the 1990s is centred on the concept of globalisation. According to some anthropologists, we are in the middle of a paradigm change where the study of remote connections, dispersed networks, flow and flux is about to replace the holistic study of localised communities as the dominant research strategy; where the subject as a whole is on the verge of becoming a comparative study of modernities, since, it is argued, modernity is the most pervasive and complex socio-cultural phenomenon extant. Others would argue, against this view, that even large-scale social and cultural processes, fast change and highly diversified, unbounded societies may profitably be studied by means of our traditional conceptual and methodological toolboxes. Further, the sceptics would claim, the actual importance of globalisation - seen as uneven modernisation on a global scale - is frequently exaggerated, and many, many millions of earthlings are still relatively unaffected by modern mass media, capitalism, the state and labour migration - just to mention some of the most important features of globalisation.

This essay is concerned with this development, which is related both to changes in the world and to changes in anthropological styles of thought and research. By way of a lengthy introduction on walls, the idea of primitive society, and the globalisation of culture, some of these changes will be sketched. Drawing on my own ethnographic material from Mauritius,[1] I shall then raise a few questions concerning the relationship between our field of enquiry - social anthropology - and the contemporary world. In conclusion, I shall defend the view that classical anthropological epistemology and methodology, while far from obsolete, are quite inadequate if we are to fully understand cultural variation in the contemporary world. This argument is no longer an original one, but it concerns us all as social and cultural anthropologists, and no matter our various specialisation, we shall have to deal with it since it crucially impinges on conventional conceptualisations of society and culture.

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1 Fieldwork in Mauritius was undertaken from February through November, 1986, and from December 1991 to March 1992. See Eriksen (1990) for a general ethnography.

It should be remarked at the outset that there are two dominant ways of handling the current implosion of the classic concepts of culture and society: deconstruction and the comparative study of local-global relationships. The neo-diffusionism implied by the very term "globalisation" hints at a new universalism, a new attempt at making discrete phenomena comparable. Deconstruction, on the contrary, which in its anthropological variety has taken the shape of a penetrating auto-critique, appears as a strong form of relativism whereby all anthropological concepts are ultimately inadequate as tools for making sense of cultural variation. My concern in the following is to show the usefulness of neo-diffusionism, which is seen as a possible escape route from the infinite regress of deconstruction.

WALLS

On the eve of the last decade of this millennium, every reader of this text (if not exactly every inhabitant of the world) remembers, waves of euphoria were catapulted through invisible globalising networks with their nodal points in television satellites, radio transmitters, computer modems, telephones and fax machines. These waves reached remote areas like Trinidad and the Trobriand islands, and engendered a widespread feeling that a new era in the history of humanity was about to begin. The collective memory of small groups may be short; the collective memory of the cultural world-system is dramatically shorter. The event spurring the euphoric celebrations referred, through its immanent metonymic chains, to a period of little more consequence than a footnote in human history. Nevertheless, the opening and eventual demolition of the Berlin Wall shall defend its place as a frontispiece to this essay, which will revolve around anthropological conceptions of difference and identity in the contemporary world different in many ways as it is from the late Victorian world of the explorers, missionaries, armchair theorists and ethnographic butterfly-collectors who were the pre-Malinowskian founding fathers of our discipline.

Like the French word *mur*, the English "wall" clusters together very different referents. In German and the Scandinavian languages, we distinguish between, on the one hand, *Mauer* and *mur*, respectively, and on the other hand, *Wand* and *vegg*, the latter referring to the inside or outside walls of a building, the former being a rather more awesome and monumental structure, such as the wall featuring in Sartre's short story *Le Mur*, in Roger Waters' *The Wall* or the *Berlin-Mauer*. (One may remark in passing that the segmentary character of the wall as a dividing agent is better taken care of in German and Scandinavian than in French and English). In the present context, the term will basically refer to the metaphor of *eine Mauer*, a solid and powerful structure ensuring separation and distinctiveness.

THE DEMOLITION OF PRIMITIVE SOCIETY

The demolition of the idea of primitive society is in some interesting ways analogous to the demolition of the Berlin wall: the importance of the event is obvious, although in some excited quarters, its significance has been greatly exaggerated. Besides, it has a strong bearing on the present argument. I shall therefore describe this deconstruction in some detail.

If modern man had not known of actual primitives, he would have had to invent them. In a sense, this is exactly what he (yes: it is usually a "he") has done, projecting good

or bad qualities of his own society, as the case may be, into his fictions of Otherness. Until the rise of modern anthropological research, "savages" were either depicted as cruel brutes who testified to the superiority of Christianity or the British Empire; or they were envisaged as noble creatures leading humble but immensely rewarding lives in profound, almost instinctive deference of Mother Nature and in love of one another.

With the emergence of the embryonic social sciences in the mid-nineteenth century, so-called scientific theories of primitive society were developed. In the beginning, as the myth inherited from Freud, Engels, Morgan and their likes goes, men and women lived in undifferentiated bands. There was no incest taboo, there were no rules of exogamy, no formal differentiation of rank or rules of inheritance and succession. Then, due to some evolutionary leap, envisaged as the development of private property, the appearance of the family, the division of labour or the primeval emergence of the Oedipus complex, humanity fell from innocence, and walls of power were erected; walls pitting man against man, man against woman, cunning against sincerity, greed against humility, the proprietors against the propertyless, the healthy against the lepers, artifice against authenticity. In Europe and elsewhere, literal walls protected the insiders of towns from the outsiders. Eventually, the myth continues, the feudal state evolved, finally transforming itself into the modern capitalist state, which imprisoned the creative labours of man and his fertile natural imagination within the walls of its bureaucratic industrial machine. The organically integrated *Gemeinschaft* turned into the fragmented and anonymous *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies); the dead labour seized the living labour at hyperbolically increasing rates (Marx); the iron-cage of bureaucracy (Weber) tightened its grip, the maladies of anomie (Durkheim) were rife, and men and women were enslaved by the clock (Mumford).

Societies which had been spared the mixed blessings of this evolution were destined to form the subject-matter of anthropology or comparative ethnology. Whether or not their inhabitants were fancied as noble savages, they served well as the white mice of anthropology and as live arguments against the anomie, alienation or excessive discipline - pick your choice - of modern society. Thus was the underlying evolutionary model of much classic anthropological research, notwithstanding its sometimes programmatic anti-evolutionary bias. The Boasian relativists lamented the fall from innocence, viewed from their comfortable vantage-point in the hubris and progress of their age; the French and British structural-functionalists refrained from subjecting their own society to crude objectivist explanations, yet applied them rigorously to others; and that master of primitive man, Claude Lévi-Strauss, who has virtually devoted his life to the promotion of "Neolithic intelligence", saw the synchronic study of cultural variation as being essentially equivalent to the diachronic study of history (Lévi-Strauss 1962).The duality between the West and the Rest, to paraphrase Sahlins (1976), remains a forceful one in our collective mind; it was a constituent element in the formation of our discipline, and it is a wall which has not yet fully been demolished. This duality, on which our discipline has rested comfortably for more than a century, has time and again been challenged; by mild-mannered iconoclasts like Bateson, who proposed new and less dichotomous paths for the mind; by Evans-Pritchard, the founder of the ethnographically based theory of knowledge; by late Malinowskians like Firth, who insisted on the primacy of practice and the particular - and more recently, by American critics of anthropological writings, who draw on interpretations of deconstructivism, contemporary hermeneutics and literary theory to show the limitations of the traditional ethnographic narrative, particularly in its representation of : "The Other".

In his study of the rise and fall of the idea of primitive society, Adam Kuper seems to close the case by arguing forcefully that the very idea of primitive society has had its time, and that this fact may eventually indicate the end of social anthropology as we have known it (Kuper 1988:243; but cf. Kuper 1994). The development of an anthropology without the primitive, as Kuper puts it, would imply a collapse of the implicit evolutionism and explicit relativism seeing societies as self-contained systems and presuming radical cultural discontinuity between ourselves and our objects of study. Recent developments within the discipline suggest that this may be about to happen.

First, anthropologists increasingly study modern societies without pretending that they are "all the same". Secondly, recent epistemological critiques have indicated the arbitrary nature of typological distinctions between "kinds" of societies. Thirdly, and that is the main focus here, boundaries between societies are in certain important respects dissolving in a very visible way. One may also add that apartheid and similar ideologies promoting the enforced maintenance of cultural boundaries are clearly inspired by a reading of anthropological notions of insular, integrated and bounded cultures. According to the theory (if not the practice) of apartheid, cultures cannot be ranked, but they should nonetheless be allowed to evolve according to their unique internal logic, and for this reason, modernity should not be allowed to corrupt traditional African societies: they should be kept isolated, in *apartheid* (which is Afrikaans for apartness).[2] Ask an ANC militant what he thinks of cultural relativism, and the point will be made emically. Let us assume, then, as a premise for this discussion, that the wall separating the monolithic, thoroughly rationalised Us from the intriguing and primeval Them, is finally about to come tumbling down.

We may flatter ourselves in a Popperian manner and attribute such a turning away from simplistic evolutionary dichotomies to the merciless self-criticism inherent in the anthropological practice. However, it is beyond doubt that changes in the outside world (i.e., aspects of the world which are not constructed by anthropologists) have made important contributions to the increasing uneasiness with which we use dichotomous models dividing the world's societies into two categories. For the Others have caught up with the ethnographic practice, rather than the other way around. They are demonstrably no longer distant "savages" or acephalous segmentary tribes; they are no longer illiterate half-naked exotics informing the adventurous, but confused traveller that they are "really" red macaws, and nowadays some of them may even correct faulty details and misinterpretations when they are casually leafing through the ethnographer's draft manuscripts. The walls dividing civilisation from savagery have been demolished, if at all, by insistent savages. Unless we pretend that the tribal world remains intact because a few groups seem to have avoided the onslaught of modernisation, we shall be compelled to realise that many of our dear Azande, Trobriand islanders, Kachin and Swat Pathans are, like ourselves, citizens and wage workers who meet every afternoon in the neighbourhood café to discuss the current situation in the Balkans. The vernacular equivalent to the word "country" forms part of their everyday vocabulary. They tell the anthropologist that "if we did not have kastom, we would be just like the white man" (Sahlins 1994: 378). The world has in many respects been decolonised,

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2 In Andrè Brink's novel *The Wall of the Plague* (1984), the central metaphor for apartheid is a wall which was erected in Carcassonne to protect the healthy from the Black Death.

and anthropology must come to terms with this; provided, of course, it is willing to take the challenge.

THE GLOBALISATION THESIS

At the inception of our discipline, there were still white spots on the map. Simultaneously, our subjects for investigation were gradually colonised. They no longer are. Some of them even refuse to offer themselves to the appropriation of anthropologists: they refuse to be our objects of investigation. (This is glossed, among anthropologists, as "mounting difficulties to research"). They are citizens in nation-states, and indeed, social and cultural processes channelled through the institutional dimensions of modernity are at this very moment busy ravaging the heartlands of the former anthropological laboratory. Let me briefly mention some general tendencies of social change, although they are already quite familiar from the literature on bureaucratic society. Let me also stress that the processes which I describe are happening now; they have not already happened. That is to say, I speak of an emergent pattern of relationship, not an established one.

First, a monetary economy based on wage work has become the norm, if not a universal practice, in most parts of the world. Such an economy is encouraged by states, which receive important revenue through direct and indirect taxation. States have become the most powerful absentee landlords, and the omnipresence of money integrates an unlimited number of people anonymously into a vast system of exchange. The temporal structure on which this depends is linear and irreversible.

Secondly, formal education is nearly universally recognised as an important means for the achievement of rank, wealth and related benefits. This entails, among other things, literacy, the standardisation of languages and the suppression of minority languages. Two hundred of the original two hundred and fifty Australian languages have been eradicated, which is a testimony not only to literal genocide, but also a strong indication of cultural genocide.

Thirdly, political units of prime importance to the majority of mankind are political parties, organised at a nation-state level with local branches. Position in political parties is ostensibly achieved, not ascribed.

Fourthly, official ideologies in virtually every country in the world are nationalist in character, and everybody is to a varying degree forced to be a citizen. The nation-states require their citizens to adhere to an abstract ideology of metaphoric kinship, and to make personal sacrifices for the betterment of the abstract community of the country. In return, the nation-state presumably offers protection and career opportunities.

This list could have been made much longer, but I shall stop here. The main point is that the fact of the modern nation-state seems to create a uniform and universal framework for social organisation on a very large scale. Of course, everybody is not affected in the same way, but virtually everybody has to cope with aspects of the nation-state and capitalism. Hardly anybody is totally unaffected in the contemporary world. Even our celebrated significant Others, the Yanomamo, are currently negotiating with two nation-states and desperately trying to ensure their survival as a culture-bearing group through transnational networks including the global media, the WCIP *(World Council of Indigenous Peoples)*, and invocations of international law.

At this very general level, there can be no doubt that a massive process of global cultural homogenisation is taking place; that the temperature of hot societies (Lévi-Strauss) is spreading in conformity with the second law of thermodynamics, as it were, rapidly heating up the erstwhile cold societies.

The globalisation of power and the inter-relatedness of systems of exchange are no less spectacular. Truly global processes affect the conditions of people living in particular localities. Giddens (1990:124) has remarked that risks are globally shared in the age of the nuclear bomb and potential ecological disasters. One may also note that the economic conditions in localities often depend on events taking place elsewhere in the global system. If there is an industrial boom in Taiwan, towns in the Midlands will be affected. If oil prices rise, this implies salvation for the Trinidadian economy and disaster for the Mauritian one. Charles Tilly has suggested this delineation of global processes.

A sensible rule of thumb for connectedness might be that the actions of powerholders in one region of a network rapidly (say within a year) and visibly (say in changes actually reported by nearby observers) affect the welfare of at least a significant minority (say a tenth) of the population in another region of the network. Such a criterion indubitably makes our own world a single system; even in the absence of world-wide flows of capital, communications, and manufactured goods, shipments of grain and arms from region to region would suffice to establish the minimum connections (Tilly 1984:62).

In a word, the boundaries between societies and cultures, which were never absolute, are becoming increasingly fuzzy in our minds. A further point, which is immediately relevant to our branch of comparative sociology, is that patterns of consumption seem to merge in certain respects. A precondition for this to happen is the more or less successful implementation of certain institutional dimensions of modernity, notably that of a monetary economy - if not necessarily wage work and literacy. The ever-increasing transnational flow of commodities, be they material or immaterial, seems to create a set of common cultural denominators eradicating local distinctions. The hot-dog (whether *halal* or not), the pizza and the hamburger are empirically at the apex of world cuisine; identical pop songs are played at apparently identical discotheques in Mauritania and Mauritius; the same Coca-Cola commercials are shown with minimal local variation at cinemas all over the world. And investment capital, military power and world literature are equally being disembedded; they no longer belong to a place (Giddens 1990).[3] Territorial walls have been demolished to this effect. With the development of the jet plane and the satellite dish, distance no longer seems a crucial limiting factor for the flow of cultural signifiers. There are Pakistani migrants settled in Oslo who follow Pakistani news on the Internet and watch new Pakistani films on their video. A future scenario which could be extrapolated from these tendencies might therefore be a world where cultural variation is not related to space (cf. Hannerz 1992) - where the spatial dimension has imploded.

Several social theorists have responded to these emergent changes in the external social world. In anthropology and neighbouring disciplines, Wallerstein's and others' neo-Trotskyite notions of world-systems (Wallerstein 1979) are currently being transformed into theory of culture through a hastily prepared marriage with McLuhan's (1964) and others'

3 "By disembedding I mean the 'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space" (Giddens 1990:21).

theory of modern mass media, injected with insights from recent grand theory on nationalism and the nation-state (see, for example, Robertson 1992; Hannerz 1992; Appadurai 1990; see Worsley 1984, for a slightly different perspective).

According to this cluster of notions, which can loosely be labelled the globalisation thesis, the *Entzëuberung* (Weber) or disenchantment of the world is about to be completed; the contemporary world is secular, rationalised, continuous and woven together by dense networks of communication and exchange. Jean-François Lyotard (1979), better known as the ambivalent high priest of post-modernity than as a critic of globalisation, sees these tendencies as being inherently levelling and destructive. In Lyotard's view, the social world is being moulded, transformed and reduced to a language intelligible to computers. From a slightly different perspective, the American historian of ideas Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992), who rose briefly to fame around 1990 for proclaiming the end of history, argued, slightly nostalgically, that profound ideological difference was a thing of the past, and that the liberalist ideology associated with capitalism and bourgeois democracy had virtually become universal. The Hegelian dialectic of history had reached its end, claimed Fukuyama, an employee of the U.S. State Department.[4] A social theorist of Ernest Gellner's kind would fit into the same rough category, as he, too, highlights the apparent disappearance of profound cultural differences. At a conference on nationalism, Gellner remarked that it may well be that people in different areas still utter different noises, but nowadays they say pretty much the same things: the political culture of the world has become one (Gellner 1991; cf. also Gellner 1992). According to such a view, conservative Islamic societies, for example, would appear to be a variant of modern society, or at least as being crucially interdependent with modern societies, rather than something qualitatively different. This assumption, of course, cannot be taken for granted. Nevertheless, the main point is well taken: The world has shrunk, and global links function at the representational level as well as on the economic and macropolitical levels. As Miller (1992) writes, rhetorically: "What proportion of the world's population today has not been exposed to the concept of class and the reorientation of their cultural perception in the light of this exposure?"

To sum up: The argument of globalisation goes approximately like this. In the post-colonial world, that is to say the world of the micro-chip, general-purpose money, linear time, the satellite dish and the jet plane, culture is no longer restricted to particular places - it has in important respects been disembedded from spatial structures. Transnational and non-localised networks of communication and exchange function alongside localised processes of modernisation and integration into nation-states, to the effect that cultural variation is forcefully being channelled through the universal interfaces of modernity. As Giddens (1990) puts it, rather bluntly: The world is becoming a single place.

4 Commenting on the author of *Understanding Media*, Umberto Eco remarks: "Where the apocalyptics saw the end of the world, McLuhan sees the beginning of a new phase of history. This is exactly what happens when a prim vegetarian argues with a user of LSD: The former sees the drug as the end of reason, the latter as the beginning of a new sensitivity. Both agree on the chemical composition of psychedelics" (Eco 1987:137).

DIFFERENTIATION

However, as every serious anthropologist working within the emerging globalisation paradigm would stress, "no total homogenisation of systems of meaning and expression has occurred, nor does it appear likely that there will be one any time soon" (Hannerz 1990: 237). Global culture is marked by an organisation of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity.[5] But the world has become one network of social relationships, and between its different regions there is a flow of meaning as well as of people and goods (idem.).

The Rushdie case from 1989 on exemplifies the "flow of meaning" aspect mentioned by Hannerz: A book published in Britain provoked a reaction in Iran, and as a consequence, virtually half of the world's population were immediately involved in a public debate on religion versus civil rights.

The globalisation theorists find themselves in a complementary relationship to those romantics who would perhaps, if pressed, prefer to keep their traditional peoples or "Others" in a state where they would be allowed to remain authentic. Lévi-Strauss himself said, in an interview in *L'Espresso* in 1986, that he is mainly interested in phenomena which no longer exist. To him, the contemporary world holds no charm because world-wide cultural homogenisation has, in his view, obliterated those radical cultural discontinuities which he has seen it as his task to understand and account for. The German anthropologist Hans-Peter Duerr, who has also devoted himself to understanding radical cultural variation, has increasingly been compelled to use archaeological and historical sources when arguing, in a vaguely "original affluent society" vein, that modernity and the state have shamelessly reduced the depth and scope of the human experience (cf. Duerr 1985).

Extrapolating from the recently coined notion of globalisation, it might be tempting to model the world as a segmentary lineage, its chief constituent segments being nation-states, which occasionally unite at the highest conceivable level of scale, namely the General Assembly of the United Nations. The world according to the globalisation schema could also be conceptualised as a kind of generalised entropic field where all differences between local world-structures are shaved away, where individual identity becomes fuzzy and where individuals become interchangeable at a global level.

The anthropological community was never impressed by this line of reasoning; world-system theory, to mention one important example, never really caught on within our discipline. We knew too much, it seemed, about the peculiarly local dynamics of our field sites to be seduced by general theories of the global. Such anthropological arrogance may sometimes be misplaced, but sometimes it is pertinent, as I shall argue later. Further, the idea that we are not all becoming culturally identical does not require justification from anthropologists who have always concentrated on intrinsic processes taking place in unique localities. In fact, it is an important insight from recent studies of modernities that modernisation and increasing scale in social organisation are marked by a dual process of simultaneous homogenisation and differentiation. Some differences vanish, whereas others emerge. This is plain Parsonian sociology. As Friedman puts it:

5 The idea of an "urgent anthropology" seems related to this perspective. However, and on the contrary, the proponents of urgent anthropologies, who argue that certain tribal peoples must be studied quickly before they "disappear", demonstrate that they are aware of important changes taking place in remote corners of the world.

> Ethnic and cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenisation are not two arguments, two opposing views of what is happening in the world today, but two constitutive trends of global reality (Friedman 1990:311).

ANTHROPOLOGICAL GUT REACTIONS

The intuitive scepticism displayed by many anthropologists against rather sweeping statements describing the world as being "one place", has prevented many among us from appreciating that there are in fact profound changes taking place this very moment, which contribute to modifying our subject-matter, in most parts of the world, in substantial ways. One common type of reaction among anthropologists faced with such changes in the social world can be labelled the *plus ça change* stance. According to this view, appearances of modernity are frequently superficial, and when all is said and done, the exotic societies really stay the same. Popular ethnographic films such as *Trobriand Cricket* (Leach & Kildea 1974) would seem to confirm such a view. The film shows how cricket has been introduced into the Trobriand islands apparently without altering the fundamentals of Trobriand culture; rather than adapting the natives, the institution of cricket has itself been adapted to suit the indigenous requirements of the natives. According to such a perspective, we may safely go back to our old toolbox; that is to say, we will not need to modify our vision of the world as consisting of discrete, relatively isolated cultures or societies because of mere processes of diffusion of cultural form or superficial appearances of modernisation.

Another reaction consists in insisting that modernities are peculiar and extraordinary phenomena, and that we should therefore mainly focus on non-modern or non-industrial societies, which display a much wider range of variation than modern ones do. That would be the romantic view as well as the typical positivist view, which both tend to envisage the world as an archipelago of societies or cultures or, less charitably phrased, as a laboratory for cross-cultural measurements. That would also be the view of those who more or less programmatically reject development projects because they interfere with the "local culture".

The third typical reaction, related to the previous one, argues on epistemological grounds that social anthropology must be the study of otherness, since our own culture is necessary as a basis for comparison.

The fourth typical reaction, which is the position represented in this essay, consists in discarding the dichotomous classification of societies into the West and the Rest, which also implies that we cease to regard "modernity", "nationalism", and so on as uniform social and cultural systems. Instead we should study actual social systems, warts and all.

For like it or not, it is an indubitable fact that we live in a world where the local increasingly bears the mark of the global. Neither anthropology nor the natives benefit from the excessive romanticism, the widespread anti-modern moralism and the view that tropical societies ought to be spared from the influences of the so-called Western world. Societies change, for better or for worse, and instead of pretending that they do not, or proclaiming that they should not, we might get down to looking into what is actually going on. A family network in a Lima shantytown may initially seem less fascinating to an anthropologist than a New Guinea highland clan, but it may on closer investigation turn out to be just as revealing of the variations of human culture and social organisation. A major merit of recent

writings on the globalisation of culture indeed consists of reminding those who still rely on the image of the primitive that they are really living in the past. Certain institutional and symbolic dimensions of modernity are non-localised (which is not to say that they are omnipresent); most of the world's inhabitants are in different ways citizens; formal schooling and literacy are widespread even in remote areas; wage work has replaced so-called domestic or tribal modes of production on a large scale; consumption based on monetary exchange has replaced non-monetarily based consumption on an even larger scale; and modern mass media have disseminated fragments of shared meaning-structures so widely that it may indeed in certain respects be correct to talk of global culture. There are truly global issues in the world, and they are discussed locally as global issues. The Balkan war has affected the value of the Deutsche Mark, provoked worried editorials in Mauritian newspapers, and is being discussed in cafés and homes all over the world.

On the other hand, it would clearly be nonsense to claim that we are all becoming "the same". Such statements reveal, if anything, a lack of ethnographic sensitivity. Nonetheless, the substantial changes which have taken place in the world since the inception of our discipline provide ample reasons for a reassessment of our entire endeavour, which initially drew its *raison-d'être* - on both sides of the Atlantic - from the assumption that the world was an archipelago of societies or cultures which could be grouped in two rough clusters or categories. The companion idea postulating the uniformity of "Western culture" as a basis for comparison, absurd from the outset, has become even more curious in the light of globalisation.

The notion that cultural variation remains discontinuous in a systematic way is virtually part of our habitus (cf. Ingold 1993), and anthropologists are also fond of pointing out that predicted cultural "melting-pots" never came about. Statements of this kind are too general to be of any real value. For example, one may definitely claim that a cultural melting-pot has come about if virtually all that remains of the distinctiveness of a minority is the self-awareness of belonging to a distinctive group.

Taking our cue from the notion of the globalisation of culture, we may thus pose the following questions: In what respects do the walls come tumbling down, in what respects do they remain unmoved, under which circumstances are new walls erected, and finally: What are the mechanisms of entropy-resistance preventing the dissolution of boundaries between symbolic universes?

ENTROPY AND NEGENTROPY IN A MAURITIAN TOWN WARD

Writings on the globalisation of culture have been littered with anecdotes revealing disembeddedness of cultural signs or links between the local and the global; there has so far been relatively little context-sensitive research on the actual implications of such processes (although matters are improving). I shall now provide a brief example, a main purpose of which is to emphasise the continued relevance of anthropological fieldwork in a world increasingly marked by symbolic and social structures too vast in compass to be investigated anthropologically.

Rose-Hill is a Mauritian town of some 40,000 inhabitants, according to statistics. However, boundaries between Mauritian towns are unclear, and it would probably be most accurate to describe Rose-Hill as one of five or six nodes along the nearly continuous

urbanised stretch from Port-Louis to Curepipe, where about half of the Mauritian population of a million live.

The quarter of Roches-Brunes, located on the western outskirts of Rose-Hill, is dominated by a municipal housing estate (*cité ouvrière*), and most of the approximately 1,000 people living in the area are working-class Creoles or blacks. The more imposing dwellings belonging to a few affluent families are located away from the more monotonous *cité ouvrière*. Apart from the Creoles, some Coloureds (light-skinned Creoles with middle-class aspirations) and Chinese live in the area, as well as a few Hindus and a single Muslim household. Roches-Brunes is not representative of Mauritius with regards to ethnicity, since the largest "community" island-wide is Hindu.

In describing the relationship between the global and the local, I shall focus on the Rioux household, which I have come to know very well. It is what is commonly described as a matrifocal household, consisting of Mme Rioux, her daughter Aline (20), her two sons, François and Jean, both in their mid-twenties, Aline's baby daughter and a tenant, a young student from the neighbouring island of Rodrigues. Their income is average by local standards. Aline works as a shopgirl in the town centre, her elder brother François is a carpenter's apprentice, and her younger brother Jean is unemployed. The household sometimes receives remittances from other relatives, notably a married daughter who lives in the neighbouring French *dèpartement* La Rèunion, and the student from Rodrigues pays a moderate sum in monthly rent.

The living-room in the Rioux' home contains several objects signifying links with distant places. Two posters depicting pop stars (one English, one American) are prominently displayed; so is a cupboard with glass doors, behind which are souvenirs from Paris, Bombay and London. There is a radio cassette and a black-and-white TV set. On the floor next to the TV set there is a small heap of foreign magazines, some of them in English, which is a language none of the household member masters. Images of Europe are powerful and persuasive in Mauritius; an opinion poll carried out in the mid-seventies indicated that half of the population wished to emigrate if they could (Sofrès 1977).

The mass media consumed in the household confirm the common stereotype of life in "the Western world" as an easy, glamorous life. Local knowledge of Europe generally suggests it is a continent of affluence and excitement. Many Mauritians have emigrated, the majority to France and Britain. Aline Rioux says she wouldn't emigrate; she has heard too many ugly stories of girls who were forced into prostitution, or who were married to old men living in the countryside. There has, in other words, been a certain feed-back from other parts of the global system. She reads *romans-photo*, "photo-novels" of French origin, and occasionally a local magazine. She is very fond of French pop music.

François Rioux plays soccer and follows world politics in the local newspapers; he frequently discusses global issues with his friends. The whole family watches American soap operas[6] on TV; the younger generation go to the cinema to see largely American films dubbed in French about twice a month. They are devoted Catholics and go to Mass every Sunday (actually, Aline goes somewhat more rarely).

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6 Miller (1992) has described in detail how the North American soap opera *The Young and the Restless* is appropriated by Trinidadians; indeed, he claims that "paradoxically, imported soap opera has become a key instrument for forging a highly specific sense of Trinidadian culture".

The members of the household agree that education is important for a person's opportunities, unless he or she has relatives in high places. François, Jean and Aline are all prepared to compete for jobs and promotion. None of them have completed secondary school.

Seen superficially and in a fragmented way, as I have done now, the world-structures and patterns of consumption of the Rioux household seem comparable to, similar to, that of working classes in many other countries. The globalisation of culture seems predominant in Roches-Brunes, which to an untrained observer like the Lévi-Strauss of *Tristes Tropiques* (1955), must seem a squalid backyard of civilisation. Scrutinised more closely, however, the lives and world-structures of the Rioux and the others in the *cité* have a distinctively local character, and cannot at all be understood outside of their local context.

Soccer and pop music may credibly be seen as prime instances of global culture. Eduardo Archetti (1991) tells this anecdote about an incident in Burkina Faso, which may illustrate the global nature of soccer as channelled through mass media. Arriving at the airport in Ouagadougou with his Argentinean passport at a time of political instability, just after Thomas Sankara's assassination, he expected difficulties. At first, the passport official seemed suspicious, glancing through his passport. He then left the room with the passport, re-emerged, opened it on a blank page and stamped it, smiling, while uttering the magical word: "Maradona" (personal communication with Eduardo Archetti, 1991).

Unlike cricket in the Trobriands, soccer in Roches-Brunes follows the same rules as in Britain. Unlike World Cup soccer, however, it is entirely local in character. François Rioux owes much of his reputation in the neighbourhood to his skills as a soccer player. As a result, he is popular with girls, makes friends with boys and in fact, he got his present job at least partly because of his personal popularity. - Concerning pop music, so arrogantly despised by most anthropologists who encounter it in the field, a similar local context applies. It is played at local parties and in rumshops, and may evoke sentiments and stimulate social relations quite different from its effects in other environments. In the black Jamaican working-class, for example, the world-famous pop singer Michael Jackson was unpopular already in the late 1980s because he was considered "not sufficiently black"; in the black Mauritian working-class, he is second only to God, not least because he is black.

When watching American TV serials (dubbed in French), the Rioux comment them incessantly. Very often, they compare the characters with people they know; when commenting on rich and miserly men, they might make remarks to the effect that "Hey, that's just like Lee Foo used to treat my friend," referring to a neighbourhood Chinese merchant. They always compare the plots and social milieux on the screen with contexts they are familiar with. It should also be noted, significantly, that for a Mauritian Creole, European culture is attractive partly because it is reflexively being contrasted locally with Mauritian Hindu culture. Films and magazines describing middle-class life in Europe or North America, for example, thus make sense and are popular partly because they can be interpreted into a local dichotomous schema depicting Indian culture as inferior. Overcommunicating what is locally perceived as Europeanness indicates a culturally valued air of superiority compared with the local Indians. In their selective interpretations of aspects of global culture, the inhabitants of Roches-Brunes appropriate them and transform the global into something local.

There are sound reasons that we should treat the thesis of globalisation, in its most general and sweeping forms, with great caution. For one thing, local life-worlds are produced and reproduced locally, and there are social fields where the globalisation of culture

has little or no effect; for example in the socialisation of children, where Mauritian Creole custom is strikingly different from the French. For another, there are large parts of the world where the globalising agencies hardly enter. Poverty, it needs to be mentioned, functions as an efficient entropy-resistant mechanism in these matters. The very poor have no access to the shared interfaces of modernity, nor are the agencies of modernity particularly interested in providing them.

CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALISATION FOR CULTURAL RESEARCH

Let us now try to draw some general conclusions from the preceding discussion. First, the institutional dimensions of modernity, to the extent that they are present in a particular locality, facilitate the globalisation of culture and, by extension, create a wide range of potentially meaningful communication between people from discrete places. To this effect, walls between societies are being torn down. Further, certain aspects of the globalisation of culture relating to consumption in a wide sense do not necessarily depend on the implementation of modern social institutions.

Secondly, the disembedding of culture and social relations from the spatial dimension is partial and applies in special contexts only. Most contexts of communication and exchange remain local, although they are influenced by the non-spatial symbolic systems. As Hannerz (1990) wryly observes: Cosmopolitans are dependent on locals for their very identity as cosmopolitans.

Thirdly, facile talk about "Western society" or "Western culture" as a monolithic system should no longer be tolerated in anthropological writings. The cultural variations within and between so-called modern societies are spectacular, not least since most societies in the world could be classified as "more or less modern". In line with this, processes of "rationalisation" considered endemic to modern bureaucratic society cannot be taken for granted anywhere. As Sahlins has convincingly argued, it cannot be said of dominant styles of thought in bourgeois societies that they are more or less "rational" than styles of thought in other societies (Sahlins 1976).

Fourthly, the thesis of globalisation seems relevant for anthropology in two main ways. First, it may inspire research into those limited social and cultural forms which are truly non-spatial, such as international business conglomerates or international advertising, or the "global switchboards" of the kind envisaged by Hannerz when he speaks of international hotels breaking down barriers between symbolic systems. Secondly, it may increase our sensitivity as anthropological fieldworkers vis-à-vis the impact of processes taking place at a vast scale, yet manifesting themselves locally. Surely, it cannot be without interest to an ethnographer that the leading Mauritian socialist party, the MMM (*Mouvement Militant Mauricien*), which was initially inspired by French militant groups in the late 1960s, followed the example of the French socialist party in altering its programme in a less anti-capitalist direction in the mid-eighties. In order to grasp this interrelationship, one must know something about French politics, even if one's field of enquiry is in Mauritius.

Fifthly, the lives of humans are in crucial respects created through local practices which take place in locally defined contexts. In this regard, it would be futile to look for particular entropy-resistant mechanisms. In many a regard, societies do remain discrete; the actual impact of globalisation is variable and never all-encompassing. Remarks about international soccer which fall between people from Argentina and Burkina Faso, it must be con-

ceded, form a small part of their respective life-worlds. On the other hand, it becomes increasingly clear that in order to study the local, we must frequently know something about the global for it to make sense. For the local is usually a part of the global in certain respects. To that effect, walls have been demolished. In this regard, we should be careful to avoid a logical error in our reasoning. The fact that the global always manifests itself locally does not mean that all or most local phenomena have a global element.

Sixthly and finally, the ethical implications of globalisation should not be missed. A deconstruction of the radical distinction between "us" and "them" implies that they, rather than being beasts in a natural laboratory, must be taken seriously as human beings during research and analysis. On fieldwork in Trinidad, I was once threatened - only half jokingly - by one of my Trinidadian informants, that if I dared to depict Trinidad as a typical "plural society" in the tradition from Furnivall and M. G. Smith, he would personally come and beat me up.

NEW DIMENSIONS FOR ANTHROPOLOGICAL COMPARISON?

Let us finally consider the utility of concepts concerning modern society in anthropological comparison. The danger of our analytical concepts becoming diluted in accuracy by their use in casual political small-talk increases as we try to come to terms with the contemporary world. Such a confusion of everyday terms with analytical concepts is quite common among globalisation theorists. It may, for example, seem plausible to assume that "nationalism", "cinema" and "political party", for example, which form part of native systems of representations and practices in many remote areas, are useful comparative concepts or constants. Individual competition in the labour market, thus, is becoming universal and seems to lend itself to cross-cultural comparison. On the other hand, the local perceptions of labour markets, opportunities and so on, and the actual set-up of labour markets vary - they are context-dependent. As comparative concepts, notions like "competition in the labour market" may therefore serve as preliminary bridgeheads at best. When we try them out cross-culturally, we will presumably be forced to acknowledge the enormous variations within that category of societies which Lévi-Strauss and others have written off as "the same kind" or worse, "Western society".

In a word, one should not be deluded into believing that the influences of "global culture" are omnipresent and unambiguous. On the other hand, substantial dimensions for wide-ranging comparisons are becoming viable. Walls have been demolished to this effect. These dimensions for comparison may well reveal greater differences than similarities, and their comparative use may rapidly lead to what Ardener (1989) has called parameter collapse: they may cease to be meaningful as defining concepts and collapse into the defined space, like the concept of society may already have done (see discussion in Ingold 1989). Until such a collapse occurs, we should try to use the concepts in a comparative way; comparing patterns of consumption, nationalist ideologies, labour markets and migration, and so on.

The anthropology of the present should ideally do the same for contemporary society as classical anthropology did for so-called traditional societies; it should insist on, and demonstrate, the enormous variation between the social systems which have hitherto been lumped conveniently together as "modern society" or even "Western culture". Readings of Shakespeare, we have learnt from Laura Bohannan (1966), can take on very different mean-

ings in different societies. This holds true for citizenship, wage work, TV watching, disco dancing and consumption in general as well. However, and that is a fact of cultural homogenisation, concepts and practices relating to citizenship, wage work etc., no matter how context-dependent they are, now intrude into the life-worlds of millions of people whose grandparents were considered savages by anthropologists. Future comparisons cannot, therefore, be conducted as anthropological quasi-experiments. An aspect of Galton's problem, namely the problem of isolating systems in comparison, is now evidently irresolvable (Strathern 1991). Not only are no societies isolated, but they are subjected to such a multitude of influences, and form part of networks of such inconceivable scale that it is impossible to control for such interferences with quasi-experimental set-ups. Diffusion, in a word, is a constitutive element of the global system (Robertson 1992).

The scope of cultural variation in the world has definitely been reduced, but the diversity remains enormous and must be accounted for. Within the post-colonial, disenchanted parameters of the nation-state, capitalism and globalising systems of symbolisation, we shall find the survival of theoretically incompatible institutions; there will be people "living in two cultures", as it were; we shall find a wealth of unexpected bricolages, ancient religions comfortable in the nuclear age, we will discover unique local appropriations of prefabricated signifiers - and we shall, certainly, find stable, sleepy local communities oblivious of the external world. Finally, we should not forget, there will always remain desolate backwaters abandoned by the never omnipresent agencies of modernity and globalisation. The primitives, however, are dead. They were killed by their own disenchantment - and by ours.

Allow me finally to return to my initial metaphor, the Berlin wall. Certainly, like so many other walls dividing people or societies into fixed categories, this wall has been demolished. But as I have argued, walls remain all over the world, even if we succeed in doing away with the wall dividing the civilised from the savages, the intuitively familiar "us" from the radically different "them". There are the walls of class, ethnicity, religion and gender, there are the walls enclosing localities, and there are other, thick walls preventing power and meaning from seeping out. In Germany, walls still separate *Ossies* from *Wessies*, *Deutsche* (Germans) from *Ausländer* (foreigners). Nowadays, walls like these are invisible and require high ethnographic field competence as well as knowledge about the global system to be fully understood. This is exactly the kind of competence which will be required of us in the future. Never has the Parsonian cliché depicting homogenisation and differentiation as complementary processes (Parsons 1977) been more evidently true than in the contemporary world, a pristine field for comparative anthropological research.

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ANTHROPOLOGIES OF EMOTION AND SICKNESS

BORUT TELBAN*

A soldier became melancholic because of his parent's rejection of a girl he desperately loved. He was distracted, complained of a severe headache, and of continual heaviness in that part. He grew visibly thinner; his face turned pale and he became so weak that he voided his excrement without noticing it ... There was no delirium, although the patient gave no positive answers and seemed to be entirely absorbed. He never asked for either food or drink.

Gazette salutaire, *March 17, 1763; quoted in Foucault 1965:295, ftn.*

The anthropology of emotion[1] creates a rich subfield, being at once a domain of psychological anthropology, ethnopsychology, culture and personality studies, ritual studies, cross-cultural psychology and psychiatry, and forming links with sociology, philosophy, history, and other disciplines.[2] In their overview of research into the anthropology of emotion, Lutz and White state:

> The past relegation of emotions to the sidelines of culture theory is an artefact of the view that they occupy the more natural and biological provinces of human experience, and hence are seen as relatively uniform, uninteresting, and inaccessible to the methods of cultural analysis. In going beyond its original psychobiological framework to include concern with emotion's social, relational, communicative, and cultural aspects, emotion theory has taken on new importance for sociocultural theory proper (1986:405).

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1 An earlier variety of this paper was presented as a pre-fieldwork seminar in 1990 at the *Australian National University*. Since then I completed my second fieldwork in Papua New Guinea, in Ambonwari, East Sepik Province, as well as my Ph D in the *Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University* (1994). Some of my views presented in this seminar have sharpened or have even slightly changed (1993, 1994, in press). However, because of its value as an overview of the different concepts and approaches in the field of the anthropologies of emotion and psychiatric disorder, I decided to publish it in its original form. In addition, I believe, this paper will in some way add to my previous overview of medical anthropology (1989b), published in Slovene, and will open a new dimension with its focus on the relationship between human emotions and sickness. I am grateful to all participants at the seminar, particularly to Chris Ballard, Alleta Biersack, Don Gardner, Peny Graham, Margaret Jolly and Michael Young for their encouragement and comments. I thank the *Australian National University* for the scholarship; the *Slovene Research Association, Slovene Ministry of Science and Technology*, and the *Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* for a Radcliffe-Brown Memorial Fund/Sutasoma Trust award which enabled me to complete my PhD thesis.

2 The role of psychology in anthropology was central to some major theorists in English (Rivers 1926), French (Mauss 1985[1938]) and American (Boas 1910) anthropology. The term ethnopsychology can be understood as an indigenous theory denoting what people explicitly say about the self (Ewing 1987:16); it represents the way in which people conceptualise, monitor, and discuss their own and others' mental processes, behaviour, and relationships (Lutz 1985b:36).

Sickness, on the other hand, though an important field in some early anthropological works (Clements 1932, Evans-Pritchard 1972[1937], Rivers 1927), was first specified as a subfield of medical anthropology in the fifties (e.g. Caudill 1953). While social and cultural dimensions of sickness were recognised during the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, interest in them declined after the discovery of micro-organisms at the end of the same century, to reappear in the research of medical and social scientists during the last four or five decades. "Physicians and anthropologists have intersecting interests because health and disease are related not only to biological factors, but also to people's cultural resources and the social behaviour that utilises these resources" (Lieban 1977:15).

From what has been said already about emotion and sickness, it appears that any interest in them must consider all aspects of the human being: biological, psychological, social, and cultural. In his search for meaning, Geertz strips a human being, beginning with culture as the superstructure of human existence, the "webs of significance" that people as animals, have themselves spun (1973:5).

Socio-cultural phenomena are obviously supra-individual, yet a human community or society that embodies these phenomena is composed of individuals in interaction. This is the simple source of the basic anthropological dilemma as to how far the intra-psychic characteristics of individuals need to be taken into account for the purpose of understanding and explaining socio-cultural phenomena (Jahoda 1982:32-3). Both the social anthropologist and the psychologist may study the mental and emotional life of individuals. The psychologist seeks to find relations between these events as they occur in the life of single individuals, what Radcliffe-Brown called "individual mental or psychical systems". The social anthropologist seeks to find relations between these events as they link together mental systems within a physical environment, i.e. he studies them within social systems (Gluckman 1964:160, cited in Jahoda 1982:36-7).

Emotion and sickness, phenomena central to psychological and medical anthropology, usually conjoin during inquiries into the field of psychiatric disorders and forms of psychotherapy in non-western societies. Anthropologists such as Kiev (1964), Opler (1959), or Wallace (1959) have shown how rituals, possession states, and other phenomena serve to restore or maintain mental health (Honigmann 1975:609).

While "emotion" and "sickness" are mentioned in a majority of cases in connection with mental disorders, I believe that emotions are equally important in other psychosomatic (or somatopsychic) and sociopathic (Biersack personal communication) disorders. Moral and social transgressions, fear of sorcery and spirits, and so on, are in many societies considered to be important causes of sickness; these causes are thus culture specific. It is culture, not nature, that defines disease, although it is usually both which foster it (Hughes 1978:153). While such psychologically and socio-culturally conditioned disorders affect a person as an individual, they also affect society as a whole.

When writing this paper I found myself caught in a persistent contradiction between body and mind, nature and culture, thought and emotion, and I even unwittingly returned to the old emic/etic and relativist/universalist debate, as Michael Young generously pointed out. I found myself thinking differently while "in the field" in Papua New Guinea, at the *Australian National University*, and at home in Slovenia, or before, in Yugoslavia. I realised later that not only body and mind, but body and soul, soul and mind, and even soul, and "soul" as translation, are different dichotomies.[3] It is necessary then to put forward some position statements which I will try to follow throughout my paper.

First, "the individual" is the term which is widely used in most parts of the Western world to represent an autonomous, "mortal human being" who struggles and competes to acquire power, role, rule, and office (La Fontaine 1985:134, Rosaldo 1984:146). These individuals are for an outsider very much members of a society with particular social structures. On the other hand, many societies do not place emphasis on the individual, and do not even distinguish between private self and public person. Among Paiela of Papua New Guinea, the person is not an autonomous and self-centred individual, but envisioned in his or her relationships (Biersack 1990). "The singular person can be imagined as a social microcosm" (Strathern 1988:13).[4]

Second, from the ethnopsychological point of view, there is a gap between emotion and thought in Western societies in contrast to non-western societies. In these latter, thought and emotion are not so sharply distinctive, they shape each other through their interconnection, and the notion "feeling-mind", as in Bali (Wikan 1989:294), has a social source and significance. In contemporary Japan, *hara* (stomach, abdomen) represents a combination of the heart and the brain in the Western sense. Furthermore, it is the point of connection between thought and emotion or between intellect and affect (Ohnuki-Tierney 1984:58-9). Lutz (1988:4) treats emotion as "an ideological practice rather than as a thing to be discovered or an essence to be distilled", while Michele Rosaldo (1984:143) and Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) talk about "embodied thoughts" and "mindful body". These last two statements, for example, would be difficult to understand where I come from.

Third, emotions in many societies are collective sentiments rather than matters of personal choice (Wikan 1989:294). That is why Rubin, for example, argues that tribal art expresses a collective rather than individual sentiment (1984:36). Lutz argues that because in Western ethnopsychological frameworks emotion is seen as a component of individuals (private, hidden, interior, psychological) rather than of social situations, we can misunderstand other cultures through the employment of the discipline and methods of psychology (which are notoriously oriented toward individuals) and through the reflection of Western cultural experience (Lutz 1988:41-2).

Fourth, the nature/culture and universal/relative dichotomies: in the West, emotion is primarily considered a universal and pre-cultural biological heritage with no relevance to a specific culture. Lutz states that although we may experience emotion within our bodies, the meaning is social, a product of social life, rather than an individual achievement (1988:5, see also Scheper-Hughes 1985). In her book, Lutz attempts to demonstrate how "emotional meaning is fundamentally structured by particular cultural systems and particu-

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3 In her article discussing soul and mind, Wierzbicka (1989) argues that what appear in the literature as Western ethnopsychological categories are in fact English categories. Thus while "person" and "I" seem to have equivalents in all languages of the world, that is not the case with the English concept "mind". The concept "mind" is specific to Anglo-Saxon culture and does not have exact semantic equivalents in other languages (e.g. Russian, French, German or Latin). When we identify "something other than body" as mind, "we are exchanging a universal, scientific perspective for an Anglocentric one; we are adopting the point of view of a particular folk psychology in the belief that we are discussing folk psychologies from a culture-independent point of view" (Wierzbicka 1989:46). - I would like to mention here that my use of the term "Western" in this paper refers to scientific, highly technological, intellectual, rationalistic and as such an extreme version of technologically highly developed societies.

4 In 1637, Descartes wrote that an individual would be quite a different person if brought up as a child among different cultures, such as French, German, Chinese, or among cannibals (Honigmann 1975:602). It is through the process of socialisation that the asocial individual achieves a position of socially and culturally defined personhood (Fajans 1985:375). "Persons are cultural bases for formulating and exploring subjective experience. Equally, persons are recognisable as elements of social life occupying social statuses and participating in social groups and events" (Kirkpatrick and White 1985:9).

lar social and material environments. Claim is made that emotional experience is not pre-cultural but pre-**eminently** cultural" (1988:5).

Fifth, I think that it is necessary to distinguish between, and specify, the different aspects of emotion, and in this I follow Lewis and Saarni (1985) who have proposed a structural model which consists of five components: emotional elicitors, emotional receptors, emotional states, emotional expression, and emotional experience. It is necessary to note individual, social, and cultural relevance (including political, historical, and economic issues), of each of these components. We should be aware of differences in emotional life between women and men, adults and children, old and young, and also of differences within such groups. We should avoid ethnocentric conclusions about other people's emotions.

Sixth, I will extend Lutz's (1985a:64) statements on depression to a wider spectrum of ill-health. As the state and syndrome of mental sickness and psychosomatic sickness may be fundamentally emotional in nature (or incorporated within a unitary form of emotion-thought), theories about the nature of emotion (or emotion-thought) are also theories about the nature of these sicknesses. This is to say that if the experience of emotion can be culture-specific, so can the experience of sickness; only through combined study of sociocultural aspects of health and sickness, ethnopsychology, and indigenous beliefs and practices about prophylactics, diagnosis, and therapy, can one prove that emotional and sick states are also culture-specific. I argue that some emotions and some sicknesses may also be multihuman (which does not mean "panhuman" or "universal") among some Western, non-western or mixed societies (all of them culturally distinct), due to their social, political, economical, historical, geographical, religious, and environmental similarities. Browner et al. (1988:685) argue, for example, that *susto* is not a "culture-bound" syndrome because it appears among different cultures in South America and elsewhere. Cultures are never static, they are influenced by other human groups around them.

Seventh, if in many non-western societies emotions are collective sentiments, the perception of emotionally derived sickness is also a collective phenomenon. It seems that the disease/illness dichotomy, drawn by Fabrega (1972:213) and followed by the majority of authors (e.g. Colson and Selby 1974:246, Eisenberg 1977:11, Frankel 1986:2-3, Helman 1986:214, 1990:86-91, Kleinman 1980:72, Lewis 1975:149, Telban 1988:166 f.n., 1989a:5-6), which sees an individual as the main object of interest, may be adequate only in those Western and non-western societies where the emphasis is on "individualism". In all other societies, the distinction between the biomedical model of disease or "the doctor's perspective" (Helman 1990:86) and the psychological, behavioural, and cultural illness or "the patient's perspective" (Helman 1990:90) is simply not adequate. Young's redefinition of sickness fits in this model when he says that sickness is the process for socialising disease and illness where worrisome behavioural and biological signs are given socially recognisable meanings, i.e. they are made into symptoms and socially significant outcomes (1982:270). Sickness as such may, in some societies, be brought back together with disease into the individual consciousness, receiving the label "illness" again. Therefore, to study "aspects of health and sickness" in small-scale non-western societies where "**all** knowledge of society and sickness is socially determined" is to critically examine the "**social conditions of knowledge production**" (Young 1982:277, emphases original).

Many of these perspectives were neglected in the works of various previous researchers, as I will show through this survey of emotions and sickness. Let me say something about cross-cultural research on emotions before I focus on mental and psychosomat-

ic sicknesses in non-western societies. I will discuss the case of Melanesia, with special emphasis on Papua New Guinea, at the end of this paper.

EMOTION

Not only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artefacts in man.
Geertz 1973:81

Given the primacy accorded the rationalistic bias with its emphasis on "thought" in a culture, emotions were largely neglected in the works of many social theorists (Scheff 1977:484). Indeed "cultural theory" (Lutz and White 1986:405) and "cognitive elements" (Scheff 1977:484) seem to have diverted the interests of sociocultural scientists almost until the last decade. Since then interest in emotional life has burgeoned not only in anthropology, but also in psychology, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, history, and feminist studies.

"Much more like Freudian primary and secondary process thinking, the uniform or universal aspects of emotion are variously "shaped", "filtered", "channelled", "distorted" or "masked" by cultural "moulds", "filters", "lenses", "display rules" or "defence mechanisms" "(Lutz and White 1986:412). Or, as Shweder says:

> To understand the emotional life of a person is to understand the types of feelings (anger, envy, fear, depersonalisation, shame, joy, love, homesickness, etc.) felt by a person, the distribution and frequency of those feelings across time and context, the kinds of situations that elicit those feelings, the wishes and fantasies that co-occur with those feelings, and the consequential action tendencies set off by those feelings (1985:183).

This, of course, requires that attention be paid to the sociocultural contexts of emotions.

What are emotions? Fajans argues that anthropologists should be aware of the analytical distinction between emotions (signifying a private, subjective state with or without motivation by society and culture) and sentiments as "culturally constructed patterns of feeling and behaviour, which initiate and motivate activity in the world" (1983:166) and which "demarcate the boundaries of the person" (Fajans 1985:375). In her preliminary organising paper for the symposium on emotions Michele Rosaldo says: "Emotions are both feelings and cognitive constructions, linking person, action, and sociological milieu" (cited in Levy 1983:128). Again, the author of *The Passions* says that emotion is "a system of concepts, beliefs, attitudes, and desires, virtually all of which are context-bound, historically developed, and culture-specific" (Solomon 1984:249).

I believe that cognition as well as the cultural and social environment influence the emotions as does past experience (and *vice versa*). For example, after seeing lots of his friends killed, a soldier would not experience the same kind of emotion as a soldier newly arrived on the battle field. Or a veteran anthropologist would not experience the same kind of excitement at the prospect of fieldwork as a novice.[5]

5 The psychology of cognition (in contrast to psychology of emotion) is the main concern of Sperber (1985). If such an approach

In many societies, there will always exist individual aspects of emotions, characteristic of every self though their perception and expression will be sharpened and largely influenced by their social and cultural environment, thus forming a "social self". This environment also contains the causes which elicit particular emotions. If we compare emotions with language we can make an obvious point: a child has a biological ability to learn a language, but what language it is going to learn depends upon the society in which it will be brought up.[6] In the same way, I suggest, a child has the biological ability to feel, but what kind of feelings (emotions or sentiments) it is going to develop and how it will express them depends upon its social and cultural environment. I think that speech and words representing emotions are to some extent adequate indicators of our feelings, only if we are emotionally connected with that language. Only if we feel it. But to sense words takes years and years of learning, experiencing, and feeling. And here lies the problem for cross-cultural studies. In learning a foreign language, we have already missed the period of childhood, when words, especially those in the sensitive field of emotions, have deep cultural and personal meaning. "Without culture we would simply not know how to feel" (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987:28).

While arguing that all facial expressions are universal, Darwin concluded that "conventional expressions or gestures, acquired by the individual during life, would probably have differed in the different races, in the same manner as do their languages" (1965:15). While some scientists (Klineberg, La Barre, Birdwhisteel) have argued that emotions are a product of learning and that because of this they differ from culture to culture, other scientists (Ekman, Sorensen and Friesen) while limiting themselves to seven basic emotions (happiness, fear, anger, surprise, sadness, disgust, and contempt) confirm the basic findings of Darwin and conclude that there are universals in the facial expression of emotion (Ekman 1980, Sorenson 1975:361). Recent cross-cultural research (Lutz 1988; Scheper-Hughes 1985; Wierzbicka 1986; Wikan 1989) has shown that emotional responses are not necessarily universal at all.

We must be extremely careful when we talk about another culture in terms of emotional elicitors, their intensity, the number of people involved, expression of emotion and so on. The level of individuality and sociality, and the actual feeling of particular emotion incorporated within the cognitive system of an individual and society differ from culture to culture. Shame for example, which can have either a positive or negative character, can be explained as a system of adaptation, as a system of control or as a punishment. The keys of the "emotional keyboard" (Shweder 1985:200) representing respective emotions (disgust, interest, distress, anger, fear, contempt, shame, shyness, and guilt) are available to any child by the age of four years (*ibid.*). I would add here also some positive affects (at least in our society) such as joy, love, contentment etc. So what is universal is the human ability to feel, to "get emotions working", to express and to control them.[7]

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is applicable for some Western societies, I believe that from the viewpoint of many ethnopsychologies, thought and emotion are not sharply distinguished.

6 Sartre (1977:56) criticises all those psychologists who consider the consciousness of emotion as a reflective consciousness, that is, a modification of our psychic being, as a state of mind (fear does not begin as consciousness of being afraid). He goes on to say that the emotional consciousness is non-reflective and is primarily consciousness of the world. "The emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world...it is a transformation of the world" (Sartre 1977:57,63).

7 For Kleinman, individual and cognitive processess are subjects of interest. He says : "The affects... such as anger, anxiety, depression, guilt, etc., are known to the person in whom they are evoked only via cognitive process: perception, labelling, classifying,

"Underdistanced" emotions (Scheff 1977) which could be compared with the "last drop" phenomenon - the drop of water that makes a vessel overflow - in stress (Devereux 1978:48-62), become, at least in our society, either pathogenic (e.g. despair) or curative (e.g. outburst of laughter, weeping). Emotion has in my view all the characteristics of the particular society and culture in which it appears, and if it does not fit in, it gets labelled pathogenic, evidence of mental disorder. I would argue that as ethnic music expresses particular cultures (we might even say that music has a lot in common with emotions), so do the emotions.

Besides, "we are hampered by our tendency to take as universal the emotions recognised in the West, so that there is a real danger of academic ethnocentrism" (Schieffelin 1985a:128). Michele Rosaldo (1984:149) is convinced that shame for example differs if experienced among Ilongot, or inegalitarian African groups, or in societies organised as states. Lutz expresses this more forcefully when she says that

> while it has been considered of great importance to ascertain whether some non-western people 'felt guilt', the question does not arise as to whether Americans experience the New Guinea Hagener's emotion of *popokl* 'outrage over the failure of others to recognise one's claims' [Strathern 1968] or whether they are deficient in the ability to experience the Ifaluk emotion of *fago* 'compassion/love/sadness' (Lutz 1985b:38-9).

I ask myself if this is not because of a kind of cultural imperialism? And the fundamental emotions which have their own labels in English do not have adequate translations in Polish, for instance (Wierzbicka 1986:584). So, may we call them fundamental emotions at all? In some cases elicitors are culture (and time) specific, and so are the emotions. A good example is *tesknota* in Polish language which developed its present meaning (sadness caused by separation) only after 1830 at the time of massive emigration (Wierzbicka 1986:588). "To be alone with one's sorrow" in the case of sadness is not applicable for every society, as I have noticed in Papua New Guinea.

Many works dealing with emotions are concerned only with the middle level of arousal of emotions, while other registers, higher and lower (e.g. hostility - **anger** - rage; timidity - **fear** - terror) are neglected or discussed separately and in isolation. This is the case with shame and shyness, whereas among Japanese embarrassment and shame are denoted by a single term *-haji* (Lebra 1983:194); or for example, in Malay where anger, rage, and fury are all translated into a single term *marah*, while at the same time bilingual translators would furnish the single word anger for three distinct but similar terms: *marah*, *naik darah*, and *panas hati* (Boucher 1979:171). An even more neglected area concerns those emotions that Western societies call "positive" (love, happiness, enthusiasm, and like, contentment, interest, and passion, joy, and excitement).[8] More "fine-grained research" (Epstein 1984:20) is

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explaining, valuating. Thus affects exist as such for the individual only after they are recognized. **Prior to cognition**, affective states are an essential psychobiological phenomenon, with physiological correlates, and as such are universal. Stated simply, there is no difference in quality or intensity of the primary (uncognized) affects felt by Americans and similar affects felt by Chinese or individuals from any other culture, leaving aside, of course, individual psychological differences found in all cultures. There is a cultural difference in quality or intensity of secondary (cognized) affects, however, that is to say, once labelled 'anger', 'sadness', or *huo-ch'i ta*, affects differ" (1980:147, emphases original).

8 But see the detailed paper on positive and negative (or pleasant and unpleasant) emotions among Ifaluk by Lutz (1982).

needed in the case of shame; for example, shame is associated with the states described in English as mortification, humiliation, embarrassment, modesty, shyness etc., or like in Flores in taking even vis-à-vis spiritual entities (Graham, personal communication).

Another problem arises when there is a mixture of emotions (in the majority of cases we can not talk about "pure" anger, "pure" love, "pure" fear), or when one emotion is aroused to regulate another (Izard 1983:307).[9] To use Shweder's keyboard metaphor again, this time on the piano: when someone presses a key the sound comes out but those unfamiliar with piano music will not be able to tell which key it is. But when several keys are pressed at the same time there will be even greater difficulty in identifying them individually. A good example of an apparent mixture of emotions, and of the difficulties posed by translation, are the emotional states called *wowomumu*, *veumaiyiyi*, and *unuwewe* in Kalauna on Goodenough Island, off the eastern coast of New Guinea. *Wowomumu* which Young has translated as "shame", encapsulates the emotional spectrum from shyness and mild embarrassment to guilt and self-hatred. In its extreme form it "shades into, or triggers, a state called *veumaiyiyi* - a category of emotion which is even harder to define ..." and it is expressed in self-injury (Young 1971:262). It is the mixture of anger, shame, resentment, and self-pity "which is expressed in the subject's self-punishment - a course he takes to shame or elicit sympathy from the person who offended him" (*ibid.*). To "exorcise his shame" (Young 1971:206) a person would for example deliberately "cut down his own betel palm to shame another who stole from it" (*ibid.*:262). People thus punish themselves eliciting sympathy and shame in those who have wronged them. The strongest, most extreme form of *veumaiyiyi* is *unuwewe*, a powerful negative emotion evoked by false accusation, unjust insult. It "exceeds masochistic extortion and becomes perversely and spitefully satisfying - a form of revenge" (Young 1983:73).

In his essay *Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali*, Geertz argues that the Balinese term *lek* was wrongly translated by previous researchers as "shame"; for shame, Geertz says, is the feeling of disgrace and humiliation which follows transgression and wrongdoing which are found out and publicly exposed. Balinese *lek* has nothing to do with transgressions, acknowledged or hidden, and ought rather to be translated as "stage fright", paralysing nervousness before the prospect (and the fact) of social interaction (Geertz 1973:401).[10]

In every society emotions are often expressed in terms of bodily feelings or by reference to bodily organs (e.g. "my stomach has turned over"; "hot-belly"; "broken hearted"; etc.) and have to be translated into the language of emotions for better understanding.[11] Such expressions in non-western societies are quite understandable as in Western societies

9 Foucault cites Edme-Pierre Beauchesne from the end of the 18th century (*De l'influence des affections de l'ame dans les maladies nerveuses des femmes*): "...it is by opposing fear to anger that anger may be mastered...the poison and the antidote are inseparable" (1965:180). In the Romanticist vision, emotion is seen as the pure, the honest, the uncorrupted, and thought and its offshoot and speech as less authentic and less "really real" (Lutz 1988:68).

10 In her paper, Wikan (1989) argues that aestheticism and "stage fright" as motivators of grace and composure are misidentified by Geertz. Essential in Balinese constructions of person are faces and hearts and not masks and faces (as Geertz stated); the "stage fright" metaphor is thus inappropriate (Wikan 1989:295).

11 In classical Chinese thought, the "heart" is the centre of emotions while the liver is associated with anger (Kleinman 1980:135); in Tahiti, *riri* means anger and is located in the abdomen together with a variety of other feelings (Levy 1969:370); angry hearts bring illness in Bali (Wikan 1989:295); in New Caledonia, when people are desolate, they might complain of *nena were* - distressed bowels (Leenhardt 1979:7); in Papua New Guinea, either near Lae or among Gahuku-Gama emotions are expressed through the internal organs (Hogbin 1947:284; Read 1955:271).

people also often express their feelings through the use of somatic idioms. But we must be aware that real emotion as a physical phenomenon does not exist "for a body cannot be emotional, not being able to attribute a meaning to its own manipulations" (Sartre 1977[1939]:29). Emotional reactions which appear secondary induce physiological responses via the autonomic nervous system and are expressed in different patterns of visceral reactivities (Kissin 1986:319).

Emotional experiences can be presented through bodily expressions, the most universal being those of the face (blushing, weeping, crying, laughing etc.), body movements, and other bodily symptoms (tears, rapid heart beat, cold sweat, nausea etc.). These physical symptoms can be "named".

> The extent of overlap between socially valued emotions and pleasant or egocentric rewarding emotions is thus culturally variable, as is the extent to which one or the other is seen as central to the meaning of emotion words (Lutz 1982:124).

I shall conclude this introductory survey of emotions with Gerber's statement that the study of emotions is important to ethnopsychology not only because they are interesting and powerful subjective experiences in themselves but also because they provide a means by which important social values are linked with behaviour. In addition, emotions help to define the image of the socially approved self (1985:159).

SICKNESS

Shen an pu ju shin an - A peaceful mind is more important than a healthy body.
Chinese proverb

The interest in culture-bound psychiatric disorders after the publication of the book by Caudill and Lin (1969) resulted in a great number of papers, some of them collected in representative editions: for example, Marsella and White (1984), Simons and Hughes (1985), and Kleinman and Good (1985). While "culture and personality" theorists assume that "emotions are the basis for motivational constructs such as needs, wishes, and desires, linking them to both action and symbol systems" (Lutz and White 1986:412), cross-cultural psychology and psychiatry have focused on "emotional disturbance as **illness**, including the 'affective disorders' of depression, anxiety, and a host of 'culture-bound syndromes'" (*ibid.*:413). "Non-Western psychiatry", "culture-bound (psychiatric) syndromes", "ethnopsychiatry", "atypical psychoses", "syndromes not seen in Western culture" are all categories dealing with psychiatric disorders in non-western societies.

> The life of emotions itself takes on special meaning if you believe that emotions, **if unexpressed**, are dangerous and do not go away, or alternatively, if you believe that emotions, **if expressed**, are dangerous and do not go away (Shweder 1985:186).[12]

12 In the nineteenth century, tuberculosis was considered the result of too much passion (Sontag 1977:21). Persistent troubled feelings (such as sadness) in Tahitian ideology are often interpreted as illness or as the harmful effects of a spirit (Levy 1984:219).

Both beliefs can result in psychosomatic and/or mental disorders. We can easily find a *fil rouge* between the effect we call *placebo* and the positive emotional, mental, and cognitive responses of the organism (individual). Such answers are obtained through the treatments of ritual specialists in many traditional societies, and also by actions of medical personnel in all societies. In the same way we can find a connection between the *nocebo* phenomenon (negative effect on health - the reverse of the *placebo*) and the negative emotional, mental and cognitive responses of the organism (individual). This may be the case in death by sorcery. I also believe that culturally shaped emotions may, in both familiar and foreign cultural environments, cause culturally shaped sicknesses. Medical and social workers should be "sensitive to the relativity of normality and abnormality if we are to avoid psychiatric 'imperialism'" (Marsella 1979:243).

Mental and psychosomatic disorders cannot be considered without reference to the self, and since the self is linked to, and influenced by, society and culture, disorders have different social labels in different societies, and are thus culture specific. Cross-cultural studies of emotion in connection with sickness suggest that there are many sicknesses which have their source in emotional disturbance.[13]

Individuals in Taiwan learn in their childhood that their personal affects should not be openly expressed, even more so if they are negative in the community's view (Kleinman 1980:133). Their own psychological well-being is less important then close interpersonal relationships (*ibid.*). Ifaluk see emotions as evoked in social activity while Americans consider them as internal feeling states (Lutz 1982:124), or as Shweder and Bourne (1984) see the distinction between "egocentric" constructs of "Western" Americans and "sociocentric" accounts of American Indians. Wittkower and Warnes say that

> psychoanalysis has gained ground in the United States because of a cultural emphasis on individualism, work therapy in the Soviet Union because of Marxist ideology, and autogenic training in Germany and Morita therapy in Japan because of culturally imposed rigid self-discipline in these two countries (1984:468-9).

In Western societies, those who are not labelled as mentally ill quite often suffer from internal tensions (use of tranquillisers, alcohol, drugs, tobacco etc.), or from psychosomatic illnesses (hypertension, ulcers, bronchial asthma, loss of libido, etc.). These tensions accumulate in the bodies of individuals through the years before they are expressed in physical-

13 In traditional Latin-American culture, *susto* is caused by fright, *bilis* by anger, and *envidia* by desire (Torrey 1986:143); fright is the cause of distress (*narahati*) in Iran. Sadness, anxiety, and feelings of being trapped cause culturally specific depressive sickness (Good and Good 1984); *koro* in South East Asia is caused by guilt and anxiety over sexual excess and is manifested through the belief that the penis is shrinking into the abdomen; malignant anxiety in Africa can give the appearance of *amok*; *windigo* among Canadian Indians, a possession syndrome marked by the intense desire to eat human flesh appears after the experience of depression and anxiety (Yap 1977), to name just some of the most commonly known disorders, recognised as such by the communities themselves. Numbers of disorders are attributed to sorcery, witchcraft, and moral and social transgressions where an emotional factor is evident. (See, for example, Chapter 11, *Emotional States and Cultural Constraints* in Landy (ed). 1977, where several authors discuss psychopathology among Australian Aborigines, Eskimos, and in African societies). There are also great numbers of culturally specific psychiatric disorders such as *latah* from Malaysia and Indonesia and *imu* from Japan, when someone is startled, talks nonsense, imitates the speech of others, and utters things which are socially tabooed. *Uqamairineq* and *old hay* are culture specific elaborations of sleep paralysis experienced by Eskimos in Alaska, when someone awakes terrified and is unable to move or speak. Or, there is Malay-Indonesian *amok*, when an otherwise psychologically healthy person suddenly perpetrates random violence (see Simons and Hughes 1985).

ly observable sicknesses.[14] Pressures and expectations differ from culture to culture, and individuals learn how to struggle with the tensions of their own societies during childhood. So, I contend, chronic fear (of sorcery or of the consequences of moral transgressions) mixed with other emotions may be, at the time when its intensity is intolerable, extremely harmful. This often happens when the person is already sick and is often exacerbated by resignation, a common reaction to serious sickness.

Western people have long believed that non-western societies live in a state of harmony in which stress levels are low. But "a world peopled by vengeful deities and ghosts, witches and sorcerers, and angry neighbours and envious relatives, is not less stressful than in modern life" (Foster and Anderson 1978:93). Psychological stress can be engendered by "specific sets of circumstances recognised as being particularly likely to induce fear, anxiety or emotional conflict" (Mayer 1982:251).

> Threatening stimuli are **stressors**, the resultant tension or disequilibrium produced within the organism is the **state of stress** and is followed by **stress responses** which may be physiological, psychological, social or cultural in nature (Spradley and Philips 1972:519).

While some situations may be stressors in every society (natural disasters, bereavements, wartime), others may be culturally relative. In modern society the stressors may be life crises, family instability, relative deprivation, status incongruity, intense competition, social alienation, job pressure, unemployment, retirement, mobility, migration, and so on. In non-western society the stressors may be attributed to rapid social and cultural change, to men's fear of pollution by menstruating wives, retribution for breaking social norms and taboos, being left out of food distribution, inter-group and inter-personal conflict and thus fear of poisoning and sorcery, the relationship between the living and the dead. The social and cultural stressors which act within two dimensions - intensity and duration - may be reflected in the individual's psychological state and may disturb his or her emotional perceptions. Stress may be experienced through different psychological tensions such as anxiety, fear and fright, anger and conflict, uncertainty and shame, frustration and depression. Stress may be the source of sickness but the converse also obtains, where for example, the stress will convert a benign disease into a serious sickness.

The majority of scholars have emphasised that the psychological aetiology of disease did not and does not play an important role in Chinese medicine. But Wu (1984:297) argues that in the prevention of sickness in China particular attention is paid to the avoidance of stress, which is often equated with the repression of emotion. Wu says that besides external causes of sickness, the seven emotions (joy, anger, contemplation, sorrow, apprehension, and fright) represent an important component of the internal aetiology of the disease (*ibid.*). "Excessive emotional activity (or condition) may cause imbalance of Yin and Yang, *ch'i* and blood, *ching* and *lo* blockage and malfunction of the organs" (*ibid.*:287). Quoting from the *Yellow Emperor's Classic of Internal Medicine*, translated into English by

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14 Researchers in psychobiology stress the importance of hereditary physical diathesis in the diversity of psychosomatic clinical manifestations (Kissin 1986:318). White and Marsella, summarising accounts in the *Introduction* to their edited volume suggest that in the Asian systems "popular explanatory constructs are more appropriately characterised as somatopsychic in contrast to the familiar psychosomatic mode of reasoning" (1984:17).

Veith, Wu (1984:288) says that "not only may emotion cause imbalance of the physical harmony of the body, but it also may damage the function of the organs and thus cause illness". As cold and heat are injurious to the body, so the emotions of joy and anger are injurious to the spirit. Violent anger is a symptom of insanity and it is hurtful to *Yin* (and to the liver); violent joy is hurtful to *Yang* (and to the heart). Counter emotion is used in the treatment of emotionally induced sickness. Fear counteracts happiness, joy counteracts grief, anger counteracts contemplation, and contemplation counteracts fear. But instead of talking about the patient's psyche, tracing the internal origin of psychological problems, or attempting to achieve "insight" as a Western psychotherapist would do, the Chinese physician, in recognition of the different socio-economic positions of the patient, avoids verbal communication with him or her. The physician rather tries to achieve a more direct cure, revealing the cause after the patient is cured (Wu 1984).

When talking about Ifaluk people in Micronesia, Lutz (1985b:54) points out the intimate connection between emotion, thought and body via sickness. Both emotional and physical distress are treated in parallel ways, and are expressed by Ifaluk in terms of disruptions in people's "insides". In the treatment of illness and unpleasant thoughts or emotions, both have to be "drawn out" of the suffering person. Only one word, *gachip*, is used in therapy for both kinds of problems: this is translated as "calming down" emotional upset or "curing" illness (*ibid.*). Another example comes from a Tunisian village where illness is connected with "bad" or "black" blood which can be either too strong or too weak. It can be caused by human emotions and sentiments such as ill will, jealousy, worry, all of them often provoked by poverty. They result in anger, considered to be the major cause of bad blood (Teitelbaum 1975:404).

The intimate interconnection between "emotion, thought, and body via sickness" has been largely neglected in anthropological accounts of sickness, and can form the basis of the future research within a particular social and cultural context.

EMOTION AND SICKNESS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

"Maya [shame and embarrassment] holds us fast like the anchor stone mooring a canoe... it's because we don't want to make wrongdoers ashamed that we let them flourish amongst us and because we don't want to be ashamed ourselves that we never start anything going. We just sit thinking that if perhaps we were wrong people would say we'd made a mistake. We're foolish - of course we are - but, there it is: you can't fight against shame."
Hogbin 1947:287

Little work considering emotion, and especially its connection with sickness, has been done in Melanesia and Papua New Guinea. However, there have been important contributions from Melanesian ethnography to the understanding of ethos (Bateson 1958), person and myth (Leenhardt 1979[1947]), person and morality (Read 1955), and, more recently, ritual (Lewis 1980), ethnopsychologies (in White and Kirkpatrick 1985), or indigenous expressions either psychological (Epstein 1984; Feld 1982; Schieffelin 1976), linguistic (White 1980), or physical (Ekman 1980; Sorenson 1975), of emotions. Though many researchers have contributed towards our knowledge of social concepts of health, and medical beliefs

and practices, I am thinking here of Lewis (1975) and Lindenbaum (1979), few have explored the connection between emotion and sickness, with of course some notable exceptions (e.g. Frankel 1986).

In her recent work Stephen argues that "the unconscious does not determine culture, nor does culture determine it; but that... the deepest emotional needs of the individual contribute to culture, while at the same time are shaped by it" (1989b:229-30). Through emotion and feeling, shamans, mediums, and prophets communicate with others (*ibid.*:233). Stephen is proposing that the whole set of information provided by culture and personal experience, even unconsciously, and stored in the memory is connected not only through the cognitive processes of association, but by emotional linkages as well (*ibid.*:233).

Some authors have stressed (e.g. Fajans 1985) that people in Papua New Guinea speculate a great deal about personal motivations and feelings, as if the role of the individual is given less expression, and is also actually less important, in comparison with the concept of the socially and culturally constituted person. I am very sceptical about such statements as, that it is unusual for people to talk about other people's emotions, or how can someone know what and how another person feels or thinks (Fajans 1985:383; Schieffelin 1985b:174). Maybe this is the case when people are asked by an ethnographer. What is more, many writers argue that emotion is largely "invisible" to others, if it is not expressed through body movements, facial expressions, or in some other way, as it is, for example, through song among the Ommura. Mayer (1982:246) says that the Ommura have a specific genre of song with which they express their "inner" states, employing different melodies for different emotions. These songs with their personal verbal allusions are not sung for larger audiences but are private. According to Mayer, emotion remains "inside the belly", so that no one else can see it (1982:246). On the other hand, drawing in part on my own observations, it seems that lots of emotional states in different parts of Papua New Guinea are openly and dramatically expressed with the intention of eliciting sympathy and support, either through intimidation (with anger) or by evoking compassion (with grief; Schieffelin 1983:183; 1985a:109; 1985b:173). Thus, as Schieffelin shows for Kaluli, emotions, however privately experienced, are socially located and have a social aim (1983:190).

Apparently people learn early about shame, in situations such as not having enough food to offer or show to visitors, unwittingly displaying genitals or seeing a person of the opposite sex bathing, being in a foreign place, having been seen during sexual intercourse, being caught stealing and so on. Shame is one of the most (if not the most) important emotions or sentiments in Papua New Guinea. If among the Baining of New Britain those without shame are valued more highly than those who exhibit it (Fajans 1983:173), and among Kaluli shame is a state of powerlessness and rejection (Schieffelin 1983:189), it is quite different among Melpa, where people are expected to feel shame in certain situations. Failure to evince shame as appropriate will lead others to describe the person concerned as crazy, as having no shame on his or her skin, and none of the *min* (soul) which gives a person good social attitude (*noman*, which is inside a person's chest and guides his thoughts, feelings and actions, Strathern 1977:104).[15] We should also be aware of different shame-evoking situations for men and women. Women have fewer chances to be directly shamed on account of

15 I cannot comment on the value of shameless people among Baining, but in the case of Kaluli and Melpa it seems that one has to be aware of different situations which elicit shame. It is not the same when showing shame in front of a foreign house or showing shame after committing adultery.

a poorly organised big feast or an unsuccessful participation in exchange, but they may feel so because their husbands are ashamed.

Shame has received most attention in Melanesia in its role of sanction, as an instrument of social control. It does not serve only to protect the social values of society, but also, as Epstein puts it, "to provide individuals with a cultural yardstick by which they can measure their own and others' worth" (1984:49). Thus, shame has not only "negative" aspects, but also acts as an important force "for the development of a sense of identity", and to protect and maintain basic sociocultural values (*ibid.*:10,40). In the Mt. Hagen area, among the Melpa people, shame is "on the skin", indicating the individual's reaction to his or her community; people say that their skin breaks out in sweat, and can produce either a hot or a cold sensation, or both (Strathern 1977:101). In its intensity, shame may vary from transient (blush), through to persistent (leading to self-exile), or even to intensity which can be discharged only in an act of suicide (Epstein 1984:20). Among the Lakalai of New Britain men felt shame about anal functions. If a man was named as having been seen by women defecating or if his diarrhoea was publicly discussed in the presence of women, he would be struck by such a degree of shame that he had no alternative but to commit suicide (Chowning 1989:22). More recently Lakalai men have largely abandoned traditional feelings of shame in all social contexts (*ibid.*:29). Melpa distinguish between *pipil kel* ("small shame") and *pipil mam* ("big shame"), and also other kinds of *pipil* on people's skin (Strathern 1977:102-103). As shame is observable on the outside, it is not itself the cause of sickness, as is the case with *popokl* (anger and frustration), when people are hiding something inside (*ibid.*:105). But in its extreme form shame can result in suicide, especially when someone is innocent but unable to prove it. As such, suicide becomes a form of social sanction, as revenge on those who have humiliated him or her; and it is most common among women (Counts 1988:88; Smith 1981:242; Todd 1936:423-4; but not among Telefomin according to Don Gardner). In the folk tales of the Kaliai from West New Britain Province, a misused woman will allow herself to be publicly humiliated so that her kinsfolk will, out of pity or shame, come and help her (Counts 1988:92). Resentment can be pushed to such an extreme in the sense of self-harm (mutilation and suicide) that "it edges beyond the reach of ethics" (in the Western sense) just to "'get even' with those whose behaviour has diminished one!" This is "the destruction of others by means of self-destruction" (Young 1983:72-3).

Alongside shame, it seems that anger is another significant social emotion. Those who have the tendency to get angry show the vigour with which they will stand up and pursue their own interests, and people fear and admire such a "masculine vitality" (Schieffelin 1976:136; 1983:183). "Modesty is not a virtue, the respected and successful are those who are most loud in their own praise and most positive in their expression of self-importance" (Read 1955:274, see also Schwartz 1973:160). Nearly every reason to be angry; any loss, wrong, injury, insult, or disappointment, even if only in the form of frustrated desire or disappointed hope, is interpreted in terms of the scheme of reciprocity shared by all Kaluli, and such a person is a figure of sympathy (Schieffelin 1976:147; 1983:186; see also "man of anger" in Valentine 1963). Among Melpa, for example, people believe that those who die from their frustration may return as angry ghosts to take vengeance on those who caused them the grievance (M. Strathern 1968:533). Melpa distinguish between anger which comes up in the mouth and is soon forgotten, and anger which comes up in the heart and is much more serious. I will return later to the connection between sickness, frustrated anger, and ghosts.

Anger may also be closely connected with loneliness and longing (in the case of male sexual frustration after being left alone) and as synonyms these are often shouted together in a single phrase. Aggressive anger accompanied by violent display can be motivated by the frustration of sexual separation and the disgruntlement of social loss or grief (Knauft 1989:87).

If shame is expressed "on the skin", anger is experienced from within the body. Among Mekeo, as Stephen (1989a:164) tells us, both conscious thought and emotion are located in the body. While thinking takes place inside the head, emotions are felt within the trunk of the body. When someone says *guau e kupu*, "I am angry", it literally means "my chest/stomach is obstructed", and when someone is sad, he complains of his "inside aches" (*ibid.*).

Though shame and anger are perhaps the most important emotional expressions in Papua New Guinea, we need to know much more about other emotions such as grief, or, for example, *awumbuk* among the Baining, which according to Fajans (1985:380) represents a lassitude in people following either the death or the temporary departure of friends or relatives who have resided with them. Fajans also considers "hunger" an important sentiment experienced as loneliness by people who are left alone. "Since food is the primary cultural medium of sociality, it is fitting that the absence of people is associated with the absence of food (hunger)" (Fajans 1985:379). I agree with those who say that in Papua New Guinea, nothing warms the heart like a house full of friendly people. "Noise and movement mean the presence of others, assistance, support, familiar faces..." (Schieffelin 1976:152). People like to touch each other, to hold and to caress, as such physical contact builds up their interpersonal relationship (Read 1955:268).

"Emotions are linked to words, to images, to smells; it is this linkage that gives poetry its evocative quality" (Stephen 1989b:230). To better understand emotions and sentiments means to better understand society, as it is often only emotions that provide access to comprehension of a situation; anger, shame, or guilt in the case of wrongdoing can be the first sign of social conflict and imbalance or moral transgressions. It is not that explanation through sentiments and emotions should displace another through reason, "but they interact in various, inconstant ways, particular to circumstance and occasion" (Lewis 1980:194). Better understanding of the inner world of the person in both individual and social terms would enable us to penetrate much deeper into the knowledge of personal and social fields through the relationship between, for example, religion and emotion (sentiment); magic, sorcery and emotion; dream and emotion; art and emotion; kinship, marriage and emotion; power, politics and emotion; and lastly, my prime concern, sickness and emotion. Several anthropologists have already begun to document some of these relationships (Fajans 1985; Lutz 1988; Rosaldo 1980).

The connection between emotion and sickness in Papua New Guinea is most clearly shown by Frankel (1985; 1986:136-144), though it is individual-oriented. Emotions among the Huli, according to Frankel, are autonomous forces within the individual, and can lead to a variety of sicknesses in oneself or in others. These behavioural disorders and sicknesses are explicable in terms of the somatisation of psychological distress (Frankel 1985:390). Strathern (1989:152) compares *popokl* with the recent research by Williams (1984) on connections between the psychological syndrome known as the Type A personality (who is seized by hostility, anger, mistrust) and heart attacks.

Huli say that emotions arise from the *bu* (the "life force", the drive, the "breath"). In extremely strong anger, for example, they

> rise into the throat and head and fall back as the emotion subsides. The individual experiences emotional states as a rising and falling of the bu within the body. The intimate association between emotions and the basic drive is one factor in the relationship between illness and the emotions. Another is the effect of strong emotion, particularly fright, upon the spirit (Frankel 1985:399).

Strong emotions among the Huli (envy, anger, fright, desire, etc.) may be extremely harmful, and if someone has *kuyanda* (a leech-like parasitic mass, a silent bloodsucker) inside him or her, this may result in serious effects of sickness. Fright (*gi*) as the cause of sickness among Huli is recognised especially when it occurs among children, when the spirit is most likely to leave the body (Frankel 1985; 1986:136-7). The desire (*hame*) for food, or even cupidity, lust, and yearning when observable through a hungry glance and the act of swallowing may cause sickness in the person whose food it is (Frankel 1986:140,184-5). Yearning (*hame*) for a dead wife can harm a man. This sick effect of conjugal bereavement in the first year after the wife's death is shown by the increased mortality rate among Huli widowers (*ibid.*:143). Anger (*keba*) can be self-destructive (self-inflicted wounds, suicide), but those who feel let down by others experience the emotion of spite (*madane*) which can lead to sickness (*ibid.*:143).

I have already shown in my first research in New Guinea (Telban 1989a:66-76), in talking about psychosocial causes and treatments among Northern Melpa, how sicknesses which are attributed to "wrongtalking" and "wrongdoing" have their source in people's emotions and in the intervention of ghosts, who can also get angry or frustrated, and as a result, attack the living. These feelings, called *popokl* among the Melpa, are egocentric, representing "the individual's expression of anger when his rights have been infringed or ignored" (M. Strathern 1968:558). They have been analysed in detail by the Stratherns (A. Strathern 1968; 1977; 1981; M. Strathern 1968). In "*popokl* illness", only special treatments like sacrifice, compensation, and confession will remove the source of *popokl* allowing the patient to recover. In Goodenough Island, for example, "in the case of gossip sickness, all those who have spoken badly of the patient have to "talk out" and confess their anger, envy or malice into a piece of ginger held by curer" (Young 1989:120). We could say that this kind of psychosocial illness is a stimulus which elicits care from other members of the community. It is a cultural and psychological adaptive response (Kleinman 1980:72) to felt injustices which occur amongst members of small societies (family, lineage, sub-clan, clan). As such, it is also a form of control for moral and social transgressions. Or as Strathern recently put it: "for sickness to be cured, social relationships must be sorted out" (1989:148).

Read says for the Gahuku-Gama that "moral values are one of the principal regulative mechanisms of culture" (1955:255). They represent the greater part of social life, and form an independent system on which social life is based, one whose influence is felt by most individuals and institutions (*ibid.*). Moral values have to be internalised and accepted by the majority of members of a particular group, and they represent a generalised expression of the good (which has basically a social connotation). This is not only emotional statement, but has also an intellectual, ideological component (*ibid.*). While some moral statements are familiar to the Western Christian ethic, others, such as "it is wrong to kill" or "love everyone" are absent or replaced by different moral values.

> It is a failure to separate the individual from the social context and, ethically speaking, to grant him an intrinsic moral value apart from that which attaches to him as the occupant of a particular status. /.../ There is no real dichotomy between man and society, no essential separation of the individual from the social pattern (Read 1955:257; 276).

While it seems that depressive disorders are comparatively rare in most Papua New Guinea societies (e.g. Schieffelin 1985a:119), mental disorders such as mass hysteria, "wild-man behaviour", and *amok* syndrome do occur. Psychic and social conflicts which lead to tensions may result in "emotional disturbance or overstrain" (Langness 1965). "Mushroom madness" among the Kuma (Reay 1960), or *lulu* among the Huli (Rodrigue 1963), or *ahaDe idzi Be* ("being a wild pig") among Gururumba (Newman 1964) are all examples of "wild-man behaviour" with its physical manifestations of hyper-activity, shaking, rushing from place to place, and "abnormal" behaviour. Clarke (1973) considers this temporary madness as theatre which allows a person to release intense emotion. In the majority of these cases, though not among the Kuma (Reay 1960) or the Huli (Rodrigue 1963), the actors are male, usually young adults. It is an individual phenomenon, followed by amnesia, and often attributed to attack by ghosts and spirits. Burton-Bradley presents a sociopsychodynamic explanation of the condition, saying that at some point "there is complete loss of control, when strong emotion becomes unchecked by deliberation and reflection" (1985:243). It is interesting to note the explanation of *amok* by Wulfften-Palthe, who considers it a form of emotional release, arguing that strong kinship ties and tensions arising out of these obligations among Malays have an influence on the frequency of *amok* (Burton-Bradley 1985:238). The cases mentioned differ in that some authors see such behaviour as pathogenic while others do not, and sometimes it involves not only individuals but people in mass-hysteria (see Frankel 1976). Robin differentiates hysteria from cases of *amok*. His argument about hysteria among the Huli is that "revival hysteria has been the end result of fundamentalist religious indoctrination, transformed into a rather extreme form of proselytisation by overzealous church workers". Such situations "contain frequent examples of irrational and sometimes violent behaviour within a highly charged, emotional atmosphere" (Robin 1981:161-2). It would be interesting to compare these disorders with the paranoid ethos which Schwartz (1973) sees as underlying Melanesian cultures (but see Telban, in press, for a critique). Here, psychological adjustment and cultural adaptation are not individual variations but appear in movements throughout the social, political, and economic life of peoples. The individual absorbs this ideology through the process of socialisation:

> Whatever the danger of attributing individual forms of psychopathology to a society or culture, it is an error to see such pathologies as located exclusively within the individual, ignoring their social and cultural causes and the forms in which pathologies are institutionalised (Schwartz 1973:156).

As recent research has shown, human emotions should be considered "not only as parts of the structure of personality but also as integral to the patterns of the culturally constituted expressive order" (Schieffelin 1985a:114). Lewis argues that ritual is more expression than communication, and especially the expression of sentiments and emotions. While he is mostly concerned with people's ritual behaviour, he emphasises the importance of the emotional side of social behaviour: "The power of some symbols lies ... in their dual appeal both

to the mind and to the emotions, and in the dissonance they may set up between clear reason and hot emotion" (Lewis 1980:187).[16] Lewis criticises those who leave out the emotions either because of the fear of trespassing into psychology, because they are difficult to analyse, or because they are considered instinctual (Lewis 1980:114). In a review article of Lewis' book, Carrithers (1980) emphasises this argument saying that not only in ritual but throughout social life, anthropologists should recognise the significance of emotion.

As my paper concludes with Lewis' *Essay on understanding ritual among the Gnau in a West Sepik village,* I would stress the importance of understanding emotion and sentiment in healing rituals in which indigenous practitioners employ four basic components: a shared worldview, personal qualities of the therapist, client expectation, and an emerging sense of mastery (Torrey 1986:198). Psychotherapy, psychosocial security, and the placebo effect are predominant in such treatments and are without doubt highly efficacious in dealing with sicknesses of sociocultural origin, where personal emotion is the main subject of society's concern.

This overview (though carefully selected in support of my arguments) has shown that most of my position statements from the beginning of this paper were only slightly touched on by several research. There was a high degree of ahistoricism and ethnocentrism (Anglocentrism) together with inadequate attention to gender differences. As emotion shows a kind of relationship (interaction) between people, I believe that this relationship should be studied to throw much more light on the emotion. A pathologic relationship may, as was shown, result in pathologic emotions and further in sociopathic sickness. I suggest that rather than study only individuals, we should concentrate more on the dynamics of their interaction, either healthy or diseased.

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16 The relationship between emotion and ritual has been of interest from Durkheim and Freud to Radcliffe-Brown and Turner. See also Scheff (1977) on the distancing of emotion in ritual, and Kapferer (1979) on emotion and feeling in Sinhalese healing rites. Expression of emotion in ritual does not necessarily indicate an actual feeling of an individual nor it is necessarily spontaneous; it may be even independent of his or her affective state (Durkheim 1915:397). On the other hand, the members of the group involved in the cultural medium of ritual may actually feel what they express (Kapferer 1979:153). Ritual performance has to establish a ritual connection between the conventionalised display of emotion in performance and the actual, internal and privately felt emotional and mental condition of participants (*ibid*).

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INTERVIEW

ANNE KNUDSEN

ANNE KNUDSEN, b. 1948 in Greenland, social anthropologist, is currently employed as Editor in the Copenhagen weekly *Weekend Avisen*. Her field of interest is anthropology of European cultures. She did fieldwork in Corsica, intermittently between 1983 - 93. She had published extensively, among other her dissertation titled *Korsika: historisk antropologi 1730 - 1914 <Corsica: Historical Anthropology 1730 - 1914>*, 1989; *Identiteter i Europa <Identities in Europe>*, 1989; *Kulturelle verdener: kultur of kulturkonflikter i Europa <Cultural Worlds: Culture and Cultural Conflicts in Europe>*, 1993 (co-author Lisanne Wilken); *Culture Without Tanks. Cultural Decentralisation of Europe*, 1994. Her current research is on Scandinavian political culture.

Photo courtesy Rudi Pavšič, 1995

AN: Dr. Knudsen, you once told me that you have spent your childhood in Greenland; and that it was this experience, upon coming to live in Copenhagen, that was of decisive importance to your choice of profession.

A.K.: Yes, I grew up in north-eastern Greenland and only came to Denmark as a thirteen year old. The Eskimo culture in Ammassalik did not impress me as strange (Ammassalik in the East saw their first white man in 1898. Those people thought they were all alone in the world right until then), but coming to Denmark to live and stay was rather a tough experience. Though my family and I spoke Danish and regarded ourselves as Danish - after all, in the "colonial" administration you are really "professional Danes" - we children had a hard time learning the cultural rules in the Danish society. At the time, even more than today, Danes in general did not regard themselves as people with a specific culture. They thought of themselves as the norm, the obviously reasonable ordinary society. Hence, nobody bothered to tell anybody about cultural rules. So, you had to figure out everything on your own. An elementary kind of anthropology. To interpret people's acts and sentences as signs that must imply rules which can be generalised so as to make it possible to anticipate and handle other acts and sentences. In my opinion, the precondition for anthropology is that one wonders about the obvious and tries to draw general meanings form specific experiences, so this experience of being a stranger in one's "own" society was very good training indeed, though it made us quite unhappy at the time. My younger brother, incidentally, chose the alternative strategy to becoming a "child anthropologist" - he forgot (repressed...) his for-

mer childhood in Greenland so completely that even today he can't remember the first thing about it.

AN: You chose Corsica for your PhD fieldwork. Was there any particular reason for that?

A.K.: We always have complicated reasons for that kind of choices. On the surface of things, I chose Corsica because I became *persona non grata* in Algeria, where I had done my earlier work and criticised the totalitarianism of the then socialist government. The criticism only appeared in a Danish publication, so that taught me a useful lesson about the size of this world we live in. Anyway, I looked around to find a place where the theoretical problems which interested me at the time could be investigated. The main one of these was - roughly speaking - ungovernability. The recurring uprisings in Algeria's as well as in Corsica's history had set me wondering what kind of social practice could generate values and attitudes that would lead generation after generation to commit their lives to fighting against central government.

On a different level, however, you might say that I have always been extremely interested in death and violence. This is not quite as morbid as it may sound. I find it puzzling that people will risk their lives (which is essentially what you do when you resort to violence against others), and I always have this urge to find out what they think and feel while doing so. When I look back on what I have been researching I can see that this question really runs like a *leitmotif* all through it. By implication, this interest is also a lively interest in masculinity, since most violence is perpetrated by men and quite often viewed as linked to masculinity as such. I think that "men is the normal, women is the puzzling" is very far from being true, either in a theoretical or in a social context.

AN: In your work, you concern yourself extensively with cultural diversity in Europe, and the history and the present of the political management, so to speak, of this diversity. You have taken up, if I am correct, a definitely pro-EU stance, but not unqualified?

A.K.: If the creators of the European Union should have sort of phoned me to hear what they should do, I think the treaties would have been different. Unfortunately, they didn't. But, jesting aside, I am indeed very pro-EU, and for several reasons. First of all, for security reasons. I think it quite likely that a non-unified Europe might resort to war again. Secondly, I think that both economy and environment pose problems that cannot be handled by the average nation state. So, either we get together and have political power to handle these problems, or we leave it free to the huge, transnational corporations to do our politics for us. Without any kind of democratic control.

I also see a larger European political community as one way of solving the problems of cultural minorities that are embedded in all European nation states, by dissolving them, so to say, in a larger pattern of multiple differences. Within the nation states there is a tendency to feel that democracy is an organisation aiming at expressing unity. But in my view, democracy is actually a way of working politically in a heterogeneous society. If people were already agreed, there would be no need for democracy. And indeed, I do feel "European" in the sense that I personally like differences. Similarity and uniformity give me claustrophobia.

The amendments I would like to see to the European "constitution" regard democracy. I am firmly in favour of a real political union with real political power residing in the Parliament of Strasbourg. Not only because this is the only reasonable democratic arrangement, but also because such a political arrangement would put the smaller and minority peoples in a much better position, since they would no longer each of them be facing one solid block of national negativity. They might end up realising that the small are really in majority, which would set an entirely different scene.

And I am totally opposed to the recurring ideas that Europe should develop into a nation state, "only larger". The efforts to harmonise currency, passports etc. are not only ridiculous; they are dangerous, and we know it, because the nation states have already had more than a century of unsuccessful experiences in cultural homogenisation. What difference would it make if money was called different things in different places as long as the value was the same? What disasters would come from having "Florentine" or "Welsh" as your nationality in your passport? None, as far as I can see. And we all of us put great store in the symbols of difference. Letters are already processed and delivered in much the same way by all national mail services. What could be gained by making the letterboxes look alike? Nothing, as far as I can see. The symbols are unimportant for the function, but important for the cultural identification. People want to be different, so why not let them? They also want to be fed, protected and served, and that is what political communities are about.

AN: You are currently involved in research of contemporary Scandinavian political culture.

A.K.: Scandinavian political culture, broadly speaking, is a specific culture which thinks itself a universal ideal. So, very little research has been done to disclose the cultural presumptions underlying this culture. I find it both funny and quite useful to try and decipher the goings-on. I have a book coming out this autumn about the Danish political culture. It's called *All is well here - send more money*. It is not a "scientific" book, but rather a statement in the public debate.

AN: Would you agree that anthropologists in general have a lack of heart to deal with issues of political power, especially as it concerns the nation-state? In other words: is anthropology adequately equipped to deal with the problems of power? In addressing specifically the issues that go under the name "ethnic", there seems to be a deliberate lack of distinction between, say, widespread popular prejudice and the political manipulation and channelling of these, backed by the state apparatus (army, media, legal apparatus)? I am of course thinking of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, which so many have proclaimed as springing from a course of events diametrically opposed to the process of integration of Europe - a cliché that has only recently given way to more complex analyses.

A.K.: A lot of anthropologists really live in villages, at home as well as abroad. This of course stems from the oral tradition of our research, but today, no anthropologist in his right mind should believe that he can dispense with reading national newspapers, investigating national bureaucracies, interest himself in written law, televised information or the fact that people have friends and family abroad. The "island" community no longer exists, and peo-

ples "without history" have all manner of books and periodicals, politicians, universities, radio stations, and newly generated myths about themselves. So, one can no longer just pass through the capital of Remotistan *en route* to the "real" field. If one wants to understand the locals, one has to understand their mediatised and politicised environment. That does not of course mean that the good old-fashioned field work is no longer viable. People are still bodies, placed in a specific locality. But understanding them involves understanding their larger world. Forgetting people's political environment is like forgetting to mention whether they live in the Arctic or in a tropical climate. Monographs from former Yugoslavia often had this kind of blindness, so anthropologists were really ill equipped to explain anything when political parties started to build power bases on ethnic questions. They simply had not been interested in the political dimension of life in Yugoslavia, and much less in the political implications of Yugoslavia's position as "our only socialist friend". They had left that to the political scientists who - on their side - quickly resorted to a kind of vulgar anthropology about this or that ethnic group being this or that way since time immemorial. One can't really blame the journalists or political scientists that they jump to conclusions of this kind: why should they know any better when no anthropologist had bothered to tell them so?

As a matter of fact, I think anthropologists are theoretically ideally equipped to analyse power, power relations and the rise and fall of political moods. No other discipline is better equipped for the task in terms of theory and method. It is only a question of getting started. But the traditional sympathy we have for the powerless, the "little people", have led many anthropologists to abstain from studies in the "big" people who really make most of the difference for the condition of the powerless. In a moment of wickedness one might even suggest that it is so much easier to do research with powerless people, because their lack of power also makes them defenceless against anthropological inquiry, whereas the rich and mighty may slam the door in your face...

AN: An inevitable question in relation to the above: what of the self-proclaimed epistemological and ontological crisis in the discipline? Some would want to view it simply as the fault of the nihilist post-moderners. Is there, in your view, a crisis in anthropology? And is there a radically novel epistemological breakthrough in sight somewhere?

A.K.: Anthropology has been lamenting its crisis ever since the discipline started. There is no crisis in terms of either material, method, or theory. There are disputes. There are challenging new vistas. There are - even insurmountable - disagreements. But so what? Anthropology is not supposed to be a religion. As for epistemological breakthroughs, I do not see any convincing signs of anything of the kind happening. Many "new" trends in anthropology are merely literary developments which took place within literature several years ago, and which have already found their place in the literary landscape as just so many different, optional ways of creating a text. The Californian post-modern nihilism was merely a sign that the American intellectuals discovered other continents as their equals, at the same time as the American public discovered that they were not growing richer and richer with quite the same speed as before. Welcome to the real world. Many of those texts from the eighties really reminded me of Graham Greene and his "Quiet American".

The discussions about different ways to go about the profession are, however, important. I shall start to worry when all anthropologists agree that there is no crisis in the discipline.

AN: To go back a little bit, let me take up the issue of fieldwork in relation to the disciplinary organisation. Is there in your view still a sound methodological need for anthropologists to do fieldwork "far away from home"? What about the accountability of the anthropologist's description and interpretation with regard to his informants?

A.K.: The accountability has always been our weak spot. In a way we are like the archaeologists who by definition destroy and distort the object of their research. But today there is no longer any reason why the public should rely on the eye witness and his interpretation of any given society just because he is an anthropologist. We need to have arguments for our interpretation just like any historian needs to do. And we need to quote our informants much more meticulously, to really distinguish between data and interpretation. But there is no way whatsoever out of the interpretation predicament. We share that with everybody who says anything about the world. The ambition not to tell the definitive truth is really the ambition not to be contradicted, to silence everybody else. But today, informants read books (and write books...), so the anthropologist has to come up with solid arguments if he wants his interpretation to be accepted or just taken seriously. I fail to see why that should be such a disaster. Another welcome to the real world. By doing studies in one's own society one can check out that informants disagreeing with interpretations is just the normal state of affairs. They may be right - and they may be wrong. The central issue is whether they - or you - can come up with substantiation of the interpretations. This also goes to show that a Tanzanian scholar is not necessarily better equipped to do research in Tanzania then somebody from Finland. So, in my opinion, field work is still on the agenda, maybe even more so today, when cultural interpretations are so politically loaded in many places. Whoever said that the ruling élites in any country were right in their statements about the national culture? They need to be contradicted just like anybody else. Earlier on, when colonial governments built their entire policy in a given area on the findings of a handful of anthropologists, the situation was much more precarious than today - but then, nobody lay sleepless at night over "representation" and so on. Today, we talk into an informed and engaged public sphere, which is a very healthy situation indeed. This of course also makes the rules of the game similar to the rules of other games. If you defame people and give their names into the bargain, you are not only immoral, you are likely to face a law suit. Splendid, in my opinion. It seems to me evident that rules of conduct should be applied to all relationships and not only to the ones "at home". Everything else is just plain racism.

AN: Dr. Knudsen, you are not only a renown professional among the anthropological tribe, you are also very much of a public persona in Denmark and widely known as a publicist and polemicist. Do you think that anthropologists in general should be more outspoken, more involved in all sorts of public discourses, seek more widely the public resonance? In other words, what is your personal code of professionalism?

A.K.: My personal code of professionalism takes as its point of departure that I am essentially equal to any other person. My professional qualifications give me specific ability to discern phenomena that often escape people with other professions, but my judgements are in no way more valid than theirs. I know things that few people know, and those I feel obliged to tell about when they are relevant. But I also have - more or less political - points of view that are not necessarily tied to my professional knowledge. Other anthropologists might hold their views. I do distinguish in my practise between facts and interpretation. As far as interpretation goes, I expect to be contradicted, and I expect to argue for my viewpoint.

I often wonder why so few colleagues participate in the public debate, and sometimes I tend to think that it is exactly because they don't want to be contradicted. That they prefer lecturing to discussion. It is of course exhausting to argue with people who disagree and who are maybe ignorant as well. But if our wisdom (which, by the way, most likely has been obtained at public expense) is not worth communicating, then why do we seek it in the first place? There are easier ways of making a living. I feel a certain obligation not to keep quiet, but I can understand it if people shrink from being quite as much in the public eye as I am. Anonymity is a charmingly carefree situation. But the public is not all that dangerous, and it forgets quickly. You only become a celebrity if you are convincing - and maybe controversial. But again: why find out important things just to keep them secret? For me, the crux of the matter is that the world is not perfect as it is, and changing it requires discussions with people you don't agree with. I live by the motto "somebody has to say it, and if nobody else will, I'll have to". Surprisingly, you most often find that there are also people out there who do agree, and often you find that people can tell you things you didn't know, so you end up wiser. I am not so very keen on getting things my way, but I'm very much for discussion. I suppose you might say that I am a firm believer in the power of enlightenment and informed dispute. For me, it is a democratic necessity.

Interviewer: IRENA ŠUMI

ROGER MARTIN KEESING

BORUT TELBAN

News of a particular death can be so shocking as to inscribe the moment of its reception forever in one's memory. So it was for me, when I learned of the death of Roger Keesing. I will always remember that misty Sunday morning when I called at the house of my friend and supervisor Michael Young to set off for our regular bush walking. When he opened the door, I felt immediately from the look on his face that someone must have died.

Faltering, he told me that a few moments ago Jim Fox, our Head of the *Department of Anthropology* at the *Research School of Pacific Studies* at *The Australian National University* called him to say that Roger Keesing had died, two days before, on May 7th, at the *Canadian Anthropological Society* meeting in Toronto. He would have been fifty-eight the following week. Michael and I spent the day walking and talking about him, and coming to terms with the impossible.

Roger Keesing, who graduated at the Stanford University and received his MA and PhD from Harvard, is well known for his best-selling textbook *Cultural anthropology: a contemporary perspective* (1976); the second edition was published in 1981. In 1962, he began studying the life-world of the pagan Kwaio of eastern Malaita in the Solomon Islands, re-visiting them more than a dozen times over a period of thirty years. Their language, religion and resistance to social change are the central themes of his Kwaio corpus. In all of his publications we find an abiding interest in theories of culture, language, social structure, and history of colonialism.

It was exactly seven years prior to that distressing day with Michael that I met Professor Roger Keesing for the first time. Impressed by photographs, posters and carvings hanging on the corridor-walls in the *Research School of Pacific Studies*, I made a visit to the head of the *Department of Anthropology*. Trained as a pharmacist, I was only just beginning to enter the world of anthropology (I was enrolled in postgraduate studies in medical anthropology in Zagreb). But at that first meeting, Roger enchanted me with his enthusiasm. He saw many advantages in my previous education and explained how I could, with long-term fieldwork, develop an interesting approach to anthropology. He alluded to many well known anthropologists who had entered anthropology after obtaining their qualifications in some other academic discipline or profession. When he looked at me with his blue eyes, I experienced a kind of commanding, authoritative gaze. It was the gaze which many people found disconcerting. However, I was immediately charmed by some of Roger's personal characteristics: his openness, optimism, interest in others, and his enormous curiosity. Roger introduced me to some of his colleagues who worked in Papua New Guinea, among whom was my compatriot and friend Jadran Mimica, an Australian whose parents originate from Split in Croatia.

I left for Papua New Guinea to do my first fieldwork. After a year, when I was out of money, sick and exhausted, I wrote to Roger asking him if I could write my thesis in his department. He advised me to stay longer in Papua New Guinea, to learn as much as possible about the country while I was there, but that later I should contact him about the possibility of becoming a Departmental Visitor. Through Roger's generosity I was perhaps the first person to be given office space to write a Masters thesis, as all graduate students were com-

pleting PhDs. Moreover, hearing about my financial problems, he suggested that the School might be able to assist. There and then, he dictated a proposal into a tiny tape recorder, and handed the cassette to his secretary. Within a few days I not only received money but also a fruit cake: one of the secretarial stuff, upon hearing about my troubles, had baked it for me.

In the months that followed, whenever I went to Roger's office with some minor problem, he would solve it in a matter of moments and would begin to talk about women: about the one he met on the tennis court; about another with whom he played basketball; or yet another who was about to join the Department. Nevertheless, he did not talk directly about sex, but one could sense that he was an ardent admirer of women. I was not surprised when several years later, Roger wrote to me from *McGill University* in Canada, beginning: "I've found a beautiful young woman who is just right for you; but she's probably too far away to do you any good. She may write to you, though about anthropology, not romance..." He was an excellent example of *puer aeternus*, a *Wunderkind*, a Peter Pan; only a few years after he had been elected to the *Academy of Social Sciences* in Australia he dissociated himself from it, saying that the Academy was an old men's club. He was a feminist at heart, though many gossiped about his Don Juanism.

During the summer months there were many garden parties mostly organised by Roger and his friend and rival, the late Professor Anthony Forge, Head of the undergraduate *Department of Anthropology* at the same University. These two big men (both, incidentally, friends of Gregory Bateson) were markedly different in character and personal tastes. While Anthony took delight in special wines, fine whiskey, Gitanes cigarettes and huge cigars, Roger never smoked and drank only moderately. Both loved good food, however. They espoused many different views about anthropology. Being an Englishman, Anthony was more influenced by British social anthropology, while Roger, though also specialist in kinship and social structure, was more enthusiastically swayed by new, fashionable directions taken by American cultural anthropology. While Anthony spoke assertively in a thundering voice, Roger liked to sit on the floor and expound his disagreements from a more egalitarian position. I can still visualise Roger during Wednesday seminars, frequently attended by anthropologists from all over the world, supporting his arguments not just by citing different authors but by bringing their works into the seminar room and easily finding those passages relevant to the point he wished to make. He was pedantically "politically correct", and always up-to-date.

In 1988, when I was leaving Australia, I organised a farewell party in Anthony Forge's house where I was living at that time. Among those invited was the Yugoslav Ambassador, Dr. Boris Cizej. In less than an hour we finished a litre of Dr. Cizej's plum brandy. I was embarrassed when Roger began to praise my work in Papua New Guinea, emphasising its importance for Yugoslav anthropology; he remarked that the Embassy could help me with my finances. Within days I received a discount from *Yugoslav Airlines*.

Later that same year, the 12th *International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences* was held in Zagreb. When Roger glimpsed me among the crowd, he jumped up and called me over. Though a stranger in the country, he immediately impressed me by having a few words of Croat, and with his knowledge of local places and good restaurants. As he was a passionate dancer and loved parties, he promptly inquired about the evening's events. For him, meeting old friends was as important as the presentations at the conference. Though a distinguished guest, he preferred to downplay his status and even play the clown. While some enjoyed this in Roger, others found it disconcerting. His behaviour on such occasions did not detract from the fact that he was a great teacher who cared about his students. Roger even took the trouble to go to Ljubljana to visit me, but because of a

misunderstanding about dates we failed to meet. His letter of August 1989, however, confirmed that he had taken in Slovenia in his particular way. In a concluding part of his letter he wrote: "Have a glass of good Slovenian white wine on a sidewalk café by the river for my spiritual benefit and enjoy those fabulous heavy round loaves of Ljubljana bread for me. I look forward to seeing you again!"

It was Roger who, together with Michael Young, supported my application for a PhD scholarship at The Australian National University. Before I left for Papua New Guinea, Roger used his influence yet again to help me with the administrative problems that beset every anthropologist before leaving for the field. While I was in the field, Roger moved to *McGill University* in Canada after 16 years at *Australian National University.*

I saw him for the last time in December 1992 in Nijmegen, at the *First European Colloquium on Pacific Studies.* Roger had been invited as the honorary speaker. I was surprised when I almost bumped into his partner, the beautiful and playful Christine Jourdan, as I stepped off the train. She told me that Roger was catching up on some sleep as he had spent the whole flight from Canada writing his speech. It was typical of Roger, and one of his virtues, that he could write an article or a speech while travelling. She told me that he had been rather offended that no one had come to meet him upon arrival, and that no one at the University seemed to know anything about the meeting. Roger delighted me by attending my presentation, and by making an example, lured some other senior anthropologists to the seminar room. He was characteristically generous in his praise.

On the last day, at a party held in an old inn, Roger was the first to jump onto the stage and dance wildly. He was the initiator of the drinking and dancing party which followed. I sat with Christine and we talked about Roger's contradictory qualities. I can still see him dancing, with his bright shirt open, causing some embarrassment among the attractive female anthropologists by inviting them to join him on the dance-floor.

A few months later at the *Canadian Anthropology Society* meeting, on the evening of the day when he addressed a symposium, Roger was again dancing vigorously when he suddenly collapsed and died of a massive heart attack. He had reached the same age as his father, and that of our famous disciplinary "ancestor", Bronislaw Malinowski.

At a commemorative gathering of his friends and colleagues in Canberra, people exchanged their favourite stories about Roger. We knew that he would not have wanted us to mourn him, only to remember him.

There is much more to be said about this remarkable man. Some of it has already been told in the many obituaries published in anthropological journals. I was fortunate to be among the last generation of students at whose anthropological initiation Roger assisted. Many who knew him for longer than I can write more detailed and personal accounts of him. But as Christine said: "Let's talk about Roger. That's what he would like most."

A few months after his death someone knocked on the door of my office in Canberra. It was Christine Jourdan. After we had hugged each other she told me with tears in her eyes about Roger's final journey. As he would have wanted, she, with his second wife and his children from his first marriage, had taken his cremated remains to the Solomon Islands. But a problem emerged. While pagan Kwaio wanted to bury him on their land on top of a high escarpment, the Christian Kwaio complained about the inaccessibility of such a site. The problem was resolved by placing his grave midway between coast and mountain. The ceremony included both pagan and Christian elements. In this way Professor Roger Martin Keesing was brought back to the place where his heart and mind so often dwelt: among the Kwaio people of the Solomon Islands.

ROGER MARTIN KEESING

CURRICULUM VITAE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY*

(b. 16 May 1935 - † 7 May 1993)

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS:

1956 - BA, Stanford University (Great Distinction)
1963 - MA, Harvard University (Social Anthropology)
1965 - PhD, Harvard University (Social Anthropology)

PHD DISSERTATION:

Kwaio Marriage and Society.

MAIN RESEARCH INTERESTS:

Cultural theory, ideology, linguistics, social structure, colonial history, religion and symbolism, development, Melanesia (esp. Solomon Islands), India (esp. Himalayas).

LAST APPOINTMENT:

Professor of Anthropology, McGill University (1990 - 1993).

PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS:

Acting Assistant Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz, **1965**; Assistant Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz, **1965 - 1969**; Visiting Lecturer, Harvard University, **1967 - 1968**; Acting Director, Center for South Pacific Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, **1972 - 1974**; Chairman, Anthropology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, **1971 - 1972**; Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Cruz, **1969 - 1974**; Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, **1973 - 1974**; Professor of Anthropology, The Australian National University, **1974 - 1991**; (Head, Department of Anthropology, **1976 - 1990**; on leave, **1990 - 1991**); Chercheur Associé, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, **1986 - 87**; Visiting Lecturer, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, **1989 - 90**.

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* We are indebted to Ms Christine Jourdan for providing us with the late Professor Keesing's Vitae and Bibliography. The latter was only slightly updated (Editors).

FIELD RESEARCH:

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(NOT LISTED: About 50 book reviews in scholarly journals)

TO BE ON THE NEEDLE.

THE HYPOTHETICAL ORDER OF SUBSTANCE-INTAKE RITUALS

ANDREJ MARUŠIČ*

It is useful to consider all events, including substance abuse, on three different levels. A substance is of course defined by its chemical composition if it affects the level and the nature of change of psychological functions. No less important is the way in which the substance is prepared or the type of intake it requires. Equally important is the connotation which the society assigns to a substance.

The behaviour exhibited during the ritual of taking a psychotropic substance should not be disregarded because the method of its intake and in particular the level of its unnaturalness or rarity, probably determines the level of psychological dependency.

According to the unusualness of the ritual, and the unnaturalness of the method of substance-intake, we can roughly differentiate among four different types in consecutive order: oral consumption, oral inhalation, inhalation through the nose, and intake through the skin.

TERMINOLOGY

The complexity engendered by illicit substance use is reflected in its associated terminology, which seems to change on a regular basis as various professional and governmental committees convene to discuss the problem (Kaplan, Sadock and Grebb 1994). For example, the revised third edition of *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-III-R) referred to them as "psychoactive substances" (American Psychiatric Association 1987), but the fourth edition (DSM-IV) refers to them simply as "substances" and to the related disorders as "substance-related disorders" (American Psychiatric Association 1994). One reason the word "psychoactive" was dropped was the risk of limiting the attention to those substances that cause brain activity altering as a primary effect (e.g. cocaine). That concept of psychoactive substance does not include chemicals with brain-altering properties (e.g. organic solvent) that may be ingested either on purpose or by accident (Kaplan, Sadock and Grebb 1994).

It is also not possible to separate illegal substances from legal substances, since many legal substances (e.g. morphine) are often obtained by illegal means and used for non- prescribed purposes (Kaplan, Sadock and Grebb 1994).

And the word "substance" is generally preferable to the word "drug", since "drug" implies a manufactured chemical, whereas many of the substances associated with abuse patterns are naturally occurring (such as the opium, cf. Kaplan, Sadock and Grebb 1994).

Related to a degree to "dependence" is the word "addiction", and the related word "addict". The later has acquired a distinctive, unseemly, and pejorative connotation that does not reflect the concept of substance abuse as a medical disorder. "Addiction" has also been trivialised in popular usage, as in "TV addiction" (Kaplan, Sadock and Grebb 1994).

DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA

According to the Diagnostic Criteria for Substance Dependence from DSM-IV it is

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possible to diagnose a substance abuse when three (or more) out of seven characteristics have been present within the last year. These include (*American Psychiatric Association* 1994):

- a need for markedly increased amounts of the substance to achieve desired effect or markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of the substance;
- a withdrawal;
- the substance is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended;
- a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control substance use;
- a great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the substance, use the substance, or recover from its effects;
- important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because of substance use; and
- the substance use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by the substance.

Three of the seven listed characteristics must be exhibited in the last year in order for substance abuse to be confirmed. This attempt at objectifying the diagnostic process is as compelling as if medical science were, out of sheer despair because contemporary science is not able to appropriately define substance abuse, to resort to a complex study of the symptoms. The characteristics which carry a different meaning but are interrelated and in fact correlate with each other, are then evaluated equally and considered from the point of view of the simplest mathematical formulae. The requirement that only three of all seven possible characteristics be present is so vague that in theory it allows for two distinct states which have no common characteristics to be diagnosed as the same substance abuse.

BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL VIEWPOINT

It would be possible to break down the phenomenon of substance abuse into artificial factors in order to understand better each of them separately but, as in the case of differentiating between physical and psychological dependence, it is necessary to simultaneously measure and thus understand the degree to which they are related; is it a matter of simple addition, or perhaps multiplicative interaction. After analysing each segment of the phenomena we would prob-

MAN	static parameters	dynamic parameters
biological	body	motion
psychological	personality	behaviour
social	social position	communication

Table 1: Man as a biopsychosocial whole according to static and dynamic parameters

ably realise that for the substance abuse in general, single or parallel rules apply.

Faced with the multitude of existing knowledge, ascertainment and speculation regarding man and a substance, it is a little easier to find one's way around if human being is considered as a biological, psychological and social whole and if each problem which lasts is first considered on three separate levels and only afterwards in its totality.

A biopsychosocial viewpoint shows an individual as a body in continuous motion, a responsive personality and its social position in interaction with the society *(Table 1)*.

To every event which represents a change, a man reacts physically, mentally and socially through movement, behaviour and communication. All of the three reactions to the change are interrelated.

It is useful to consider all events, including substance abuse, on three different levels. This enables us to obtain a comprehensive picture of how an individual is interrelated with an event, such as intake of psychotropic substances *(Table 2)*.

BIOCHEMICAL COMPOSITION

While research has already provided precise data on which biochemical processes are initiated within the body by the chemical composition of a particular substance, questions remain regarding the types of behaviour that are induced by a substance within a specific personality and how the personality adapts to the substance or even changes as a result. We are only a little closer to understanding how the interaction of the addicted personality and his or her environment gradually changes and to what extent an addict's social position is effected by being labelled an "addict".

Because of the obvious advantages of the biochemical research and this type of data compared to the speculation of psychosocial sciences, professional opinion is more inclined to put the emphasis on the research subject itself, such as the body or the substance for example (Goldstein 1991).

Such implications are without the solid base however, since areas which have not as yet been the subject of investigation are not necessarily insignificant. They perhaps

INDIVIDUAL & SUBSTANCE	static parameters	dynamic parameters
biological	body receptors & psychotropic substance	biochemical processes
psychological	personality & substance administration ritual	intoxication
social	social position & social meaning of a substance	stigmatisation

Table 2: Interaction between an individual and a substance

represent something which is more difficult to investigate.

The discovered effects of a given psychotropic substance on the body sensors and the biochemical processes which are initiated by a substance represent a material basis for the symptoms of intoxication which, with a given dose of a substance, differ from one person to the next (Davis, Janicak, Wang, Gibbons and Sharma 1992), producing a different effect on an individual each time the substance is taken. Furthermore, it is impossible to discover related biochemical processes for some substance-induced states. Perhaps the chemical composition of a substance is a relatively unimportant factor for certain types of intoxication.

A substance is of course defined by its chemical composition if it affects the level and the nature of change of psychological functions. No less important is the way in which the substance is prepared or the type of intake it requires, inhalation in the case of opium or injection in the case of heroin for instance. Equally important is the connotation which the society assigns to a substance.

SUBSTANCE-INTAKE RITUALS

The behaviour exhibited during the ritual of taking a psychotropic substance should not be disregarded because the method of its intake and in particular the level of its unnaturalness or rarity, probably determines the level of psychological dependency. The latter tells us to what extent a person is able to control the effects of the substance, if at all, and to what extent the substance determines his or her behaviour.

The variety of substance-intaking rituals is extensive and has as many ways perhaps as there are people who participate in it. According to the unusualness of the ritual, and the unnaturalness of the method of substance-intake, we can roughly differentiate four different types.

- Oral consumption is least unusual and perfectly natural. The majority of substances prepared for this type of intake are legal and even socially acceptable.
- Most acceptable of these are diluted alcoholic beverages. The desire for intoxication is disguised by thirst, the craving for liquids. If the ritual of alcohol intoxication is combined with the ritual of food consumption, then it is not only acceptable but even "perfectly normal".
- Certain substances are also made to be taken orally in the forms of tablets. These however act as a concentrated additive which to an autonomous individual would be superfluous. Anyone who requires them is thus dependent on something supplementary (Elkind 1991).
- Oral inhalation is the second type of ritual, still natural and common.
- At birth a new-born baby becomes bodily independent on first inhalation through the nose. If the baby is born with a defect such as *atresia hoan*, which is an anatomical blockage of the upper air passages, the first emergency treatment is a forceful and bloody method of unblocking these passages, which means that we are far from able to make the baby breathe as a grown up with a cold would do, through the mouth.
- A few months after being born the child learns to breathe through the mouth. Breathing through the mouth or oral air inflow is now added to the reflex combination of nasal breathing and oral sucking. What causes this? The position of the soft palate is known to determine the breathing route, but the physiological mechanisms that bring about a shift from nasal to oral breathing are unclear. The activation of receptors in the nasal

passage may be involved in reflex initiation of oral breathing after nasal obstruction (Nishino, Sugiyama, Tanak, and Ishikawa 1992; Harding, Hooper and Wood 1991). Perhaps it is the consequence of crying tears which always run through the nasal passages from the eyes into the nose, thus blocking it. Not all crying, like that which alerts the mother to a baby's hunger, is dry. Perhaps we are all able to breathe through the mouth only because our early development involving the combination of nasal breathing and oral eating was not without traumatic experiences.

- Breathing through the mouth is certainly not an autonomous act but a way-out in an emergency. We breathe through the mouth when we have a cold, which to a large extent carries psychological connotations (a cold is always dependent on interaction between the factors that cause the cold and the immunological system, with the latter being related to the psyche). Some psychiatrists associate deep breathing through the mouth as a symptom of deep feelings of depression. The most explicit ritual of breathing through the mouth is represented by smoking. In this instance the air, or smoke in our case, is literally drawned or sucked.
- Inhalation through the nose, as in the case of cocaine powder, is a very sophisticated form and hence appears unusual. This is still not considered as unnatural however because it only represents an "abuse" of a natural process.
- A solvent can be also taken by this ritual. A history of solvent use may indicate individuals at high risk for intravenous substance abuse, and youths who have used solvents should be considered at high risk for severe substance abuse, including intravenous (Dinwiddie, Reich and Cloninger 1991).
- Intake through the skin is the last and the most unusual substance-intaking ritual because it bypasses a natural process and is executed with the use of an invasive device - a hypodermic syringe. Ceasing to use particular substance is more likely the fewer times the subjects have used this substance, and if they had never injected (Hammersley, Lavell, and Forsyth 1992).

SOCIETAL PRESSURE

The meaning which society attaches to the method of intake and to a substance as such is very important for an "addict". The more a ritual is unusual and perhaps unnatural, the more an individual must cope with the society pressure. Probably the coping style of an addictive personality with this pressure is not adaptive. Hence, an "addict" escapes by increasingly adopting the more unusual forms of substance-intake rituals, with more effective substance and thus with more negative connotations attributed by the society. Larger amount of social pressure only works to accelerate the vicious circle of stress, substance taking, substance dependence... (cf. O'Doherty 1991). In the meantime, the ability to control the substance decreases and its effects on behaviour are correspondingly exaggerated. Meanwhile the substance acts on the psyche which, due to shift in attention, becomes less active and almost passive.

PERSON-SUBSTANCE INTERACTIONS

In general terms, we could describe person-substance interaction, including physical, psychological and social, as two possible relationships:

The relationship is not necessary a substance dependence. A person can be active

and react differently each time, and the substance can be a person's unique challenge. A person's active craving for a substance represents his or her controlled and active involvement with the substance, his or her interest in a substance, measuring out of trial dosages, in short, his familiarisation with the substance itself.

The substance-dependence is a situation in which the substance has become an integral part of the person - the body dependent on the dosage, the personality dependent on the ritual, and the social position dependent on the stigma. This type of person-substance interaction (if indeed we can still refer to them as to two separate entities) represents the unexpressed will, and indifference of a passive addictive personality, left to his or her own, or to the fate of the chosen substance.

The opinions of physicians, psychologists and sociologists on why an addicted person may want to seek help vary. Such a person may see his future health as a time without substance. He could also imagine it as a way to reach a rational attitude towards a particular substance or to all types of psychotropic substances. In his attempt to adopt such an attitude he is, however, faced with a lack of people willing to show him the way towards this objective.

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THE UPPER KOLPA RIVER VALLEY:

THE IMPACT OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL BORDER

DUŠKA KNEŽEVIČ-HOČEVAR*

The new international border between Slovenia and Croatia, established in 1991 as a result of the break-up of the federal

Yugoslav state, had an immediate and immense impact on the lives of the people in the Upper Kolpa Valley where the river bed is the demarcation line. Although authorities both in Slovenia and Croatia were quick to assure the new border's "modern", "European", permeable nature, in the then recorded words of a local, "everyone tells us the border is a mere formality, but this formality hit us so bad we cannot function any more."[1] On the other hand, the Kolpa river section of the new border was deemed entirely unproblematic by the state-builders on both sides, since it was the historic location of several political borders and delineations (that between Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the administrative provinces of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and last but not least, the "administrative" border between federal Socialist Republics of Croatia and Slovenia).

A first question therefore had to be posed, namely, what "kind" of a border are we dealing with in the Upper Kolpa valley, given that it is simultaneously a border "from all times past", and very new; at least the locals clearly experience it as a "real border" only from 1991. This seeming paradox I have translated into studying if, and how, the new international border affects the perceptions of belonging to the locality in the valley's inhabitants; in other words, I have set out to test the many times over voiced complaint of the locals, holding that before the international border, they were "like one", and now they are "divided". This I have sought to accomplish with a classical sociological questionnaire method, wherein the results were quantified and compared to form a sondage study for a forthcoming anthropological fieldwork.

Data compilation was twofold: firstly, I endeavoured to locate the "overt" similarities/dissimilarities as are perceived by the locals; secondly, I tried to disclose the more "covert" delineations they draw among themselves, a task much limited due to the nature of the method selected, but hopefully sufficiently credible to allow for some initial speculation. Fieldwork was carried out between August and end of November 1993, and started off with a series of unguided and unrecorded depth interviews with the locals, on basis of which a questionnaire numerus was determined. Individuals to comprise the numerus totalling 60 persons, 30 on each river bank, were selected according to their places of living in four pairs of settlements along both river banks: Draga/Čabar, Osilnica/Hrvatsko, Slovene Kuželj/Croat Kuželj, and Vas-Fara/Brod na Kolpi. In the selection of individual informants from these settlements, I have relied on general opinion of locals as to who would be most "knowledgeable" on local circumstances, satisfying simultaneously the basic demands of gender and age, as well as their explicit "national" affiliation, balance.

The data gathered with the questionnaire were analysed with a series of uni- and multivariate methods of statistic analysis (from analysis of frequentation distribution to discriminative analysis and grouping). A structured questionnaire included two sets of questions: the closed ones, where answers are offered in advance (and formed in accord with tendencies identified in preliminary interviews) and furnished with a scale of descriptive evaluations, and open questions without provided answer options. - Employing so-called snowball technique revealed the individuals who are, according to the locals, "most knowledgeable". It should be noted however that this category

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1 Cf. e.g. ŠTAMCAR, Miha; SEVER, Jani. 1991. Osilnica ni več v Sloveniji. <Osilnica is no longer in Slovenia.> *Mladina*, No. 50:18-19.

of respondents does not match the statistically useful concept of "opinion leader", since the selection criteria were different.

Students of border situations have recently called for a shift in attention from border lines to borderlands, since the latter represent real millieux as opposed to former which are highly abstract. Two accents in modern border studies emerged: First, that it is a characteristics of a borderland to form a distinct locality through the presence of the border; and second, that by shifting the attention to borderlands/border localities, the stress also shifted, from conflict to peaceful situations. As was noted by many, notably social geographers, classical border studies did not as a rule include the opinions, standpoints, and loyalties of the frontier populace, thus marginalising them in the process of determining the border line. Not least because of this warning which hints to the existence of a special relationship between state authorities and border populace, of which more will be said later, I have adopted the concept of border locality to refer to the territory in question.

The saying „before we were as one, now we are divided" I sought to verify with an analysis of the intensity of contacts among people of both river banks, both before and after 1991. Categories describing individual purposes of these contacts were extracted from the aforementioned preliminary interviews with the locals. According to interviewees, on both river banks the contacts have since 1991 dropped significantly in all neighbourly relations, most drastically in those classified as "leisure time" (e.g. a drop from "frequent" mark to "rare"). A comparable one step drop marks business and commerce contacts. Although there is a drop in every category of contacts, there is a statistically significant and very telling least drop in family/kin, festive and friendship categories; the latter hit half a gradation step dropping. It would therefore seem that the new border affected primarily those categories of contact that are most susceptible to system changes (business, commerce), while family, kin and friendship, though perceptibly reduced, remain the basis of cross-border communication.

Further, I tried to establish whether there are differences in perception of quality and quantity of contacts prior to 1991, on one river bank as compared to the other. Statistically significant differences were determined in evaluation of business, friendship and commerce contacts. Business contacts are marked "frequent" on the Croat side, while "rare" on the Slovene side; friendship ties are marked on the Croat side as "frequent" bordering upwards to "regular", while on Slovene side "frequent" bordering downwards to "sometimes". Commercial contacts are likewise highly evaluated on Croat side as "frequent", while on Slovene side two marks lower, "sometimes".

A comparably significant difference was not found with reference to post-1991 contacts, meaning that estimations of these are more or less uniform on both banks; the results indicate merely that the Croat side was more affected by the border imposition, specifically in the areas of leisure, business, commerce and employment. There too, friendship and kin relations appear to be the least affected, while leisure and festivity (entertainment involving public places) appear to have been completely abandoned. Though data are meagre and hardly allow for speculation, the seeming dramatic drop in publicly manifest intermingling indicates an altered spatial perception of "home" area in affective, not in state-territory terms, and perhaps in the direction of narrowing down.

To verify this, informants were requested to determine the borders of the Upper Kolpa valley as they see it in terms of "home" area. The diversity of these perceptions is aptly illustrated with the fact

that no less than 16 different places were enumerated as determining the northern border, and 18 as delineating the valley to the south. Locals on the Slovene side, however, tend to pose these border points relatively higher in the north, and lower in the south, compared to the interviewees on the Croat bank, but there is no statistically significant difference.

(Self)ascriptions in terms of local designations and names were a further step in research. A set of questions was directed at naming the people on the opposite river bank, self-naming, and perception of difference/likeness as compared to the opposite bank, to "all Slovenes/Croats". Aside to many local colour revealing data, a most striking result of this query was the fact that 56 out of 60 informants view their cross-river neighbours as "more alike us" than anyone else offered, "all Slovenes/Croats" included. In other words, the informants have in 93 odd percent designated all valley people as more alike **myself** than alike other Slovenes/Croats. - Crossing the results of self-naming with naming the cross-river neighbours, the following interesting information was extracted: while self-naming after the settlement of residence is prevalent (48 cases), the same does not quite apply to naming people on the opposite bank: while naming after the settlement is still frequent, it is followed closely by naming after their "nationality", both in the form Slovenes/Croats, and in local synonyms, *Kranjci* for Slovenes and *Gorani* for Croats (total of 25 cases). There is therefore an obvious and interesting discrepancy in differentiating between self-ascription and national belonging: while a person identifies him/herself primarily with the name of the settlement, his cross-river neighbour is in 40 odd percent of cases perceived as firstly Croat/Goran or Slovene/Kranjec before anything else.

Is the language in the valley identical, similar or different on both river banks, was the next question. A majority of 43 informants thought that the everyday language in the valley is so similar, with differences so minor, that a newcomer may fail completely to register them. A rough fifth of total (13) responded that the language is identical, and only a minority (4 cases) insisted that there are distinct everyday languages on respective river banks. There is, however, a significant, general drop in evaluating "nowadays" spoken language as compared to "before" towards growing differences: a majority of respondents mark the former as similar, while the latter is perceived as having been identical.

Pinpointing the "culprits" of the growing dividedness, the people in the Upper Kolpa valley quote the fact of unpleasant formalities connected with international border (currency differences, customs checks, public transport difficulties and delays, cross-border employment procedures), and secondly, the degradation of intimate and social relations cross-border; typical statements such as "there is no more friendship as it was, no mingling" do not readily include the concrete reasons of this estrangement: rather, it is perceived as somehow "automatic". However, as justifications for growing perception of strangeness, local and "borrowed", "national" stereotypes, pejorative jokes and folk verse are endowed with new meaning, as if they have somehow "come true".

* * *

The self-perceived "oneness" of the inhabitants of the Upper Kolpa valley can initially be inspected in terms of ecological characteristics of the territory. The famous Slovene geographer Anton Melik (1963:13)[2] remarked that the canyon of the

2 MELIK, Anton. 1963 (1937). *Slovenija. Geografski opis 1: splošni del. <Slovenia: Geographical descripton 1. General.>* Ljubljana: Slovenska matica.

Upper Kolpa valley represents one of the rare natural barricades most suitable for situating a political border: in his opinion, the very steep and wild features of the canyon "naturally" functioned as a political border. Since both river banks were thus but poorly connected to their respective hinterlands - and remain largely so even today -, and since urban centres are relatively far to both river banks, Melik, as well as other researchers of the valley, deemed it natural that the inhabitants of both banks should maintain close relations in economic as well as in social terms.

It would seem that various political entities throughout the last couple of centuries which encompassed the settlements of the valley did not seek to bond it more closely to their respective mainlands. As various as the reasons may be, one of decisive importance was always the presence of the wilderness forests that were as early as 1892 protected by special status. Although a fair portion of the originally protected area was deforested during post W.W.II Socialist "plan-years" times, the remaining three major forest regions (Kopa, Pečka and Rajhenavski Rog) are nowadays protected as natural parks with prescribed protection regimens.

Many authors who dealt with the Kolpa valley sought to explain its special characteristics, and the "naturalness" of the border there, by invoking still other "natural" features, among other, as was habitual in the days of the so-called *Landwiessenschaft* studies tradition, the valley's "ethnographic" peculiarities. A central importance was given the presence of the "linguistic border", which too was found to be all but unproblematic: while there definitely existed at least since after W.W.I a border between Slovene and Croat standard languages, more attention was given to local spoken language on both banks, which was more or less identical. The documented historic fact that sizeable population waves at least twice hit both banks, comprised of immigrants from Slovene coast- and mainlands triggered nationalist scientists in the 20' and 30', and in some cases even later to full exercise of wildest scholarly imagination in the effort to prove the original "ethnic", or rather, "genetic" purity of Croat as opposed to Slovene ancestry on respective river banks. Like manywhere else in Europe of the time, this forced "origins" manipulation played on differentiation between dialect as natural language and standard code as a means for nivelisation of state loyalties, therefore, national homogenisation.

Although the research did not seek to find how the inhabitants of the border locality recall and interpret the above summed-up formalised history, pieces and portions of it, or local varieties thereof, no doubt influence and shape their self-understanding; while historic projections are to be more closely dealt with on forthcoming fieldwork, the structure of sentiments of belonging the research tried to encompass in two ways. First, a hierarchization of spatial-symbolic loyalties was established by presenting the informants with a set of choices, ranging from the settlement of his or her living, to the nation-state. Second, following the hypothesis that language as the primary communication means, and therefore as primary communicator of social borders, the research included a series of questions pertaining to language, given that a historic differentiation, and a distinct social position, obviously exists between the local spoken language (the dialect), and the two standard languages, Slovene and Croat. One of the goals therefore was to determine the ways, and extent, of linguistic loyalties of the valley inhabitants, since linguistic loyalty could presumably be treated as a form of political, in our case, national loyalty.

The latter term, and the problem of "national identity", is of course a most delicate subject to translate into operational methods of research that would yield to

quantification. Moreover, in the Upper Kolpa border locality, the assumed "naturalness" of the establishment of the new border notwithstanding, the issue of national loyalty presented itself in a height of mobilisation and over-communication of nationalist ideologies. The widely assumed "naturalness" of this border in political and public discourses in both Slovenia and Croatia confronted the people in the border locality with specific, and poorly understood, complication: on both river banks, the people thought of themselves as sharing the same culture, the same language, and furthermore, they view themselves as a complex conglomerate of intermarrying kin groups; whatever extant, traditional, historic, superimposed (formal) linguistic and "administrative" delineations, they saw as viable, not disturbing, and essentially immaterial to their economic and social life. The presence of "real", international border however, forced a substantial reorientation of their primary interests. Speaking metaphorically, one could say that for the first time in the experience of living generations, the storms of nation-state forming, hitherto in the hands of sufficiently remote-based state-builders and firing far enough, finally hit home in a way that could no longer be ignored. Speaking from the point of view of what could be termed "nationalist propaganda" within political and public discourses throughout the century, the predominant streams relevant for this locality were pan-Southern Slavic, the enemy figure as a rule impersonated in non-Slavic neighbours (Italians, Germans). - While the study within its limited frame could not validly account for the process of distance-building along the Slovene-Croat line in terms of local entrepreneurs who no doubt had a powerful tool in both standard language and historic argument, as well as in growing discrepancies between "rich" and peaceful Slovenia and impoverished and warring Croatia, it is nevertheless clear that in the opinion of the informants, the new border, strengthened to its present degree for the first time perhaps since the Austrian-Ottoman times, affects deeply the course of daily living in the valley; indeed, it "causes hatred."

Using terminology of a classical anthropological discourse, one could say that the situation in the Upper Kolpa valley is one of a closely intertwined network of kin groups. Within this primary realm of cross-river socialising and intermarrying, superimposed differentiation such as Slovenes/Kranjci and Croats/Gorani with many additional sophisticated distinctions and precisations served as tools in a descriptive array of communicating primarily social standing of person(s) thus designated, not nationality in any sense such same designation could pertain to a non-local. Being educated in two different standard languages which, to be sure, are nevertheless mutually perfectly intelligible, and to be formally, through school, indoctrinated with two different national histories, obviously played a secondary role in the lives of the people of the valley.

While the precise position of these "outer", or "broader" identifications is yet to be determined by further study, the most obvious state of affairs exposed by the here presented sondage is twofold: that acceptance of the international border in place of preceding "administrative" one was never manifestly questioned, and second and paradoxically, that the new border is uniformly seen as an obstacle causing divisions of such nature that threaten the very primary social resources in the valley. Needles to say, despite the fact that questions seeking informants' opinion as to the state previous to 1991 were clearly and necessarily answered by their then projections of that past, their constructed version of the past, the changes they perceive remain a fact. Their complaints seem mainly to be directed towards a threatening radical reorientation of their everyday practices and their life

strategies. The Kolpa river had clearly functioned, in the absence of strong hinterlands, as a means of communication, not as divisor, facilitating the formation of a closely bound social universe to which superimposed divisions were of little relevance.

With the installation of the international border in 1991, a specific systemic buzz became manifest between two distinct discourses: that of the locality on the one hand, and that of the nation-state on the other. Dwelling on a simplified understanding of the fact that loyalty to respective nation-states, and loyalty to the locality was practically equally present in the valley, both new nation-states simply translated the historical existence of two different standard languages into that of a "national" division. Characteristically, "national" was in political context read as synonymous to both "ethnic" and "cultural". Providing a classic example of the limitations of nation-state-building logic, one of the parliamentary parties in Slovenia (the Slovene National Party) sought to read the publicly voiced complaints of the people from the Croat side who were no longer able to send their children to the nearest, Slovene school, as the proof of existence of no less than a Slovene minority in that part of Croatia, while a high-ranking official in one of Slovene ministries accused the locals, albeit not publicly (in a conversation with the author) as "as unfit to comprehend the concept of sovereign state".

Many factors, among them the strength of kin ties; the capability of both nation-states to provide tighter, primarily economic bonds with respective hinterlands; the course of nivelisation of economic differences on both sides; and the quality of Slovene-Croat relations insofar as they necessarily influence public opinion, are all going to shape the future life in the Upper Kolpa Valley. The forthcoming fieldwork research is to concentrate itself on cross-river kin groups, and life careers within them, as primary source of data in an attempt to further interpret the situation, and the ongoing processes, in the valley.

NOTES FROM A MOBILE FIELD

IRENA WEBER*

'Guide, monsieur?'
Silence.
'Guide, monsieur?'
Silence.
'Qu'est-ce que vous desirez, monsieur?'
Silence.
'D'ou venez-vous, monsieur?'
Silence.
'Ou allez-vous, monsieur?'
Silence.
'Vous avez des affaires ici, monsieur?'
'Non.'
'Vous avez des affaires a Baghdad, monsieur?'
'Non.'
'Vous avez des affaires a Teheran monsieur?'
'Non.'
'Alors, qu'est-ce que vous faites, monsieur?'
'Je fais un voyage en Syrie.'
'Vous etes un officier naval, monsieur?'
'Non.'
'Alors, qu'est-ce que vous etes, monsieur?'
'Je suis homme.'
'Quoi?'
'HOMME.'
'Je comprends. Touriste.'
Robert Byron, The Road to Oxiana, *1981 (1937)*

LE TOUR COMMENCE...

When Robert Byron was travelling to the East in 1933, writing his famous travelogue *The road to Oxiana*, in the eyes of the local people he was not a **traveller**, not even a voyager, as he noted, but simply a **tourist**. One among many. Because "real" travellers belonged to the past, those travellers who

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were "searching for knowledge" and were in Byron's opinion well respected and welcomed by indigenous people. As for a tourist, he is just... part of the landscape... simply a tourist, as skunk is a skunk, a parasitic variation of the human species, which exists to be tapped like a milch cow or a gum tree" (Byron 1981[1937]:43).

This notion of "real" travellers, the privileged seers and knowledgeable observers in the time of "real" travelling seems much alike a nostalgic *fil rouge* not only in many a travelogues but in "popular" views as well. Nostalgia for the times gone, places remote, and possibilities lost is not necessarily connected with personal experience. We can be nostalgic for the world, for places, for things we have never seen or been to. Nostalgia is a way of reinterpretation - old people sitting in the sun "remembering" that every day of their youth was like Steinbeckian "Sweet Thursday".

The contents of nostalgia are "all the past", no matter how remote or close; but it does not attempt to explain the past, it rather explains the present and the position, often ambiguous and contradictory, of the narrator's voice. In one of the most famous and cited travelogues in anthropology, *Tristes tropiques*, Lévi-Strauss is nostalgic for the past and nostalgic for the future at the same time, predicting that travellers to come will experience much the same regrets as he:

> I wished I had lived in the days of **real** journeys, when it was still possible to see the full splendour of a spectacle that had not yet been blighted, polluted and spoilt; ... A few hundred years hence, in this same place, another traveller, as despairing as myself, will mourn the disappearance of what I might have seen, but failed to see (Lévi-Strauss 1973:50-51).

The time of "real" travelling thus seems inevitably to belong to the past no matter which point in time one chooses. Lévi-Strauss asked himself when was the best time to see India and wished he could see Lahore like Bernier, Tavernier, and Manucci have. Not with their eyes, but within "their" time. And, he felt trapped in a strange predicament:

> I have only two possibilities: either I can be like some traveller of the olden days, who was faced with stupendous spectacle, all, or almost all, of which eluded him, or worse still, filled him with scorn and disgust; or I can be a modern traveller, chasing after the vestiges of vanished reality. I lose on both counts... (*Ibid.*).

Searching for the unspoilt and the exotic, craving for the authentic then is not only a trait of the old-time, "real" travellers, but the underlying characteristic of contemporary tourism as well. It makes for an interesting question indeed: when exactly **was** the best time, the "right" time to travel? Even back in the 4th century when Egeria was travelling in the footsteps of Christ, she was really travelling in the footsteps of other pilgrims before her. In 1930s, in the time of Byron's journey, "real" travellers were times and again confined to the "glorious" past in their pursuits, and tourists are ever to embark on their "perpetual circular walk", not discovering, but visiting the already discovered. Who then are these "strange creatures", "a parasitic variation of the human species" called tourists, where do they come from, and where did the travellers go?

HERE COMES A TOURIST, OR TRAVELLING IN STEREOTYPES

The French and English expression *tour* is derived from *tornus* - Latin expression for journey, literally, a "circular walk".[1] A person who goes on a *tour* is consequently a *tourist*. Among the first who made the expression popular were writers: in 1830, it was used by Jacquemont in his work *Lettres*, and by George Sand in *Lettres d'un voyageur* (Antunac 1965); Stendhal established it in 1838 in his *Memoires d'un touriste*. The expression *tourist* is closely connected to the so called *grand tour* travelling of the late 16th and 17th century.

The traveller, the individualist, member of the élite who travelled to culture centres of Europe, was washed ashore in Europe of 16th century. Notes from such travels are rich with observations of geography, nature, landscape, customs, cultural monuments, etc. A person who at the time or later undertook the *grand tour* or similar travelling acquired the name *tourist*. According to a French dictionary of 1855, tourists were mostly the English with much time on their hands and a lot of curiosity, following their fellow countrymen to France, Switzerland and Italy. By then, tourism is not a term yet, only tourist(s).

In 1841, the annual meeting of an anti-alcoholics society was held in Longhborongh. Thomas Cook, a society member from Lester, was entrusted with the organisation. Cook was aware that the railroad is loosing money due to popular prejudice; therefore, he offered to hire an entire train composition in exchange for a reduced price of tickets. He also offered to provide tea and refreshments for travellers. This organised trip turned out to be a huge success, and quite a financial gain for Cook who afterwards dedicated himself entirely to this new enterprise. In 1845, he founded the famous *Cook & Son* agency which paved the path towards organised mass tourism. Things English marked other features of the emerging industry as well: in continental Europe, hotels were emerging under names such as *London*, *Bristol*, *Windsor*, etc. Years later, a renown traveller, Bruce Chatwin, will note in his travel diary: "Djang, Cameroon: There are two hotels in Djang: the Hotel Windsor and, across the street, the Hotel Anti-Windsor" (Chatwin 1987:184).

"Anti-Windsor", however, is far from being the only "anti" in tourism. Tourism itself is said to be "anti"-everything there is to admire, honour, and worth pursuing. Worse still, tourism is barely "human" at all, so to speak, and consequently, the tourist a strange, very often ridiculous creature, an ill and offensive sight, as we can learn from Foster's *A room with a View* (1947):

> 'Look at their figures!' laughed Miss Lavish. 'They walk through my Italy like a pair of cows. It's very naughty of me, but I would like to set an examination paper at Dover, and turn back every tourist who couldn't pass it.

Both Byron and Foster have chosen to compare a tourist with a cow. Popular imagery abounds with negative stereotypes of the tourist - as a rather stupid, laughable, no-style and "animal"-instincts-sort of creature prone to being blind-led. Someone to be looked down upon, scorned and treated with contempt. Zoological metaphors for tourists were (and are) quite common - the tourist is compared to animals that are considered either stupid, destructive, or both. In 1865, the British Consul in Italy publicly expressed his regrets about the invasion of tourists in Italian cities, comparing them to

1 Cf. *The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of English language*, 1977.

animal herds, with their guide acting as the shepherd dog guarding the flock by hopping incessantly front to back. "It is grotesque, I've never seen anything like it," was scandalised the Consul (Antunac 1965). In present-day Greece, Krippendorf (1986) noted that tourists compare to insects who destroy everything they get in contact with.

Much of the resentment towards tourists derives, so it would seem, from the mere fact of their numbers - but this quantitative aspect is, on the other hand, much contested among the tourists themselves. "One among some fifty million globe-trotters, the traveller maintains his difference mostly by despising others like himself" (Minh-ha 1994:22). And it is not only tourists that despise tourists. The sentiment "I am not a tourist, I live here", expressed on badges for instance, is not uncommon to find among the inhabitants in large European cities.

In a situation where "real" travellers "always" belong to the past, i.e. to the time before tourists, how can one ever identify oneself as a traveller other than by dismissing the others as mere tourists? This seems necessary not only because one doesn't want to be characterised as an animal; one strives to reassure oneself of one's separate identity as a traveller, as the privileged seer. When too many people are looking at the same thing, that thing cannot be "seen" anymore: the gaze becomes blank. So in order to see, to be a privileged seer, a traveller has to dissociate him/herself from others by, as Minh-ha (ibid.) suggests, imitating the Other:

> The traditional traveller's tragedy is that he is an imitable and imitated explorer. Therefore, in order not to be confused with tourist, the traveller has to become clandestine. He has to imitate the Other, to hide and disguise himself in an attempt to inscribe himself in a counter-exoticism that will allow him to be a non-tourist - that is, someone who no longer resembles his falsified other, hence a stranger to his own kind.

A TRAVELLER OR A TOURIST- THAT IS THE QUESTION (NOT TO MENTION GENDER)

Tourists of course are far from being a homogenous group. Eric Cohen's widely cited typology of tourists, based on the degree to which a tourist seeks novelty or familiarity in his chosen destination, distinguishes four categories: **the organised mass tourist** (the least adventurous one, seeking high degree of familiarity and travelling in an "environmental bubble"); **the individual mass tourist** (with more control over the itinerary but basically with similar needs of familiarity as the organised mass tourist); the **explorer** (travelling off the beaten track, yet seeking some of the comforts of home); and the **drifter** (the most adventurous, travelling off the beaten track and trying to make close contacts with native people).

The first two categories of the typology (with the expressive term "tourist" in them) would fit the tourist as the "circular walker" definition, in agreement with the etymology of the term, while the other two, and especially the last, correspond with the notion of the traveller as a "hard worker", this description in turn springing from *travel*, a different orthography and application of *travail* - from French *travaille* - to labour; *travel*, therefore, originally stands for labour, difficult strenuous work, physical or mental hardship. In this view, a tourist is a person visiting the already discovered, while a traveller is a "hard worker", "doing" some discovery of his own. The 17th century *grand tour* had its similarly parallel counterpart in the institutionalised

"tramping", a "working class version of a grand tour" (Adler 1985) where travelling was mixed with working. Present-day "young budget travellers", "backpackers" (cf. e.g. Teas 1988; Riley 1988; Loker-Murphy & Pearce 1995), are often using phrases like "I was doing India last year"- meaning they are "doing (working at)" their travelling, they do not just have vacations like tourists are supposed to. So much for an outline of possible differentiation between a tourist and a traveller that is not based in the assumption of the privileged seer of the old times, but in the supposed attitude towards travelling as derived from etymology itself. *Nomen est omen*, one could say, but it can be, as will presently be shown, even more ominous.

In Slovene language, the naming of various travellers reveals yet another interesting point. The expression for tourist is the same as in French and English, only written more phonetically - *turist*. The expression for "traveller" is *popotnik*, comprised of the adverbial prefix *po-*, meaning "on", and *pot*, meaning "road" "path", so *popotnik* is literally the one who is on the road. In Slovene language, as should be noted, every noun and adjective applicable to both sexes should come in both male and female form (while all nouns are gendered like in German or French), by means of transformed suffix. For example: *turist*, male, and *turistka*, female. But with travellers, the case is not as straightforward. *Popotnik* is a male traveller or explorer, while the primary meaning of the female equivalent, *popotnica* however, is the food prepared for the traveller. Similarly, the alternative term for "traveller" - *potovalec* - with the same meaning (one who travels from place to place, usually with motives of research or exploration, as is stated in the *Dictionary of Slovenian language*) has its female equivalent *potovalka* which primarily means a travelling bag. Therefore, to both expressions, *popotnica* and *potovalka*, the qualifying noun "woman" has to be added to clarify the meaning, that is, to make clear that the subject is not a pack of food or a bag, and that she is a woman.

Such then is in Slovene language the predicament springing from the lack of concepts for traditionally "male" activities performed by women, while in English the same lack of terms can be said to be less a matter of grammar: in the past, men have been described as "going places", travelling" and "exploring", while women travellers were seen as "skylarking", "rambling" and "puddling around" (Birkett 1991). Or, informed by the Slovene language mirroring the situation, one can say that in most cases, women just stayed put at home, preparing food and travelling bags for "real" travellers.

SLOVENE TRAVELLERS "ON A SHOESTRING"

'¿De donde eres?'
'De Eslovenia.'
'¿... Que es Eslovenia?'
Mexican-Guatemalan border (1993).
Customs officer was scrutinising my passport in which the name of my home country is written in four different languages, but he was mystified nevertheless.

As my compatriot travellers would surely know, for some reason the fairly reasonable question "Where is Slovenia?" is often replaced by "**What** is Slovenia?" It was never a particular fun travelling with Yugoslav passport - many visas were difficult to obtain, and fellow travellers kept asking how I managed to get out of the country. In all of the years of travelling I have met less than ten people out of several hundreds who knew that Yugoslavia was not a part of the Eastern block and that its borders were opened to travel - but at least its existence was not being questioned. As for Slovenia, it seems that it cannot possibly exist - at least not for Central American

officials. And how should I have answered the question of or "where", let alone "what", Slovenia is? Would "In the middle of Europe" do? Obviously not, as the question is not about geography at all. "You are the first Slovenian I've ever met", exclaim the fellow travellers. Not that most of them know where Slovenia is in the first place. "Have you graduated in Prague?" is a standard question. When I answered - for the umpteenth time - "NO! I haven't studied in Prague!" to a postgraduate student in London, he asked: "Are you sure?"

Well, perhaps I should have reconsidered my vitae. However, as tiresome as it gets after a while, it still does not compare to the experience on a bus in Bali where an Australian traveller sitting next to me asked where I was from. When I said Yugoslavia, she looked at me with a mixture of horror and disgust, then got up and moved to another seat.

I was flabbergasted, to put it mildly. And being forced out of the bus at Belize's border at the machine-gun point, because the guard has never heard of my country, is definitely an adventure I could live without. Still, it obviously makes for another specific feature in the travelling experience:

> At home no one ever really complains about this entanglements with passports and crossing borders, obtaining visas etc. - I wonder is it all simply considered to be a part of the travelling hardship? Or are we just used to obstacles bureaucrats are so good at inventing? (Central-American travel diary, 1993)

Facing or even seeking a hardship on the road fits in with a view of travelling as a self-defined rite of passage, a specific liminoid rite defined by a traveller who can connect with a group of other "initiators" in a process of "worldmaking" and "self fashioning" that "art of travel" consists of (Teas 1988, Adler 1989).

It is said that traveller's motives are purely personal and so are the gains of his/her travelling, still many travellers (which are described in studies as mostly middle class, single and without explicitly mentioned "Western") state that their main motive for travelling are native people as a symbol of the search for the things 'authentic' yet spend most of their time preoccupied with themselves (cf. e.g. Teas 1988; Riley 1988).

Problems concerning the perception of difference, the experience of exoticism, and not least, the nature and reasons for factual ignorance among travellers instigated my research among Slovene travellers. By the experience of exoticism, I mean here the experience of being myself perceived as exotic by other travellers. To put it simply, I wanted to establish whether the differences between Slovenian travellers and other so called budget travellers or backpackers are really significant to a point which could somewhat "explain" the nature of "exoticizing".

I have conducted twelve taped unstructured interviews, up to four hours long. Some of my respondents I have encountered at "slide sessions" (to be dealt with in a moment); some were referred to me by acquaintances, and I was previously acquainted with two of them. Their age was ranging from 24 to 36, and the duration of their travelling varied from three months to three years. Six of the respondents have graduated at the Ljubljana University, and six were enrolled students at the time of research. Five of them were females and seven males. Their travel spans embraced East and south-east Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, North and South America. One shared characteristic was that they travelled more than once, not only at the points of structural life-change (after studies and before regular job, or before settling

down). Settling down was not their "intention" for the time being, or for some time to come anyway, since they considered travelling a life-style: they all planned to do more travelling. Style and motivation of their travelling did not differ significantly from other contemporary budget travellers (as described by Riley 1988), although their budget style was not so much a trendy choice as economic necessity.

One of the topics discussed in the interviews was their perception of difference between a "traveller" and a "tourist". The overall opinion was that tourists are more organised, with a lot of money and not an equal lot of interest in local people or country of their destination. Tourists seek comfort and travel for a short period of time. Only one respondent declared himself outright as a tourist:

> I must admit I have never been more than just a tourist. Travellers are hard workers. I went to Australia just to see some things, that's all.

All female respondents categorically declared themselves travellers and not tourists. "Tourists go somewhere so they can boast about it later at home" stated one of them, her response, amusingly enough, resembling closely the *Dictionnaire universale du XIXe siècle* of 1876 where tourist travel is described as "the joy of boasting about it afterwards" (Smith 1992:5). "Travellers are 'workers', they seek more authentic experience, try to accomplish something and share interest with local people." These answers then coincided well with Cohen's typology, as well as with the perception of travelling as "work". Let me quote at length a male respondent:

> What is the difference between a traveller and a tourist? I have often asked myself that very question. Even in physics every observation bears some consequence for the observed. The difference between travellers and tourists is probably in the degree of these consequences and not in that one produces consequences and the other doesn't. For, when I arrive at a certain place and I'm different, I'm already an influence. Difference is in the level and not in the core. The other thing of course is that tourists tend to be interested in a very safe, protected way of travelling. Being a traveller means that you have to be a little bit destined to be one, firstly with limited amount of money on your hands, and on the other hand, with your soul - you are trying to find more than just what travel agencies are offering. It's extremely hard work - travelling - and often you wonder why you are doing it. I've asked myself why, but I just haven't found any smart answers.

Further, it was the opinion of all the respondents that those travelling only in Europe are not "real" travellers. Here we encounter yet another perception of who the "real" traveller is, this time based in the destination of travel. A person can gain this status by leaving Europe, preferably for some "exotic destination" (North America and Australia do count, although not as much, presumably because there are many Slovene emigrants living there who can make it easier for the traveller). Clearly, the title has to be earned and deserved.

At times however, a person can be both a tourist and a traveller:

> Sometimes I'm a traveller and sometimes a tourist. When I'm travelling I come home tired. When I want to have a vacation, I go someplace with a travel agency and I'm a tourist. As a tourist I would never walk for three days just to see a sunrise. As a traveller I did.

Again, travelling is perceived as "work" and not a vacation. And what happens when "the work is done" and one returns home?

SLIDE SESSION

The script: The theatre is nearly full. People of all ages, the majority between 30 and 40. Lights are on and soft music is playing... slides are prepared, lights go out, the audience is silent... The performer introduces her/himself, states general information: the duration of travelling, destination(s), means of transportation, and presently there is a map displayed of the area where he/she has travelled. Images start to appear... the performer is addressing the audience in first person plural... "Now we are here... now we are going there..." so that the audience has the illusion of "participation" in the act of travelling. Information given by the performer consists of scarcely more than what is written in any average travel guide often even less; but anecdotes recounted are invariably personal: 'At this place I fell ill...' 'Here I twisted my ankle...', and also, 'I don't remember which tribe this is exactly, but I remember having a lot of fun there...'

Portraits of native people are often given in the form of popular stereotypes (the slide depicts a sleeping man in India and performer says: "They have all the time in the world you know, they are so relaxed, not like us rushing around all the time"). The performer is trying to entertain the audience with small jokes, without attempting to suppress the air self-importance. Finally, the audience applauds... Souvenirs are exhibited and the floor is opened to the questions from the audience.

Who is in the audience? Some of them are those who have themselves been "on the road" and who have come to compare the quality of slides, and the experience as revealed by the performer, with their own. But the majority are those who could not or would not travel, and yet have come to seek the opportunity for a symbolic participation in the experience of Otherness.

The performance is most likely held in the *Cankarjev dom*,[2] the nation's largest cultural and congress centre in Ljubljana, with halls that host the best national and international symphony orchestras, theatres, dance and music groups, exhibitions, etc. They also host travellers for the so-called "slide sessions" which are well attended if not sold out and vary but insignificantly from the one described above. Travellers and destinations differ, but the script remains the same. The act of travelling, and the fact of an accomplished travel, defines the traveller's social status at home. Those who travel are considered privileged, they are the "daring ones" who gain admiration, though at times mixed with envy. This status is defined and redefined in slide sessions which closely resemble a rite of incorporation. The performer also earns some money, but that is secondary to the main motive: to show slides to other people. Indeed, one of my respondents stated that the main motive of his travelling is taking pictures and organise a slide show upon returning home. Slide show is the conclusive visual proof that the traveller has really been "out there". Lévi-Strauss, for instance, when stating that he hates travelling and those who undertake it (yet was himself one of them), had little regard for slide shows or for those who gave it, or the audience that attended:

> For this audience, platitudes and common-places seem to have been miraculously transmuted into revelations by the sole fact that their author, instead of doing his plagiarising at home, has supposedly sanctified it by covering some twenty thousand miles (Lévi-Strauss 1973:18).

2 Some of slide sessions in Ljubljana are organised by the local Traveller's Club *(Popotnik)*, an informal association which holds meetings once a month. Potential travellers can obtain information about cheapest air tickets and get tips from seasoned travellers to their prospect destinations. Still other slide sessions are organised by individuals.

Not all travellers, however, show their slides in public sessions, but showing slides to a group of friends in a private setting is somewhat of an obligation. Friends are expecting to be entertained and to participate in the aftermath of travelling, sharing the privilege. The traveller as the privileged seer of his/her own kind and of his/her own time might not be able to see the very same things that travellers of the past times have seen, but is able to see different things in a different way. Sharing "the gaze" is not confined to the past, it is still very much alive. At least in Slovenia.

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A PARTICIPANT'S OBSERVATIONS OF THE COURSE: METODOLOGIJA ANTROPOLOŠKEGA RAZISKOVANJA (METHODOLOGY OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH)

ROBERT GARY MINNICH*

BACKGROUND

In 1993/94 the *magister* (MA) program in anthropology was initiated at the *Faculty of Social Sciences (Fakulteta za družbene vede, FDV/FSS), University of Ljubljana*. I was invited as a guest lecturer (sponsored by the *Ministry of Education and Sport*) to lead the first session of the methodology course which is a compulsory component of this program. A course outline and reading list was finalized in consultation with Prof. Stane Južnič, anthropologist, and Anuška Ferligoj, Full Professor of Statistics. And the latter joined me in teaching the first session (April 12 - May 20, 1994) in which 13 students participated, two from the anthropology program and the remainder from the sociology of everyday life program at the same faculty. All these students successfully completed the course. An abbreviated version of the course took place in May - June 1996. And Prof. Ferligoj and I shared responsibility as co-leaders of this second session. Five students registered in anthropology were attending.

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT (CITED FROM THE INTRODUCTION TO THE 1996 COURSE PLAN):

Long-term fieldwork involving participant observation is fundamental to the research practice established within cultural and social anthropology. The participants in this course are required to employ this fieldwork method in the creation of individual research proposals. This will be achieved by writing a preliminary proposal and conducting a short fieldwork involving participant observation techniques. Data collected and insights gained during this fieldwork will then be used to revise and expand the original research proposal. The final proposal will be submitted at the conclusion of the course and presented for discussion in a seminar. Since this course emphasizes the completion of research designs tailored to the interests of course participants intensive student supervision will be provided by the course leaders: Anuška Ferligoj and Robert Minnich. Analytical perspectives and fieldwork methods represented in social and cultural anthropology as well as quantitative methods developed within the social sciences will be the topics of lectures accompanying this course of study. (An additional lecture series was held during the first session which presented diverse examples of anthropological field research relevant to the course participants' interests.) The research traditions of social and cultural anthropology are perhaps best known for phenomenologically oriented analyses (interpretive studies) presented in the form of ethnographic monographs. But the research on which this literature is based depends upon the discovery of causal relationships and the classification of empirical phenomena for purposes of generalization

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and comparison. Anthropological research thus oscillates between, and combines, qualitative and quantitative research procedures. With regard to the latter, course participants are required to include a quantitative analytical procedure in their respective final project proposals. In this regard special attention will be given to the analysis of social networks.[1]

THE METHODOLOGY COURSE IN RETROSPECT

My general impression is that this course introduced a few well motivated graduate students to a type of field methodology with which they have had little experience, but which is increasingly important in various sociologically defined fields of investigation. All those who registered for the first session completed it with commendable results. And I feel this can be attributed to the utility and, for most them, the novelty of participant observation as a means for data production, regardless of the kinds of research problems which they brought with them into the course. Another, very positive feature of my experience was the cooperation, motivation and flexibility of Prof. Anuška Ferligoj. Although schooled in very different methodological traditions we have found a common ground - articulated through the contrast between qualitative and quantitative research procedures - upon which to integrate this praxis oriented pedagogical endeavor. We have since learned that the spirited involvement of our students can also be attributed to the coordinated personal supervision which we provided them along the way.

1 A copy of the course plan can be obtained from the *Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.*

We encouraged course participants to take issue with the inter-subjectivity endemic to participant observation fieldwork and the consequences this has for the production of data. We also had to find a means for attaining distance from research settings with which most of our students were intimately familiar because of their background or professional involvement. Course participants were challenged to reflect over their personal background (i.e., social identities, personalities, etc.) as a filter in their observations. They were asked to exploit the insights gained from such reflection in the refinement of their field methods and analytical perspectives. This was achieved in part by compulsory student presentations of examples of anthropological research unknown to them beforehand and drawn from an extensive literature list. Although these examples were taken primarily from exotic social-cultural settings, they focused upon analytical themes of relevance to each student's research interests. Compulsory reading for the course included Spradley and Mann's (1975) monograph, *The Cocktail Waitress* (New York: Wiley), which was used as a compact representation of diverse analytical perspectives and fieldwork techniques grounded in Cultural Anthropology. This monograph became a frequent point of reference in our on-going discussions, probably because it deals with an empirical setting which is at least vaguely familiar to all of us. Other required reading contrasted qualitative and quantitative research procedures and presented various fieldwork techniques ranging from participant and passive observation, to interview and survey techniques and the coding of data for quantitative analysis. The final course session in which fieldwork experiences were discussed was without a doubt the highlight of our course. Here each student's reflection over his or her fieldwork experience enriched one another's understanding of the course's

overall objectives and provided encouragement for further pursuit of these research designs as the basis for individual magister theses.

THE METHODOLOGY COURSE IN A BROADER CONTEXT

I am the member of an anthropology department (*University of Bergen*, Norway) where approximately half of all graduate student research is conducted abroad, that is, away from the familiar surroundings of one's home society. Furthermore, all of our diploma level students are required to submit for staff approval research proposals that include three to six months of fieldwork. In these proposals they outline their field methodology and relate it to their theoretical interests in a comprehensive statement of their research problem. Ideally, these papers reflect extensive substantial background knowledge about the research setting chosen for investigation.

The graduate study of anthropology at the *Social Science Faculty* in Ljubljana is notably different. I am aware that a great deal of research which is identified as anthropology in Slovenia does not share the empirical natural history orientation of our research practice in Bergen - a research tradition which we inherited from mainstream British Social Anthropology and American Cultural Anthropology. Rather, it seems that social and cultural anthropology in Slovenia have been rediscovered and pursued by historians, philosophers, linguists and social scientists whose methodologies for the generation of data are more notable for their great diversity than for any kind uniform field research tradition. Slovene ethnographic, ethnological and folklore studies are of course an exception to this rule. Here fieldwork is the foundation of data collection. But even within these fields of inquiry the nitty-gritty task of accounting for inter-subjectivity in the production of data through participant observation is not a hot topic. And if I am honest, it first becomes a burning issue for my Bergen students once they return from the field and are forced to sort out what they are told is the primary source of their data: their fieldwork experience.

Taking into account these differences in research traditions, I am pleasantly surprised by the interest demonstrated by our Ljubljana students in the field methodology which lies at the core of my own professional experience as a student of marginal Slovene speaking communities. Furthermore, I am impressed by their ability to sharpen their powers of observation through the study of exotic examples of human organization and behavior. This surely has its roots in their solid basic training in anthropology at the *Social Science Faculty*.

THE BASEL CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF OCEANISTS (ESO, DECEMBER 15 - 17, 1994)

BORUT TELBAN

In 1992, the first European meeting of anthropologists who work in the Pacific area was held in Nijmeng, the Netherlands. The participants enthusiastically greeted the initiative to continue with the meetings every second year. The initiative to establish a professional and interdisciplinary association to encompass researchers of Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia and Australia also received resolute support. Thus was born the *European Society of Oceanists* (ESO) whose first conference convened between December 15 - 17 in Basel, Switzerland, under the auspices of

the *University of Basel Institute of Ethnology*, and with co-operation *of Museum of Ethnology.*[1]

Interestingly, the organisers decided that the conference language should be English only, despite the nearness of both Germany and France - a decision that prompted me, only half-jokingly, to conclude that we do indeed live in the historic era of Anglo-Saxon symbolic imperialism. I am quite certain that a decade or two back, at least some participants would use French in their presentations; and a little earlier still, native German speaking participants would surely use their tongue. Out of round two hundred participants from Europe, Australia and USA (absent were representatives from Pacific countries), ninety presented papers.

The theme of the conference was *Knowing Oceania: Constituting Knowledge and Identities*. Emphasising "knowing" Oceania, the organisers sought to lay stress on the multitude of various forms of human "knowledge" and "ignorance" (on the part of both the natives and anthropologists) in their perpetual mingling through the process of social change in the Pacific and world-wide. The notion of identity in the sense of an active process should bound these various forms of knowing, shedding light on knowledge, perspective, approaches, methodology, manifestations and ways of communication in anthropology as scientific and humanist discipline.

The four keynote lectures focused on the theme of the conference from different theoretical as well as regional positions (Polynesia, Melanesia and Australia). The rest of the presentations were grouped in ten sections which ran simultaneously. Marilyn Strathern, who recently became William Wyse Professor of social anthropology at Cambridge, presented her introductory lecture entitled *The new modernities*. The lecture was organised as a critical review of the recent book by Bruno Latour *We have never been modern* (1993), in which the author presented his differentiation between actions of separation and purification that constitute the human and non-human world as two separate ontological domains, and the processes of mediation and translation through which these forms of being are merged to create hybrids of nature and culture. Such blends are created as by-products of the original differentiation between human and non-human world. Distinction between the abstract categories "nature" and "culture" is a recent Euro-American invention, while in the pre-modern world (as Latour terms it), everything is personified or embodied. Latour thinks that nature in pre-modern society is not conceptualised separately as the people are unable to experiment and invent new technologies in the modern sense of the word, which in turn renders them politically impotent and incapable of influencing one another. Conversely, Latour argues that in the Euro-American mentality, the hybrid notions of nature and culture are omnipresent since times past, which accounts for its failure to achieve modern, purely rational thought. In Latour's view, the Euro-American society never was modern since the way of thinking demonstrates close similarities with pre-modern, hybrid creatures of imagination. By pre-modern world, Latour means various non-European societies, among other the Baruya and Bimin-Kuskusmin from Papua New Guinea. Marilyn Strathern argued in her speech that Melanesians never were pre-modern according to Latour's definitions.

The second keynote lecturer was Professor Bob Tonkinson from the

1 I would like to thank the organisers' committee (Jürg Wassmann, Verena Keck and Ingrid Bell), who provided coverage for my travel expenses. My stay in Basel was made possible by *Open Society Fund - Slovenia*. Sincere thanks to them as well.

University of Western Australia, renown for his works on Australian Aborigines. His lecture centred on recent political events in Australia which are of immense importance to the Aborigines and their self-perceptions. At the time of bicentennial celebrations of Australia in 1988, the Aborigines declared it the year of mourning, launching slogans like "White Australia has black history", "Earth is our mother", "We don't own the land, the land owns us", "We survived 200 years". Regardless that the population of Aborigines and Torres Strait islanders reaches a mere 1.5%, two-thirds of these of mixed ancestry, their voice is clear and carrying. Tonkinson stressed the importance of the 1992 ruling of the *Australian High Court* discarding an old legal doctrine according to which Australia was prior to White settlement a "nobody's land", thus attesting to the fact that the Aborigines were the owners of the fifth continent and are eligible to the "Native title". This, "Mabo decision", so named after one of the initiators for the change in legal doctrine, the painter Edi Mabo, of course does not mean that the land will be returned to the possession of the Aborigines, as the best agricultural land has long been in immigrant hands and out of legal reach of the Aborigines. The "Native title" is therefore more or less a moral victory of the Aborigines backed by the federal government, though much opposed to by federal states' administrations, title holders on exploitable lands, and the political opposition. Economically and socially, the Aborigines remain in the position of exploited, socially despised and discriminated against, and politically and economically marginalised. Tonkinson stressed that the "Native title" decision will, however, greatly influence the Aborigines' self-determination, sovereignty, political activities and identity both inter-communally and in relations to immigrant population and the state.

The organisers intended Sir Raymond Firth, then 93 years old, to be the third speaker of honour; however, he was understandably unable to attend. Nevertheless, he sent his lecture entitled *Reflections on knowledge in an Oceanic setting* that was read by the curator of the *London Museum of Mankind*, Michael O'Hanlon. In his highly theoretical text, Sir Raymond contemplated the differences between "knowledge" and "knowledges", and the relation between "knowing", "perceiving" and "believing", stressing the role of these in the processes of individual identity formation in Oceania.

The fourth and last key speaker was Professor Jonathan Friedman of the *University of Lund*, who did his research in Hawaii. Friedman discussed the various forms of knowing and understanding, both on the part of anthropologists and their subjects ofresearch. The natives in the Pacific do not perceive Oceania from the European perspective, as dispersed "islands in the vast sea", but rather as "a sea of islands", which is to say, a sea of relations, co-operation, opportunities, chances, wealth. In recent times, the natives of the Pacific islands began to present themselves both inwards and outwards, both politically and culturally (e.g. the multitude of literature and other cultural production) a task not so long ago reserved for foreign "specialists". Inevitably, this situation had influenced anthropology as well. Once vigorous scientific activity shrank, there is much less sweeping theorising, giving way to extensive and methodologically enriched ethnography. Observing and describing no longer provides grounds for grand hypotheses and theories. The stress is on interpretation based on solid facts. Pacific societies are undergoing the process of the "invention of traditions" so characteristic of many modern cultural and political movements, and of key importance for the formation of new identities.

The first among the ten sections was entitled *Local and imported knowledges*

and was centred around the relation between Christianity and traditional beliefs. As was pointed out by Maurice Godelier, the convenor, two contributions merited special attention: one about a shaman's dreams of the White man's world, and the other on conflict and coexistence of Protestant (influence of English missionaries) and Catholic (influence of French missionaries) natives in a village in New Caledonia.

The second section bore the title *Common worlds and single lives* and was presided over by Andrew Strathern who himself contributed a paper. The contributions and discussions mainly dealt with the conceptualisations of body, emotions, the collective and individual memory, life histories of individuals, and rites of initiation. In my paper, I have briefly presented an ethnography of the Ambonwari from Papua New Guinea and their concepts of the human "self" and "insideness" (where thoughts and emotions are interwoven), and proceeded to some critical thoughts on Mauss' in Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* in relation to the modern trend of "embodiment" studies. I argued that not only is the Cartesian dualism an invention of the Western world, but so are the very concepts of the "body" and "mind". The current attention to body and embodiment merely serves to replace the previous long-standing anthropological interest in thought, mind, knowledge etc. The Ambonwari prefer to stress the human existentialist being, linking it with past, present and future and a person's place within a broader social context. Neither the body nor the mind have a place in the Ambonwari cosmology, at least not in a conceptual form that would readily yield to European understanding.

The third section, entitled *Cultural practices of identity construction and nation building* brought about discussions of the use, misuse and suppression of written and photographic colonial archives, about the impact of tourism, about resistance on the part of many Native groups against social change, about traditional systems of power and rule. Discussions about *Genealogies, land ownership and titles* were the theme of the fourth section, where attention was mainly centred on the tense relations between native minorities and state governments. Assessed were many instances of different interpretation of identity and land ownership on the part of the natives and governments respectively, whereby common grounds is difficult to reach. - *Competing and converging systems of* and problems arising from the mixing of these systems were the subject of the fifth section; *Ecological pluralism* of the sixth; *Scrutinizing regional systems and modelling of Oceania* was the topic of the joined seventh and eighth sections. The ninth section was well represented, as the topic was museums and their contents. Discussed was the importance of material artefacts in national identity formation, about how museum artefacts create and recreate Westerners' views on various peoples, about how museums are themselves a kind of artefacts belonging into a period of European history. - The last, tenth section, entitled *Ethics and politics of fieldwork*, dealt with various questions like: Should the anthropologist on fieldwork participate in local politics? For whom do we write and who are we addressing?, and about the relationship between the anthropologist and his or her informants.

Socialising in Basel was, as is common at smaller, specialised conferences, extremely rich and productive. Not only could we hear what one or the other is currently up to, several co-operating plans were drawn, several confusing issues, not properly spelled out during the official programme duly clarified, prospect join publications plans drafted, recent published pieces exchanged. Lunching and dining in small informal groups on top of two big

dinners thrown by the organisers enabled the participants to get to know each other better. There was sufficient time for trading stories, gossiping about those not present, and asking about mutual acquaintances. Some complained about the "rigidity" and conservatism of German, Austrian and Swiss university systems, others again (a colleague from Finland, for example) boasted about successful resources pooling for graduate studies, or (the French) whispered about a newly established anthropological institute being drawn out of Paris. The curator of the Basel *Museum of Ethnology* led a tour through most interesting collections from Oceania and other parts of the world. Finally, the decision was announced to publish the conference papers in two volumes.

In his concluding speech, Andrew Strathern pointed out that nowadays everything, be it local or global, is omnipresent and intermingled. And that it is exactly this co-presence of the local and the global that counts. He called for productive communication that would broaden the knowledges of both natives and anthropologists, and concluded with a short poem in Melpa language, somewhat like this: "I have come from a misty rainforest ... to say but a few words and leave them with you." You, my anthropologist friend, will know what to do with them.

After we all thanked the main organisers Jürg Wassmann, Verena Keck and Ingrid Bell, the conference ended with the ESO meeting and the final farewell dinner.

MULTILINGUALISM ON EUROPEAN BORDERS:

THE CASE OF VALCANALE

VALCANALE, ITALY, OCTOBER 20 - 21, 1995

IRENA ŠUMI*

The initiative for the symposium came, for once, from the local quarters: from the Slovene cultural society *Planika* in Valcanale, and the local seat of the *Slovene Research Institute* that also secured participation of the local German and Friulian speakers' representatives. The previous sentence probably reveals all essentials about Valcanale: it is a small place, a valley enclosed by the Karavanken and the Julian Alps, it is a border region (in Italy, bordering on Austria and Slovenia), it has "multiethnic and multilingual" populace, in short, minorities, and as this latter term should also indicate, a grim history.

This history, together with abundant demographic and social-geographic data, was covered extensively at the second session of the symposium by Andreas Moritsch, *University of Klagenfurt*, Karl Stuhlpfarrer, *University Vienna*, and Ernst Steinicke, *University of Innsbruck*, following an introductory lecture by Vladimir Klemenčič, *University of Ljubljana* (who was the symposium's distinguished guest). After W.W. I. the valley was, unlike the rest of predominantly Slovene speaking regions of the ex Austrian Empire that subsequently went for a new alliance with Croats and Serbs, and to the dismay of the new Austrian state, annexed to Italy. Literally overnight, the life situation of the people in Valcanale was dramatically changed: the German speaking élites, previously backed

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by the state in their continuous bickering with the Slovene speaking majority over issues such as language of instruction in primary schools and in the church, and over symbolic appropriation of local history and culture in terms of two opposing nationalisms in general, suddenly found themselves to be a minority, at once also wittily marginalised in political representation; the Slovene speakers, predominantly peasants far from any levers to local political power, were cut off the Slovene mainlands and the centres of Slovene nationalism in Carinthia, which rendered their national identification next to meaningless. Both German and Slovene speakers found themselves in the position of functional illiteracy in a state with Italian as official language. By encouraging the locals of Friulian origin to honour their "Romance" ancestry, and by energetic immigrant settlement from inner Italy, the valley was effectively subdued for a period of twenty years.

In 1939, as a result of the Hitler-Mussolini pact, the valley people were made to choose between the Italian state and relocation to the German Reich. A large majority of native (as opposed to immigrant) population indeed opted for the Reich to escape the loathed Italian state, German and Slovene speakers alike. The end of W.W. II. left Valcanale with a radically changed demographic structure: a scattered few German speakers, a weak quarter out of total of Slovene speakers, and the rest the Italian speaking post 1919 immigrants. Thus, in the years after the war, a new opposition was forming, that between the "natives", the "real" *Kanaltaler*, and the Italian "foreigners", to substitute most of the previous nationalist discourse. However, beginning in the 1950', and increasingly throughout 1960' and 1970', the Valcanale "natives" were subject to many political controversies among Italy, Austria and Yugoslavia in the pack of other "national minority protection" disputes, and have been continuously addressed by competing state nationalisms. In the early 1970', political representation of Slovene speakers began to form by a handful of locals who have been educated in other Slovene minority centres in Italy, notably Trieste and Gorizia.

Their position, much as that of all Slovene minority politicians anywhere outside Slovenia and Yugoslavia, was all but easy. They were torn between the sharply divided left and right wings within the organised Slovene minority in Italy, of which the left was unreservedly, and abundantly, supported by the Communist Slovene and Yugoslav leadership, while the right was barely kept alive. In addition to that, they were faced with their "electorate's" stubborn reluctance to openly march for the sacred national cause. That particular lack of enthusiasm had to be carefully concealed from the public both within minority regions and in Slovenia; the result was a specific discourse of the minority's reality" in politics and in the well-established tradition of "Slovene national question" studies. The doctrine was that the Slovene minority is blood and flesh, so to speak, of the Slovene national body; it was cut off it in a series of historic misfortunes and injustices, is threatened by an alarming loss of mother-tongue and lack of legal protection, but will eventually gather strength to resume the "natural" process of "growth of national consciousness" with the aid of "the mother-bee nation and the nationally conscious elements within the minority".

But again, for once and finally, the symposium did not take after the classical minority "demonstration of plight" matrix. Small as the minority communities are in Valcanale, and somewhat belatedly "discovered" by the proponents of the above outlined "national question" specialists, all three representatives of German, Friulian and Slovene speakers (Carlo Lagger, Mario

Faleschini and Salvatore Venosi respectively) rendered valuable portrays of their situation in the first session of the symposium. Rather than adopting the "plight" rhetoric, they spoke vividly of the way a person's linguistic repertoires and cultural background are integrated in the local context. Revealed was a convincing picture ranging from neighbourly brawls where national tags come just as handy as any other piece from the rich derogatory arsenal, of locally meaningful displays of social relics from the time of the old Empire (for instance, the very colourfully costumed German-based Fire brigade and its rituals, or Slovene prayers at the mass), of local social investment into family lines continuation that one is expected to uphold also with regard to the perceived "Germaneness" or "Sloveneness" of one's ancestry, to the issue of personal moral integrity linked to that, and of emotional concerns of parents who are anxious to convey their linguistic repertoire to their offspring, even if parts of it do not serve any practical purpose in terms of the expected life careers of the children, and may feel to be bad parents if they fail to do so.

This latter aspect of being a minority member was summed up somewhat poetically by Roberto Gusmani, *University of Udine* (and the second guest of honour), who spoke about *lingua del pane* as opposed to *lingua del cuore*. In his presentation at the beginning of the third and last session, Gusmani had outlined the relation between German and Slovene codes based on his extensive study of the village Camporosso's spoken Slovene. He reviewed the typology and the dynamics of language borrowing between the two codes, and warned against various interpretative abuses of the relation between "ethnos" and language in ethnic studies, state politics, and in locally more pertinent appropriations, such as local history teaching in schools; an issue that provoked quite some discussion from the audience.

Robert Gary Minnich, *University of Bergen*, the pioneer fieldworker in Valcanale, followed suit in his presentation; he outlined his ethnographic material on the Ugovizza "native" villagers to discuss, in a meticulous way for which he is renown and highly regarded among Slovene social scientists, the formation of self-perception in the Ugovizza people in the context of the tensely opposed social positions of "homesteaders" vs. "citizens", and more closely still, the individual authorship of self-representations of the villagers of the generation for which this tension was/is most pertinent. Finding that homestead membership for this group of villagers did not require, or did not translate into, the competing ethnic or national categories they have been exposed to, Minnich too warned forcefully against a priori categorisations of social and cultural differences.

My own presentation dealt with linguistic repertoires and proficiency in the Ugovizza and Camporosso school-children, attendants of the facultative course of Slovene standard language. In view of evidence of language acquisition in these children, the social position of respective codes as is perceived and arranged within their families and kin (dialect and standard Slovene, dialect and standard German, Italian) and patterns of code-switching, I have endeavoured to expose in a lengthier discussion the Slovene nationalist discourse in both politics and "Slovene national question" type of ethnic/minority studies. Not only is this discourse blatantly ideological in the sense that it views professed Sloveneness as both "natural" and ultimate, self-sufficient "goal" (and its lack in Valcanale Slovene speakers consequently reads as a kind of social aphasia), it is also interpretativelly sterile (for scientific purposes) and operationally impotent (in terms of politics), and quite possibly actually

harmful, as it builds real-life constraints against free choices of linguistic and cultural competence and loyalty for the younger generations in the Slovene-speaking community in a way very comparable, if not quite identical, to compulsory Romanisation in the past. Such comparisons were made all the more possible, and the consequences of essentialist identity politics all the more transparent, by the excellent and exhaustive introductory lecture to the third session by Albina Nečak-Lük, *University of Ljubljana* and *Institute of Ethnic studies*, Ljubljana, who presented the sociolinguistic aspects of the situation in two other minority regions in vicinity, that in the Slovene coastal region, and that on the Slovene-Hungarian border.

The dangers of identity management in the ongoing competition between state nationalisms were, as needs be pointed out, clearly recognised by the local minority communities' representatives who organised the event; the symposium itself can be viewed as a gesture on the part of the local civil society, a convincing and maturely designed move against the essentialisms of nationalist ideologies. Arguments pro a radical deconstruction of the nationalist stance were further laid out by the two special guests of the symposium, Anne Knudsen, Copenhagen, and Iver Neumann, *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, Oslo. Anne Knudsen has in her introductory lecture to the first session outlined the genealogy of European state nationalism as set forth by the French revolution, the nivelisation and attempts at reduction of cultural and linguistic differences in the process, and an era of narrowmindedness that took the European nation-state to be the natural, model state of affairs in all human groups. Only comparatively recently were these views changed to reveal that humans are not "monolingual" or "monocultural", as they are not mere "bearers" of language and culture, but their creators; a view that renders both the dangers of "disappearance of differences" and the overall "uniformation" unlikely.

The idea that borders - linguistic, cultural, political - need not coincide in a viable community, and that precise correct norms need not be set as inflexibly as was the case in the times of the height of essentialist thinking, was further expanded by Iver Neumann in his round table discussion titled *The formation of European identity and the minorities* as he extended the proposition to embrace the personality, the individual, as well. After placing the issues of ethnicity or minorities into a broader context of the nature of democracy and nationalism which both tend to depend on the same precondition, namely a fair degree of cultural homogenisation, he proceeded to comment on the recurring debates on what a prospect political unification of Europe would mean; would it mean giving up a part of national identity for sake of a European one, or would we all be turned into a patchwork of minorities? On many levels, these issues call for a consideration of power relations, as mere professing the understanding, respect for the Other, and the joy of living in difference are not much more than nice declarations; there is such a thing as the joy of playing yourself against something or someone. A much time-honoured playgrounds for "a good match" in Europe has always been the playgrounds of history, that is to say, understanding one's own identity in opposition to, or at peril by, someone else, as in Christendom against the infidels, or Europe against "the Turk", etc. A degree of relativisation of these patterns is well underway in political discourse as well, as nationalism with its history reiterations is being increasingly exposed, and as identity repertoires expand and are viewed as multiple in increasing number of contexts. Neumann concluded with the aforementioned thought that perhaps the modern notion of the single-entity person-

ality is at the core of monolithic thinking, and would need a radical revision.

The idea of the multi-faceted person in a likewise complex cultural landscape was taken up by Senator Darko Bratina, formerly the director of the *Slovene Research Institute* (SLORI) in Trieste, in his plenary session conclusions. The nature and interrelatedness of these complexities should influence the political discourse more then they currently do, which is demonstrate in the omnipresent talk of mutual "tolerance". Rather than tolerance, we should promote acceptance as our goal, as the ethnic difference, like any other culturally construed difference, is but a proof of a trait we all share, a universal human propensity to erect complex boundaries that should themselves be our primary object of study. *Ethnos* can thus be read as a cryptogram really saying *et-nos*, us too.

Several discussants have challenged or corroborated these views and propositions and made many comments to the lectures and papers; the organisers promised a detailed record of the discussions in a separate publication. For purposes of this review, I had to rely, apart from my memory, on the already published anthology of lectures and papers,[1] a task I have been invited to participate in as co-editor (with Salvatore Venosi), and one I have gladly taken up.

Various commentators, among them the reviewer of the anthology, Miran Komac, *Institute of Ethnic Studies*, Ljubljana, found the symposium refreshingly devoid of any kind of politicising haranguing and the pathos of nationalist sentimentalism, and highly productive in its three-layer organisation of debate (minority representatives' views; presentation of research results in various disciplines and topics; a set of introductory lectures to provide a broader context, followed up by the round-table to shed special light on the most acutely important ongoing process, the European political integration). Not least, the representatives of local political life paid close attention to the proceedings that extended far beyond the customary politeness: the Mayor of Tarvisio attended all sessions and contributed not only to initial greetings, but to the plenary discussion as well. Additionally, the papers of the minority representatives were supplemented by an account on local high school structure with respect to the multilingual context of the valley, by Orlando Orlandi-Arrigoni, high school professor. For the organisers, this kind of participation on the part of the representatives of the state structures may have been one of the major successes of the event, while the participants and the audience of the symposium will probably long keep the impeccable organisation, and the cordial hospitality of the hosts, in fond memory. Well done, Valcanale.

1 ŠUMI, Irena; Salvatore VENOSI. 1996. *Večjezičnost na evropskih mejah. Primer Kanalske doline / Multilingualism on European borders. The case of Valcanale.* Valcanale: SLORI, seat Valcanale.



ROGER MARTIN KEESING

1935•1993

Roger Martin Keesing was born on May 16, 1935, and died May 7, 1993. He obtained his MA and PhD degrees from Harvard University, and held several research and teaching positions at a number of distinguished anthropological institutions (among others, University of California, The Australian National University, the McGill University). His primary field was Melanesia, specifically the Salomon Islands. He published 13 booklenght volumes, among them his renown textbook **Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary perspective** (1976, 1981) and several hundred articles.

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II. REFERENCES

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